Pacific War of 1940: fizzle

[trurle]

In early Sunday morning 25 August 1940, the unintended ignition has happened in Mobara gas field(1), under murky circumstances. The fire was out of control in a few hours, destroying pumps, storage tanks, and accomodations. Before nightfall, the huge explosions have started to propel the flaming debris several kilometers away, and fire service of Tokyo Area was overwhelmed in instant(2) by bushfire.(3) The Army and Navy have sent a teams ashore to demolish buildings and fight the fire. This decision has turned out to be disaster.

The IJN newest and most capable carrier Hiryu, being loaded in Yokosuka for her first combat patrol in Hainan in support of ongoing Battle of South Guangxi, was hastily transferred to Kimitsu(4), mostly motivated to try her brand-new chemical fire suppressing equipment. Majority of her crew went to fire gaps demolition and firefighting. By time of her arrival, fuel station storage drums in Kimitsu were already been hit by flying debris multiple times, and pools of gasoline have started to accumulate. The accounts then differs. Some witness say the carrier have burst in flames first, confusing sailors on ground who nearly finished plugging the major leaks. Others say the fire was set off near Tank No. 4 by falling cigarette ash. Nearby residents also noted the outburst of fire at Kimitsu have happened few minutes after last major explosion at Mobaru, therefore debris may be responsible. Regardless of origin of fire, the results were devastating. Carrier Hiryu crew have suffered over 90% dead (total 1028 men, with 68 survivors), and carrier was burnt to nearly waterline, due shallow waters preventing scuttling.

The extent of disaster have prompted a re-thinking of Japanese government strategy. National Diet extraordinary session was assembled 30 August 1940, as soon as changed wind have allowed the Great Tokyo Fire of 1940 to be extinguished.

(1)Mobara gas field was one of three (besides small oil fields in Nagano and Niigata) and largest one of Home Islands fuel producers in Japan of 1940.
(2)The high building density and antiquated fire brigades organization of Tokyo have historically resulted in city-scale fires in 1923 and 1945
(3) Boso peninsula is the only region in Japan featuring shrublands, due frequent forest fires and high winds, fortunately in 95% of time blowing away from Tokyo.
(4)Kimitsu was the Navy fueling station in Chiba, re-modeled as steel mill in 1965 after several accidents involving fire.

 

[trurle]

Although the investigation concerning a botched scuttling of Hiryu have dragged on (mostly due too many would-be scapegoats already dead), the investigation of Tokyo fire itself soon leaked a scandalous information.

As turned out, neither Mobara explosion debris nor subsequent Boso peninsula bushfire had a chance to ignite Tokyo. Tokyo was satisfactory insulated from such accidents by a wide belt of low-density suburban farms saturated with rice paddies. Tokyo fire have happened solely due arson, while the Mobara fire role was limited to the distraction of the fire brigades. Several conflagrations have started from shop owners setting their own premises on fire(1). And, in least one case, several shops were set to fire by US citizens of Italian descent, apparently in relation to racketeering scheme.(2)

Public outrage, and hundred thousands of men who lost relatives in the fire, soon resulted in violence. Anti-American pogroms have started, and become only worse after US ambassador Joseph Grew made a fatal mistake of demanding transfer to US of original arson suspects. 16 September 1940, the US embassy in Tokyo was stormed by flash mob, while police guards were passively looking on.(3)

The diplomatic fallout of US embassy massacre was severe. The American public opinion was heavily leaning to reject Japanese indemnity payment similar to Panay case(4), and to impose severe sanctions. Congress was more moderate, therefore seemed the discussion would continue long enough for hysteria to subside and a diplomatic solution to be found. Unfortunately, French Indochina events 22 September 1940 have put an end for such a naive hopes.

(1) Burning his own business is the common form of insurance fraud in Japan
(2) Italian mafia members placing incendiaries in garbage bins near racketeered shops was the historical reason for removal of street-side garbage bins in cities Kobe and Osaka (private communication with policeman in Osaka, 2007)
(3) Modeled on anti-Korean pogroms of 1923, which were triggered by rumours of water well poisoning in aftermath of Kanto Earthquake.
(4) Panay Accident has happened in 1935, when Japanese aircraft repeatedly bombed and strafed US gunboat Panay. It was solved by Japanese paying a $2.2mln indemnity to the US.

 

[Anhtuan]

Interesting, the US will be cautious, there will be no surprises element. I wonder how Japan can deal with this.

 

[trurle]

Interesting, the US will be cautious, there will be no surprises element. I wonder how Japan can deal with this.

In this time frame, air raid on Pearl Harbor is unthinkable - IOTL Japanese Navy officers came to the idea of Pearl Harbor strike after analyzing the reports of the Battle of Taranto, which has happened IOTL 11 November 1940. Japanese would make very different war plan if forced to war with US before that date (especially in light of fact what carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku are still under construction, and Hiryu was nearly hulked in August 1940, leaving IJN with just 4 large aircraft carriers)

 

[Anhtuan]

Can I guess, Japan declare war on America. Move some of reserve fleet to Philippines to lure Americans fleet from Hawaii.

 

[trurle]

Meanwhile, during September 1940, in Indochina, the news from Home Islands came in slow trickle. Events did not differ much from the history as we know. The forced negotiation with French colonial authorities proceed without surprises - after all, Japanese had enough troops and artillery in vicinity of border to make any resistance futile. The Japanese negotiation leader, Seiichi Kuno(1), was still plotting to discard any agreed restriction on Japanese garrisons for the "greater glory of Japan". And he did exactly what was expected from his personality. 22 September 1940, the Japanese invasion to French Indochina have started.

From that point, the events have started to diverge from OTL history at alarming pace. The Prince Kan`in(2), instead of trying to cover his subordinate, have rapidly yielded under pressure of Emperor, members of Privy Council (3), and fellow staff members. 24 September 1940, an Imperial Decree to "Suppress rebellion" was issued to the 22nd Army.

The Seiichi Kuno has panicked. He rapidly assigned a scapegoat - Aketa Nakamura, commander of 5th division, and went with a section of military police to arrest him in the evening 25 September 1940. The unsightly brawl ensued, ending with Seiichi Kuno fatally shot (he died two days later while being flown to Japan), and Aketa Nakamura committing suicide 26 September 1940, immediately after accepting surrender from remnants of French garrison in Tonkin. 27 September 1940, the Japan have issued a formal apology to the Vichy French government.(5)

The media impact of "Indochina rebellion" was terrible. "Washington Post" have published an article under headline:
"Last month yellow monkeys burned their own capital. This month they burned Tonkin. Next month, Washington D.C.?"
Other US newspapers generally followed suit.

(1) Seiichi Kuno, commander of Japanese 22nd Army in 1940. IOTL, he staged betrayal of Japanese-French Indochina occupation agreement 22nd September 1940, and was silently forced to resign few months later, apparently for demonstrated insubordination. IOTL, that betrayal was direct cause of US-Japanese trade embargo and ultimately precipitated Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
(2) Prince Kan`in Kotohito, the Chief of General Staff of Japanese Supreme War Council, making him a nominally top military leader of Japan in September 1940. IOTL, he have tried to cover Seiichi Kuno`s Indochina adventure, and as result was forced to abandon his post 3 October 1940. He has been kept nominally in Supreme War Council, but without any duties until his death from natural causes in 1945.
(3) Privy Council, the advisory committee to Japanese Emperor. Had no real political power in 1940, although exercises some influence due dual membership of it members in military.
(4) Aketo Nakamura, commander of 5th division of 22nd army. IOTL, he was demoted from division command position 15 October 1940 for suspected co-conspiration with Seiichi Kuno, but has resumed active command from October 1941.
(5) IOTL, same apology was issued to French only 5th October 1940

 

[trurle]

Can I guess, Japan declare war on America. Move some of reserve fleet to Philippines to lure Americans fleet from Hawaii.

The problem Japanese had no reserve fleet at moment. Every battle-capable vessel is tied to provide deterrent for the foreign intervention during the evacuation of troops from the Battle of South Guangxi (which is no longer needed because French Indochina controls overland arms smuggling route to Guangxi). IOTL, Japanese left only token garrisons in Guangxi by late October 1940.

 

[NotBigBrother]

In this time frame, air raid on Pearl Harbor is unthinkable - IOTL Japanese Navy officers came to the idea of Pearl Harbor strike after analyzing the reports of the Battle of Taranto, which has happened IOTL 11 November 1940. Japanese would make very different war plan if forced to war with US before that date (especially in light of fact what carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku are still under construction, and Hiryu was nearly hulked in August 1940, leaving IJN with just 4 large aircraft carriers)

The US- Japanese war started with a raid on US Navy base in Pearl Harbour. The Russian-Japanese war started with a raid on Russian Imperial Navy base in Port Artur. Battle of Taranto is good to give some ideas for IJN but they already have some own.

 

[Anhtuan]

The US- Japanese war started with a raid on US Navy base in Pearl Harbour. The Russian-Japanese war started with a raid on Russian Imperial Navy base in Port Artur. Battle of Taranto is good to give some ideas for IJN but they already have some own.

Port Arthur is close enough for the raid/attack. Pearl Harbor is.... well if just raid like you said, it only gone bad for Japan. Yamamoto know this, he know that the only change Japan can “win” is decisive victory against American fleet.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Can I guess, Japan declare war on America. Move some of reserve fleet to Philippines to lure Americans fleet from Hawaii.

That was Japans naval plan, to reproduce the Tushima naval battle in a war with the US.

The US- Japanese war started with a raid on US Navy base in Pearl Harbour. The Russian-Japanese war started with a raid on Russian Imperial Navy base in Port Artur. Battle of Taranto is good to give some ideas for IJN but they already have some own.

...and start the war with a suprise raid. As remarked by others here the PH raid was both inconceiveable and impractical in 1940. Among other things the US Pacific Fleet was not home ported there in 1940. PH was a a refueling stop & repair site during bi annual fleet exercises. There were IJN plans to deploy submarinse and scout cruisers around Hawaii, near the Panama canal, and off the US west coast. Any suprise attack on US forces would have been against the US Asiatic squadron that was home ported in Subic Bay and mostly forward deployed in China. Mopping up this dispersed group of river patrol boats, destroyers, PT boats, light & heavy cruisers would have been the Japanese suprise attack of 1940.

The IJN had built up a forward naval base at Truk. Using that as a mid Pacific staging point they intended to destroy any US fleet struggling across the empty expanse of the Pacific to reach & relieve the Phillipine islands. This plan was deeply flawed in that it depended on the US behaving exactly like the Russians had 35 years earlier. The US Navy leaders had written off since the 1920s the Phillipines as indefensible, and repeatedly proven in fleet exercises and map tests the folly of rushing across the Pacific. in 1940 it was still not possible to supply such a fleet action with combat fuel expendentures. War Plan Orange revolved around 18 to 24 months of US defense actions, raids, and limited opportunistic actions while the fleet was expanded. In short a entire new fleet of ultra modern battle ships, cruisers, carriers, destoryers ect... was to be built. When the US Navy did cross the Pacific it was to outnumber the Japanese in capitol ships by 2-1, and as much as 4-1 in auxillaries and logistics vessels.

At their core the Japanese naval plans and prepartions in the 1930s were worthless. They completely misunderstood the US capabilities and intent.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

That was Japans naval plan, to reproduce the Tushima naval battle in a war with the US.

Well, until Yamamoto threw it in the trash...

At their core the Japanese naval plans and prepartions in the 1930s were worthless. They completely misunderstood the US capabilities and intent.

Not necessarily. While all you say about the USN's warplan orange is true, that doesn't mean the USN would not prematurely sail to the Philippines if their political masters outright ordered them too over the Navy's own objections. Pearl Harbor meant that the USN never had to worry about that.

 

[Draconis]

@trurle Can you expand further on OTL Italian/American Mafia activities in 1920s Japan? I'd like to know a little more about this. Or is this only a fictional construct for the purpose of your timeline?

 

[trurle]

@trurle Can you expand further on OTL Italian/American Mafia activities in 1920s Japan? I'd like to know a little more about this. Or is this only a fictional construct for the purpose of your timeline?

The information about pre-war Japanese crimes and Mafia involvement in particular is scant, therefore episode with mafia arsonists in 1940 is fictional.
Here some sources:
"On the average, total penal code offenses, homicide, and arson were greater during the pre-war years", from "A Longitudinal Analysis of Japanese Crime From 1926 to 1987: The Pre-War, War, and Post-War Eras"
"Half-Chinese son of al Capone, Chuson Li, have entered Japan soon after war and proceed to organize illegal gambling business" - japanese wikipedia

Overall, i suspect the environment for Italian mafia would be pretty hostile in Japan of 1928-1941 period, and realistically you should expect very volatile mafia groups clustered around ports instead if city-wide coverage with demarcated zones of influence

 

[trurle]

The Japanese excuses 27 September 1940 came too late. The same day, Japanese merchant ship radioed overflight by multiple four-engine aircraft south-west of Hawaii. The description matched the newest, heaviest and longest range US bombers- B-17(1). 28th September 1940, US congress have ratified a full trade embargo to Japan, with side note "US Navy is responsible to prevent any arms shipment to the Japan or Japan-controlled territories"(2)

The Harold Stark, the Chief of Naval operations in the US, have already brought Pacific Fleet from San Francisco area out to the sea, for short-notice exercise. The level of anxiety and terror in Tokyo have went off-scale when the fleet have failed to be detected after two weeks. The map in the Supreme War council showed huge hatched area covering half of Pacific, to indicate the possible location of US carriers and battleships. More sensible marks were dotting East China Sea, these oppositely showing US forces concentration toward the Subic Bay.

It it not known who in Japanese Supreme War Council, or General Headquarters make a "brilliant" idea of laying minefields close to Subic Bay in anticipation of arrival of US Pacific fleet. Nonetheless, the heavy flying boats H6K have started to dispense floating mines daily from 3rd October 1940, with the predictable result - British armed merchant cruiser RMS Corfu(3) struck the mine 6th October , resulting in over 60 dead, mostly men who fell from overcrowded deck. The rescue operation in twillight, with British and US planes flying in all directions, have triggered an indiscriminate, fatal response from Japanese,who mistook aircraft for scouts from the main US fleet. Ground-based G3M torpedo bombers (4) have scored four torpedo hits on HMS Hermes by 21:00 local time, and Japanese declaration of war to the US was hastily delivered, to the surprise of everybody involved.

It took three days to sort things out, but by 9th October 1940 the Japanese have declaration of war from British, dying-out air battles over US bases on Luzon and Guam and US Pacific fleet still deep in the Pacific.

In US, long standing cultural legacy of this deadly accident has become the joke of "Three red days per month for US girls, three red months per year for Japanese generals".

(1) IOTL, US have transferred squadrons of B-17 to Philippines in late 1941 as deterrent, although it obviously did not work as intended - most of planes were destroyed by Japanese airstrikes on the ground in December 1941. In September 1940, US had 23 operational B-17, and production line restarted in July 1940 will start churning out additional B-17 soon.
(2) Such side note never existed in mainline history. US are obviously trying to capitalize on the good timing - Japanese ground forces are actively being hauled by sea now, and even attempt to avoid confrontation (not saying about confrontation itself) would be detrimental to Japanese operations.
(3) IOTL, it has collided with HMS Hermes carrier and was lightly damaged 10th July 1940, butting both ships out of action until December 1940. In this timeline, collision did not happen (showing the deviations from known history already started well before dramatic Mobara fire 25th August 1940), and both ships were sent to Hong Kong as deterrent and reinforcement when the tensions were building up in September 1940.
(4) IOTL, G3M torpedo bombers have sunk British "Prince of Wales" and "Repulse" battlecruisers at the opening stages of Pacific War in December 1941.

 

[Anhtuan]

Japan is fuck, I know how incapable the Japanese war staffs is, but this is utterly stupid of them.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Overall, i suspect the environment for Italian mafia would be pretty hostile in Japan of 1928-1941 period, and realistically you should expect very volatile mafia groups clustered around ports instead if city-wide coverage with demarcated zones of influence

A foreign 'Mafiosa' would be redundant. Japan had its own robust urban criminal organizations since at least the 19th Century.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Not necessarily. While all you say about the USN's warplan orange is true, that doesn't mean the USN would not prematurely sail to the Philippines if their political masters outright ordered them too over the Navy's own objections. Pearl Harbor meant that the USN never had to worry about that.

The key here is not the the US Navy did not want to sail to the Philippines, but that it could not do so under war conditions. Underway refueling was barely past the experimental level in 1940 & oilers capable of at sea refueling were to thin on the water. In practical terms getting a fleet to PI under war conditions required a protected refueling site partway there. Preferably multiple sites. Those were all under the thumb of the Japanese. This went beyond the matter of equipment and crew training. The fleet staff had to little experience in adding the complications of at sea refueling to fleet operations. Some seventeen months later than these ALT events the staff of the carrier TF attempting to relieve Wake ran into friction & delay refueling the TF destroyers. If they were still not getting it right for limited operations like that there not much chance of pulling it off a year earlier. WP ORANGE revolved around capturing suitable western Pacific bases for very good reasons.

The Japanese were aware of the limits of any fleet in trying to operate at that distance, and estimates of where and when the US 'Rescue Fleet' would have to pull over to gas up was part of their calculation for ambush.

Unless the US leaders are altered in this ATL the "political masters" were on the same page as the Navy leaders. Roosevelt as a former member of the Dept of the Navy and with eight years as commander in chief was well aware of the basis for WP ORANGE. He'd signed off approval on each update, and had a hobby of closely monitoring the exercises testing the war plan. Neither was Sec Nav Knox a reflexive political dummy. Both men had neutralized many ill conceived actions aimed at the USN. Within WP ORANGE the interim period of "raiding" and 'opportunistic' attacks served the political dimension as a opportunity to claim the Navy was doing something. There was also the factor that the PI were not regarded as sacred soil of the Republic. A hefty portion of the voters regarded the place as a burden that should have never been picked up & the suppression of the insurrection a embarrassment. That the Navy regarded PI as indefensible was public knowledge, marked in that few cared. The furor raised during WWII over the PI had a lot to do with propaganda & MacArthurs notions. In short there would not be some sort of unstoppable public force driving the USN towards Tushima 2.0.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

A few notes concerning the War Department...

The US Army had zero combat ready formation in the US in mid 1940. Four of its divisions were at 75% strength, & that after a influx of new recruits authorized for 1939-40 in the budget passed in 1938. The Army had just started training for amphibious operations in late 1939, after a seven year hiatus. So far the January exercise of the 3rd Division had proved they had a long way to go. For WP ORANGE the Army had the Philippines Scouts, the Panama garrison, and the Hawaiian Division overseas. The latter had 12,000 - 14,000 men in early 1940, plus Coast Artillery, and Air Corps units on Oahu.

For overseas service the War Dept claimed it would have 50,000 combat ready men six months after mobilization, and 100,000 at the twelve month mark.

 

[trurle]

A foreign 'Mafiosa' would be redundant. Japan had its own robust urban criminal organizations since at least the 19th Century.

It would be more difficult to organize storming of US embassy in this case, especially because Japanese government try it best to prevent conflict with the US.

A few notes concerning the War Department...

The US Army had zero combat ready formation in the US in mid 1940. Four of its divisions were at 75% strength, & that after a influx of new recruits authorized for 1939-40 in the budget passed in 1938. The Army had just started training for amphibious operations in late 1939, after a seven year hiatus. So far the January exercise of the 3rd Division had proved they had a long way to go. For WP ORANGE the Army had the Philippines Scouts, the Panama garrison, and the Hawaiian Division overseas. The latter had 12,000 - 14,000 men in early 1940, plus Coast Artillery, and Air Corps units on Oahu.

For overseas service the War Dept claimed it would have 50,000 combat ready men six months after mobilization, and 100,000 at the twelve month mark.

Yes, the readiness of the US for the large conflict on ground in late 1940 was null. Combined with the failure-ridden start of campaign on Japanese side, the war can indeed end up "fizzling", as thread name suggests.
I should also note what Battle of Britain is still ongoing in October 1940, therefore British would prefer to wrap up conflict if given good enough excuse.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Yes, the readiness of the US for the large conflict on ground in late 1940 was null. ...

Not quite null. There were two combined arms brigades of Marines, one on each coast. And, a half dozen Base Defense Battalions.