Mossadegh stays on the US' good side?

[Vinization]

Fair warning, my knowledge of this subject is fairly limited.

While the overthrow of Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh is seen primarily as an American operation, the country whose government was most invested in his demise was actually Great Britain - the main target of Mossadegh's nationalization of Iranian oil production was a British company, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

From what I understand from giving this thesis a very quick read, the United States government was initially willing to help Mossadegh's government, even in the face of London's opposition, due to the fear that the economic crisis caused by the British-led boycott of Iranian oil would lead to a Communist takeover of the country. Mossadegh traveled to New York in late 1951 in an attempt to get support from the American government, but his behavior during the visit (he was erratic, alternating between favoring a compromise in one moment and being completely against it in another) alienated them instead. The result was that American aid dried up by early 1952, and, amidst worsening economic conditions and political unrest, Mossadegh's government was eventually overthrown in August 1953.

So, what if Mossadegh's visit to the US went better, ensuring at least some meaningful American aid to Tehran in 1952? Since the Iranian economy won't degrade as badly as IOTL, or at least not as quickly, could this butterfly away some of Mossadegh's more autocratic actions? IOTL he was ruling by decree by the time of the 1953 coup.

Lastly, could Mossadegh and the AIOC reach a compromise if the crisis doesn't escalate as quickly as IOTL? From what I've read he first proposed a 50/50 share of profits between the Iranian government and the British, with the latter refusing the proposal. Mossadegh had already backed himself into a corner by the time London was open to this option, and he rejected it as a result.

 

[French Frog]

I'd dare to suggest that Iran becomes a regional superpower and economic engine by the mid sixties.

 

[Vinization]

I'd dare to suggest that Iran becomes a regional superpower and economic engine by the mid sixties.

Honestly, I'm more curious about how Iranian politics could evolve. While Mossadegh was far from a democrat, as his actions while in power showed, it wasn't until after the coup that the Shah took a more active role in governing the country. Considering how autocratic the Shah turned out to be, I think Iran have a better chance to democratize properly - and likely keep its monarchy - if the prime minister and the parliament were more powerful. Again, I don't think Mossadegh would start this process, but a successor of his might.

 

[raharris1973]

Fair warning, my knowledge of this subject is fairly limited.

While the overthrow of Iranian prime minister Mohammad Mossadegh is seen primarily as an American operation, the country whose government was most invested in his demise was actually Great Britain - when Mossadegh's nationalization of the Iranian oil industry hit a British company, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

From what I understand from giving this thesis a very quick read, the United States government was initially willing to help Mossadegh's government, even in the face of London's opposition, due to the fear that the economic crisis caused by the British-led boycott of Iranian oil would lead to a Communist takeover of the country. Mossadegh traveled to New York in late 1951 in an attempt to get support from the American government, but his behavior during the visit (he was erratic, alternating between favoring a compromise in one moment and being completely against it in another) alienated them instead. The result was that American aid dried up by early 1952, and, amidst worsening economic conditions and political unrest, Mossadegh's government was eventually overthrown in August 1953.

So, what if Mossadegh's visit to the US went better, ensuring at least some meaningful American aid to Tehran in 1952? Since the Iranian economy won't degrade as badly as IOTL, or at least not as quickly, could this butterfly away some of Mossadegh's more autocratic actions? IOTL he was ruling by decree by the time of the 1953 coup.

Lastly, could Mossadegh and the AIOC reach a compromise if the crisis doesn't escalate as quickly as IOTL? From what I've read he first proposed a 50/50 share of profits between the Iranian government and the British, with the latter refusing the proposal. Mossadegh had already backed himself into a corner by the time London was open to this option, and he rejected it as a result.

50/50 splits were becoming the oil industry standard in the early 1950s in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, so the western parties could have been brought around to it eventually. In the ultimate oil settlement after the coup, the Shah's/Iranian govt share was raised to 50% or 40% minimum at worst, so it is not like AIOC got a roll back to the pre-crisis ownership, profits and control once Mossadegh was out of the way. And less than 20 years later, the sovereign countries were nationalizing or getting to 75-90%.

 

[CountDVB]

Mossadegh was still concerned about the conservative and monarchical elements coming after him. I think that was part of the issue and it was them who helped the British and Americans.

Perhaps if they tried something, but failed or the Americans warned Mossadegh, that could have a large change.

 

[Dancing Fool]

From what I've read he first proposed a 50/50 share of profits between the Iranian government and the British,

I’ve read there was a human element, in that . . .

Iran said they were doing the compensation per British law. But I’m sure the British attitude was, We’re not going to have someone else telling us what British law is.

 

[yulzari1]

I’ve read there was a human element, in that . . .

Iran said they were doing the compensation per British law. But I’m sure the British attitude was, We’re not going to have someone else telling us what British law is.

The British government was actively nationalising it’s own key industries in the period e.g road, rail, power, and coal, which was a model for discussion.

 

[Maponus]

Every possibility Britain and the Iranian elites go ahead with the coup anyway.

 

[BlueTrousers]

Iran said they were doing the compensation per British law. But I’m sure the British attitude was, We’re not going to have someone else telling us what British law is.

AFAIK, one of the major problems the British government had was that AIOC accounting didn't distinguish between profit made in Iran, and profit made in Britain, and the British weren't willing to open their books to Iranian auditors. Which meant, of course, that any 50/50 split that was initially acceptable to Britain would allow them to claim that the profit made in Iran was two buttons and some pocket fluff, and all the rest was made elsewhere. That, in turn, was totally unacceptable to Iran.

Of course, the deal that Britain was later forced to accept was a 40% share of a 50% share of the National Iranian Oil Company, i.e. 20%. A 50/50 split between AIOC and Iran would leave the British better off overall. Persuading them that 50% is better than nothing, and that they can't stand against the tide, is potentially a very impactful change.

 

[raharris1973]

Every possibility Britain and the Iranian elites go ahead with the coup anyway.

I think their individual assets in country were better surveilled by the Iranians and kicked out and their direct ties with locals cut. If the British had an easier covert option there is decent chance that they would have exercised it in the two years (1951-52) when the oil crisis was going on but the Americans were not on the same page. In fact, the British in 1951 I think did a ham-handed naval blockade of Abadan refinery that just looked bad to the world, and slowed down American acceptance that Mossadegh might be the problem.