Chapter 4: Decade of the Four Ministries
IV. Decade of the Four Ministries
In the last quarter of the 19th century, the Dutch government, acknowledging that its defence of their premier colony, the East Indies, was lacking a coherent policy, formed two commission to rectify this situation. These two commissions were composed of persons of high military or administrative rank and public office, and in 1892 formed Grondslagen, or Fundamentals, upon which defence policy should be based. It must be concluded however, that this did not in fact happen and the Dutch defence of the East Indies remained incoherent and disjointed.
The incoherency in policy was the most clear in the Dutch navy, which – as an institution - failed to plot a clear course in the period directly after the Fundamentals were formulated. Different factions within the service had different visions on the defence of the Indies, with corresponding differences in what they saw as the most likely scenario for that defence to counter and which kind of ships were needed to do so. The conquest-scenario assumed that a large enemy invasion fleet would launch a deliberate attack with the aim of conquering the whole of the Dutch East Indies. The coup-de-main scenario assumed a lightning fast attack by a comparatively small invasion-force (to keep the element of surprise) on a port on Java, or (and this was another point of contention) somewhere else in the archipelago. Beside these two main scenario’s there was also the neutrality-scenario in which two foreign powers were at war and had to be dissuaded from prosecuting that war inside the territorial waters of the colony, lest the Netherlands got involved in that conflict. The neutrality-scenario was generally accepted but discussion centred on the importance of that scenario for formulating policy.
In the decade that followed the Fundamentals, three different ministers (not including acting ministers or minister Kruys, who became minister in august 1901 and died in December of that year) presided over the Ministry of Navy in four different periods:
1. J.C. Jansen (1891-1894): Naval engineer by trade. Jansen sees the task of the Navy to stop a conquest of Java, but thinks the most likely scenario is a coup-de-main on one of it’s ports. For that reason, and in line with the Fundamentals, he builds a force of three ‘strijders’, basically armoured coastal defence ships. His tenure ends when the cabinet falls over the expansion of suffrage.
2. H.M. van der Wijck (1894-1897): Former lieutenant in the navy and secretary-general of the Minister of the Navy. Agrees with his predecessor that a coup-de-main attack is the most likely, but thinks such a scenario – coupled with threats to the Dutch neutrality – is more likely outside of Java. Jansens’ coastal defence ships are useless in those areas because of their lack op seaworthiness. Instead, Van der Wijck orders a force of cruisers to be constructed, which can operate throughout the archipelago, breaking with the army and the Fundamentals.
3. J.C. Jansen (July-December 1897): In his second tenure Jansen tried to turn back the clock to the situation during his first, by putting the focus back on armoured coastal defence ships. The threat of large battleships was discarded because those were probably needed elsewhere. This was not the case with the armoured cruiser, a new and fast ship type that was excellent for coup-de-mains. The cruisers of Van der Wijck were too light to counter those. Jansen’s alternative was denied by parliament however, causing him to resign.
4. J.A. Roëll (1898-1901): Vice-Admiral and former commander of the navy in the East Indies. Wants a heterogeneous fleet with both cruisers and armoured coastal defence ships, to succeed in most of the possible scenario’s. Political and economical circumstances make that impossible but Roëll does manage to build ships that are able to match the foreign armoured cruisers in guns and armour, though not in speed. Minister during the First Sino-Japanese War he sees the Japanese as growing threat. This is a problem that the Netherlands would have to solve by itself or through an alliance. In both cases that would mean heavier naval units.
The different tenures by different ministers with – sometimes fundamentally – different opinions regarding policy, made the Dutch navies procurement of material walk around like (please forgive the pun) a drunken sailor.
The challenges for policymakers were very difficult in this period. The preceding Second Industrial Revolution had caused a subsequent revolution in naval warfare. Inventions and developments in this period included the torpedo, the naval mine, the cruiser (in all its varieties), the battleship, the submarine, the turbine-engine, radio and the airplane. These inventions changed the landscape (or seascape if you will) continuously. To the effects of the Second Industrial Revolution could also be added the continuous scaling up of naval ships. The Dutch building program was one step behind the curve, hampered by the fact that the county’s wharves and locks were simply too small. Funds were lacking efforts to remedy this, caused by economic woes and an almost cultural tendency by parliament to be frugal, especially in military spending. To illustrate: between 1880 and 1913 the budget for the Royal Navy grew from 126 million to 643 million guilders, or 510%. In the same period the Dutch budget for the navy grew from 12,6 million to 19,8 guilders, or 157%. Was the Dutch budget in 1880 10% of the British budget, in 1913 it had shrunk to 3,1%.
While the context of Dutch policymaking in the described period was clearly demanding, this article will explore in more depth what lessons can be learned for the current age, in which the Digital Revolution can be the cause of similar challenges….
De Vries, A. (2020). Decade of the Four Ministries: lessons for building coherent policy. Politics of the Low Countries 19, 62-77.
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Sorry for the long wait! It has been pretty busy at school and writing didn't go as smooth as I had hoped. Thankfully last week was a school holiday so I was finally able to get some things in order. I had to move some bits and piece around which made this chapter neither spectacular nor long, but now I do still have two chapters in reserve so to speak, which will hopefully allow me to have a more steady update-pace of a chapter every week at least. All comments, feedback and spelling tips very welcome as always
In the last quarter of the 19th century, the Dutch government, acknowledging that its defence of their premier colony, the East Indies, was lacking a coherent policy, formed two commission to rectify this situation. These two commissions were composed of persons of high military or administrative rank and public office, and in 1892 formed Grondslagen, or Fundamentals, upon which defence policy should be based. It must be concluded however, that this did not in fact happen and the Dutch defence of the East Indies remained incoherent and disjointed.
The incoherency in policy was the most clear in the Dutch navy, which – as an institution - failed to plot a clear course in the period directly after the Fundamentals were formulated. Different factions within the service had different visions on the defence of the Indies, with corresponding differences in what they saw as the most likely scenario for that defence to counter and which kind of ships were needed to do so. The conquest-scenario assumed that a large enemy invasion fleet would launch a deliberate attack with the aim of conquering the whole of the Dutch East Indies. The coup-de-main scenario assumed a lightning fast attack by a comparatively small invasion-force (to keep the element of surprise) on a port on Java, or (and this was another point of contention) somewhere else in the archipelago. Beside these two main scenario’s there was also the neutrality-scenario in which two foreign powers were at war and had to be dissuaded from prosecuting that war inside the territorial waters of the colony, lest the Netherlands got involved in that conflict. The neutrality-scenario was generally accepted but discussion centred on the importance of that scenario for formulating policy.
In the decade that followed the Fundamentals, three different ministers (not including acting ministers or minister Kruys, who became minister in august 1901 and died in December of that year) presided over the Ministry of Navy in four different periods:
1. J.C. Jansen (1891-1894): Naval engineer by trade. Jansen sees the task of the Navy to stop a conquest of Java, but thinks the most likely scenario is a coup-de-main on one of it’s ports. For that reason, and in line with the Fundamentals, he builds a force of three ‘strijders’, basically armoured coastal defence ships. His tenure ends when the cabinet falls over the expansion of suffrage.
2. H.M. van der Wijck (1894-1897): Former lieutenant in the navy and secretary-general of the Minister of the Navy. Agrees with his predecessor that a coup-de-main attack is the most likely, but thinks such a scenario – coupled with threats to the Dutch neutrality – is more likely outside of Java. Jansens’ coastal defence ships are useless in those areas because of their lack op seaworthiness. Instead, Van der Wijck orders a force of cruisers to be constructed, which can operate throughout the archipelago, breaking with the army and the Fundamentals.
3. J.C. Jansen (July-December 1897): In his second tenure Jansen tried to turn back the clock to the situation during his first, by putting the focus back on armoured coastal defence ships. The threat of large battleships was discarded because those were probably needed elsewhere. This was not the case with the armoured cruiser, a new and fast ship type that was excellent for coup-de-mains. The cruisers of Van der Wijck were too light to counter those. Jansen’s alternative was denied by parliament however, causing him to resign.
4. J.A. Roëll (1898-1901): Vice-Admiral and former commander of the navy in the East Indies. Wants a heterogeneous fleet with both cruisers and armoured coastal defence ships, to succeed in most of the possible scenario’s. Political and economical circumstances make that impossible but Roëll does manage to build ships that are able to match the foreign armoured cruisers in guns and armour, though not in speed. Minister during the First Sino-Japanese War he sees the Japanese as growing threat. This is a problem that the Netherlands would have to solve by itself or through an alliance. In both cases that would mean heavier naval units.
The different tenures by different ministers with – sometimes fundamentally – different opinions regarding policy, made the Dutch navies procurement of material walk around like (please forgive the pun) a drunken sailor.
The challenges for policymakers were very difficult in this period. The preceding Second Industrial Revolution had caused a subsequent revolution in naval warfare. Inventions and developments in this period included the torpedo, the naval mine, the cruiser (in all its varieties), the battleship, the submarine, the turbine-engine, radio and the airplane. These inventions changed the landscape (or seascape if you will) continuously. To the effects of the Second Industrial Revolution could also be added the continuous scaling up of naval ships. The Dutch building program was one step behind the curve, hampered by the fact that the county’s wharves and locks were simply too small. Funds were lacking efforts to remedy this, caused by economic woes and an almost cultural tendency by parliament to be frugal, especially in military spending. To illustrate: between 1880 and 1913 the budget for the Royal Navy grew from 126 million to 643 million guilders, or 510%. In the same period the Dutch budget for the navy grew from 12,6 million to 19,8 guilders, or 157%. Was the Dutch budget in 1880 10% of the British budget, in 1913 it had shrunk to 3,1%.
While the context of Dutch policymaking in the described period was clearly demanding, this article will explore in more depth what lessons can be learned for the current age, in which the Digital Revolution can be the cause of similar challenges….
De Vries, A. (2020). Decade of the Four Ministries: lessons for building coherent policy. Politics of the Low Countries 19, 62-77.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Sorry for the long wait! It has been pretty busy at school and writing didn't go as smooth as I had hoped. Thankfully last week was a school holiday so I was finally able to get some things in order. I had to move some bits and piece around which made this chapter neither spectacular nor long, but now I do still have two chapters in reserve so to speak, which will hopefully allow me to have a more steady update-pace of a chapter every week at least. All comments, feedback and spelling tips very welcome as always