No Battle of Okinawa?

[Simon]

The Battle of Okinawa was an incredibly bloody affair which, similar to the Battle of Iwo Jima, has been subsequently questioned as to whether it was worth it. Just over six weeks after it concluded the first nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, three days later the second was dropped on Nagasaki and the Soviet Union declared war on Japan, with their surrendering roughly a week later.

Do people think it was worth it? Would Japan have still surrendered if they hadn't been taken, or was the loss of Japanese territory and potential marshalling point for an invasion near the Home Islands needed to give them a necessary jolt?

 

[History Learner]

Yes.

The island was needed for and ultimately did become a much needed air base to escort bombing missions over Japan but more importantly was to be the main logistical base for the invasion of the Home Islands. Without it, Operation DOWNFALL becomes much harder if not impossible; the atomic bombs as decisive only makes sense in hindsight with regards to U.S. war planning.

 

[Winestu]

-At the time most people involved in the planning of Downfall didn’t know that Manhattan even existed.
-There was no guarantee that Trinity would work.
-IMHO, Okinawa was part of a rapid series of events that proved to (most of the) Japanese high command the futility of continuing the war. It wasn’t just “the bomb” alone.

 

[Bellacinos]

Okinawa is often considered the dress rehearsal for the invasion of Japan and showed the US that they needed to try to find another way besides downfall.

 

[History Learner]

-IMHO, Okinawa was part of a rapid series of events that proved to (most of the) Japanese high command the futility of continuing the war. It wasn’t just “the bomb” alone.

The military leadership, even into the end, was in favor of not surrendering; it came down to Hirohito's "sacred decision". Even then, you had the 8-15 Coup Incident.

Okinawa is often considered the dress rehearsal for the invasion of Japan and showed the US that they needed to try to find another way besides downfall.

This has been coming up long before Okinawa; as far back as the Marshalls in mid-1944 JCS was beginning to realize how insanely bloody Japan was going to be.

 

[Simon]

The island was needed for and ultimately did become a much needed air base to escort bombing missions over Japan...

How much of an effective air defence force did Japan have left by that point? I know that was part of the justification for Iwo Jima but the ranges involved made it rather spurious. I've come across some mentions of bombers being diverted from attacking the Japanese mainland to supporting the invasion of Okinawa which suggests it might not have been vital.

At the time most people involved in the planning of Downfall didn’t know that Manhattan even existed. There was no guarantee that Trinity would work.

True, but their superiors knew about it. Why not plan out the operation but delay implementation a few months since the nuclear test was imminent? You're already running large-scale firebombing missions from Tinian so I'm not sure it really loses you much. If turning most of Japan's cities to ash and then the nuclear bombs haven't induced surrender you can still invade Okinawa.

 

[HMS Audacious]

Yes. If you don't invade okinawa then possibly the war in the Pacific lasts into 46-47 as Japan has the bomb but no way to use it. Six fat man would be ready by 46 so say goodbye to Hiroshima Nagasaki Kyoto Kobe and any other major city not fire bombed. You would possibly have the tiger force using the first gen jet bombers bombing Japanese cities high above both Japanese jets and flack

 

[raharris1973]

Yes. If you don't invade okinawa then possibly the war in the Pacific lasts into 46-47 as Japan has the bomb but no way to use it. Six fat man would be ready by 46 so say goodbye to Hiroshima Nagasaki Kyoto Kobe and any other major city not fire bombed. You would possibly have the tiger force using the first gen jet bombers bombing Japanese cities high above both Japanese jets and flack

I do not understand any of the underlined assertions or assumptions.

 

[A Piece of History]

Yes. If you don't invade okinawa then possibly the war in the Pacific lasts into 46-47 as Japan has the bomb but no way to use it.

Wait, what? How do they produce the bomb with no uranium!? I doubt they're going to be looking for uranium in 1945 when the Japanese economy is in ruins and it is far too late to begin exploring Fukushima Prefecture and Korea!

You would possibly have the tiger force using the first gen jet bombers bombing Japanese cities high above both Japanese jets and flack

WHAT!? The Japanese Army Air Service was effectively neutralized as a viable threat to the Allies by 1945!

 

[History Learner]

How much of an effective air defence force did Japan have left by that point? I know that was part of the justification for Iwo Jima but the ranges involved made it rather spurious. I've come across some mentions of bombers being diverted from attacking the Japanese mainland to supporting the invasion of Okinawa which suggests it might not have been vital.

In August of 1945 they had over 12,000 planes and 18,000 pilots with enough fuel left for a maximum air effort against any landing force invading Japan; the reason they disappeared over Japan by the Summer of '45 was a deliberate effort to lull the U.S. into a false sense of security and to conserve their strength. As for Okinawa, temporarily supporting landings is not a wash in this; you gotta think long term how many bombers would be saved.

Also, with the invasion of Japan coming, they needed Okinawa as the origin point of supplies and troops.

 

[A Piece of History]

Don't listen to the allied propaganda. They built it in Korea and managed to get enough uranium for one bomb. They detonated it i think two days before Hiroshima.

What, you mean this?

Japan Tested Atomic Bomb in NK Before End of WWII?

Japan Tested Atomic Bomb in NK Before End of WWII?

www.koreatimes.co.kr

.

Many modern researchers find fault with Wakabayashi's claims including Walter E. Grunden who compared the American plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee (93 square miles with 82,000 personnel all dedicated to the production of U-235) to Hamheung, a mere 15 square miles, which at its peak probably had about 45,000 personnel, many of them ``Korean laborers, conscripted students, convicts, and prisoners of war,'' who were primarily involved in ``manufacturing synthetic fuel, explosives, and industrial chemicals.'' Grunden also claims that there were only five buildings in Hamheung that the United States was unsure of their purpose

On August 29, 1945, they [The Soviets] shot down an American B-29 attempting to drop provisions and medical supplies at an allied prisoner of war camp near the city. They later claimed they thought the aircraft might have been a Japanese bomber even though it had American markings and the war had ended nearly two weeks earlier.

But even this is not completely correct. According to Bill Streifer, the co-author of The Flight of the Hog Wild, there were three B-29s sent out on a ``mercy mission'' to provide food and supplies for the 302 British and 52 Australian POWs held near Hamheng. While the first two B-29s may have been legitimate, the third B-29, known as the Hog Wild, was probably on a photo recon mission.

The Hog Wild was one of the newest B-29s and was equipped with the most sophisticated radar and a high-precision K-20 camera. Unlike the first two B-29s, the Hog Wild circled Hamheung several times before the suspicious Russians sent four fighters that intercepted and ordered it to land at a nearby Russian-controlled airfield.

When the Hog Wild declined it was attacked and forced to land. The crew was held for 18 days before being released. Streifer doesn't believe an atomic bomb was ever tested in Hamhung. In an email correspondence he wrote,

``I have personally interviewed an allied prisoner of war who was about five miles away at the time. He didn't recall an explosion at sea. I also read the diaries of other POWs, and they make no mention of an explosion at sea. If an atomic bomb explodes five miles away, you'll know it!''

 

[CalBear]

Don't listen to the allied propaganda. They built it in Korea and managed to get enough uranium for one bomb. They detonated it i think two days before Hiroshima.

The Japanese were given jumo and bmw jet engines and plans for both the engines and the me 262. Tai found that the Japanese built and improved the 262 .the first test flight was over Tokyo bay in late 45.

The tiger force was a RAF group created for the far East consisting of Lancaster heavy bombers and tempest v fighters. There was plans for in air refueling but the war ended before we started to design and test it

If you are trolling, stop. If you are advocating well debunked conspiracy theories, stop. If you actually BELIEVE the Japanese managed to create a Special... well, stop.

 

[Raferty]

The military leadership, even into the end, was in favor of not surrendering; it came down to Hirohito's "sacred decision". Even then, you had the 8-15 Coup Incident.



This has been coming up long before Okinawa; as far back as the Marshalls in mid-1944 JCS was beginning to realize how insanely bloody Japan was going to be.

I think the Marshalls were actually a pretty cost effective operation and was really the peak of US amphibious operational success, as Japan had not yet abandoned waterline resistance, and the territory was not suited for a mountainous redoubt type last stand, which is what made Iwo Jima and Peleiliu so bloody. Okinawa fell into the latter group.

The Marianas, where you saw this strategy employed at Saipan and Guam, were really the hint that things might need to go a different way. But even at Saipan, the battle was still ended by a mass suicidal charge (which because of sheer mass actually inflicted some damage, but less than the Japanese expected)

 

[BlackDragon98]

I'm going to propose a third option here.
Why not nuke Okinawa?
Sure the Japanese can survive in their cave bunker systems, but the nuclear radiation above ground means they can't venture above ground at all.
Effectively, a couple nukes could neutralize all the Japanese forces based in Okinawa at no cost to the US.

 

[BlackDragon98]

In August of 1945 they had over 12,000 planes and 18,000 pilots with enough fuel left for a maximum air effort against any landing force invading Japan; the reason they disappeared over Japan by the Summer of '45 was a deliberate effort to lull the U.S. into a false sense of security and to conserve their strength. As for Okinawa, temporarily supporting landings is not a wash in this; you gotta think long term how many bombers would be saved.

Also, with the invasion of Japan coming, they needed Okinawa as the origin point of supplies and troops.

Air raids on Japan - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

They had planes, yes, but were they serviceable?
Because if they aren't then they're no better at fighting B-29s than a ball of tinfoil.

The passage below is from the link above:

"Resistance to the air raids decreased sharply from April 1945. On 15 April the IJAAF and IJN air defense units were belatedly placed under a single command when the Air General Army was formed under the command of General Masakazu Kawabe, but by this time the fighter force's effectiveness had been greatly reduced due to high rates of casualties in training accidents and combat. Due to the poor standard of the remaining pilots and the deployment of P-51 Mustangs to escort B-29s, the Japanese leadership decided in April to withdraw their remaining fighters from combat. These aircraft were placed in reserve to counterattack the Allied invasion.[210] As a result, few of the subsequent Allied raids were intercepted.[210] The effectiveness of Japanese anti-aircraft batteries also decreased during 1945 as the collapse of the national economy led to severe shortages of ammunition.[210] Moreover, as the anti-aircraft guns were mainly stationed near major industrial areas, many of the raids on small cities were almost unopposed.[211] Imperial General Headquarters decided to resume attacks on Allied bombers from late June, but by this time there were too few fighters available for this change of tactics to have any effect.[212] The number of fighters assigned to the Air General Army peaked at just over 500 during June and July, but most frontline units had relatively few serviceable aircraft.[213] During the last weeks of the war Superfortresses were able to operate with near impunity owing to the weakness of the Japanese air defenses; LeMay later claimed that during this period "it was safer to fly a combat mission over Japan than it was to fly a B-29 training mission back in the United States".[214]"

 

[History Learner]

Air raids on Japan - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

They had planes, yes, but were they serviceable?
Because if they aren't then they're no better at fighting B-29s than a ball of tinfoil.

The passage below is from the link above:

"Resistance to the air raids decreased sharply from April 1945. On 15 April the IJAAF and IJN air defense units were belatedly placed under a single command when the Air General Army was formed under the command of General Masakazu Kawabe, but by this time the fighter force's effectiveness had been greatly reduced due to high rates of casualties in training accidents and combat. Due to the poor standard of the remaining pilots and the deployment of P-51 Mustangs to escort B-29s, the Japanese leadership decided in April to withdraw their remaining fighters from combat. These aircraft were placed in reserve to counterattack the Allied invasion.[210] As a result, few of the subsequent Allied raids were intercepted.[210] The effectiveness of Japanese anti-aircraft batteries also decreased during 1945 as the collapse of the national economy led to severe shortages of ammunition.[210] Moreover, as the anti-aircraft guns were mainly stationed near major industrial areas, many of the raids on small cities were almost unopposed.[211] Imperial General Headquarters decided to resume attacks on Allied bombers from late June, but by this time there were too few fighters available for this change of tactics to have any effect.[212] The number of fighters assigned to the Air General Army peaked at just over 500 during June and July, but most frontline units had relatively few serviceable aircraft.[213] During the last weeks of the war Superfortresses were able to operate with near impunity owing to the weakness of the Japanese air defenses; LeMay later claimed that during this period "it was safer to fly a combat mission over Japan than it was to fly a B-29 training mission back in the United States".[214]"

Between 8-10k were by August 15th; can’t remember the exact number because I’m on my phone and don’t have access to my sources.

 

[BlackDragon98]

Between 8-10k were by August 15th; can’t remember the exact number because I’m on my phone and don’t have access to my sources.

No you're missing the point.
They had the planes, but how many of those planes were actually flyable?
A plane needs parts, fuel, and pilot to fly.
Many of those 8-10k planes had none of the three.

So yes, they did have 8-10k planes, but they were mostly grounded.
Only maybe 1% of those planes were serviceable (aka flyable) which makes about 80-100 planes.
Against the 100s of P-51s escorting each B-29 formation, the hopes of making it thru alive are near zero.
Even Japanese pilots recognized that kamikaze attacks would make no difference in the big scale.
It was over for Japan by that point.

 

[History Learner]

No you're missing the point.
They had the planes, but how many of those planes were actually flyable?
A plane needs parts, fuel, and pilot to fly.
Many of those 8-10k planes had none of the three.

So yes, they did have 8-10k planes, but they were mostly grounded.
Only maybe 1% of those planes were serviceable (aka flyable) which makes about 80-100 planes.
Against the 100s of P-51s escorting each B-29 formation, the hopes of making it thru alive are near zero.
Even Japanese pilots recognized that kamikaze attacks would make no difference in the big scale.
It was over for Japan by that point.

No I get your question, I think you misunderstood my response; they had 12k planes of which 8-10k were in service.

 

[History Learner]

I think the Marshalls were actually a pretty cost effective operation and was really the peak of US amphibious operational success, as Japan had not yet abandoned waterline resistance, and the territory was not suited for a mountainous redoubt type last stand, which is what made Iwo Jima and Peleiliu so bloody. Okinawa fell into the latter group.

The Marianas, where you saw this strategy employed at Saipan and Guam, were really the hint that things might need to go a different way. But even at Saipan, the battle was still ended by a mass suicidal charge (which because of sheer mass actually inflicted some damage, but less than the Japanese expected)

The Marshalls was a necessary operation, but I meant in terms of it signaling how bad things were going to get as they continued to come closer to Japan.

 

[Raferty]

The Marshalls was a necessary operation, but I meant in terms of it signaling how bad things were going to get as they continued to come closer to Japan.

The point I was making is that the Marshall Island campaign saw the lessons learned from Tarawa applied well, in that the preparatory bombardment was effective, the landing zones were well selected and supported, the Japanese were quickly forced into a situation where they had more to lose from staying put than from attacking even in a suicidal frontal attack

The Mariana Campaign was different entirely, and accomplished what you discussed, as the mountain defense at Saipan and Guam proved much more difficult to handle than a few days of intensive combat on nearly flat atolls with little defensive cover outside of stationary emplacements that could be hit. I think if anything the Marshall Island Campaign had the Central Pacific task force too confident going into the Mariana Campaign, as less than 1000 KIA was suffered across the entire offensive.