We all know that Hitler ordering the Lufwaffe to begin attacking British cities instead of RAF airfields is considered to be the turning point in the Battle of Britain because it gave the RAF time to catch it's breath and train replacement pilots, but what if Hitler decides to continue the airfield attacks in hopes of trying to cripple the RAF. He still orders the cancellation of Sea Lion but British airfields undergo several more weeks of attacks. How does this affect the British war effort, like its strategic bombing campaign, as well as the American public's perception?
No Unspeakable Sea Mammal, but RAFairfield attacks continue
- Thread starter cra0422
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Contrary to popular perception, even with airfield attacks, the Luftwaffe was still getting the worst of attrition rates, especially amongst the air crews. The only difference is that with continuation of air battles for a few weekd more, Luftwaffe has fewer experienced aviators in it's ranks as the Barabarossa starts, but the difference is not big enough to make a mayor change.
Douhet's ghost will be rattling its chains with glee at the prospect of Britain conceding because Germany has destroyed it's most important fighter bases.
The thing is, attacking the fighter bases is useful if you have some purpose, otherwise it's an expensive way to be seen to be doing something, and if Sealion has been called off, what is the objective of the bombing csmpaign?
There may be strategic merit in destoying the fighter bases then launching everything that can fly at London for a week or so [1] in attempt to cripple Britain politically and economically before heading East.
I suspect the end result would be pretty much as OTL but compressed into a week or two. Once the intensive bombing stops, the bases are restored at least as emergency landing bases, more pilots and planes start arriving to replace losses etc. The Luftwaffe will claim victory, but the POWs crashed and damaged aircraft may suggest otherwise.
[1] Somewhere along the line, pilots, ground crews and aircraft need a rest or a refit before things start falling apart. Stimulants only go so far before the need for sleep catches up.
The thing is, attacking the fighter bases is useful if you have some purpose, otherwise it's an expensive way to be seen to be doing something, and if Sealion has been called off, what is the objective of the bombing csmpaign?
There may be strategic merit in destoying the fighter bases then launching everything that can fly at London for a week or so [1] in attempt to cripple Britain politically and economically before heading East.
I suspect the end result would be pretty much as OTL but compressed into a week or two. Once the intensive bombing stops, the bases are restored at least as emergency landing bases, more pilots and planes start arriving to replace losses etc. The Luftwaffe will claim victory, but the POWs crashed and damaged aircraft may suggest otherwise.
[1] Somewhere along the line, pilots, ground crews and aircraft need a rest or a refit before things start falling apart. Stimulants only go so far before the need for sleep catches up.
It is really hard to win a war of aerial attrition when nearly all of your pilots shot down are killed or captured and most of theirs survive to fight another day after bailing out. Most wargames model this as a 'pilot recovery rebuild' which costs only half as much. You have to have a pretty obscene air to air kill ratio to overcome that.
Now if you had a mechanism to get the Battle of Britain to be fought mostly over ground that you control, like, say, Northern France (maybe by lots of earlier V-1s being launched from there forcing the UK to try to suppress the sites?), you might actually win such a war of attrition. But over the UK? I don't see it.
Now if you had a mechanism to get the Battle of Britain to be fought mostly over ground that you control, like, say, Northern France (maybe by lots of earlier V-1s being launched from there forcing the UK to try to suppress the sites?), you might actually win such a war of attrition. But over the UK? I don't see it.
There could have been a difference.
As far as I understand it, LW did not fully understand the entire UK air defense system. It was not just the air bases or the radar masts, etc. If they had understood the entire system, they could have focused on the critical and 'easy' points, among these the plotting centres.
These were (as far as I know) rather 'un-defended' or next door to a fighter base. Hitting such a centre, killing the plotters etc and (importantly) destroying the telephone lines would set the entire RAF back.
What good is a radar mast if there is nobody to interpret the data coming in?
That would have opened the South up for a sustained (and far less costly) LW series of attacks.
Could it have made the sea mammal possible? probably not, but the UK industry could have been harmed badly if LW could roam rather freely all over the south.
Combine this with drop-tanks for ME-109 etc, and there is a new situation
As far as I understand it, LW did not fully understand the entire UK air defense system. It was not just the air bases or the radar masts, etc. If they had understood the entire system, they could have focused on the critical and 'easy' points, among these the plotting centres.
These were (as far as I know) rather 'un-defended' or next door to a fighter base. Hitting such a centre, killing the plotters etc and (importantly) destroying the telephone lines would set the entire RAF back.
What good is a radar mast if there is nobody to interpret the data coming in?
That would have opened the South up for a sustained (and far less costly) LW series of attacks.
Could it have made the sea mammal possible? probably not, but the UK industry could have been harmed badly if LW could roam rather freely all over the south.
Combine this with drop-tanks for ME-109 etc, and there is a new situation
No.11 group plotter room and headquarters was located in a bunker 60 ft underground, with 1 m thick walls and ceilings. The sector operations rooms were less well protected but they controlled only their sector, and each sector control room was as well equipped as the group command was, so control could be passed to other sectors or back to group if need be.
All this is assuming you are able to determine which airbases to hit, get close enough to them and bomb them accurately enough to hit the particular control room.
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How though?
Did the LW demonstrate such capability as to precision bomb plotting centres even had they known of their existence?
Even late war such a feat was difficult
Just a few thoughts...
Hitler did not order attacks on London, Hitler approved attacks on London after Goering asked if they were allowed to move to the next phase of attacks on commerce, ports and transport infrastructure.
Luftwaffe pilots and crews were not as seriously pushed as you'd imagine. Yes, there were some who were hard pushed but the majority of fighter pilots flew no more than 2 war flights a day and had at least 2 days off a week according to intelligence gathered from captured pilots. As for bomber crews, it was rare that they used more than a 1/3 of available aircraft in any 24 hour period. As I've mentioned there were exceptions to this but in general they were nowhere near as hard pushed as people imagine.
The whole myth of the RAF moving north to preserve their strength is just that, a myth. To prevent attacks on the ground Fighter Command would have to move northwards of Duxford and would therefore be conceding any defence at all of the skies in the South East and London. Effectively the Luftwaffe would have won and could bomb indiscriminately any targets in that region. Even if it was just a small scale retreat retaining Northolt, North Weald, Debden and Duxford the limited communications network and shorter interception times would cut the British defence capabilities by a half at best.
Statistically Fighter Command was losing a higher % of trained pilots than the Luftwaffe Fighter arm even with the Battle over British soil. From memory, on the British side the pilots had a 55% chance of returning to the flight of their aircraft was lost or damaged. This drops down to about 35% for German Fighter pilots, but the Germans had less than 50% the number of Bf109s lost/damaged during the battle than the British did.
There was a lot more going on in early September than you would think. For starters British airfields were starting to show sign of the battle, at Biggin Hill for instance the station commander set charges and ordered the demolition of the main buildings if another raid occurred, it didn't luckily. Secondly, Dowding introduced the Stabilisation scheme on 7th September effectively reducing the available front line strength of his command to less than 600 pilots. Thirdly, the number of aircraft available for immediate reinforcement had dropped to just 2-3 days in the first third of September.
Would a continuation of the campaign against airfields have had much effect? Yes it probably would in the short term. Would it have been a battle winner? Nope, not likely. As it was the Germans needed to advance their plans to the next stage to fit the timescale of invasion. They probably had about ten days of intensive flying left to them in September due to weather etc. and they chose to use that time attacking commercial docks, transport links and targets other than airfields as per their predetermined plan. Those ten days would not have been enough to destroy Fighter Command, weaken them yes, but not enough.
Hitler did not order attacks on London, Hitler approved attacks on London after Goering asked if they were allowed to move to the next phase of attacks on commerce, ports and transport infrastructure.
Luftwaffe pilots and crews were not as seriously pushed as you'd imagine. Yes, there were some who were hard pushed but the majority of fighter pilots flew no more than 2 war flights a day and had at least 2 days off a week according to intelligence gathered from captured pilots. As for bomber crews, it was rare that they used more than a 1/3 of available aircraft in any 24 hour period. As I've mentioned there were exceptions to this but in general they were nowhere near as hard pushed as people imagine.
The whole myth of the RAF moving north to preserve their strength is just that, a myth. To prevent attacks on the ground Fighter Command would have to move northwards of Duxford and would therefore be conceding any defence at all of the skies in the South East and London. Effectively the Luftwaffe would have won and could bomb indiscriminately any targets in that region. Even if it was just a small scale retreat retaining Northolt, North Weald, Debden and Duxford the limited communications network and shorter interception times would cut the British defence capabilities by a half at best.
Statistically Fighter Command was losing a higher % of trained pilots than the Luftwaffe Fighter arm even with the Battle over British soil. From memory, on the British side the pilots had a 55% chance of returning to the flight of their aircraft was lost or damaged. This drops down to about 35% for German Fighter pilots, but the Germans had less than 50% the number of Bf109s lost/damaged during the battle than the British did.
There was a lot more going on in early September than you would think. For starters British airfields were starting to show sign of the battle, at Biggin Hill for instance the station commander set charges and ordered the demolition of the main buildings if another raid occurred, it didn't luckily. Secondly, Dowding introduced the Stabilisation scheme on 7th September effectively reducing the available front line strength of his command to less than 600 pilots. Thirdly, the number of aircraft available for immediate reinforcement had dropped to just 2-3 days in the first third of September.
Would a continuation of the campaign against airfields have had much effect? Yes it probably would in the short term. Would it have been a battle winner? Nope, not likely. As it was the Germans needed to advance their plans to the next stage to fit the timescale of invasion. They probably had about ten days of intensive flying left to them in September due to weather etc. and they chose to use that time attacking commercial docks, transport links and targets other than airfields as per their predetermined plan. Those ten days would not have been enough to destroy Fighter Command, weaken them yes, but not enough.
Unfortunately I think you've misinterpreted the point I was making. There were nine sectors heavily involved in the fighting in SE England with between 27-30 squadrons. The logistics and more importantly communications network wouldn't allow more than 3 squadrons to be effectively controlled by a sector at any one time. If you reduce the number of sectors you reduce the number of squadrons, in this case to 12, maybe 16 at a push.
It took approximatelg 20 minutes for a squadron to scramble, climb to a decent interception height and travel roughly 55 miles whilst doing so. In that time the slowest Luftwaffe units could cover 60 miles. That's the distance from the coast to central London. Anything south of Central London could be hit before an effective defence could be mounted with a withdrawal North of London. Central London becomes the front line... previously it would have been Maidstone/Canterbury/Ashford.
If the RAF have withdrawn north of the Thames, how much is there worth bombing left that isn't still covered? There's not a whole lot outside of RDF masts worth bombing if there's no planes based there.
Also, even if there's no planes and the airfields appear abandoned, is there anything stopping the sector stations from continuing to control interceptions? So long as the phone lines work there's nothing I'm aware of that stops them from continuing their work and with no planes parked anywhere near the control rooms there's no real reason for the Luftwaffe to take any interest in them.
Also, even if there's no planes and the airfields appear abandoned, is there anything stopping the sector stations from continuing to control interceptions? So long as the phone lines work there's nothing I'm aware of that stops them from continuing their work and with no planes parked anywhere near the control rooms there's no real reason for the Luftwaffe to take any interest in them.
Not quite nothing, the main Hurricane and Spitfire production facilities are there. Then you have the airfields north of London. North Weald, Debden and Duxford (and satellite fields are all within escorted bomber range). They were attacked half a dozen times OTL with a handful of aborted attempts. Now they have at least six squadrons in each of these sectors if you want to keep the same strength in numbers. Typical flight path for the Luftwaffe is Calais to north of Margate then following the Thames estuary to the target. From their position north of Margate they can and did attack any number of targets (London, Hornchurch, North Weald, Debden etc.) So any interception can only be mounted once the bombers reach the Thames Estuary and the path of any raid can be tracked.
As controller what can you do in this case, RDF has reported a raid of 100+ off the coast at Ramsgate but there is no indication what the targets will be? At this point you've got 19-23 minutes to mount your defence, up till now you've been able to put up aircraft sooner to patrol Margate to Canterbury or Maidstone to Canterbury or Ashford to Maidstone, any of which could be vectored to intercept at Ramsgate or Margate etc. Now you don't have that luxury. All you can do is put up base patrols hoping they will be at height in time and send aircraft north to gain height then circle back to intercept once you know the tracks of the raids, as a formation that large would split, and hope they can be stopped in time. At best you could probably get 6 squadrons airborne in time to intercept before the target is reached, maybe around Bilericay if the attacks are on North Weald. Other squadrons would still be climbing at this time and would be vulnerable.
Basically it all becomes a huge mess, unworkable, raids north of London on the Bases that now have too many aircraft to effectively control will be too easy to attack. Dowding refused to contemplate withdrawal as did Park and there were very clear reasons why.
Garrison
Donor
Its a pointless exercise, even if you accept the idea that they could drive the RAF off some of the airbases, which is dubious, it achieves nothing strategically. the experience of Bomber command shows how hard it is to put factories out of action without constant attacks and they had far more firepower to bring to bear than the Luftwaffe could muster.
Ian Hathaway makes a good argument that early interception and foward bases are good.
The unwanted scenario is where the Big Wing starts lo look like a good idea or is the only idea. That's not good for Britain. There was a lot to be gained from early interception, both to disrupt the bomber formations and to get the escorting fighters to engage early so that they have to return sooner.
The big wing idea looks good at first glance - hit the returning bombers really hard. Unfortunately by then they have hit the target without interference, without bombs and with less fuel they are lighter and therfore faster and more agile, can head in any direction they want (within reason) and they are already heading home so non-terminal damage is less likely to result in a crash or forced landing on British soil. Plus forming up a big wing takes time and fuel and a big wing is hard to control. Add in that a big group that misses the target is a big gain for the enemy.
Forward bases, early and aggressive interception are definitely my choice. I'm reasonably sure that there is a decisive weapons episode on Hurricanes which is worth a watch as it includes some interesting pilot interviews. It was definitely pre 2000 and actually on TV, though if I have anything wrong please correct me.
The unwanted scenario is where the Big Wing starts lo look like a good idea or is the only idea. That's not good for Britain. There was a lot to be gained from early interception, both to disrupt the bomber formations and to get the escorting fighters to engage early so that they have to return sooner.
The big wing idea looks good at first glance - hit the returning bombers really hard. Unfortunately by then they have hit the target without interference, without bombs and with less fuel they are lighter and therfore faster and more agile, can head in any direction they want (within reason) and they are already heading home so non-terminal damage is less likely to result in a crash or forced landing on British soil. Plus forming up a big wing takes time and fuel and a big wing is hard to control. Add in that a big group that misses the target is a big gain for the enemy.
Forward bases, early and aggressive interception are definitely my choice. I'm reasonably sure that there is a decisive weapons episode on Hurricanes which is worth a watch as it includes some interesting pilot interviews. It was definitely pre 2000 and actually on TV, though if I have anything wrong please correct me.
Tactically attacking the airfields is the right thing to do. There are some problems:
It isn't just airfields. You need to hit the plane construction facilities and they didn't seem to know where they were!
- Luftwaffe fleet make up ( right planes to make the attacks as often as required)
- Correct tactics to deliver the attacks. ( Do the Luftwaffe know HOW to do this kind of campaign?)
- Weight of bombs that can be delivered ( enough bombs to deny airfields)
- Intelligence and lack thereof. ( hitting the right fields - looking at you costal command stations!)
- Knowledge about radar ( lack of understanding of the system and how to damage it)
- Knowledge about the fighter control system ( hitting the central nodes of the system)
It isn't just airfields. You need to hit the plane construction facilities and they didn't seem to know where they were!
I don't think that attacking airfields really is the right thing to do. It's not how the allies beat the LW in 1943/1944 and I've never seen it as a suggested sttrategy.
They beat the LW by outproducing them, forcing them to fight the bombers and letting their own fighters roam free to attack fighters (which I think they did partly by strafing airfields).
AFAIK attritionrate favoured the RAF in the BoB, so that needs to be adressed. Otherwise the best the LW can get is staying in the fight a bit longer, then they need to rebuild (for Barbarossa), and so the BoB is still won by the British.
The British had the home advantage as pilots shot down could just bail out and hop on to new aircraft. The LW had to fly back to occupied France in their damaged or seriously low on fuel aircraft. The British could afford to repair the air fields so it's just a matter of outlasting the Germans.
The name airfield attacks is a bit of a red herring, the German aim was to attack the RAF... so airfields are part of that strategy. In general the main effect was a dislocation of infrastructure that put an added strain on an already stretched defence system. It was a fine balance between guessing where the German formations were going and ensuring the RAF fighters were in the air with time to spare to get to the right altitude and location. Park and his staff were the masters of it.