No British guarantee

[Michele]

The British decision to issue guarantees to Poland was not carefully thought out, nor unopposed within the British Cabinet itself. Does anybody remember any past good thread on the issue, or has anybody written an ATL about this? It should be a rather obvious POD about this key juncture.
If it's been discussed over and over again - my apologies, but... thanks in advance for any pointer.

 

[Jordat]

The British decision to issue guarantees to Poland was not carefully thought out, nor unopposed within the British Cabinet itself. Does anybody remember any past good thread on the issue, or has anybody written an ATL about this? It should be a rather obvious POD about this key juncture.
If it's been discussed over and over again - my apologies, but... thanks in advance for any pointer.

Would Poland fold to Hitlers demands? Not sure if by this time he was eager for war after being denied it over Czechoslovakia. If not, then would Poland just become a German puppet? I'm not sure of the Polish mind set at this time.

I'm also thinking no need for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact either.

Also no, I'm not aware of any past post - so good opportunity for discussion

 

[Wozza]

The British decision to issue guarantees to Poland was not carefully thought out, nor unopposed within the British Cabinet itself. Does anybody remember any past good thread on the issue, or has anybody written an ATL about this? It should be a rather obvious POD about this key juncture.
If it's been discussed over and over again - my apologies, but... thanks in advance for any pointer.

Well, the British need some sort of alternative policy, they cannot just ignore Hitler, unless one starts to make a lot of changes - such as no seizure of Prague.

I'm not sure of the Polish mind set at this time.

The Poles are prey in the unfortunate position of thinking themselves predators.

 

[Tizoc]

Well, the obvious change is that Germany attacks Poland on 26th August 1939... About state's attitudes - they remain unchanged. All in all it will end with a bit shorter campaign in Poland...

 

[PMN1]

Calling Tony Williams and the 'Foresight War'......


​

 

[seraphim74]

Originally posted by Jordat

Would Poland fold to Hitlers demands? Not sure if by this time he was eager for war after being denied it over Czechoslovakia. If not, then would Poland just become a German puppet? I'm not sure of the Polish mind set at this time.

I don't know if Hitler was all too eager for war, but he certainly was ready to fight it. He wouldn't have minded to conquer Poland without a fight, but he was more than willing to crush it by force.
And as far as Poland becoming German puppet - NO WAY IN HELL. Poles were very proud of their independence. Also, they weren't so affraid of Germany, because they didn't know abou Blitzkrieg - Polish campaign was to be the first real test of that strategy. Also, Poles underestimated a brutality of coming war; they believed German army would act like during WWI - harsh, but without any bigger war crimes.
Another thing: Poles really believed their army could stop Germans at least for some time to give their western ally (France) an opportunity to strike. British guarantees were wonderful news for Poles, but their biggest hope was France, tied with Poland with military treaty. So Poland would have fought even without British promises of help.
Besides, no Polish goverment could accept Hitler's demands. It would have meant pushing Poland from Baltic Sea. And after occupation of Czechoslovakia nobody believed it would be the last of Hitler's demands. Most probably next would be demand of incorporating Pomerania and Silesia to Germany, then Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) - in short, return of German border from 1914.

 

[Tony Williams]

Calling Tony Williams and the 'Foresight War'......​

Hmm? He said dozily. Oh, that, right....

There's a certain novel called The Foresight War, for which the starting assumption is that present-day British and German historians wake up in 1934, and do their best to change history.

One thing the British chap is insistent on is that it was a very bad idea for most of the British Army to be plopped in France in the path of the German juggernaut, so under no circumstances must any kind of guarantee be given to Poland...you can read Chapter 1 on the publisher's website (there's a link to it from the main novel page above).

 

[Markus]

Hmm? He said dozily. Oh, that, right....

There's a certain novel called The Foresight War, for which the starting assumption is that present-day British and German historians wake up in 1934, and do their best to change history.

Sounds interesting, I´ll take a look, but the idea of a german historian working for the Nazis is very much ASB. Some right-wing revisionist might do that, but not an actual historian. No way!

 

[Jukra]

Sounds interesting, I´ll take a look, but the idea of a german historian working for the Nazis is very much ASB. Some right-wing revisionist might do that, but not an actual historian. No way!

I completely agree, but doesn't that provoke another question:

The "Nazi Fanboy goes back in time to give Wunderweapons to Reich" has been done, but how about a German historian who goes to Germany of 1930's and with his foresight starts to sabotage Nazi war effort, but obviously does not want the end result of World War Two with Germany in ruins and Soviet Union in control of Eastern Europe?

 

[Michele]

The idea is that the British issue no guarantee – that is, after the disappearance of what remained of Czechoslovakia. As to their needing another policy, that may be true, or not.
If it's true, the alternate policy might be to remain with their hands free. Without guarantees, they can still find another reason to go to war when that suits them – and given Hitler's attitude, he'll be giving them plenty of other reasons down the line. This choice, however, carries a strong risk that the French will feel left alone to deal with the German threat to Poland, and it's difficult to case what they'll do if not supported by the British.
It is also possible that the British do not feel they need another policy for Germany. The point of the British policy on the continent has always been to prevent any one power from gaining hegemony or supremacy. Now, most people today agree that Nazi Germany was indeed hell-bent on that. But did Halifax, for one, share that assessment? What if the British Cabinet concluded that it wasn't so? What if they thought that there was indeed one continental country more dangerous than Germany, i.e., the Soviet Union?

Seraphim74, I agree with your assessment as to the Polish stance. Had the government accepted Germany's demands, they would have faced very strong internal opposition. There were plenty of extreme-right nationalism in Poland at the time. There would certainly have been demonstrations in Warsaw, maybe cases of insubordination in the army, and probably ethnic-related rioting in places like Bydgoszcz. The latter would have offered Hitler an excuse anyway.
Besides, given the Czech case, everybody knew what happened if one acquiesced to Hitler's initial demands; more demands would follow.

Tony Williams, I'm surprised with the British historian. He doesn't sound like one who really studied the German Blitzkrieg in France and the Netherlands. Just deploying that BEF _exactly_ in the path of the German so-called juggernaut, i.e., at the exit of the Ardennes, would more than do the trick. Especially if we add a Belgian historian to tell his Belgian guys to fortify the upper end of Eben-Emael, but that would be icing on the cake.

 

[Tony Williams]

Sounds interesting, I´ll take a look, but the idea of a german historian working for the Nazis is very much ASB. Some right-wing revisionist might do that, but not an actual historian. No way!

He isn't a Nazi, but (as a former East German) he has a powerful personal motivation connected with preventing East Germany from being taken over by the Soviets. I won't be giving too much away by saying that his only son was killed trying to get over the Wall.

 

[Tony Williams]

Tony Williams, I'm surprised with the British historian. He doesn't sound like one who really studied the German Blitzkrieg in France and the Netherlands. Just deploying that BEF _exactly_ in the path of the German so-called juggernaut, i.e., at the exit of the Ardennes, would more than do the trick. Especially if we add a Belgian historian to tell his Belgian guys to fortify the upper end of Eben-Emael, but that would be icing on the cake.

What you are forgetting is that the Germans have a "throwback" too: so the German army is even better equipped, organised and informed than in RL, and is devastatingly effective. The two historians find out about each other, so the British one no longer knows if they will attack through the Ardennes...

The British Army is better too, but British priorities have to be with the navy and the RAF, both to defend against invasion and to keep the N Atlantic trade routes going, so the British army is always going to be much smaller and less effective than the German one: and they focus on keeping the Germans out of Norway.

And the French and Belgians do not benefit from such advice, so are no better than in RL (both Britain and Germany keep their "throwbacks" a closely-guarded secret).

 

[Michele]

The two historians find out about each other, so the British one no longer knows if they will attack through the Ardennes...

Ah, I see. That evens the field, yes.

 

[Wozza]

One thing the British chap is insistent on is that it was a very bad idea for most of the British Army to be plopped in France in the path of the German juggernaut, so under no circumstances must any kind of guarantee be given to Poland...you can read Chapter 1 on the publisher's website (there's a link to it from the main novel page above).

The notion that, with the benefit of hindsight the best thing for Britain to do between 1934-1949 is to effectively ignore the Continent- and thus condemn itself to the same disastrous isolation as 1940, is simply preposterous.

There are about twenty vastly superior alternatives - ranging from fighting over the Czech crisis, an alliance with the USSR, bringing Italy onside, bringing "regime change to Italy, or simply having a superior ground force in place in 1940.

 

[Wozza]

If it's true, the alternate policy might be to remain with their hands free. Without guarantees, they can still find another reason to go to war when that suits them – and given Hitler's attitude, he'll be giving them plenty of other reasons down the line.

The British are not trying to go to war with Hitler - they are trying not to whilst still containing him. The whole point is deterrence. Short of a guarantee and the threat of war how can Hitler be deterred?

The only alternative policy is one advocated by some French strategists of abandoning the East, and building up an anti-German bloc in western Europe, a kind of proto-NATO facing Germany. Such a policy would certainly not be then have been popular in Britain, also it would have faced severe credibility issues.

Edit: There is also the issue of timing, Britain and France felt that they were finally catching up with Germany on armaments but that they would not be able to sustain this unless war came soon. They therefore judged 1939 a good time to settle the issue one way or another. A different re-armament timetable would be the best way to remove the guarantee.

 

[Tony Williams]

The notion that, with the benefit of hindsight the best thing for Britain to do between 1934-1949 is to effectively ignore the Continent- and thus condemn itself to the same disastrous isolation as 1940, is simply preposterous.

There are about twenty vastly superior alternatives - ranging from fighting over the Czech crisis, an alliance with the USSR, bringing Italy onside, bringing "regime change to Italy, or simply having a superior ground force in place in 1940.

You can write your version, I wrote mine

I suggest that you read at least the first chapter, which explains the reasoning, before commenting.

 

[Wozza]

You can write your version, I wrote mine

I suggest that you read at least the first chapter, which explains the reasoning, before commenting.

True enough, and I paid to download it, and read much of it. so you win I suppose. I just thought that what you did with military technology might have been explore in a more plausibly strategic/political context.

 

[DuQuense]

Well, the obvious change is that Germany attacks Poland on 26th August 1939... About state's attitudes - they remain unchanged. All in all it will end with a bit shorter campaign in Poland...

Not so sure about this.
Without a British Gaurentee, The Poles would have continued mobilizing that last weekend in August.
Even without full mobilization the Poles held out for 6 weeks, and forced the Germans to burn 6 months worth of supplies.
Even At full Moilization I doubt the Polish forces could have stopped the Germans, But they would have hurt the Germans worse.

Early May 1940 was the soonest the Germans were recovered from the Polish Attack,
If the Invasion of France/Holland is delayed to the end of May, or into June , every thing from the Weather over Holland, to number of French Planes, location of Troops ECT is changed.

 

[PMN1]

There is a version called Foresight America as well, various other countries get their throwbacks

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/ForesightAmerica.htm

What the Japanese and Soviet ones have to say is not exactly welcomed...

I suspect there would be plenty on the Allied side who would see a throwback as a source of danger as well as a benefit as he/she is going to know where a lot of skeletons are buried.

 

[Markus]

He isn't a Nazi, but (as a former East German) he has a powerful personal motivation connected with preventing East Germany from being taken over by the Soviets. I won't be giving too much away by saying that his only son was killed trying to get over the Wall.

I´ll already ordered the book, so I´ll wait and than read.

One thing that you guys have not mentioned so far; since 1935 Germany was rearming as fast as possible and still the process was far, far from completed in 1939- few decent tanks, inexperienced infantry you know it. If the Brits get to benefit from hindsight could rearm sooner, while the Germans could not speed up things at all. The result would be much stronger allies, especially if France can be convinced to rearm sooner, too.