NO PH, the USN sorties to the PIs?

[elkarlo]

If Japan simply made a DOW, and then went on the offense in WWII. How would the US and especially the USN navy respond to the Japanese invasion of the PI. Esp with the investment of the Bataan pen? With the Pacific fleet afloat, I don't see how public would allow the US to let the PI just fall.

I know that Operation Rainbow (?) was seen as almost impossible by the late 30's. With Mac Arthur though, do you think he would have gone down valiantly, with no calls for a relief effort?

That said, I believe that the PIs would be in trouble much like ITTL, and the Japanese would neutralize the USAAF pretty quickly, and be able to land.

Would the USN sortie, as they have their 3 carriers, and all their battle ships serviceable. Would we see a larger longer Malta like relief convoy? Or just the fleet go charging in to attempt to break the IJA's supply line?

Remember, many Admiral's at this time were still Battleship orientated, and with having more BBs than carriers, I could see the USN thinking that they had a good chance to beat the IJN.

Thoughts?

 

[TFSmith121]

Actually, the RAINBOW war plans covered a

variety of possible situations in the 1940-onward situation (i.e., after the Fall of France), including war only with Japan, war only with Germany, war with and without various allies - RAINBOW 5 was the variant closest to reality (strategic offensive with Germany, strategic defensive with Japan, allied with British Empire and USSR).

The various volumes in the Green Books series lays it out pretty clearly:

http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/ww2-wardept.html

War Plan Orange, which was one of the color plans that preceded RAINBOW, included a variety of responses to a conflict with Japan; the "relieve the Phillippines" option was set aside in the mid-1930s, because mobilization studies in the US had made it clear that the logistics were impossible for an early counter-offensive; basically, by the time (M+90/M+180 days) the US could assemble the fleet train necessary to support the Pacific Fleet and an expeditionary force into the Western Pacific, the Japanese would already be in control of the islands.

See Edward Miller's "War Plan Orange" for an exhaustive discussion of the US options, from 1898 on-ward; Evans and Peattie's "Kaigun" is an analysis from the Japanese side.

Best,

 

[elkarlo]

variety of possible sutuations in the 1940-onward situation (i.e., after the Fall of France), including war only with Japan, war only with Germany, war with and without various allies - RAINBOW 5 was the variant closest to reality (strategic offensive with Germany, strategic defensive with Japan, allied with British Empire and USSR).

The various volumes in the Green Books series lays it out pretty clearly:

http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/ww2-wardept.html

War Plan Orange, which was one of the color plans that preceded RAINBOW, included a variety of responses to a conflict with Japan; the "relieve the Phillippines" option was set aside in the mid-1930s, because mobilization studies in the US had made it clear that the logistics were impossible for an early counter-offensive; basically, by the time (M+90/M+180 days) the US could assemble the fleet train necessary to support the Pacific Fleet and an expeditionary force into the Western Pacific, the Japanese would already be in control of the islands.

See Edward Miller's "War Plan Orange" for an exhaustive discussion of the US options, from 1898 on-ward; Evans and Peattie's "Kaigun" is an analysis from the Japanese side.

Best,

Very interesting, thank you.

I am sorry, I meant Dec 7th the Japanese Declare war, and go on the offense.

I know it would take a significant amount of time to mobilize enough forces to relieve the PIs. But would the US try to anyhow? Throw together a Hawaiian marine brigade or so, and tilt the windmill?

 

[TFSmith121]

Short answer? No.

Germany First had been agreed on at ABC-1, and nothing would change that, as long as the Germans were insane enough to declare war on the US and/or chose not to come to terms...

By mid-late 1941, there was agreement in Washington that if the US forces, particularly in terms of the submarine forces and long-range bombers, in the Far East could be reinforced that the Japanese might be deterred from going into the Phillippines and Guam (hence the deployment to the Far East of resources that could have been used in Hawaii), but even that concept did not translate into a counter-offensive if the Japanese did attack US territory.

Best,

 

[BlondieBC]

Thoughts?

Not enough fuel to reach the PI with all these ships, if memory serves me right. Basically enough fuel to go to Truk Island, hang around a day, come home. Also lack of spare parts, ammo, etc. We simply did not have enough consumables for a major, sustained naval campaign at the start. Situation was rapidly improving, but no where near fast enough to save the PI. Also seems like shortage of drydock space and like in PI for major sustained fleet operations. Basically, the drydocks (major port facilities and like) were limited to Japan proper, Hawaii, Singapore, and West Coast of USA.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I know it would take a significant amount of time to mobilize enough forces to relieve the PIs. But would the US try to anyhow? Throw together a Hawaiian marine brigade or so, and tilt the windmill?

No. As TF Smith wrote it was not the plan. The back story to that is that the USN had repeatedly wargamed, both at sea and on maps, Pacific War scenarios as far back as the early 1920s. Hector Bywaters 'The Great Pacific War' was a thinly fictionalized description of one of these wargames circa 1922-23.

What the USN leaders learned from these games is that it was suicide for the US navy to rush off into the Pacific without extensive preparation. Limited offensive operations to seize outlying islands might start 90 to 180 days after the start of war, but sustained operations might require as much as 18 months or preparation. Until then the strategy was to raid and probe for tactical opportunities. Admirals Kimmels operational plan or guidance issued to the fleet when he took command of the Pacific Fleet was a update of the Navies role in War Plan Orange, which had changed little in the Rainbow 5 plan. While Kimmel made it clear he intended to raid and probe aggresively it was also clear there would be no serious offensive for six to twelve months.

The realities reflected in the Orange plans of the 1920s & 1930s were also reflected in the lack of preparation to defend the Phillipines. The defenses such as they were sufficed to protect Manilia and the US naval base against a raid or coup de main. The Phillipine constabulary, the Phillipines Scouts, and the Corrigidor fortress were not a defense against a serious invasion. There was no point to such a defense since the US Navy could not make a effective relief expedition in time.

 

[TFSmith121]

Point worth making in this context:

The big reason the US was able to go on the counteroffensive at transoceanic distances in both theaters in 1942 (August in the Pacific and November in the Atlantic) is because the US mobilization for total war essentially began in October, 1940, with passage of the Selective Service Act and mobilization of all reserve and Guard components.

If one uses October, 1940, as M Day, then WATCHTOWER came at M+22 months; TORCH came at M+25.

Obviously, Lend-Lease and various short of war measures took resources that would have been available in a one ocean war (US vs. Japan in the late 1930s, for example), but it still gives a guide to the time required to mobilize for a counteroffensive.

It is tougher with the British, since they were on the defensive in multiple theaters almost immedaitely in 1939-40, but a couple of examples worth noting are Operation CRUSADER, which was the first British Army-level offensive in the war, and IRONCLAD, which was their first division-level amphibious assault. CRUSADER began in November, 1941 (M+26 months) and IRONCLAD in May, 1942 (M+32 months), using September, 1939 as M Day.

Best,

 

[CalBear]

The U.S. wouldn't have tried to relieve the Islands, at least not through the oft assumed Taiwan Strait unless there was some sort of dramatic reduction in IJN assets. It was flat out suicide to even consider it unless the IJN air assets on Formosa had been seriously degraded.

What might be possible however, is a southern strategy. This assumes that an alerted Percival wouldn't screw the pooch quite as badly as was the case OTL and probably that Wake isn't lost. This might allow the Allies to move up through the DEI and land forces on Mindanao in enough strength to hold at least that island.

Overall, however, the war plan was correct. The Islands were indefensible with available resources.

 

[elkarlo]

The U.S. wouldn't have tried to relieve the Islands, at least not through the oft assumed Taiwan Strait unless there was some sort of dramatic reduction in IJN assets. It was flat out suicide to even consider it unless the IJN air assets on Formosa had been seriously degraded.

What might be possible however, is a southern strategy. This assumes that an alerted Percival wouldn't screw the pooch quite as badly as was the case OTL and probably that Wake isn't lost. This might allow the Allies to move up through the DEI and land forces on Mindanao in enough strength to hold at least that island.

Overall, however, the war plan was correct. The Islands were indefensible with available resources.

Yes, that seems to be the consensus.

I wonder how the war would be fought then? Would the USN try to a larger Java sea like campaign to stop the Japanese from taking Indonesia?

I would liek to know how the US and the Japanese would fight, and what the battles would look like. As the USN would have a lot of battle ships to throw around

 

[David S Poepoe]

I know it would take a significant amount of time to mobilize enough forces to relieve the PIs. But would the US try to anyhow? Throw together a Hawaiian marine brigade or so, and tilt the windmill?

I could see them either mobilizing a force to both Wake and Midway Islands. Nothing much mind you, no capital ships, but defenses would probably be strengthened to a degree.

 

[TFSmith121]

US stands on the defensive in the Pacific;

"Germany First" meant just that.

In RAINBOW 5, basically the US Pacific strategy would be to:

1. Protect the Alaska-Hawaii-Panama triangle;
2. Defend the SLOC to New Zealand and Australia;
3. Defend Australia;
4. Raid the Mandates (Japanese territories in Micronesia);
5. Attempt to defend the Malay Barrier (Indonesia, essentially);

Once the NEI fall, the basic strategy of defending Australia in Papua would presumably be the default; however, with stronger forces in Hawaii (because of no Oahu Raid) from Dec. 7, it is possible the Coral Sea and (especially) Midway battles might be even more in the US favor than historically.

That could lead to an earlier Central Pacific counter-offensive (GALVANIC/ FLINTLOCK/FORAGER in place of WATCHTOWER/LANDCRAB/COTTAGE) which moves things forward roughly six months, so the US is landing in the Phillippines in the summer of 1944, rather than the fall.

Presumably that leads to the end game against Japan in early 1945, rather than in the fall of 1945. VE Day and VJ Day may be within a few days of another, rather than a few months.

Best,

 

[LHB]

What could the defenders of the PIs do to hold out long enough for the Plan Orange sortie to relieve them? Is that within the realm of possibility if Dugout Doug chokes on his pipe and dies at a convenient moment?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Started serious preparations for a Phillipines Army a decade earlier. The cost of creating a native PI army was larger than the US tax payers could cough up, in the short run. Spreading that cost over a decade might make it managable.

Alternately, start reinforcing from the US en mass in 1940. This would include a crash construction program of warehousing to depot food and other supplies.I am unsure how effective that would be, with just 15-16 months from the passage of the War Powers Acts to Japans DoW. In OTL th effort undertaken might have bourne results after 20 months - April 1942. Or maybe not. In either case it means a large modification of the Europe First decision.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Yes, that seems to be the consensus.

I wonder how the war would be fought then? Would the USN try to a larger Java sea like campaign to stop the Japanese from taking Indonesia?

US efforts to support he ABDA command floundered on the lack of cargo ships in the Pacific to supply the very distant battle front.

I would liek to know how the US and the Japanese would fight, and what the battles would look like. As the USN would have a lot of battle ships to throw around

When the naval battles developed around the Solomons in autum 1942 the admirals held back the older battleships. The Washington and South Dakota fought while the older BB sat in reserve doing escort of convoys to Australia. The older BB were too slow to dart in and out of the enemy air cover, or to manuver with the carrier forces. For the battle of Midway Nimitz sent the BB back to the west coast of the US. They were all the older ships & more of a hindrance in the type of battle that had developed. The modern US BB launched after 1940 had nearly the speed of a cruiser and needed every knot of that speed to survive the battles in the South Pacific.

 

[TxCoatl1970]

@LHB - I'm not a fan of Dugout Doug, who pulled more than a few boners when the IJN showed up.

TBF, barring years of preparation and the US plowing a huge amount of defense $$$ arming, training, and laying in the TOE and ammo/supplies for the Philippine Scouts and Philippine Army from say 1938 on and having a well-drilled combined-arms defense plan, it wouldn't have mattered much who was in charge of the US/Filipino defenses.

Personally as a squid, I'd have loved to have a few air/sub/PT bases merrily wreaking havoc on the Japanese SLOC, whether PH happens or not, but the USA/USN/USAAC weren't thinking in guerrilla mode yet.

As mentioned upthread, all USN staff exercises pointed to way too long (25 mos) for the Philippines to be relieved in force.

 

[TFSmith121]

Short answer: Nothing

What could the defenders of the PIs do to hold out long enough for the Plan Orange sortie to relieve them?

As it was, the Filipino and US forces on Bataan/Corregidor held out until the second quarter of 1942, which - considering the correlation of forces - was actually pretty impressive.

The Japanese could have committed stronger forces to Luzon, but it would have required postponing their operations in the NEI, which - given that the oil of the NEI was essentially what they were going to war FOR - was a non-starter.

It is worth remembering that the ground forces the Japanese committed to their initial (1941 to Q2, 1942) amounted to about 12 infantry division equivalents, of which they never had more than about four afloat and combat loaded.

That's pretty impressive, given that the first time the Allies had more than one division afloat for an assault was TORCH, in November, 1942, but it still was not enough to allow them to do anything more than what they accomplished historically, and even then it was a pretty near thing on several occasions.

Nonetheless, they still managed to create local superiority most everywhere they tried (other than 1st Wake), which actually shows how slender the Allied resources were at the same time in the Western Pacific.

Best,