Napoleonic Sanity Options, 1812

[Orko]

I'm finding myself obsessed recently with the concept of a maximalist Napoleonic victory, complete French hegemony over Europe from Moscow to Lisbon. However, I can't really figure out how that could be achieved, and I would love it if people here who know more about military history can help me figure some of these things out, or if they're even reasonable thoughts. Some of the stuff I've been asking myself are:
- If Napoleon's original plan for the invasion of Russia worked out, and he did catch the Russian army close to the border and defeated it in an Austerlitz-level decisive victory, would that be enough to force the Tsar to negotiate?
- If it would be enough to force the Russian to sue for peace, what kind of peace would Napoleon want? In addition to a return to the CS system, I'm assuming Napoleon would want to reward his allies and to further weaken Russia (both territorially and economically, I assume?) to make sure they're less of a threat in the future. would it be enough to secure a long-term peace with Russia? Or is a sixth coalition still inevitable even with a decisive French victory in 1812?
- If it isn't enough to force the Russians, what then should Napoleon do after his great victory over the Russians? Having the benefit of hindsight, should he have just stayed in the Lithuania\Belarus region, occupying Russia's lands and waiting for the Tsar's armies to come to him?
- And say you can talk to Napoleon in the Spring of 1812 (and assume that you have his best interest in mind), how would you tell him to pursue the Russia campaign? Obviously don't march all the way to Moscow, but what else? March to St. Petersburg?
- And let's say Napoleon's invasion of Russia goes badly, but not nearly as bad as IOTL and at the end of it you have a triumphant Russia and a humiliated-but-still-formidable Grande Armee (with say around 200k men still standing), would a Sixth Coalition still form? My understanding is that Prussia was really on the fence about the sixth coalition, and could be dissuaded from joining it if only the GA would have seemed like more of a threat in 1813.
- Now assume that a Sixth coalition does indeed form following a failed invasion of Russia, and that it includes both Austria and Prussia, does the aforementioned humiliated-but-still-formidable Grande Armee stand a chance against all of them, and is a victory against them realistic?
- If it is realistic, then what would the peace following such a victory look like?
- Once Napoleon wins in the east, though, he still has the British and French to contend with in Iberia. What could he do there? I know some people probably think he's better off just cutting his losses and giving up on Spain, but it seems like it's a front that could become vulnerable unless the British are kicked out of the continent completely. And keep in mind, I'm going for a maximalist Napoleonic victory so just cutting his losses isn't it.
- Speaking of which, is Napoleon better off dealing with the threat from the west first, before moving on to deal with the Russians? I know that one of the reasons for the timing of the invasion was that Russia was quickly rearming and Napoleon didn't want to give it an extra year to build up its forces, but with the benefit of hindsight I don't know if Napoleon was really correct in this assessment.

 

[alexmilman]

I'm finding myself obsessed recently with the concept of a maximalist Napoleonic victory, complete French hegemony over Europe from Moscow to Lisbon.

A little bit of a nitpicking, if you don’t mind: Moscow was neither capital of the RE nor its most Eastern point in Europe so either St-Petersburg or Ural would make much more sense in your schema. 😉

However, I can't really figure out how that could be achieved, and I would love it if people here who know more about military history can help me figure some of these things out, or if they're even reasonable thoughts. Some of the stuff I've been asking myself are:
- If Napoleon's original plan for the invasion of Russia worked out, and he did catch the Russian army close to the border and defeated it in an Austerlitz-level decisive victory, would that be enough to force the Tsar to negotiate?

Nobody can tell for sure what AI would do but you are seemingly sharing a popular misreading of the situation (no offense). Nappy could defeat the 1st and 2nd Armies, total of approximately 150,000. There were also: 3rd Army - 45,000, Danube Army - 55,000, corps in Finland -19,000, corps in Riga - 18,000, four reserve corps (don’t know the numbers), approximately 200,000 newly raised troops in training and preparation to raise approximately 200,000 more. You may make your own conclusions.

- If it would be enough to force the Russian to sue for peace, what kind of peace would Napoleon want? In addition to a return to the CS system, I'm assuming Napoleon would want to reward his allies and to further weaken Russia (both territorially and economically, I assume?) to make sure they're less of a threat in the future. would it be enough to secure a long-term peace with Russia?

AFAIK, Nappy at the start of the campaign was not making any definite announcements regarding the territorial issues. However, the part of the CS being the only reason is one more popular idea, which is not necessarily quite correct. Funny as it may sound, there were personal reasons on both sides:

• There was an issue related to Napoleon’s expansion of the French Empire in Germany, which was a direct concern of AI: contrary to the earlier agreements Nappy annexed the Duchy of Oldenburg. AI was a formal head of the ducal family and the duchy inclusion into the French Empire was in theory making him Napoleon’s vassal. AI sent a letter of protest to the courts of Europe, which pissed off Nappy.
• The Duchy of Warsaw was raising the troops out of proportion to its population and Nappy refused to guarantee that its size will not increase (he just stated that he will not help.
• The French kept much bigger garrisons in Prussia than what was agreed upon.

Now, as far as CS is involved, Russia abandoned CS only after the invasion. The beef was about:

• Permission to use the neutral ships for trade with Britain (which Nappy himself also was doing). Everybody was bypassing CS so on its own this was not a big deal.
• Russian tariff of 1811, which put very high dues upon the luxury items imported by land, aka, the French goods. This was a public slap on the face and Nappy demanded to change it removing the discriminating part.

The funny thing was that the diplomats actually reached a compromise on all issues shortly before Nappy started campaign. Presumably, he used negotiations as a smoke screen but perhaps he also did not trust AI (with a good reason) fearing that he may chose a moment for stabbing him in a back or perhaps just spent too much efforts and resources preparing to this campaign to simply call it off.

Or is a sixth coalition still inevitable even with a decisive French victory in 1812?

Chances of the decisive victory eliminating most of the Russian forces were too slim. See above.

- If it isn't enough to force the Russians, what then should Napoleon do after his great victory over the Russians? Having the benefit of hindsight, should he have just stayed in the Lithuania\Belarus region, occupying Russia's lands and waiting for the Tsar's armies to come to him?

Nappy’s problem was that he could not “stay” anywhere or a long time and definitely could not keep over 400,000 troops in one place. Poland was already destroyed in the terms of supplies (there were memoirs on that account), East Prussia was not much better, Lithuania\Belorussia was poor and to run huge convoys over great distances also was problematic. At least in Clausewitz’ view.

- And say you can talk to Napoleon in the Spring of 1812 (and assume that you have his best interest in mind), how would you tell him to pursue the Russia campaign?

Such a conversation took place, see Caulaincourt’s memoirs. His advice was not to start campaign at all and his book contains a detailed explanation why Napoleon’s army was not good for such a task. You also can find relevant material in Zamoisky’s book on campaign of 1812 or in Sokolov’s book about organization of Napoleon’s army.

Obviously don't march all the way to Moscow, but what else? March to St. Petersburg?

Stay in Paris. 😂

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

I'm finding myself obsessed recently with the concept of a maximalist Napoleonic victory, complete French hegemony over Europe from Moscow to Lisbon. However, I can't really figure out how that could be achieved, and I would love it if people here who know more about military history can help me figure some of these things out, or if they're even reasonable thoughts. Some of the stuff I've been asking myself are:
- If Napoleon's original plan for the invasion of Russia worked out, and he did catch the Russian army close to the border and defeated it in an Austerlitz-level decisive victory, would that be enough to force the Tsar to negotiate?
- If it would be enough to force the Russian to sue for peace, what kind of peace would Napoleon want? In addition to a return to the CS system, I'm assuming Napoleon would want to reward his allies and to further weaken Russia (both territorially and economically, I assume?) to make sure they're less of a threat in the future. would it be enough to secure a long-term peace with Russia? Or is a sixth coalition still inevitable even with a decisive French victory in 1812?
- If it isn't enough to force the Russians, what then should Napoleon do after his great victory over the Russians? Having the benefit of hindsight, should he have just stayed in the Lithuania\Belarus region, occupying Russia's lands and waiting for the Tsar's armies to come to him?
- And say you can talk to Napoleon in the Spring of 1812 (and assume that you have his best interest in mind), how would you tell him to pursue the Russia campaign? Obviously don't march all the way to Moscow, but what else? March to St. Petersburg?
- And let's say Napoleon's invasion of Russia goes badly, but not nearly as bad as IOTL and at the end of it you have a triumphant Russia and a humiliated-but-still-formidable Grande Armee (with say around 200k men still standing), would a Sixth Coalition still form? My understanding is that Prussia was really on the fence about the sixth coalition, and could be dissuaded from joining it if only the GA would have seemed like more of a threat in 1813.
- Now assume that a Sixth coalition does indeed form following a failed invasion of Russia, and that it includes both Austria and Prussia, does the aforementioned humiliated-but-still-formidable Grande Armee stand a chance against all of them, and is a victory against them realistic?
- If it is realistic, then what would the peace following such a victory look like?
- Once Napoleon wins in the east, though, he still has the British and French to contend with in Iberia. What could he do there? I know some people probably think he's better off just cutting his losses and giving up on Spain, but it seems like it's a front that could become vulnerable unless the British are kicked out of the continent completely. And keep in mind, I'm going for a maximalist Napoleonic victory so just cutting his losses isn't it.
- Speaking of which, is Napoleon better off dealing with the threat from the west first, before moving on to deal with the Russians? I know that one of the reasons for the timing of the invasion was that Russia was quickly rearming and Napoleon didn't want to give it an extra year to build up its forces, but with the benefit of hindsight I don't know if Napoleon was really correct in this assessment.

1. If Napoleon had defeated the Russians near the border the Russians can just recruit more troops and knowing how the Russian campaign went in our timeline Napoleon would think that the Russians are on the verge of collapse and would charge into Russia only to find himself in the same situation as in our timeline.
2. I don't think the Russians would accept any peace term until total defeat which is impossible without years of campaigning in Russia which would leave the rest of Europe defenseless. But if the Russians do agree to peace the terms need to be mild but if Napoleon had a free hand he would expand the Duchy of Warsaw into previous Polish-Lithuanian land which is not enough to cripple Russia with realistic gains
3. With power of hindsight the whole Russian was a mistake as while Napoleon needs to slowly grind Russia in the same way Basil II did with Bulgaria but worse Europe is without defense so the best option for Napoleon is to just give up on Russia and go back home as the Tsar's armies cannot compete with Napoleon's Grande Armée
4. Pass the winter in Minsk and continue campaigning in the next year its not ideal but its the best way the Russian can go
5. The only way 200k men are still standing is that Napoleon understands the hopelessness of the campaign and retreats which would in a way be humiliating for Napoleon but a sixth coalition is unlikely to happen unless Napoleon loses a battle as the aura of invincibility goes away immediately.
6. If it has only 200k men and they use the same strategy as in our timeline they can defeat him especially if they put Archduke Charles at the head of the armies (Archduke Charles defeated Napoleon with only the Austrian army in 1809 at Aspern)
7. It depends if they use the use the "fight Napoleon's Marshals not Napoleon" strategy if they do they certainly won't be completely defeated so Napoleon would have to give back some land but the impression that Napoleon is invincible would go away which is very detrimental for him
8. Winning in Iberia is almost impossible because prime Grande Armée couldn't win the war so it can't do much I think that giving up is the best idea as the Spanish wanted independence and knowing they can't defeat Napoleon they would be like Austria and wait the opportunity to take revenge
9. The best thing for Napoleon is not get involved with Russia but as I've already said Iberia is almost impossible to control so its difficult to deal with them first especially as you can't throw all of your troops in Iberia as you need them to defend Europe.

 

[alexmilman]

1. If Napoleon had defeated the Russians near the border the Russians can just recruit more troops

Of course. There were already 150-200,000 in training and during 1812 approximately the same number had been raised additionally forming the armies fighting in 1813-14.

and knowing how the Russian campaign went in our timeline Napoleon would think that the Russians are on the verge of collapse and would charge into Russia only to find himself in the same situation as in our timeline.

2. I don't think the Russians would accept any peace term until total defeat which is impossible without years of campaigning in Russia which would leave the rest of Europe defenseless. But if the Russians do agree to peace the terms need to be mild but if Napoleon had a free hand he would expand the Duchy of Warsaw into previous Polish-Lithuanian land which is not enough to cripple Russia with realistic gains

The problem with this item is that potential expansion of the Duchy was one of the main reasons for A-N alienation. AI was adamantly against the greater Duchy (under Napoleon) before he was for the greater Kingdom (under himself). 😉

Actually, this was one of the diplomatic points on which Nappy (with a benefit of hindsight) screwed up aggravating the situation instead of defusing it. Alexander asked for an assurance that Napoleon will not allow the further expansion of the Duchy and Nappy answered that he will not help in such an expansion. Taking into an account the military situations in Prussia and the Duchy in 1810-11, this could be interpreted as blessing expansion at the Prussian expense, which was unacceptable for AI.

3. With power of hindsight the whole Russian was a mistake as while Napoleon needs to slowly grind Russia in the same way Basil II did with Bulgaria but worse Europe is without defense so the best option for Napoleon is to just give up on Russia and go back home as the Tsar's armies cannot compete with Napoleon's Grande Armée

The problem with Napoleonic military system was that it had been ill-suited for “slow grinding” warfare, especially in the poor areas with a bad logistics. In the terms of the light troops Russia had a clear advantage and prolonged staying of 400-500,000 in a very poor area was not feasible.

4. Pass the winter in Minsk and continue campaigning in the next year its not ideal but its the best way the Russian can go

Another impossibility. Nappy could establish his headquarter in Minsk but where would the rest of his troops stay during the winter? And what would they and their horses eat? Clausewitz analyzed similar scenario and came to a conclusion that it will be disastrous.

5. The only way 200k men are still standing is that Napoleon understands the hopelessness of the campaign and retreats which would in a way be humiliating for Napoleon but a sixth coalition is unlikely to happen unless Napoleon loses a battle as the aura of invincibility goes away immediately.

If graph above is reasonably accurate, 200,000 are somewhere before reaching Polotsk area. Which means the very start of the campaign.

6. If it has only 200k men and they use the same strategy as in our timeline they can defeat him especially if they put Archduke Charles at the head of the armies (Archduke Charles defeated Napoleon with only the Austrian army in 1809 at Aspern)

Taking into an account that Austria was Napoleon’s ally this is an interesting idea. 😂

7. It depends if they use the use the "fight Napoleon's Marshals not Napoleon" strategy if they do they certainly won't be completely defeated so Napoleon would have to give back some land but the impression that Napoleon is invincible would go away which is very detrimental for him

Here goes one more problem of this campaign. Short of the not too significant events on the flanks, its was impossible to fight marshals because the main army almost all the time had been marching in a single huge column. On a positive (for the Russians) side, there was no real need to fight anybody because this march had been causing huge losses without any fighting.

8. Winning in Iberia is almost impossible because prime Grande Armée couldn't win the war so it can't do much I think that giving up is the best idea as the Spanish wanted independence and knowing they can't defeat Napoleon they would be like Austria and wait the opportunity to take revenge
9. The best thing for Napoleon is not get involved with Russia but as I've already said Iberia is almost impossible to control so its difficult to deal with them first especially as you can't throw all of your troops in Iberia as you need them to defend Europe.

Look, the whole thing was initially a confrontation of two a—holes with no national interests involved. With few minor adjustments their states could co-exist quite well even if each of them wanted control beyond his borders. In 1812 most of the issues had been resolved diplomatically in what Napoleon considered a smoke screen for his military preparations and when the results were achieved, he could not just sent the assembled troops back to Germany, Italy and France and disband a big part of the Duchy army to make it sustainable.

Other than diplomatic solution, he had a plausible winning option, which he screwed himself: AI sent an ultimatum demanding reduction of the Duchy’s army and downsizing the French garrisons in Prussia as per Tilsit treaty. Nappy did not react and AI was ready to give an order to cross the Nieman when the news cane that Austria formally became Napoleon’s ally. This eliminate possibility of an offensive strategy (quite popular among the Russian top commanders).

Now, if Austria stays neutral and “offensive party” is still dominant, AI invades the Duchy presenting Nappy with a chance to beat him on a foreign territory. As already happened in the 3rd and 4th coalitions. AI is an aggressor and this is one more of his cabinet wars. If at that point Nappy generously offers Tilsit-like peace, AI gets the blame and his future is anybody’s guess.

In OTL Nappy was an aggressor invading the Russian homeland, which generated a great degree of the national enthusiasm with the nobility being OK with the extra recruitments and merchants donating considerable amounts of money. The stuff about the “people war” is a later invention but such a war was not necessary, unlike Spain. If AI is an aggressor and Nappy is not making politically foolish moves, then AI will be forced to make a peace under the “public pressure”.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Of course. There were already 150-200,000 in training and during 1812 approximately the same number had been raised additionally forming the armies fighting in 1813-14.



The problem with this item is that potential expansion of the Duchy was one of the main reasons for A-N alienation. AI was adamantly against the greater Duchy (under Napoleon) before he was for the greater Kingdom (under himself). 😉

Actually, this was one of the diplomatic points on which Nappy (with a benefit of hindsight) screwed up aggravating the situation instead of defusing it. Alexander asked for an assurance that Napoleon will not allow the further expansion of the Duchy and Nappy answered that he will not help in such an expansion. Taking into an account the military situations in Prussia and the Duchy in 1810-11, this could be interpreted as blessing expansion at the Prussian expense, which was unacceptable for AI.



The problem with Napoleonic military system was that it had been ill-suited for “slow grinding” warfare, especially in the poor areas with a bad logistics. In the terms of the light troops Russia had a clear advantage and prolonged staying of 400-500,000 in a very poor area was not feasible.


Another impossibility. Nappy could establish his headquarter in Minsk but where would the rest of his troops stay during the winter? And what would they and their horses eat? Clausewitz analyzed similar scenario and came to a conclusion that it will be disastrous.


View attachment 890366
If graph above is reasonably accurate, 200,000 are somewhere before reaching Polotsk area. Which means the very start of the campaign.



Taking into an account that Austria was Napoleon’s ally this is an interesting idea. 😂


Here goes one more problem of this campaign. Short of the not too significant events on the flanks, its was impossible to fight marshals because the main army almost all the time had been marching in a single huge column. On a positive (for the Russians) side, there was no real need to fight anybody because this march had been causing huge losses without any fighting.

Look, the whole thing was initially a confrontation of two a—holes with no national interests involved. With few minor adjustments their states could co-exist quite well even if each of them wanted control beyond his borders. In 1812 most of the issues had been resolved diplomatically in what Napoleon considered a smoke screen for his military preparations and when the results were achieved, he could not just sent the assembled troops back to Germany, Italy and France and disband a big part of the Duchy army to make it sustainable.

Other than diplomatic solution, he had a plausible winning option, which he screwed himself: AI sent an ultimatum demanding reduction of the Duchy’s army and downsizing the French garrisons in Prussia as per Tilsit treaty. Nappy did not react and AI was ready to give an order to cross the Nieman when the news cane that Austria formally became Napoleon’s ally. This eliminate possibility of an offensive strategy (quite popular among the Russian top commanders).

Now, if Austria stays neutral and “offensive party” is still dominant, AI invades the Duchy presenting Nappy with a chance to beat him on a foreign territory. As already happened in the 3rd and 4th coalitions. AI is an aggressor and this is one more of his cabinet wars. If at that point Nappy generously offers Tilsit-like peace, AI gets the blame and his future is anybody’s guess.

In OTL Nappy was an aggressor invading the Russian homeland, which generated a great degree of the national enthusiasm with the nobility being OK with the extra recruitments and merchants donating considerable amounts of money. The stuff about the “people war” is a later invention but such a war was not necessary, unlike Spain. If AI is an aggressor and Nappy is not making politically foolish moves, then AI will be forced to make a peace under the “public pressure”.

So we agree that the whole campaign is hopeless
Just a few precisions when I say that Archduke Charles participates I meant on the Coalition's side as Austria would always participate against Napoleon
And when I say fight Napoleon' Marshals its when he retreats from Russia before all of the Grande Armée is destroyed and has to inevitably fight for Germany

"Look, the whole thing was initially a confrontation of two a—holes with no national interests involved. With few minor adjustments their states could co-exist quite well even if each of them wanted control beyond his borders. In 1812 most of the issues had been resolved diplomatically in what Napoleon considered a smoke screen for his military preparations and when the results were achieved, he could not just sent the assembled troops back to Germany, Italy and France and disband a big part of the Duchy army to make it sustainable."
What Duchy?

 

[Rafi_T]

Off topic, but I think the best way for Napoleon to succeed in Europe is to pull a Hapsburg and get as many advantageous marriages as possible.

The most ASB version would be him marrying Desiree Clary and having enough kids with her to match his marriage proposals from OTL.

1. Lucien Napoleon marries Maria Luisa of Spain
2. Napoleon’s first son and Catherine Pavlovna of Russia (Their son marries Princess Sophie of Bavaria)
3. Napoleon’s second son and Anna Pavlovna of Russia
4. Napoleon’s third son and Marie Louise of Austria
5. Napoleon’s fourth son and Princess Caroline Augusta of Bavaria
6. Napoleon’s fifth son and Infanta Maria Isabella of Spain (Spain’s pretty much useless)
7. Fernando de Asturias (Ferdinand VII) + Charlotte Bonaparte (First daughter of Lucien Bonaparte)
8. Ferdinand III of Tuscany + Second daughter of Lucien Bonaparte
9. Prince Mario Gabrielli + Third daughter of Lucien Bonaparte
10. Napoleon’s sixth son + Lucien’s fourth daughter (to keep the family power going)

Add to this Jerome still being married to Patterson (a happy king is a good king), making Lucien King of Hungary, and keeping Charles IV on the throne of Spain (and giving him all of Portugal), and you now have a royal family that has intermarried enough within Europe that they can reasonably call upon their relations for mediation. (As well as having built up enough goodwill with certain segments of Europe that Coalition building against the French will be a much harder task than IOTL.

With such direct marital ties (Napoleon’s two oldest sons married to Russian princesses), you would most likely butterfly the need for an invasion of Russia in 1812, and with Charlotte married to Ferdinand VII, you would also avoid a need to topple Charles IV, meaning no Spanish Ulcer. Much better to make love, not war.

 

[DJ03]

What Duchy?

Warsaw?

 

[CountofDooku]

The problem Saint Petersburg and Moscow should have both been goals in Russia as nowhere else was any major supply hubs and fabrication basis to keep the Russian Empire running back then, even with Moscow lost and burning, would Napoleon have kept Petersburg, or damaged it similarly during the campaign even without occupation, Russia would look worse of. Had Napoleon also proclaimed the liberation of the Russian peasentry during the campaign, Russia could have easily turned out much, much better, even without any major victory on the battlefield more then OTL I would assume.

 

[Polish Eagle]

In addition to alexmilman's points about the forces the Tsar could raise, I think it's worth noting that, by 1812, France had been at war essentially non-stop for twenty years. Expenditures on the Grand Army exceeded state revenue by large margins. French morale was really not great in 1812--Napoleon himself observed that there was a great deal of draft-dodging that year. The country was running out of horses.

The entire war was fought because, to quote Bainville, Napoleon's wishes for a continental alliance had become father to his thoughts--he deceived himself into thinking that he could park the army in Vilnius and dictate terms.

The campaign was hopeless...but on the other hand, what options did he have? Acceding to Alexander's demands would mean the end of the Continental System and with it any hope of challenging England economically (however foolish that hope might have been). Of course, the suggestion of letting Alexander strike the first blow and winning a battle in defense of Poland, leading to essentially status-quo-ante (possibly with small gifts to Poland at Prussia's expense?), is interesting.

The suggestion of taking Petersburg is also an interesting one--intuitively, it seems that it would be an easier city to take and supply, and would more directly contribute to the goal of closing ports to English trade. But would it end any differently? By 1812, Napoleon had antagonized Sweden (letting Bernadotte, a man he seemed to personally despise and vice-versa, become crown prince was an odd decision in retrospect), and the Danish fleet had already been neutralized in Copenhagen in 1807--is there a realistic possibility of closing the Baltic to Britain, thus leaving only ice-bound Arkhangelsk as an entrepot?

 

[alexmilman]

So we agree that the whole campaign is hopeless
Just a few precisions when I say that Archduke Charles participates I meant on the Coalition's side as Austria would always participate against Napoleon

Not in 1812.

And when I say fight Napoleon' Marshals its when he retreats from Russia before all of the Grande Armée is destroyed and has to inevitably fight for Germany

Well, there were some confrontations on the way back, like Battles at Krasnoe and Berezina.

"Look, the whole thing was initially a confrontation of two a—holes with no national interests involved. With few minor adjustments their states could co-exist quite well even if each of them wanted control beyond his borders. In 1812 most of the issues had been resolved diplomatically in what Napoleon considered a smoke screen for his military preparations and when the results were achieved, he could not just sent the assembled troops back to Germany, Italy and France and disband a big part of the Duchy army to make it sustainable."
What Duchy?

Duchy of Warsaw.

 

[Rafi_T]

I'm finding myself obsessed recently with the concept of a maximalist Napoleonic victory, complete French hegemony over Europe from Moscow to Lisbon. However, I can't really figure out how that could be achieved, and I would love it if people here who know more about military history can help me figure some of these things out, or if they're even reasonable thoughts. Some of the stuff I've been asking myself are:
- If Napoleon's original plan for the invasion of Russia worked out, and he did catch the Russian army close to the border and defeated it in an Austerlitz-level decisive victory, would that be enough to force the Tsar to negotiate?
- If it would be enough to force the Russian to sue for peace, what kind of peace would Napoleon want? In addition to a return to the CS system, I'm assuming Napoleon would want to reward his allies and to further weaken Russia (both territorially and economically, I assume?) to make sure they're less of a threat in the future. would it be enough to secure a long-term peace with Russia? Or is a sixth coalition still inevitable even with a decisive French victory in 1812?
- If it isn't enough to force the Russians, what then should Napoleon do after his great victory over the Russians? Having the benefit of hindsight, should he have just stayed in the Lithuania\Belarus region, occupying Russia's lands and waiting for the Tsar's armies to come to him?
- And say you can talk to Napoleon in the Spring of 1812 (and assume that you have his best interest in mind), how would you tell him to pursue the Russia campaign? Obviously don't march all the way to Moscow, but what else? March to St. Petersburg?
- And let's say Napoleon's invasion of Russia goes badly, but not nearly as bad as IOTL and at the end of it you have a triumphant Russia and a humiliated-but-still-formidable Grande Armee (with say around 200k men still standing), would a Sixth Coalition still form? My understanding is that Prussia was really on the fence about the sixth coalition, and could be dissuaded from joining it if only the GA would have seemed like more of a threat in 1813.
- Now assume that a Sixth coalition does indeed form following a failed invasion of Russia, and that it includes both Austria and Prussia, does the aforementioned humiliated-but-still-formidable Grande Armee stand a chance against all of them, and is a victory against them realistic?
- If it is realistic, then what would the peace following such a victory look like?
- Once Napoleon wins in the east, though, he still has the British and French to contend with in Iberia. What could he do there? I know some people probably think he's better off just cutting his losses and giving up on Spain, but it seems like it's a front that could become vulnerable unless the British are kicked out of the continent completely. And keep in mind, I'm going for a maximalist Napoleonic victory so just cutting his losses isn't it.
- Speaking of which, is Napoleon better off dealing with the threat from the west first, before moving on to deal with the Russians? I know that one of the reasons for the timing of the invasion was that Russia was quickly rearming and Napoleon didn't want to give it an extra year to build up its forces, but with the benefit of hindsight I don't know if Napoleon was really correct in this assessment.

If he has dealt with Russia and won, all he needs to do is march to Portugal, and he’ll kick the British out quickly. (From what I understand, when he did directly command in Iberia, he was quite successful, and nearly pacified the region before having to go elsewhere.)

Personally, I’d just annex all of Portugal to Spain, but he did promise north and south Portugal as kingdoms to compensate for Etruria, as well as getting Godoy to leave Spain without a fuss.

 

[alexmilman]

The problem Saint Petersburg and Moscow should have both been goals in Russia as nowhere else was any major supply hubs and fabrication basis to keep the Russian Empire running back then,

Moscow had been depots (which, AFAIK, Nappy captured) but not a weapons production. The main weapons-making facilities were in Tula and on Ural.

even with Moscow lost and burning, would Napoleon have kept Petersburg, or damaged it similarly during the campaign even without occupation, Russia would look worse of.

Napoleon could not go simultaneously in both directions so this scenario was not an option.

Had Napoleon also proclaimed the liberation of the Russian peasentry during the campaign, Russia could have easily turned out much, much better, even without any major victory on the battlefield more then OTL I would assume.

Popular idea but not practical one. How would he liberate them in practical terms without physical possession of a big part of the territory? He would need a massive network of the Russian-speaking agents and many other things to accomplish this on a noticeable scale but, putting these things aside, how are you going to combine looting people with telling them that now they are free?

 

[Rafi_T]

In addition to alexmilman's points about the forces the Tsar could raise, I think it's worth noting that, by 1812, France had been at war essentially non-stop for twenty years. Expenditures on the Grand Army exceeded state revenue by large margins. French morale was really not great in 1812--Napoleon himself observed that there was a great deal of draft-dodging that year. The country was running out of horses.

The entire war was fought because, to quote Bainville, Napoleon's wishes for a continental alliance had become father to his thoughts--he deceived himself into thinking that he could park the army in Vilnius and dictate terms.

The campaign was hopeless...but on the other hand, what options did he have? Acceding to Alexander's demands would mean the end of the Continental System and with it any hope of challenging England economically (however foolish that hope might have been). Of course, the suggestion of letting Alexander strike the first blow and winning a battle in defense of Poland, leading to essentially status-quo-ante (possibly with small gifts to Poland at Prussia's expense?), is interesting.

The suggestion of taking Petersburg is also an interesting one--intuitively, it seems that it would be an easier city to take and supply, and would more directly contribute to the goal of closing ports to English trade. But would it end any differently? By 1812, Napoleon had antagonized Sweden (letting Bernadotte, a man he seemed to personally despise and vice-versa, become crown prince was an odd decision in retrospect), and the Danish fleet had already been neutralized in Copenhagen in 1807--is there a realistic possibility of closing the Baltic to Britain, thus leaving only ice-bound Arkhangelsk as an entrepot?

Could it go better if Frederick VI of Denmark had been appointed to the Swedish throne? (It would be a remake of the Kalmar Union, with Denmark, Norway, and Sweden being under the same ruler for the first time since Christian II lost the throne of Sweden in 1521.)

After the British attacked the Danish fleet, he wasn’t exactly on good terms with them, so would it be possible he actively assists Napoleon with his invasion of Russia?

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Not in 1812.

Well, there were some confrontations on the way back, like Battles at Krasnoe and Berezina.


Duchy of Warsaw.

Well the participation of Austria depends entirely on how is perceived the retreat out of Russia if Napoleon loses the Duchy of Warsaw (unlikely if he has a standing army) or if he loses a major battle (also very unlikely) then you can be sure a Sixth Coalition is formed otherwise it would simply be a defeat but not one that ends Napoleon's empire immediately.
No matter the scenario Napoleon would always have a loss in prestige the only question how much prestige does he lose? That is what will determine the future of Europe

 

[alexmilman]

In addition to alexmilman's points about the forces the Tsar could raise, I think it's worth noting that, by 1812, France had been at war essentially non-stop for twenty years. Expenditures on the Grand Army exceeded state revenue by large margins. French morale was really not great in 1812--Napoleon himself observed that there was a great deal of draft-dodging that year. The country was running out of horses.

And a big part of the invading army were not even French but the conscripted Germans and Italians. Enthusiasm of the Prussian and Austrian troops on the flanks was zero so out of the foreign contingents the enthusiastic one could be Poles.

The horses is a very good point and it seems that from the start of the campaign the problem was not even in their numbers (at the start there were plenty of them) but in inadequate competence in their care. The French troops had been used to changing horses in the conquered territories and none of the foreign contingents, even the Poles, had experience in campaigning under these specific circumstances. The substitute horses were available in some numbers along the road but they were Russian peasant horses, small and not very strong.

IIRC, Zamoiski provided the huge number of horses that died at the very beginning due to a single strong rain, Caulaincourt mentioned extreme exhaustion of the horses even before Smolensk and both him and the Russian contemporaries mentioned the catastrophic losses on the way back just due to the absence of the proper horseshoes. Zamoiski described terrible damage to the horses due to the idiotic saddling of the Napoleonic Army (the same comment you can find in the memoirs of the Russian military attache in France in 1914). The horses were not watered properly, a lot of them died eating green grain, they were not used to grass and hay, etc.

The entire war was fought because, to quote Bainville, Napoleon's wishes for a continental alliance had become father to his thoughts--he deceived himself into thinking that he could park the army in Vilnius and dictate terms.

Yes, and on the other side of the equation there was another self-important prick who, however, understood that if he gives up, he may share fate of his father. 😉

The campaign was hopeless...but on the other hand, what options did he have? Acceding to Alexander's demands would mean the end of the Continental System and with it any hope of challenging England economically (however foolish that hope might have been).

Well, prior to the campaign Caulaincourt pointed out to him that Alexander is doing exactly the same thing that Napoleon is doing himself, using the third party ships for imports (including, IIRC, the British goods). 😉

The confrontational point in that area was not the CS, which AI did not abandon until the invasion, but a tariff of 1811, that was putting the high tariffs on the luxury items imported by land, aka on the French goods. This was a slap on Nappy’s face but a negotiable one if Nappy was ready to compromise on some other issues.

Of course, the suggestion of letting Alexander strike the first blow and winning a battle in defense of Poland, leading to essentially status-quo-ante (possibly with small gifts to Poland at Prussia's expense?), is interesting.

The suggestion of taking Petersburg is also an interesting one--intuitively, it seems that it would be an easier city to take and supply, and would more directly contribute to the goal of closing ports to English trade.

The goal of (any) war as defined by Napoleon was to destroy the enemy’s army, not to take the geographic points. He took Vienna twice and in neither case did it cause Austrian capitulation. Taking of Berlin did not end the war with Prussia and he was still holding Madrid …

In 1812 he was not going for Moscow, he was going for the Russian army which was retreating toward Moscow because this was the most reasonable direction for it. The demagoguery about chosing between St.Petersburg, Moscow and Kiev was just a face-saving BS to pretend that he is in control of the situation while actually he was not.

March on St.P. would make him advance in a long column with the Russian army being not ahead of him (with him having a chance to catch it up and defeat) but on his flank with a complete freedom of action including ability to cut off his supplies. St.P. itself was a massive consumer of the suppliers but its region was relatively poor in that area so no good supply situation to be expected. Actually, in OTL it was better in the terms of the local supplies and could be even better if the French had been paying the local peasants in gold.

But would it end any differently? By 1812, Napoleon had antagonized Sweden (letting Bernadotte, a man he seemed to personally despise and vice-versa, become crown prince was an odd decision in retrospect),

History of the N-B relations had been thoroughly distorted by the post-Napoleonic French “patriotic” writers and the Anglophonic historians tended to pick up the stories, including completely silly ones, without bothering to think or to check the available facts. For example, how could a person relieved of command in a middle of a battle, remain in charge of his troops and even issue the next day bulletin to these troops? Would Napoleon (Consul Bonaparte) write Bernadotte a letter saying that in the case of his death in Italy he expects expects him to march on Paris as save his family (and France as well…) if there was such an alleged mutual hatred?

The relations were not even but as often as not they were OK with Bernadotte receiving the important appointments. The tensions were mostly on two accounts:

• Since the 1st Italian campaign Bernadotte and Berthier were on the very bad terms and the later was regularly arranging “setups” and Nappy taking Berthier’s side.
• Nappy was clearly irritated with B’s habit of issuing addresses to his troops praising their performance. This was the Emperor’s prerogative. Well, at least in the case of the Saxons, B’s attitude proved to be more productive in a long run. Ditto for the nice treatment of the Swedes and Blucher (who become an open hater of Nappy but cooperated with Bernadotte without problems).

At the time of the Swedish affair they were, again, in one of their friendly periods and Nappy fully expected that under Bernadotte Sweden will be the French ally (but not a vassal, Bernadotte made an explicit point of it when this issue was discussed with Napoleon) and Bernadotte was considering this quite seriously: most of the Swedes were pro-French until Nappy occupied Swedish Pomerania.

and the Danish fleet had already been neutralized in Copenhagen in 1807--is there a realistic possibility of closing the Baltic to Britain, thus leaving only ice-bound Arkhangelsk as an entrepot?

Archangelsk (or its site) had been the main Russian port almost since the time of Ivan IV and until Peter I so it would do. Riga and St-P were not ice free either. And there were Black Sea ports as well.

 

[Hearkener]

Nobody can tell for sure what AI would do but you are seemingly sharing a popular misreading of the situation (no offense). Nappy could defeat the 1st and 2nd Armies, total of approximately 150,000. There were also: 3rd Army - 45,000, Danube Army - 55,000, corps in Finland -19,000, corps in Riga - 18,000, four reserve corps (don’t know the numbers), approximately 200,000 newly raised troops in training and preparation to raise approximately 200,000 more. You may make your own conclusions.

Unless you get all of these on the battlefield at the same time, that vast numerical advantage won't mean a whole lot. And at any rate, the Russian troops were nowhere near comparable to the the Grande Armeé. Frankly, if the Russians fight another big field battle in the campaigning season, they will be crushed again (and again). The nature of the war was such that Russia could offset the weakness of its military through operational means, that is restricting the French army from supplying until it collapsed.

- And say you can talk to Napoleon in the Spring of 1812 (and assume that you have his best interest in mind), how would you tell him to pursue the Russia campaign? Obviously don't march all the way to Moscow, but what else? March to St. Petersburg?

"Take those parts of the Russian border that you can easily reach and advance slowly into Russia, while prioritizing the destruction of infrastructure and economic necessities, most importantly agricultural regions. The Russians can try to throw troops at you, in which case they loose because you're Napoleon and you have the most powerful military on the planet, or they can squat in their heartland and watch their peasants die while doing nothing. Here the operational goal is the destabilization of the Russian state by destroying its capacity to meaningfully protect its citizens. Burn Moscow to the ground if you can, and then get out of there and burn Minsk as well. So too every single city, town and village you can physically reach. Make a public spectacle of torching Russia's holy icons. The Emperor can either make peace with you or surrender all claim to be a protector of his nation."

Basically, I don't see any chance of inducing Russia to surrender in 1812 except through genocidal brutality, which would force Russia to fight a conventional war and thus loose. Not that I could see Nappy actually going through with it.

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

In addition to alexmilman's points about the forces the Tsar could raise, I think it's worth noting that, by 1812, France had been at war essentially non-stop for twenty years. Expenditures on the Grand Army exceeded state revenue by large margins. French morale was really not great in 1812--Napoleon himself observed that there was a great deal of draft-dodging that year. The country was running out of horses.

The entire war was fought because, to quote Bainville, Napoleon's wishes for a continental alliance had become farther to his thoughts--he deceived himself into thinking that he could park the army in Vilnius and dictate terms.

The campaign was hopeless...but on the other hand, what options did he have? Acceding to Alexander's demands would mean the end of the Continental System and with it any hope of challenging England economically (however foolish that hope might have been). Of course, the suggestion of letting Alexander strike the first blow and winning a battle in defense of Poland, leading to essentially status-quo-ante (possibly with small gifts to Poland at Prussia's expense?), is interesting.

The suggestion of taking Petersburg is also an interesting one--intuitively, it seems that it would be an easier city to take and supply, and would more directly contribute to the goal of closing ports to English trade. But would it end any differently? By 1812, Napoleon had antagonized Sweden (letting Bernadotte, a man he seemed to personally despise and vice-versa, become crown prince was an odd decision in retrospect), and the Danish fleet had already been neutralized in Copenhagen in 1807--is there a realistic possibility of closing the Baltic to Britain, thus leaving only ice-bound Arkhangelsk as an entrepot?

Napoleon was running the Grande Armée with the money taken from its neighbours and the money from the Louisiana purchase which sooner or later will end.
So if Napoleon hadn't invaded Russia his system would ultimately collapse as his armies would be too costly to maintain during peacetime so this is an interesting point of view however I would add that Britain was also having some economic problems as maintaining her allies on the continent was extremely costly so as everybody is coming near economic collapse could Napoleon be able to compromise by hiding the fact that he was almost bankrupt and obtain a positive deal or would he be overtaken by ego and its system would collapse?

 

[EasternRomanEmpire]

Unless you get all of these on the battlefield at the same time, that vast numerical advantage won't mean a whole lot. And at any rate, the Russian troops were nowhere near comparable to the the Grande Armeé. Frankly, if the Russians fight another big field battle in the campaigning season, they will be crushed again (and again). The nature of the war was such that Russia could offset the weakness of its military through operational means, that is restricting the French army from supplying until it collapsed.

"Take those parts of the Russian border that you can easily reach and advance slowly into Russia, while prioritizing the destruction of infrastructure and economic necessities, most importantly agricultural regions. The Russians can try to throw troops at you, in which case they loose because you're Napoleon and you have the most powerful military on the planet, or they can squat in their heartland and watch their peasants die while doing nothing. Here the operational goal is the destabilization of the Russian state by destroying its capacity to meaningfully protect its citizens. Burn Moscow to the ground if you can, and then get out of there and burn Minsk as well. So too every single city, town and village you can physically reach. Make a public spectacle of torching Russia's holy icons. The Emperor can either make peace with you or surrender all claim to be a protector of his nation."

Basically, I don't see any chance of inducing Russia to surrender in 1812 except through genocidal brutality, which would force Russia to fight a conventional war and thus loose. Not that I could see Nappy actually going through with it.

Do you really think the Tsar cared about his people? And Napoleon making mass genocides would only convince the Tsar to fight even more. Burning its holy icon is sort of difficult as the Russians would rather die a hundred times than let them fall in French hands

 

[Hearkener]

Do you really think the Tsar cared about his people?

Not at all. But every state has to maintain its monopoly on violence, and once it no longer can, it collapses. If Alexander can no longer protect his subjects from Nappy, he also cannot impose his will on them, because they will turn to someone who can protect them. No idea who that would be, but if Alex lets the French just do whatever without doing battle at all, his Empire is done for. His soldiers would desert him, his governors and the church disavow him, his own family abandon him, if he watched all of this and did nothing.

And Napoleon making mass genocides would only convince the Tsar to fight even more. Burning its holy icon is sort of difficult as the Russians would rather die a hundred times than let them fall in French hands

Very true. Unfortunately, Russia has no hope to win a conventional war against the First French Empire on the latter's terms. If Alex sends his armies, they will be destroyed: if he does not, his subjects desert him. If however he acquiesces to Napoleon's demands, he can safe face and continue to rule Russia more or less as he did before. Since French demands were not onerous, this is by far the easiest option for the Emperor.

This is classic Sun Tsu: crush the enemy utterly but allow an easy exit.

Imo, the main reason why the extreme brutality that the Nazis tried failed them, was because they actually allowed no room for escape. If you make it clear that you really only want a few concessions, but will stop at nothing to enforce those, the Russians will most likely just stop trading with Great Britain.

 

[Polish Eagle]

And a big part of the invading army were not even French but the conscripted Germans and Italians. Enthusiasm of the Prussian and Austrian troops on the flanks was zero so out of the foreign contingents the enthusiastic one could be Poles.

The one enthusiastic faction in Napoleon's army was the one whose enthusiasm he, for political reasons, could not afford to stoke too hard.

The horses is a very good point and it seems that from the start of the campaign the problem was not even in their numbers (at the start there were plenty of them) but in inadequate competence in their care. The French troops had been used to changing horses in the conquered territories and none of the foreign contingents, even the Poles, had experience in campaigning under these specific circumstances. The substitute horses were available in some numbers along the road but they were Russian peasant horses, small and not very strong.

IIRC, Zamoiski provided the huge number of horses that died at the very beginning due to a single strong rain, Caulaincourt mentioned extreme exhaustion of the horses even before Smolensk and both him and the Russian contemporaries mentioned the catastrophic losses on the way back just due to the absence of the proper horseshoes. Zamoiski described terrible damage to the horses due to the idiotic saddling of the Napoleonic Army (the same comment you can find in the memoirs of the Russian military attache in France in 1914). The horses were not watered properly, a lot of them died eating green grain, they were not used to grass and hay, etc.

Zamoyski does also mention that a large number of better horses were available in Ukraine...but Napoleon's army did not go there (and doesn't Zamoyski also remark that Napoleon was self-consciously trying to avoid repeating Charles XII's campaign?).

Yes, and on the other side of the equation there was another self-important prick who, however, understood that if he gives up, he may share fate of his father. 😉

That too, particularly given the (alleged?) British involvement in that.

Well, prior to the campaign Caulaincourt pointed out to him that Alexander is doing exactly the same thing that Napoleon is doing himself, using the third party ships for imports (including, IIRC, the British goods). 😉

The confrontational point in that area was not the CS, which AI did not abandon until the invasion, but a tariff of 1811, that was putting the high tariffs on the luxury items imported by land, aka on the French goods. This was a slap on Nappy’s face but a negotiable one if Nappy was ready to compromise on some other issues.

This might be an area where Napoleon's notorious micromanaging might have backfired on him--he might have been less offended by it had he not taken it upon himself to go over the imperial ledgers himself. But it's an interesting possibility for compromise.

The goal of (any) war as defined by Napoleon was to destroy the enemy’s army, not to take the geographic points. He took Vienna twice and in neither case did it cause Austrian capitulation. Taking of Berlin did not end the war with Prussia and he was still holding Madrid …

In 1812 he was not going for Moscow, he was going for the Russian army which was retreating toward Moscow because this was the most reasonable direction for it. The demagoguery about chosing between St.Petersburg, Moscow and Kiev was just a face-saving BS to pretend that he is in control of the situation while actually he was not.

March on St.P. would make him advance in a long column with the Russian army being not ahead of him (with him having a chance to catch it up and defeat) but on his flank with a complete freedom of action including ability to cut off his supplies. St.P. itself was a massive consumer of the suppliers but its region was relatively poor in that area so no good supply situation to be expected. Actually, in OTL it was better in the terms of the local supplies and could be even better if the French had been paying the local peasants in gold.

Good points. And yeah, the swampland around Petersburg isn't particularly appealing.

History of the N-B relations had been thoroughly distorted by the post-Napoleonic French “patriotic” writers and the Anglophonic historians tended to pick up the stories, including completely silly ones, without bothering to think or to check the available facts. For example, how could a person relieved of command in a middle of a battle, remain in charge of his troops and even issue the next day bulletin to these troops? Would Napoleon (Consul Bonaparte) write Bernadotte a letter saying that in the case of his death in Italy he expects expects him to march on Paris as save his family (and France as well…) if there was such an alleged mutual hatred?

The relations were not even but as often as not they were OK with Bernadotte receiving the important appointments. The tensions were mostly on two accounts:

• Since the 1st Italian campaign Bernadotte and Berthier were on the very bad terms and the later was regularly arranging “setups” and Nappy taking Berthier’s side.
• Nappy was clearly irritated with B’s habit of issuing addresses to his troops praising their performance. This was the Emperor’s prerogative. Well, at least in the case of the Saxons, B’s attitude proved to be more productive in a long run. Ditto for the nice treatment of the Swedes and Blucher (who become an open hater of Nappy but cooperated with Bernadotte without problems).

At the time of the Swedish affair they were, again, in one of their friendly periods and Nappy fully expected that under Bernadotte Sweden will be the French ally (but not a vassal, Bernadotte made an explicit point of it when this issue was discussed with Napoleon) and Bernadotte was considering this quite seriously: most of the Swedes were pro-French until Nappy occupied Swedish Pomerania.

Fair--thanks for the correction.

Archangelsk (or its site) had been the main Russian port almost since the time of Ivan IV and until Peter I so it would do. Riga and St-P were not ice free either. And there were Black Sea ports as well.

True, though the Black Sea ports might have been closed if Napoleon could come to an understanding with the Sultan (which is another matter entirely).

Unless you get all of these on the battlefield at the same time, that vast numerical advantage won't mean a whole lot. And at any rate, the Russian troops were nowhere near comparable to the the Grande Armeé. Frankly, if the Russians fight another big field battle in the campaigning season, they will be crushed again (and again). The nature of the war was such that Russia could offset the weakness of its military through operational means, that is restricting the French army from supplying until it collapsed.

"Take those parts of the Russian border that you can easily reach and advance slowly into Russia, while prioritizing the destruction of infrastructure and economic necessities, most importantly agricultural regions. The Russians can try to throw troops at you, in which case they loose because you're Napoleon and you have the most powerful military on the planet, or they can squat in their heartland and watch their peasants die while doing nothing. Here the operational goal is the destabilization of the Russian state by destroying its capacity to meaningfully protect its citizens. Burn Moscow to the ground if you can, and then get out of there and burn Minsk as well. So too every single city, town and village you can physically reach. Make a public spectacle of torching Russia's holy icons. The Emperor can either make peace with you or surrender all claim to be a protector of his nation."

Basically, I don't see any chance of inducing Russia to surrender in 1812 except through genocidal brutality, which would force Russia to fight a conventional war and thus loose. Not that I could see Nappy actually going through with it.

If the Tsar were Napoleon's only opponent at the time, going genocidal might work (not considering the moral consequences; though the man who sent troops to reimpose slavery in Haiti could probably get over any scruples he had about an extermination campaign in eastern Europe). Emphasis on might (the most recent analogy to what you suggest might be the Swedish Deluge, where the Swedish siege of the Jasna Gora monastery inspired popular uprisings by the Poles; similarly, the apocalyptic character of anti-Polish resistance in Moscow from 1610-1612; the Tsar has more population at his disposal). Problem is, while Napoleon sends Poniatowski and Murat and possibly Eugene to purge the country with fire and sword, he's still got the Spanish ulcer, a British foe that can land at any point on the exposed coast of Europe, a resentful Prussia just waiting for a chance, and an Austria that wouldn't hesitate to turn on him. A second Spain is the last thing he needs--even if, from day 1, he'd accepted the offer of the Lithuanian Szlachta and proclaimed the restoration of Poland-Lithuania.

I agree that genocidal brutality is the only thing that might work--and even it is iffy, for reasons of morale on both sides and crucially because it would leave Napoleon with no way out because, once he starts it, he has no option but "exterminate or lose." Which would be completely out of his character in 1812--this is the guy who tried so hard to marry the Tsar's sister, after all. He doesn't have some deep-seated hatred toward them that might fuel this kind of decision. By 1815, if he'd somehow restored the borders of the Empire after returning from Elba, maybe; or if he'd captured the Tsar in 1813 (though his behavior during the hundred days also speaks to some great personal loss of nerve by then).

EDIT: There is another matter worth considering. Public opinion. A hundred years or so prior, Louis XIV's excesses against Palatine Germans did play a measurable roll in strengthening coalitions against him. If Napoleon does go down this path, he has to be ready to do the same in Germany, Spain, and, if he can ever get there, Britain, because it would serve to rally people in all those places against him.