No Nazi Takeover in Germany 1933 - Which other dictatorships are averted, too?

[Salvador79]

A wave of coups and self-coups, sometimes succeeding very smoothly, in a few cases (like France in 1934) failing, in others (Austria and Spain) leading to shorter or longer civil wars, washed over Europe in the 1930s. In many places, they resulted in the installation of dictatorships, very often of a far-right character. Spain, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Latvia, and Estonia come to mind. (I certainly forgot some.)

The archetype of this sort of far right takeover is Fascist Italy, of course, whose establishment dates from the 1920s. Other places turned to into far-right dictatorships temporarily or more permanently in the 1920s already, too: Hungary, Portugal, Spain temporarily under Primo de Rivera, or into less clearly ideologically defined sorts of dictatorships (Poland, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia).

But, I would argue, the takeover of the Nazis in Germany must clearly have been a catalyst in the further spread of this phenomenon in 1933ff. And this for two reasons: firstly, it immediately inspired imitators, and secondly, most important for smaller nation states in Eastern Europe, the increased threat from a Nazi Germany from the West (combined with the continuing threat by Soviet Russia in the East) may have helped in a spirit of militarisation and military takeovers in such countries.

But what is the extent of the influence of the Nazi takeover? Which of the above-mentioned dictatorships would still be established without the Nazi Machtergreifung, which ones would be most likely not to happen?

Let us not dwell on Germany here. Just assume that the Weimar Republic stays a democratic state, Hitler never becomes chancellor etc. I am interested in the implications this has on the above-mentioned transformations and to what extent it inhibits them.

 

[HJ Tulp]

A wave of coups and self-coups, sometimes succeeding very smoothly, in a few cases (like France in 1934) failing, in others (Austria and Spain) leading to shorter or longer civil wars, washed over Europe in the 1930s. In many places, they resulted in the installation of dictatorships, very often of a far-right character. Spain, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Latvia, and Estonia come to mind. (I certainly forgot some.)

The archetype of this sort of far right takeover is Fascist Italy, of course, whose establishment dates from the 1920s. Other places turned to into far-right dictatorships temporarily or more permanently in the 1920s already, too: Hungary, Portugal, Spain temporarily under Primo de Rivera, or into less clearly ideologically defined sorts of dictatorships (Poland, Lithuania, and Yugoslavia).

But, I would argue, the takeover of the Nazis in Germany must clearly have been a catalyst in the further spread of this phenomenon in 1933ff. And this for two reasons: firstly, it immediately inspired imitators, and secondly, most important for smaller nation states in Eastern Europe, the increased threat from a Nazi Germany from the West (combined with the continuing threat by Soviet Russia in the East) may have helped in a spirit of militarisation and military takeovers in such countries.

But what is the extent of the influence of the Nazi takeover? Which of the above-mentioned dictatorships would still be established without the Nazi Machtergreifung, which ones would be most likely not to happen?

Let us not dwell on Germany here. Just assume that the Weimar Republic stays a democratic state, Hitler never becomes chancellor etc. I am interested in the implications this has on the above-mentioned transformations and to what extent it inhibits them.

To be honest I'm not sure how much of a boon the rise of Hitler was for the other European fascists. It is very well possible that the Dutch NSB lost a lot of support because of things like the Kristallnacht.

 

[marktaha]

Maybe Spain different- without German support for Franco,that is.

 

[Salvador79]

To be honest I'm not sure how much of a boon the rise of Hitler was for the other European fascists. It is very well possible that the Dutch NSB lost a lot of support because of things like the Kristallnacht.

That is an interesting perspective, and I see your point.
On the other hand, the Kristallnacht was in 1938, and the Netherlands are not on the above list anyway. Things look a lot different in, say, 1934, and Austria, to pick just one example. More on that below.

Maybe Spain different- without German support for Franco,that is.

That's the first thing I thought about, too. Assuming Franco does coup in the first place. But let's say he does. Less German support means there's still Italian support, though. I'm no expert on the Spanish Civil War, but I suppose even without German support, the Republican side, being much more heterogeneous and less coherent, will ultimately lose; maybe a year later with mostly only Communists still holding out in the end (since they're the only ones receiving external support on the Republican side here)?

I don't really know enough about the Bulgarian, Greek, Latvian and Estonian situations, so the only ones I'll comment on are Austria and Romania. Their coups are quite a while apart: 1933 and 1938, and the internal and external situation is very different.
But in both cases, there were anti-democratic self-coups where right-leaning governments (Dollfuß in Austria, King Carol in Romania) assumed power even AGAINST explicitly pro-Nazi groups, so HJ Tulp's argument, while valid, does not weaken mine.

Let's look at Austria first. In March 1933, in a situation of parliamentary crisis, the government declared that Parliament had just suspended itself, and Dollfuß started to govern autocratically. The social democrats soon rose in opposition, but the Austrofascists emerged victorious and constitutionally erected their system in 1934.
I dare formulate the hypothesis that if no extraparliamentary rule happened in Germany, no February Decrees and the persecution of the left-leaning political opposition, that March 1933 also does not mark the beginning of a Dollfuß autocracy in Austria, either. Parliamentary crises caused by the Christian Socials' sharp right course and yet their rivalries with other far right groups had occurred often before. They could have gone on for quite a while. For Austria, German events have always been important and influential. The German model of simply doing away with the unruly parliament and eliminating the left was what prompted the Austrian Right to try something similar. No Hitler chancellery and no February Decrees - then I consider it fairly likely that Austria also trudges on with its right-wing coalition government, and the social democrats also don't rise up in revolt, and in 1934, there are new elections, which will probably not change the situation too massively, with the Social Democrats gaining yet a little more votes, but still not enough for a majority of their own. But the Great Depression begins to subside, and whichever path Weimar takes out of its impasse is likely to influence Austria's path, too.

On to Romania in 1938. This was already a time in which questions of foreign policy had risen to great prominence and played out in the context of "Berlin-Rome or Paris-London", a context which would not exist in a TL with a continuing Weimar. Likewise, Codreanu would not have had German support, and Goga, while clearly being an anti-semite to the bone, would not have had the German example of massively open antisemitic policies. Carol clearly wanted similar royal powers like his neighboring Balkan monarchs, and so he played a devilish role in weakening Romanian democracy, which he might be tempted to do in any TL, but in a TL without massive Nazi German influence, this might not work too easily. The Romanian party political landscape is still highly polarised and even violently so, on the other hand. Therefore, I think that there's about a 50-50 chance for Carol still taking on dictatorial powers.

 

[Beefhammer]

Less German support means there's still Italian support, though. I'm no expert on the Spanish Civil War, but I suppose even without German support, the Republican side, being much more heterogeneous and less coherent, will ultimately lose; maybe a year later with mostly only Communists still holding out in the end (since they're the only ones receiving external support on the Republican side here)?

Or, without an openly revanchist and hostile Germany to worry about, Britain and France feel more secure aiding the Second Republic, in the process cockblocking Stalin's plan to become the power behind the throne because the Soviet Union is no longer the only one in Madrid's corner.

 

[Lee-Sensei]

Maybe Spain different- without German support for Franco,that is.

Most of Franco’s support in the Civil War came from Italy. Portugal would also offer support. I imagine that he’d still win.

 

[Thon Taddeo]

In Estonia, Konstantin Pats exploited fears of the Nazi takeover to justify the banning of the supposedly crypto-Nazi Veterans' League, which paved the way to Pats' dictatorship. It might not stop Pats, but without the threat of Nazism, he might have a little more difficulty getting support and making himself dictator.

 

[Salvador79]

Or, without an openly revanchist and hostile Germany to worry about, Britain and France feel more secure aiding the Second Republic, in the process cockblocking Stalin's plan to become the power behind the throne because the Soviet Union is no longer the only one in Madrid's corner.

How much political will and interest was there actually in Paris and London to support the Second Republic? I am somewhat doubtful...

In Estonia, Konstantin Pats exploited fears of the Nazi takeover to justify the banning of the supposedly crypto-Nazi Veterans' League, which paved the way to Pats' dictatorship. It might not stop Pats, but without the threat of Nazism, he might have a little more difficulty getting support and making himself dictator.

Thanks for that background information! That makes sense. If I'm not much mistaken, Ulmanis argued in a similar way in Latvia? That sounds like both countries staying in the democratic camp is not entirely implausible.

 

[stodge]

By 1933, much of central and eastern Europe had states governed by dictatorships - I wouldn't call them fascist for the most part but they were nationalist and authoritarian.

They had succeeded in holding the post-1918 settlement together where democracy hadn't. That often meant internalising nationalist grievances within states "waiting for the day" when these grievances would be resolved on the battlefield. The other side of this was the threat of communism - that was seen primarily as a threat to the "middle classes" in the cities though that was extended to the countryside with the threat of forced collectivisation. Those with wealth saw communism as inherently antithetic to their way of life and backed any political person or movement who was forthright in their denunciation of anything which even smacked of communism such as socialism and trades unions of any kind.

Plural democracy functions on the premise the more voices that are heard the more the arguments are contained within democratic structures and can be resolved via the democratic process (Hitler would show that to be grotesquely naive). The problem was plurality by its nature included the voices of the "left", of socialism, of workers' rights and for those in dread of communism of any kind, that was too much. Democracy was an easy price to pay for the guarantee of lifestyle, of privilege, of status.

If you make people frightened enough, they'll vote away their rights without a second thought. The sceptre of armed communist revolutionaries at home and the Red Army invading from Russia was enough to make large numbers of people give up their democratic rights and accept authoritarianism couched in nationalism.

 

[Wendell]

Arrow Cross rule in Hungary.

 

[Salvador79]

By 1933, much of central and eastern Europe had states governed by dictatorships - I wouldn't call them fascist for the most part but they were nationalist and authoritarian.

But a lot more changed after 1933. By the time of the Nazi takeover in early 1933, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, and Yugoslavia were dictatorships. Estonia, Latvia, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece were still democratic states. By 1938, only Czechoslovakia was left.

They had succeeded in holding the post-1918 settlement together where democracy hadn't.

Not really. The story of most of these authoritarian-nationalist dictatorships (perhaps excluding the early years of Hungarian autocracy, which were brutal but fairly stable) was one of great instability, I would argue. They were threatened all the time by yet more far-right-leaning groups, internal inter-ethnic tensions escalated, and it wouldn't be long until they would jump on the bandwagon of a war that would obliterate many of them for decades as truly sovereign entities. The narrative of STABILITY was exactly what dictators like Ulmanis, Päts, Horthy, Dollfuß and Schuschnigg, Pilsudski, Smetona, Carol and Antonescu etc. told their populations. As a historical description, it is highly inadequate, I would say. Not meaning that far-right dictatorships can't be stable for a long while - Portugal and Spain clearly show that this was a distinct possibility. But most of those who promised this stability in exchange for freedom and democracy did not really deliver even on that promise.

But I'm digressing from my question...

That often meant internalising nationalist grievances within states "waiting for the day" when these grievances would be resolved on the battlefield. The other side of this was the threat of communism - that was seen primarily as a threat to the "middle classes" in the cities though that was extended to the countryside with the threat of forced collectivisation. Those with wealth saw communism as inherently antithetic to their way of life and backed any political person or movement who was forthright in their denunciation of anything which even smacked of communism such as socialism and trades unions of any kind.

Plural democracy functions on the premise the more voices that are heard the more the arguments are contained within democratic structures and can be resolved via the democratic process (Hitler would show that to be grotesquely naive). The problem was plurality by its nature included the voices of the "left", of socialism, of workers' rights and for those in dread of communism of any kind, that was too much. Democracy was an easy price to pay for the guarantee of lifestyle, of privilege, of status.

If you make people frightened enough, they'll vote away their rights without a second thought. The sceptre of armed communist revolutionaries at home and the Red Army invading from Russia was enough to make large numbers of people give up their democratic rights and accept authoritarianism couched in nationalism.

Yeah, anti-communism was certainly one factor. Interestingly enough, as some posts here have shown, even fear of a "more extreme right-wingers" were an important factor in the establishment of "less extreme right-wing" dictatorships after 1933. Beyond that, there are the heavy difficulties which both conservatism and liberalism had in adapting to modern mass democracy in Europe; they no longer absorbed their bourgeois electorate, which then strayed, for example towards the Nazis in Germany. And, of course, there was the social upheaval and impoverishment caused by the Great Depression in which large parts of the "middle classes" lost that lifestyle you talked about or had to fear it - let's not forget that many fascists, Nazis etc. did not only feature anti-communist, but also anti-capitalist rhetoric.

Arrow Cross rule in Hungary.

That one is fairly evident, I agree. I didn't even include them, since that was a war collateral, and Hungary had been authoritarian-nationalist for over two decades by that point already. Another one I did not really include in that list is the Hlinka dictatorship in Slovakia, another puppet which the Nazis created.

 

[TheRealAndOnlyGaru]

That's the first thing I thought about, too. Assuming Franco does coup in the first place. But let's say he does. Less German support means there's still Italian support, though. I'm no expert on the Spanish Civil War, but I suppose even without German support, the Republican side, being much more heterogeneous and less coherent, will ultimately lose; maybe a year later with mostly only Communists still holding out in the end (since they're the only ones receiving external support on the Republican side here)?

Part of Franco's argument for leadership among the Spanish generals were his connections to Germany and Italy. Without said connection to Germany in this scenario, some other general might have better chances at becoming the Nationalists' top dog.

 

[Anarchomando]

So who is going to be in its place if the Nazis don't rise?
I personally always say Rosa and the rest of the sparties


cuz if that's the case it could avoid a lot of other dictatorships

 

[Zephyr Stobart]

So who is going to be in its place if the Nazis don't rise?
I personally always say Rosa and the rest of the sparties


cuz if that's the case it could avoid a lot of other dictatorships

Strasser maybe? He wouldn't be a Nazi member in this scenario.

 

[Anarchomando]

Strasser maybe? He wouldn't be a Nazi member in this scenario.

Na here's the thing.


Although it would be useful to get rid of the society thing of those Rich German assholes who were blaming the Jews

The kind that basically act like the Koch brothers of its day, I can't remember its name



Yeah we might have to get rid of them before anything happens

 

[Salvador79]

So who is going to be in its place if the Nazis don't rise?
I personally always say Rosa and the rest of the sparties


cuz if that's the case it could avoid a lot of other dictatorships

That's a very early PoD that would change much.

I asked the question in a background scan for a scenario which may or may not become a TL some day. The PoD would be a different outcome in the 1925 presidential elections and different governments going into the Great Depression. I am pondering whether I want a coup against a SPD-led minority government, which then fails after a civil war (basically Spain but with a different outcome), or just stumbling on until times are less troubled. The question is part of the background check on the No Coup version.

 

[Salvador79]

Part of Franco's argument for leadership among the Spanish generals were his connections to Germany and Italy. Without said connection to Germany in this scenario, some other general might have better chances at becoming the Nationalists' top dog.

Great input, thanks! Got any suggestions who you think might lead the coup instead?