22nd June – 23rd August – Germany – Operation Barbarossa and the Afrika Korps
Operation Barbarossa was the greatest clash of arms in human history and in the first few weeks the offensive seemed about to fulfil all of Hitler’s dreams, helped in no small part by Stalin’s failure to respond to the build-up on the borders of the USSR and his refusal to sanction the withdrawal of the Red Army forces in the face of overwhelming German assault. In the wake of these military successes for the Wehrmacht came horror and mass murder. Not only did the Einsatzgruppen begin their campaign of terror against Jews and other ‘undesirables’ but Soviet POWs were herded into camps with little in the way of food, shelter, sanitation, or medicine. Hunger and disease were weaponized as the Wehrmacht demonstrated a supreme indifference to the rules on the treatment of POWs and eventually millions of Soviet soldiers would die either in these POW camps or being marched to them. This only stopped when it was finally decided it would be more ‘efficient’ to work them to death as slave labour. As horrifying as this brutality was it merely served as the prelude to the systematised mass murder of the Holocaust [1].
Hitler had gotten his way as far as the armoured spearhead of the invasion went, more less. Many Panzer IIIs had been refitted with additional armour and 5cm guns, and there were platoons of Panzer IV with 7.5 cm KwK 40 L/43 guns attached to the leading elements of the first Panzer Divisions to cross into the USSR. Overall though the vast majority of Panzer IV were still equipped with the short 75mm howitzer, and fully half of the Panzer III were armed with the 37mm gun, despite the best efforts of German industry. There also not nearly enough Panzer III and IV available, many unit were still deploying large numbers of Panzer II as well as Panzer 35(t) and 38(t). The opening phases of Barbarossa however gave the Generals at OKH little reason to be concerned about this. Such was the dismal performance of Soviet armour that von Kleist and his staff remained convinced them that Hitler’s demands for upgunning and mass production of StuG vehicles was an overreaction to events in France and felt to further prioritize the re-equipping of the Panzer divisions in light of other demands on resources. That this was a mistake would not become clear until the first large scale encounters with the T-34 and the heavy KV tanks [2].
The only thing that caused Hitler some annoyance during those heady summer months was the developing situation in the Middle East, where it seemed British forces were advancing into Libya almost as rapidly as the Panzer Divisions in the Ukraine. The possibility of the collapse of the Italian Fascist regime in the wake of further military setbacks, and its replacement by one hostile to the Reich, was still an important strategic consideration. Unlike the spring when Hitler had been willing to divert large numbers of men and equipment to aid the Italians in the Balkans there was now a distinct shortage of formations, especially Panzer Divisions, that could be sent to shore up their floundering army in the Middle East. Hitler’s insistence on seizing the entirety of the Ukraine flew in the face of the belief held by many of the Generals that the key to defeating the USSR was taking Moscow and they were not happy with the dispersal of the Wehrmacht’s strength to pursue multiple objectives, though their protests were never as vehement as some claimed later. The consensus in OKH was that given the multiple objectives dictated by the Fuhrer’s strategy and the absolute requirement to advance with all possible speed to destroy the Soviet forces before they could retreat behind the Dnieper, which also not coincidentally constituted the limit of the Wehrmacht’s logistical reach, the diversion of any forces from Barbarossa to Libya could not be supported. In the view of the General Staff once the USSR was defeated then the entire strategic picture would be changed and British actions in the Middle East would be irrelevant, any threat to Mussolini’s regime would be academic.
These arguments, couched in terms of Hitler’s grand ambition, were vigorously supported by Goering, tying the Libyan situation into his effort to rewrite the history of Operation Mercury. Objectively the failure to seize Crete could be explained by underestimating the strength of the British defences and the resistance of the local population whilst overestimating the combat capability of the Fallschirmjägers. This analysis would place most of the blame for the failure on the Luftwaffe and the plan he had endorsed, and Goering was not going to allow that to happen. In his new version of events Italian support had always factored into the plan and the Italians had failed to live up their promises. When Italian aid finally dispatched it had repeatedly fled at the first sight of the Royal Navy. Goering seems to have begun to believe his own propaganda and made it clear to Hitler that supporting the Italians in the Middle East would be a waste of men and materiel that could be put to better use [3].
In the end Hitler essentially accepted the argument of the Generals, no forces would be withdrawn from the Eastern Front, instead what became the Afrika Korps would primarily have to be assembled from other theatres, though the leading element would be one that had been held in reserve during the initial offensive and one that was not strictly speak under the command of OKH, 1st SS Panzer Division Liebstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) commanded by General Sepp Dietrich. The LSSAH had started life as Hitler’s personal bodyguard during the early days of his rise to power before being transformed into a combat unit under Himmler’s drive to create a military arm for the SS. It had been a reinforced brigade during Operation Marita and was seen as having performed well so Himmler ordered its expansion to a full Panzer Division. This was no easy task given the needs of preparing for Barbarossa and refitting tanks with larger guns and the formation was still far from ready when the invasion began and ow it was to be the spearhead of the Afrika Korps. The decision to send it was as much political as practical, the dispatch of such a high-profile unit was meant to show Mussolini that Hitler was serious about supporting Italy in Libya, even if the numbers of troops and equipment dispatched might suggest otherwise.
OKH did not protest the loss of the LSSAH, indeed they were only too happy to see the back of Dietrich, a personal favourite of Hitler’s with a tendency to ignore the chain of command if he saw a chance for glory. There was also little protest when it was decided the 22nd Panzer Division, commanded by General Willhelm Apell, would join the LSSAH in Libya. This Division had been assembling in France and had not originally been intended to be activated until September, it was almost the antithesis of the LSSAH. Where Dietrich’s Division was given priority for new equipment the 22nd was being assembled from French tanks seized after the Armistice alongside the Czech Pz 35(t) and 38(t) models, increasingly considered obsolete, and German Panzer I and Panzer II, also entering obsolescence. Almost the only thing in common between the two was that both were understrength and despite hasty efforts to complete their outfitting they would both depart for Libya at about 80% strength [4].
The two commanding officers did not enjoy a happy working relationship. Apell resented Dietrich being given overall command, regarding Dietrich as a man promoted far beyond his level of competence solely based on his currying favour with Hitler. To Dietrich Apell was exactly the kind of officer he resented most. Dietrich had never risen above the rank of Sergeant in World War I whereas as Apell had attended staff college and remained in the much-reduced Reichsheer during the Weimar period. To Dietrich he was one of those old school hidebound officers the Fuhrer himself often railed against. This antagonism caused serious arguments over the best strategy for deploying the division in Libya.
These strategic choices would initially be constrained by the Afrika Korps having little in the way of infantry support. Orders had been issued for the creation of the 90th Light Infantry Division early in 1941, but by the time the Afrika Korps departed it was still assembling its HQ. The staff wouldn’t depart for Libya until mid-September with the first combat elements arriving at the end of that month. The 90th would never operate at full strength since the last regiment due to join the division was never dispatched to the Middle East. The LSSAH and the 22nd departed on the 31st of July, with Dietrich already thinking in terms of conducting something far more ambitious than the holding action his orders called for [5].
[1] A small reminder of the nightmare the Wehrmacht helped visit on the luckless citizens of the USSR.
[2] So some of the Panzers are better armed and better protected, though at this point it doesn’t really make a difference and is in fact going to further complicate the supply situation.
[3] Some of the arguments here parallel the ones the British had over Greece.
[4] So no Rommel and not exactly an armoured juggernaut there is still an Afrika Korps.
[5] It took me some time to come up with a couple of units that could plausibly be used. The 22nd was a relatively obvious candidate, the LSSAH was a late bit of inspiration.
