In 1930 the RN had reviewed the anti-aircraft requirements for ships and this guided policy for the next 10 years. Unfortunately it missed out on dive bombing. Destroyers were to provide long range heavy AA as escorts for heavy ships and as such the guns needed to only be able to elevate to 45degrees. It was also not worth putting high angle directors on 1500 ton ships. This had to wait till the 1800 ton Tribals. It wasn’t anticipated that they would be worth direct attack. Norway was a great shock and may influence when and where the RN will risk ships without air cover.
Operation Sea Lion (1974 Sandhurst Wargame)
- Thread starter Not James Stockdale
- Start date
Correspondents on this thread seem to completely disregard the fact that if the USM ever tried to become a reality in 1940 the RN would sacrifice as many warships as necessary to completely disrupt and destroy any invasion fleet. The Mindset of the RN at the time would not permit any other out come. Having plied the waters of the Channel for the best part of six decades and having met many OTL RN officers I find the presumption of the Mannalites to be quite breath taking. In mid September not only are the nights long enough to give RN light forces (anything smaller than a cruiser) more than enough time to cause Havok with slow moving river barges there is the small matter of the tides and the weather. The variance in the tidal stream as you cross the channel is such that unlike a solitary swimmer, who can basically 'go with the flow' a convoy of towed barges will find station keeping across tide all but impossible. For those who think that laying protective mine field in the north sea and the channel approaches is in any way a practical proposition should IMVHO take a quick look at the "Northern Barrage" of 1918. The number of mine layers and mines involved and the sheer logistical effort retired beggars believe. Also in Day light RN light forces would endeavor to 'get in amongst' the invasion flotillas making the task of the Luftwaffe in bombing then very difficult indeed ( Her Hauptman, how many destroyers did you bomb and sink today? Non Sir but I did sink dozens of out own barges with the near misses!!!).
How many rounds did the average German soldier carry when fully loaded? 50-75? Certainly not more than that. How many grenades? Even if, after the 2-4 liters of water he carries is used, he is getting all the water he needs from a stream or well (hopefully not contaminated) and after his rations run out (a day or so) getting food by raiding cottages absent ammunition what good is he. Well he does have a bayonet, but you know what they say about bringing a knife to a gun fight. If the soldiers are stuck a little above the high tide line, I'll admit getting any ammunition that comes ashore may not be too much of a problem, but if they move inland at all the ammo has to move forward from the beach. This means ammo is collected from landing craft to distribution point and moved forward from there. The folks on the beach have to know where these points are - usually pre-determined and altered as circumstances dictate. As distribution points are changed this has to be communicated to landing craft, and to the troops. Now you need to have a means of moving the ammo forward. A soldier can carry several bandoliers of ammo and/or a couple of boxes no more, and doing that for several miles will exhaust you so you need some form of transport to get the ammo from the beach to the soldiers. You also need a dedicated beach group and beach masters to direct traffic and move stores.
To the extent that landing craft deposit supplies in the wrong place, or the soldiers that need the supplies have landed in the wrong place, fixing the situation takes dedicated trained personnel and time. The Allies had issues with these sorts of problems even later in the war after they had huge experience with amphibious landings, and had developed doctrine and trained for years before the war (in the case of the USMC which then trained the Army), and had tons of specialized landing craft manned by relatively experienced sailors.
This illustrates the logistic considerations just for rifle and machine gun ammunition and grenades. Then worry about anti-tank and artillery ammunition, which is not man portable over any distance. Got that set up, great now fuel for the transport (fodder and gasoline). Next food and water/water purification. Let's throw in medical supplies and gear, so the wounded get more than a cigarette and a shot of schnapps on the way to Valhalla.
While you need to be adaptable and be prepared to alter plans, you absolutely positively cannot deal with this stuff "on the fly" grabbing the odd Fritz and Hans to stay on the beach and deal with stores. If the soldiers who do land run out of ammo, the Home Guard with pikes is better armed than they are - hint a pike with a pointy end beats a rifle with a bayonet. The German military in 1940 had zero doctrine, zero training, and zero proper amphibious landing craft (Siebel ferries...really??). Getting a relatively small number of infantry with virtually no heavy support on shore without a sensible logistic plan simply means when the ammo runs out, which it will pretty quickly, game over.
All of this without the scattering of troops and supplies that the shambolic landing craft/barges deliver spread out by poor navigation and the tides of the Channel. Throw in the effect of the RAF and RN.
BTW on another note, concerning how troops cut the bottoms off their uniforms to facilitate defecation with diarrhea (Marines did this too on Guadalcanal to some extent) - free exit of stool does not solve the dehydration of diarrhea, nor does it counteract other negative effects on activity.
To the extent that landing craft deposit supplies in the wrong place, or the soldiers that need the supplies have landed in the wrong place, fixing the situation takes dedicated trained personnel and time. The Allies had issues with these sorts of problems even later in the war after they had huge experience with amphibious landings, and had developed doctrine and trained for years before the war (in the case of the USMC which then trained the Army), and had tons of specialized landing craft manned by relatively experienced sailors.
This illustrates the logistic considerations just for rifle and machine gun ammunition and grenades. Then worry about anti-tank and artillery ammunition, which is not man portable over any distance. Got that set up, great now fuel for the transport (fodder and gasoline). Next food and water/water purification. Let's throw in medical supplies and gear, so the wounded get more than a cigarette and a shot of schnapps on the way to Valhalla.
While you need to be adaptable and be prepared to alter plans, you absolutely positively cannot deal with this stuff "on the fly" grabbing the odd Fritz and Hans to stay on the beach and deal with stores. If the soldiers who do land run out of ammo, the Home Guard with pikes is better armed than they are - hint a pike with a pointy end beats a rifle with a bayonet. The German military in 1940 had zero doctrine, zero training, and zero proper amphibious landing craft (Siebel ferries...really??). Getting a relatively small number of infantry with virtually no heavy support on shore without a sensible logistic plan simply means when the ammo runs out, which it will pretty quickly, game over.
All of this without the scattering of troops and supplies that the shambolic landing craft/barges deliver spread out by poor navigation and the tides of the Channel. Throw in the effect of the RAF and RN.
BTW on another note, concerning how troops cut the bottoms off their uniforms to facilitate defecation with diarrhea (Marines did this too on Guadalcanal to some extent) - free exit of stool does not solve the dehydration of diarrhea, nor does it counteract other negative effects on activity.
Let’s not pretend Kurita was driven off solely by the daring of Taffy 3 ships and aircraft. If it weren’t for timely air strikes from Taffy 2 and the equally arrival of McCain’s Task Group Taffy 3 would’ve been annihilated.
I think if you just pop back into the last 109 pages you'll find that all of these tedious "professional" concerns have been addressed.
Since soldiers and supplies are both headed to wrong places, that's no problem. On average, each wrong beach will have some soldiers and some supplies.
Yes, the Allies put a lot of thought into D-day, but they had naval supremacy at the time, so it is a completely different situation. Even at Dunkirk, they had more or less full command of the sea. This is something the Germans don't have to worry about.
There is no need to land the artillery shells anymore. The artillery will be standing off the coast on the barges where it can serve dual roles as land artillery but also improvised battleships to frighten off the Royal Navy. The barge guns could be resupplied at sea to avoid the trouble of actually landing their shells ashore.
As for said navy, if the going really does get tough, the barge convoy can have orders to steam away from the RN at top speed. Glenn239 has already provided math proving that in these circumstances the RN would be unable to land hits. Once the RN gives up the chase, the formation simply turns back to the English coast and conducts an improvised landing at the nearest suitable location. Alternatively, they head for the Isle of Wight. A surprise landing there could cut off any RN ships still afloat from making it back home to Portsmouth, and vice versa.
Plus all of this is likely moot because as soon as Churchill realizes the invasion convoy has set sail, he will probably surrender anyways.
I know this reply is late but it’s the first chance I’ve had to properly sit down with my books and go through the figures and refresh my memory, yes the figures I posted above were from memory and so could be a little off which is why I use terms such as roughly and about. In addition this was a very fluid time in terms of numbers so there will always be minor differences.
So lets have a look at the figures I have ‘massaged’.
During September 1940 10, 11 and 12 group had roughly 300 fighters available to them that had the range to get to the Channel and landing areas.
According to the RAF diaries for the period, on 7th September Fighter Command had 621 Spitfires and Hurricanes serviceable and 604 on September 28th. From that you can assume that during the invasion scare period they could field in total 613 (+/- 8) on any given day.
From ‘Case Studies in the Achievement of Air Superiority’ edited by Benjamin Franklin Cooling.
"The RAF’s Order of Battle remained remarkably stable over the period July 1-September 1. The total number of Hurricanes and Spitfires in the Fighter Command squadrons rose only from 756 to 761 and then fell back to 759. The number of these planes that were serviceable rose from 548 on July 1 to 558 and stayed there, while the number unserviceable actually dropped over the summer from 208 to 201."
This gives an idea of what was available to the 48 Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in September throughout the whole of the UK but not what was within reach of the Invasion area, the so-called frontline.
So, what was the frontline? Effectively it was the squadrons of 11 Group plus those at Middle Wallop in 10 Group and Duxford in 12 Group, so 26 to 28 squadrons. It’s always considered that Fighter Command put in maximum effort in the afternoon of 15th September when all of the frontline squadrons were airborne to meet Luftwaffe attacks on London. Patrick Bishop in his book Battle of Britain says this comprised of 28 squadrons (Max. 336 fighters). I Dr Alfred Prices book Battle of Britain he puts a little more meat on the bones:
“All twenty-one of No 11 Group’s Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons were now airborne and either in contact with the enemy or moving into position to engage. From No 12 Group, Squadron Leader Douglas Bader was again on his way south leading the five squadron ‘Big Wing’. And from the west No 10 Group sent a further three squadrons to protect the capital.
To defend London against attack Fighter Command had amassed a total of two hundred and seventy-six Spitfires and Hurricanes, slightly more than during the noon time engagement.”
So, it could be 304 (+/- 32) during any engagement.
This is at great odds with Stephen Bungay’s claim that Fighter Command had 630 Spitfires and Hurricanes in the frontline, a figure which is greater than they had available throughout the whole of Britain.
Overy is also at odds with these numbers and this is always going to be an issue in any discussions on Fighter Command strength which in just this small sample of authors above ranges from 558 to 746, a variation of 188.
In total they had about 450 competent pilots, the rest had been grouped into squadrons further away from the front line in Category C squadrons which were effectively training squadrons.
Just a brief bit of background which I’m sure you all know already. From the beginning of the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command’s policy was to maintain 11 Groups squadron strength by replacing worn down squadrons wholesale with selected full-strength squadrons from the rear areas. In addition, each squadron would have a small compliment of non-operational pilots straight from the OTUs that would be trained up within the squadron ready to replace lost or wounded pilots. By the end of August it was becoming clear to Dowding that this was no longer a workable system as there were fewer and fewer full strength squadrons in the rear areas and squadrons already withdrawn and refitting were taking longer to refit than the frontline squadrons were being worn down. An extra burden that could no longer be tolerated within 11 Group squadrons was the training of green pilots. By 7th September Dowding had come up with a solution. The following is taken from ‘The Battle of Britain, New Perspectives” by John Ray and explains things better than I could:
“Dowding’s arrangements for the three classes of squadron were transmitted next day [8th September] in a note headed ‘Policy for Maintenance of Fighter Squadrons in Pilots’. The classes were listed in order of priority. First were Class A Squadrons of No 11 Group, ‘to be maintained constantly at minimum strength of sixteen operational pilots’. Next were Class A Squadrons of Nos 10 and 12 Groups, kept to a ‘minimum of sixteen operational plus non-operational as convenient’. Class B Squadrons were required to have ‘a minimum strength of sixteen operational pilots with up to six more non-operational’. Blenheim and Defiant squadrons were to remain unaffected. The last category, Class C Squadrons, would retain ‘a minimum of three operational pilots to act as leaders’, except for three named squadrons which would have eight.”
So if you consider just the Class A and B Squadrons with an assumed 5% unavailability due to leave, sickness and pilot deficit (5% is very low) you get a total of 456 operational pilots available at any one time. Where I have made an error is in not counting the operational pilots in the C squadrons which could add a further 66 pilots; 512 in total with probably another 450-500 non-operational pilots in training.
The Germans in contrast had 700 single and 200 twin engine fighters to throw into the battle with fully trained crews.
This final point is the easiest one to sort. As an example, Alfred Price puts the serviceable number of Bf109s at 686 and Len Deighton at 687 as per 7th September in both cases. Other Luftwaffe OOBs for 28th September put the number of Bf109s at 716. So, throughout the invasion period they had 701 (+/- 15) Bf109s.
There are so many places the Luftwaffe OOBs can be found that there’s no real point in me directing you all to them (that and the fact that I can’t be bothered to do all the work).
The CVEs did carry torpedoes and armour-piercing bombs (typical load was 9 torpedoes per ship and 500lb SAP bombs, though no 1000lb SAP bombs were carried); it's just that the aircraft aboard were not initially armed with them. It took time to rearm an aircraft, so most strikes from Taffy 3 were carrying HE bombs, rockets and so on, yes. But aircraft from Taffy 1 and 2 did carry anti-ship weapons, and some of the aircraft launched from Taffy 3 later in the battle did carry torpedoes. The AAR of Taffy 2's commander states: "At 1115 Strike No. 4 was launched, consisting of 19 VF and 37 VT of which 11 carried torpedoes and the balance SAP and GP bombs.", while at ~11:25, Taffy 3's Kitkun Bay launched 4 Avengers carrying torpedoes (the AAR states that these were "the torpedoes remaining on board", suggesting that earlier launches had also used torpedoes).
Sealion would be part of the BoB. Instead of switching to London in early September, the offensive is switched to invasion preparations.
In terms of the "failures of the LW system", isn't it a tad incongruent of an argument to suggest that the invasion of Russia somehow made sense, when it was this decision alone that robbed the necessary fuel that the LW required for major expansion of its training establishment?
On top of losing a chunk of the Chain Home system might be the danger of capturing functioning radars. This would lead to much more precise intel on how to jam them, and what they were capable of.
RodentRevolution
Banned
[QUOTE="Ian Hathaway, post: 18887718, member: 66301"
The Germans in contrast had 700 single and 200 twin engine fighters to throw into the battle with fully trained crews.
This final point is the easiest one to sort. As an example, Alfred Price puts the serviceable number of Bf109s at 686 and Len Deighton at 687 as per 7th September in both cases. Other Luftwaffe OOBs for 28th September put the number of Bf109s at 716. So, throughout the invasion period they had 701 (+/- 15) Bf109s.
There are so many places the Luftwaffe OOBs can be found that there’s no real point in me directing you all to them (that and the fact that I can’t be bothered to do all the work).[/QUOTE]
Serviceable? As in machines available for operations? Because the suggestion here seems to be the Germans were at this stage of the Battle of Britain achieving serviceability rates close to 100% which would represent an improvement from their peacetime norm let alone active operations. By other figures the number of Operational fighters in the three Luftflotten covering the Channel were 533 Bf 109s and 107 Bf 110s, which would seem in line with having 700 Bf 109s total and while the Bf 110 operational figure might seem low there was their experience to date in the BoB and the fact that only 46% of crews were considered available for this machine. These figures are for the 15th of September per Price (funnily enough), the likely go date as the 28th is far and away too late to consider a cross Channel operation given the known weather conditions.
So yeah I really do think you have been massaging the figures.
I am happy to consider 300 RAF fighters facing 530 single and 100 twin engine machines as that seems in line with both sides operational strength but to try and shove the German numbers up by 200 and double respectively in operational machines does seem questionable.
The Germans in contrast had 700 single and 200 twin engine fighters to throw into the battle with fully trained crews.
This final point is the easiest one to sort. As an example, Alfred Price puts the serviceable number of Bf109s at 686 and Len Deighton at 687 as per 7th September in both cases. Other Luftwaffe OOBs for 28th September put the number of Bf109s at 716. So, throughout the invasion period they had 701 (+/- 15) Bf109s.
There are so many places the Luftwaffe OOBs can be found that there’s no real point in me directing you all to them (that and the fact that I can’t be bothered to do all the work).[/QUOTE]
Serviceable? As in machines available for operations? Because the suggestion here seems to be the Germans were at this stage of the Battle of Britain achieving serviceability rates close to 100% which would represent an improvement from their peacetime norm let alone active operations. By other figures the number of Operational fighters in the three Luftflotten covering the Channel were 533 Bf 109s and 107 Bf 110s, which would seem in line with having 700 Bf 109s total and while the Bf 110 operational figure might seem low there was their experience to date in the BoB and the fact that only 46% of crews were considered available for this machine. These figures are for the 15th of September per Price (funnily enough), the likely go date as the 28th is far and away too late to consider a cross Channel operation given the known weather conditions.
So yeah I really do think you have been massaging the figures.
I am happy to consider 300 RAF fighters facing 530 single and 100 twin engine machines as that seems in line with both sides operational strength but to try and shove the German numbers up by 200 and double respectively in operational machines does seem questionable.
Because there would also be an invasion fleet headed for the UK's east coast from Germany. (We know this was a diversion, but the British wouldn't have in 1940).
The most effective anti-ship aircraft for the LW were, in order, the JU-87, the JU-88, the ME-110, the ME-109 (E7, might be higher in the order), then the level bombers. The RN plan was that warships would reload in ports nearby to the fighting. These operations would be prime targets for level bombers.
I think it's quite possible that if the RN attacks on the French side in daylight, that the LW badly mauls the RN and it achieves poor results for the damage sustained. That's assuming a maximum level RAF CAP effort.
As per the first 1,000 times this was answered, Barbarossa was stupider than Sealion. And not by a little either. By a lot.
RodentRevolution
Banned
A question...and I realise you are playing the answering 20 pages from now game to avoid answering these sorts of questions...but have you read the available sources on Sealion? Because the invasion plan jeopardised a large chunk of German water transport necessary to their war effort. Barbarossa on the other hand seemed to promise gaining direct access to numerous resources even if it did not work as planned.
Data?
With what spare ships?
Why do the RN care about a few loses, if they are fighting on that side of the channel it means the invasion hasn't managed to land......?
But it wasn’t. For one thing, Germany had defeated Russia in a land war some twenty years earlier. It (Germany) had a huge, advanced army, one that dominated western and central Europe. On the other hand, its navy was utterly outclassed by the RN and it had parity at best in the skies over the Channel and southern England. So, yes, attempting to invade Britain was stupider than Barbarossa. (This isn’t to say invading Russia was brilliant, just that it played far better to Germany’s strengths)
As to the effect of the Germans capturing a British Radar station during the invasion, this would add Precisely Nothing to their knowledge of British Radar as several Mobile RDF systems (Radar) had been captured during the invasion of France in May. In 1939 the Graf Zeppelin had been used to carryout an EL-int mission up the East coast of the UK to investigate and measure the suspected British Radar system. What radio transmitions the Germans did intercept were dismissed as being incapable of being from a practical detection system and were dismissed as little more than noise (in fact they were the signals from several CH stations that were tracking the air ship at the time) and the conclusion of the Luftwaffe Intelligence service subsequently was the RAF had no viable warning system. So much for the Uber efficient Germans and their superior technology!
And where on earth have you got your figures from precisely... which book?
Kick
Good try, CV12 and fourthman, but reasoned argument is useless here. Ridicule doesn’t work either.
Only that diversion will need to be believable to be effective. That means a whole bunch of ships, and given the longer transit distance and worse sea conditions you can't do this one with barges, so your talking about your better ships. So those are therefore ships you don't have available for the actual invasion making it even more reliant on daisy chains of river barges, thus making your channel invasion even harder!
On top of that to be a believable diversion you will need LW & KM there to as well to "sell it", and so again that's KM and LW you don't have in the channel directly helping with actual invasion.
A diversion is a good idea in theory but you need the resources to actually run it and sell it, and if there's prevailing motif in Sealion is that Germany doesn't have the necessary resources for even the simplest most direct version of this.
When it comes to ships Britain's got enough RN and auxiliary to cover both
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