President Sukarno casting his ballot, 1955
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Prologue I:
The Democratic Experiment
"Thus ended our period of struggle. And thus began our struggle for survival. The deed to the house called Indonesia was
now securely in our hands, but it was a badly damaged house. It leaked aplenty. Its windows, doors, roof, and walls were broken.
Our economy, government, transportation, and industry were all damaged. Even morally and mentally we needed repairs."
– Sukarno, "Soekarno: An Autobiography As Told to Cindy Adams."[1]
It was 27 December 1949, a date which will certainly be remembered in Indonesian history books. On that fateful day, the Dutch finally and formally transferred sovereignty of their eastern colony to a new nation, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. On the following morning, Sukarno, the leader of the Republican government in Yogyakarta, the Republic's capital, left the city and returned once more to Batavia. But it's name wasn't Batavia anymore, it was Jakarta, and it was to be the new capital of a new Indonesia. Sukarno's plane arrived in Kemayoran Airport just a little after 11.30 and he was driven to the Paleis te Koningsplein, formerly the residence of the Dutch governor-general, and now the presidential palace. And as he left the car he was greeted by the welcoming citizens of the city whom had gathered at the Koningsplein, the vast square to the south of the palace, which would soon be renamed as Freedom Square.
Finally, Sukarno, the man who had fought against the Dutch, the man who had endured the humiliation of serving under the Japanese, and the man who had persevered the hardships of war and revolution for almost five years, entered the presidential palace. However, this was not the triumph that it seemed. Sure, Sukarno held the traditional symbols of power, but his power was not absolute. Not yet, at least. His power within the new republic was circumcised, a continuation of the situation inherited from the revolution. Back in 1945, he had accepted the establishment of a provisional parliament, the Central Indonesian National Committee, as well as a transition into a parliamentary system with a prime minister as head of government. Sukarno went along with this, the unstable political situation forced him to do so, though he very much resented the limitations imposed on him. But with independence, comes change.[2]
Soon, it was time for his inaugural address. And in addressing the crowd, Sukarno condemned the conventions of liberal democracy. He spoke of Indonesia's need for a democracy with strong leadership. It seemed that he wanted to play a more important role than the one he was presented with. It was a hint of the sort of part he really wanted to play. Sukarno did not want to be tied down to the routine affairs of government, nor did he wish to risk exercising full executive responsibility as he feared the unpopularity of such powers. Instead, what Sukarno wanted was a broad and general sense of his authority, while other more specific and detailed matters were handled by other leaders. Sukarno knew his worth as "Father of the Nation" and he felt that any constitution which kept him from his full potential and instead limiting him to merely a maker of speeches and host at official receptions was unjust to his service.
Even though Sukarno was dissatisfied with his position, he seemed prepared to follow the rules of the liberal democracy. Why? Because he still had room to maneuver around the restraints that were imposed on him. The constitution provided him an important weapon, information, which gave him the power to pressure the cabinet on matters including both foreign and domestic policy. In fact, Sukarno's personal influence played an important role in the rise and fall of almost, if not, all cabinets during this period. His power to sway the masses often times contradicted with government policy. At best, his actions were improper, and at worst it was deliberate sabotage of the cabinet's authority. But to the man himself, his actions appeared as a proper response to a deteriorating political environment. The constitution meant little to Sukarno, who saw his authority as not derived from the constitution but directly from his standing as a revolutionary leader.
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Still, his dissatisfaction remained, and it only grew as time progressed. However, despite Sukarno's disappointment, many others in the Republic had reasons to be optimistic in 1950. The republic had survived the national revolution and successfully repulsed the Dutch invaders. Many expected that the same sense of common purpose and vigor gained in the revolution would translate into the more complicated task of governing. But in the end, it didn't happen. Party rivalries, especially between the nationalistic Indonesian National Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) and the Islamist Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, Masyumi), eroded the unity of the Republic and hindered good governance. Meanwhile, the Republic's own internal situation was growing worse as the Darul Islam rebellions, which fought for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia, proved difficult to control.
Economic policy was also a crucial issue for the Republic, which had accrued a debt of around 4.3 billion guilders from the Dutch as result of the Round Table Conference of 1949. The War in Korea had resulted in an economic boom in the country, as the Republic's raw materials were in high demand. However, falling export prices reduced foreign exchange earnings which in turn further worsened regional rivalries. These factors, together with continuing budget deficits, led to the spiraling inflation of the Rupiah. These problems, exacerbated by political rivalries, led to the government's unpopularity and Sukarno's further disappointment. In his independence day speech in 1952, he drew a contrast between his hopes of 1945 and the results which had been achieved since. He called on his listeners to recover the spirit of 1945, which he said was lost as soon as the armed revolution was completed.
Sukarno’s concern with the spirit of the nation had practical political implications. He began to see Indonesian politics in terms of broad ideological differences. As he put it in his dictated autobiography "Indonesia was at a crossroads, between those who believe in the revolution and those who believe in cowardice."[3] In the words of Herbert Feith, Indonesian politics was divided between "solidarity makers," those who appreciated and agreed with Sukarno's approach to politics, and "administrators," who were concerned with the day to day affairs of government and believed that revolution had ended. To Sukarno, the revolution had merely lost its momentum as what kept the country's national cohesion. In other words, the revolution was the glue that kept the ship of Indonesia from sinking. Thus, a new revolution was needed. Or, more accurately, a new struggle. One that presented itself in the form of Irian.
[1] Slightly modified. Sukarno didn't say the quote exactly as written in the book.
[2] The transition into a parliamentary system was done through Vice-Presidential Edict No. X.
Interestingly, the "X" does not represent the Roman numeral "X." Rather, the state secretary forgot to
bring along his archives, therefore forcing the proclamation to use "X" for "number unknown."
[3] Fictional quote. Sukarno didn't actually say this in OTL.
