The US historically had strong interest both in Bulgaria and Anatolia. This is why I still see the US wanting to influence postwar Turkey
Of lost monkeys and broken vehicles
- Thread starter Lascaris
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TTL,even before the war with this Greece bigger territorial extension, population and economy and even more with TTL post war bigger and strengthened armed forces, IMO, both b & c, points, may not seems relevant or valids objections, or at least no so much as IOTL, anymore.
Asides of the question if TTL as OTL Greece would push for these areas, to be annexed, should be noted that ITTL these areas would probably be under Allied occupation. The point/objection about Turkey, being an Axis defeated member wouldn't be relevant or valid and I would assume that either the Dardanelles defense would be internationalized with the Royal Navy tasked with their defense alongside with the Greek Navy and/or the US Navy. Or, the,IMO,at least, most likely option that their defense would be tasked/trusted to Greece.
I think that this still would be an argument, at least its first party, that could possibly be applied to the ITTL situation. But, with the key difference that (at least ,if I'm not doing a wrong extrapolation), that at this stage Bulgaria, would end under the Western Allies military occupation and would probably signing their surrender/peace treaty to the Allied Commanders. So, the 'defense of the Balkans' would already be sort of addressed both by an strengthened Greece and the British and Americans troops already deployed there to fight along with the Greeks ones against the Nazis and their Axis allies, from whom,at least some of them would alredy stay there in occupation duties, first and later for check/counterbalance the Soviets forces.
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I see what you’re saying, but despite being point A it feels like an after thought to points B-E which which are all inter related to defense. And the situation on defense that is going to be very very different post war than it was OTL. Greece has already shown that she can defend her land much better than OTL, and is a significant contributor to this war. Plus In OTL some Pomaks are already in Greece. I don’t remember if it’s the same TTL? Regardless I don’t remember them being particularly persecuted by the Greeks OTL. So point A feels very much like it’s tacked on to me. I don’t know If any one else agrees.The US official papers are available online. In our case the memorandum that formulated US policy over modifying the Greek-Bulgarian border from May 11th, 1946 can be found below. Looks to me th3 US government was worrying about causing resentment within communist Bulgaria rather more than it did about Germany.
In response to a request by the Acting State Member, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, dated 29 April 1946, for a study evaluating the strategic elements which are involved in the Greek request for rectification of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have advised the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as follows:
- “a. Greece desires to advance her Bulgarian frontier an average of about thirty-six miles northward to include the general areas of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed, approximately doubling the present width of her territory between Bulgaria and the Aegean Sea. This would require transfer of a strip of more than 6500 square miles of Bulgarian territory along the full length of the Greco-Bulgarian frontier with a population of about 400,000, the majority of whom are Moslem Pomaks or Turks. There are no known important military establishments in the area.
- b. In all probability Greece could not successfully defend her present frontier against Bulgaria attacking alone. Greek forces in western Thrace can easily be cut off by penetration to the sea through her present narrow east-west corridor in this area. Acquisition of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed area would materially widen this corridor and strengthen Greek defensive capabilities, possibly to such a degree that she might withstand Bulgarian offensive efforts. However, Greece would not be strengthened to the extent to guaranteeing successful defense against Bulgaria or any coalition or combination of nations.
- c. Unless preparations to re-enforce Greece have been made in advance of attack, it is improbable that acquisition of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed would strengthen her sufficiently to prevent a break-through by a coalition or combination of nations before outside support could become effective.
- d. Advancing the Greek boundary at the expense of Bulgaria, as proposed, would not strengthen the Greek position sufficiently for her to participate effectively with Turkey in defense of the Dardanelles. On the other hand, in the unlikely event that neutrality is permitted to Greece, her possession of the Macedonian-Thracian watershed would be of some advantage to Turkey in a defense of the Dardanelles. This might, however, influence Turkey to accept the extreme hazard of defending her territory in Europe.
- e. Transfer of this territory from Bulgaria to Greece would likely be followed by violent resentment and partisan activities. The peace of the Balkans would thereby be endangered without decisive strategic gain.”
If the Pomaks are still in Greece ITTL I could definitely see this be allowed.
Greece could get the Pomak regions of Bulgaria in a territorial autonomy scheme. It would not be impossible, as in 1919 the regions did request to become part of Greece. Dragoumis is the type of person that would support this.
It has hit me that we might be overtly pessimistic about Greece-Turkey relations ATL going forward. The weight of history is a big, and legitimate reason for pessimism, as are recent atrocities between the two sides, but there is also cold strategic reality. ATL the USSR is going to be the most powerful naval power in the Black Sea, in way it was not OTL. Territorial gains in North-Eastern Anatolia will make this much more likely than OTL, as will the general weakening of Turkey. Knowing Russian Imperial and Stalinist Soviet demographic strategies, the areas of North-Eastern Anatolia the USSR is going to get are going to be heavily Russified. The Armenian SSR might get some token regions (for example Ararat), but the Soviets are probably going to floor the rest with Russians. Indeed while I know Lascaris like a good author is not going to mess up with the trajectory of Soviet history, there might well be a decision not to transfer Crimea to Ukraine, but instead make it with North-East Anatolia a maritime SSR covering the Black Sea (Especially if the USSR takes Trapezounta/Trabezon).
This potential strategic reality largely negates the strategic worth of who between Greece and Turkey controls the Straits (not the question of whether the USSR or the West controls it). Something similar happened in the case of the Kalmar Straits. Sweden and Denmark fought about nine major wars between 1500-1800. These were not "nice" wars. The Snaphane War, which was a proxy war between Sweden and Denmark is known in some records as the Arsonist War, as both sides used arson against villages supporting the other as the main military operation. Sweden at some point demanded that all tapestries in Danish castles celebrating Danish victories over Sweden to be destroyed. So quite a bit of hate. But with the rise of Russia to the preeminent position in the Baltic, plus the strengthening of Sweden vs. Denmark largely negated any strategic point to this rivalry. Scandinavianism as an ideology took root after this strategic transformation, not before. I am not saying rivalry termination is going to happen as thoroughly as it did in the Scandinavian case, but strategic reality may very well down the path lead to an amelioration of the rivalry, and perhaps the establishment of a stable negative peace, with the foundations for elements of positive peace. Especially if issues like Cyprus are resolved in an authoritative way early on, when Turkey cannot really do much about it.
Turkey just burned a massive amount of economic and demographic resources on WW2 and rebuilding is going to be hard. Thus there is a non-zero possiblity it will eschew revanishim (maybe not in the immediate aftermath, but certainly going down the road).
It has hit me that we might be overtly pessimistic about Greece-Turkey relations ATL going forward. The weight of history is a big, and legitimate reason for pessimism, as are recent atrocities between the two sides, but there is also cold strategic reality. ATL the USSR is going to be the most powerful naval power in the Black Sea, in way it was not OTL. Territorial gains in North-Eastern Anatolia will make this much more likely than OTL, as will the general weakening of Turkey. Knowing Russian Imperial and Stalinist Soviet demographic strategies, the areas of North-Eastern Anatolia the USSR is going to get are going to be heavily Russified. The Armenian SSR might get some token regions (for example Ararat), but the Soviets are probably going to floor the rest with Russians. Indeed while I know Lascaris like a good author is not going to mess up with the trajectory of Soviet history, there might well be a decision not to transfer Crimea to Ukraine, but instead make it with North-East Anatolia a maritime SSR covering the Black Sea (Especially if the USSR takes Trapezounta/Trabezon).
This potential strategic reality largely negates the strategic worth of who between Greece and Turkey controls the Straits (not the question of whether the USSR or the West controls it). Something similar happened in the case of the Kalmar Straits. Sweden and Denmark fought about nine major wars between 1500-1800. These were not "nice" wars. The Snaphane War, which was a proxy war between Sweden and Denmark is known in some records as the Arsonist War, as both sides used arson against villages supporting the other as the main military operation. Sweden at some point demanded that all tapestries in Danish castles celebrating Danish victories over Sweden to be destroyed. So quite a bit of hate. But with the rise of Russia to the preeminent position in the Baltic, plus the strengthening of Sweden vs. Denmark largely negated any strategic point to this rivalry. Scandinavianism as an ideology took root after this strategic transformation, not before. I am not saying rivalry termination is going to happen as thoroughly as it did in the Scandinavian case, but strategic reality may very well down the path lead to an amelioration of the rivalry, and perhaps the establishment of a stable negative peace, with the foundations for elements of positive peace. Especially if issues like Cyprus are resolved in an authoritative way early on, when Turkey cannot really do much about it.
Turkey just burned a massive amount of economic and demographic resources on WW2 and rebuilding is going to be hard. Thus there is a non-zero possiblity it will eschew revanishim (maybe not in the immediate aftermath, but certainly going down the road).
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In practice were the Pomak regions that Greece is interesting in gaining and which were at one time interested in joining Greece, mainly comprised most of OTL Blagoevgrad, Smolyan and Kardzhali along with bits of Pazardzhik and Haskovo provinces?
Hence why TTL Greece will as you alluded earlier highlight the fact that she is already home to a Pomak minority loyal to Greece.
It's more that Turkey probably would still fail in land reforms bc central Anatolia has a bunch of large landowners who work landless farmers. Turkey could ofc do land reform like otl by buying land from the landowners and selling it, but them fucking up as per otl makes sense as per otl.
While Turkey doesn't have dissident parties now, things could go differently as time goes on. Firstly Kemal's nationalist party had failed twice already and I do not believe that no one would want a different party with different ideas in charge. I could see Turkey's Communists be buoyed by the Soviets since Turkey is weaker ittl (the underground communist party could be brought back and the Soviets would defo invest in making it a popular party, and the worker's party did pop up in otl too). Another possibility is the more extremist nationalists splitting from the Moderates over Cyprus too.
Its just that the Turks have a much worse hand than otl. They essentially need to be neutral while the Americans and Soviets would be able to exert a lot more influence than they should on a neutral country.
Acting on Cyprus will destroy relations with America while doing nothing is a national humiliation. The arab-israeli wars have a possibility of spreading to Kurdistan (with or without Assyria) and the refugee crisis would be destabilising even if the Turks stay out of it completely with the successor staying on the proverbial throne, while going for war would again destroy relations with the west due to Israel.
It's just that it'll be really hard for the Turks in the next two to three decades, and I don't think a competent leader could navigate it cleanly.
Also what is DSC and the such.
Tbf I don't think Crimea would go to Ukraine, if anything it'd go to the Russian SSR. It'd fit with the geopolitical circumstances more.
I do agree, it's just that unless it's against the Soviets it risks alienating the Americans which they would need to fight the Soviets.
Yeah probably, and I don't think the Greeks could take anymore.
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I don't think TTL will have to deal with Turkey intervening in Cyprus. It'll probably end up joining Greece, or at least half of it (hell if they somehow got it at the end of the war here and kicked out the Turkish Cypriots to the mainland and Greece didn't take anymore of Anatolia unfortunately for the people involved that /might/ be the best outcome considering otherwise a conflict over the island). I consider that unlikely though.
There is no need to kick out anyone. T/C are a smaller percentage of the population than Thracian Muslims OTL. As long as Turkey is kept operationally out, the island is holdable. Does anybody think if Cyprus was given to Greecd in 1918 local history would be different than Thrace?
The biggest Greek advantage in Cyprus TTL is that the 1931 uprising fizzled. So Cyprus still has a legislative assembly and regular elections. It may not amount to much self-rule but it means you have elected politicians and parties (strongly resembling mainland Greece pre-1931). Instead of say archbishops with visions of grandeur being the sole elected Greek Cypriot official.
Yes. And also T/Cs are not Turco-Cretans. They do not have the anarchical fighting stance T/Cretan inherited from their Christian Cretan fore-fathers.
It's more that we've the extreme nationalists who want Cyprus being transported back to turkey proper, so they could become an actors in the future.
Sure and Bolivia has had a Dia del Mare every year since 1883. It has not fought another war with Chile though.
The same nationalists wanted Thrace. No TMT in Thrace though. Why? Because half the Greek Army in parked on it and there is no EOKA A insurgency background. If Greece gets Cyprus in the immediate ATL post-war period , Turkey cannot do anything about it.
The same nationalists wanted Thrace. No TMT in Thrace though. Why? Because half the Greek Army in parked on it and there is no EOKA A insurgency background. If Greece gets Cyprus in the immediate ATL post-war period , Turkey cannot do anything about it.
Cannot is too strong a word perhaps. But the answer is the same with what I tell Cypriots arguing "But Acheson plan would give Turkey a base in Cyprus. Why they wouldn't invade from there afterwards? " Because it would be outrght invading Greek territory and automatically mean general war.
Well as I tell some Turks that tell me, why did we OT take the Eaatern Agean Islands in 1922: No ships, no islands.
ATL I expect the difference in naval power between Greece and Tutkey to be depressingly in the favor of Greece.
ATL I expect the difference in naval power between Greece and Tutkey to be depressingly in the favor of Greece.
It's no big spoiler I'm debating with myself what should be the fate of HMS Leviathan. Just saying 😇
Appendix Hellenic Navy February 1944
- Battleships: 1
- Salamis class: 1 (Salamis)
- Cruisers: 2
- Lemnos class: 1 (Lemnos)
- Averof class: 1 (Averof)
- Destroyers: 15
- Themistoklis class: 2 (Themistoklis, Miaoulis)
- Kanaris (J) class: 3 (Kanaris, Apostolis, Sachtouris)
- Sfendoni (H) class: 4 (Sfendoni, Velos, Thyella, Logchi)
- Hydra (A) class: 2 (Kimon, Nearchos)
- Aetos class: 2 (Aetos, Ierax)
- S class: 2 (Kriti, Chios)
- Escorts: 8
- Hunt class: 4 (Navarino, Formion, Hastings, Keraunos)
- Flower class: 4 (Panormos, Kydonies, Pergamos, Tralleis)
- Submarines: 9
- Poseidon (S) class: 6 (Pipinos, Pontos, Delphin, Glaukos, Triton, Amphitriti)
- Matrozos (U) class: 1 (Matrozos)
- Glaukos class: 2 (Papanikolis, Proteus)
Ships Lost in action since August 15, 1940
- Cruisers: 4
- Lemnos class: 1
- Helli class: 1
- Katsonis class: 2
- Destroyers: 15
- Kanaris (J) class: 1
- Sfendoni (H) class: 4
- Hydra (A) class: 4
- Aetos class: 2
- S class: 4
- Escorts: 2
- Hunt class: 2
- Submarines: 9
- Poseidon (S) class: 5
- Glaukos class: 4
Shorta kinda so... the TTL navy in 1939 is the one the Greeks were building towards to in OTL but got caught in political instability in the 1930s severely delaying the building program. In absolute numbers the Greeks got 2 light cruisers and 6 destroyers from the Royal Navy in TTL 1921, the deal is historical but fell through after Venizelos removal from power in 1920 in OTL. Post that by ship type.So they've lost 2/3rds of their cruisers and half their destroyers and submarines, but seem to be trending towards the better with the other ship types when it comes to losses. How big was OTL Hellenic Navy in comparison? Are they even comparable?
1. Battleships
TTL the Greeks built a single ship. OTL they were to complete a single ship in 1929, cancelled after the Greek-Turkish 1930 treaty, and where discussing with Britain construction of a large cruiser (18,500t 6x10in 34knots speed) in 1939 that would had cost about as much as the TTL Salamis. Truth to tell I almost went with that TTL but reasoned British diplomacy would had kittens in 1931 over introducing to the world a cruiser killer by proxy.
2. Cruisers
TTL the Greeks built 2. OTL they wanted to build... 2 and in 1940-41 after the war start were trying to buy HMS York and two Omaha class ships.
3. Destroyers
TTL built 14 out of a planned 18. OTL built 6 out of a planned 18 with 2 more under construction in Greece and discussions for at least 2 more to be built in British yards in 1939. Then during the war received 9 Hunts and 2 fleet destroyers from RN. (A couple delayed to 1945 from the April 1944 mutinies). TTL the Greeks receive from Britain a few additional ships... the destroyers and submarines delivered to Turkey in 1942-43.
4. Submarines
TTL the Greeks built 12. OTL built 6 and were discussing the construction of 2-4 more with Britain in 1939.
If I remember right otl they planned on also building a light cruiser (presumably in Britain) in the late 30s to lead the planned G-class flotilla. Did they also plan to replace the ww1 era light cruisers ttl? Possibly with Leander derivatives, or even something American or home built.