Assembly lines are assembly lines. Learning one task, even if it's high precision, isn't extremely difficult. Plus demand for smart phones, civilians computes, civilian cars with GPS, DVD players, i-pods, etc. will have dropped by the necessity of war to the point that you'll probably be trying to deal with an excess of electronics manufacturing not a shortage.
Max US mobilization?
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Assembly lines are assembly lines. Learning one task, even if it's high precision, isn't extremely difficult. Plus demand for smart phones, civilians computes, civilian cars with GPS, DVD players, i-pods, etc. will have dropped by the necessity of war to the point that you'll probably be trying to deal with an excess of electronics manufacturing not a shortage.
BlondieBC
Banned
I have a different perspective than many of the posters, so I will start with the first post.
The 10% of total population is probably about the right figure. It is based roughly on 20% of the population being adult males from low end of 18-21 years and high end of 40-50 years. Half the working age males have been done enough it is doable. So the USA has enough bodies to do say 35 million before we begin to consider options like allowing unlimited Latin American worker permits. The we have issues like the USA not liking drafts, and the associated political issues. So for all intents and purposes, the available manpower pools is simply whatever the political will will allow and tax resources. You can pay draftees peanuts, but they still eat food, and even worse, the consume military equipment/supplies at frightening rate.
A good operating assumption is that any Great War (World War, War of National Survival, whatever the name) will go nuclear. I agree that this is almost certainly true. The odds US soldiers are occupying Wuhan, Beijing, Shanghai and the Chinese have not used strategic nukes is very close to zero. Same for USA losing.
We need large/powerful enemies to have a max US mobilization, so I guess we are looking at China, Russia, and/or India in some combination. We need some big issue that can't be negotiated, at least seems big. So lets make it a USA versus China war for simplicity. I read a quote that goes like "The army the USA will occupy China with does not exist, and the Chinese Navy that will win control of the Eastern Pacific does not exist". So we have the great cause of the war, what happens.
As Calbear and others have pointed out, the war consumes equipment much faster than it can be replace. In a day, you will consume a week or month of production. Maybe faster if we are fighting decisive battle. Within a few months, the equipment stocks are depleted. I know the Chinese will not have surface control of the Pacific, they might not even have a navy left, at least anything vaguely blue waterish. I can't see how the USA can occupy China with existing land forces. Just the occupation part is too big for the USA, if the Chinese Army simply surrendered. Someone will be winning at this point, but far from decisively. We have then the choices for the sides.
1) Conditional negotiated Peace.
2) Go nuclear
3) Continue the war.
You need option #3 to get max mobilization. Since it takes two to make peace and one to make a war happen, let's assume one side or other can't end war with collapsing. Then we get a long pause like WW2 where we build, but without the buildup for the USA. It would take years for the USA to equip an army to occupy China, decades for the Chinese to build a good enough navy. If we go down path #3, even for a bit, the weapons will not be what we are using. Too expensive, too slow. So say the USA wins the first stage of war. No one uses nukes (good luck on that POD). The USA will have to turn to people like Ford/GM and ask "What kind of vehicle can you build with a weapon at the rate of 10,000 per month in 24 months?" You get something, if it is a F150 technical. You will not get anything like a M1 Abrams.
You have to use existing machine tools to even build for a 2 year out window. Sure you may increase Abrams productions by a factor of 5 in two years, but it will be no where near the 10K per month or more you need for the 35 million man military. Setting up something as low tech as a plastic bag factory can be a year from decision to about full capacity. No one keeps spare machine tools laying around. When we order plastic bag machines, the steel had not yet been produced or if it was, it was hanging around the steel mill. Same for all the other things in the machine. I would not be surprise if a F-35 factory built from scratch would see 0 planes built year 1. Would not be shocked if it was almost 0 in first two years.
A great mobilization without a half decade leadup to hostilities means we are fighting with modified civilian gears. Think of the light infantry division using 30-06 as it personal weapon, IED as mines, drones as air support, and the like. This is best the 201st division of the US Army has in Month + 18.
BlondieBC
Banned
How big is "unbelievable". Compared to previous wars where you can lose 5% of population, I have trouble seeing 5 million, much less 15 million USA dead lost in a US v. China war. And hard to see 50 million dead Chinese. Assuming it is not a nuclear war, the USA could not kill 50 million Chinese even if it went out of its way to maximize civilian losses. We don't have enough ammo.
Are you counting the effects of disease or famine in your number?
BlondieBC
Banned
Years. It took years in WW2, and our stuff is more complicated. Seems like the Hellcat was the only plane that was started after December 7th that saw wide spread combat. And by years, I mean well over 3 years. You will fight with limited supplies of the good weapons (F-35). No more than 10 times base line peace production is my guess. And you will fight with converted modified civilian use stuff.
Every part you want for the new design takes a piece or two of equipment to make. So the idea of a new tank or airplane will be very hard.
And Vietnam vintage equipment was simple w.r.t. to the current one. E.g. apart from a few Paveways, every bomb dropped during the war was similar (or actually dating back, see Forrestal fire) to WWII ordnance. Nowadays bombs are computers [1] with some explosive attached.
[1] special purpose computers, with non commercial software and hardware. The programmer you find on Dice.com will require months of training and supervision before being of some help.
And in a total war the complexity of bombs will relax a bit to a lot. In total war you put the scalpel away and bring out the sledgehammer.
As for assembly lines, I am not kidding. The only possible issue is if it takes too much precision for the average person, in which case machines will take over. We have so much electronics production these days it's not an issue. Look around your house and there's probably like 7-10 household items that have reasonably advanced electronics. Almost none of those will be produced during wartime, and that can be geared to make what the military needs.
The stuff that goes into consumer electronics is for the most part not the stuff that goes into military equipment. The overlap is pretty minimal. The military electronics generally are analog and mixed signal semiconductors because so much of it is based on sensors or communications. The electronics in your house are mostly digital microchips. Those are cheap off the shelf chips that usually cost less than a $1. Further, the military chips need to be reliable and durable. Having your toaster break has fewer consequences than having the HUD display on an F-22, or the guidance system on a missile fail. And your toaster doesnt have to work at 30,000 feet or at 5g. Long story short, most of the computer electronics infrastructure has limited use in a military environment, particularly the more advanced systems. Some of it could be converted but engineers would have to design the equipment around the off the shelf parts if that's the case, which right now they generally dont do. And even if they did, that's still a redesign of the weapon or the system. So what you're talking about would actually be a fairly major endeavor.
That's assuming you can get the electronics built for the drones etc. I think we had this discussion a while back and you were more pessimistic than me here...
Machine Tools are vastly faster to set up and change what they're making in very small batches many times a shift, think Computer Numerically Controlled Nine Axis Milling Machines that replace 10,000 sq. ft of manual machine tools each with a skilled operator inflexibly making lower quality parts during WWI-Vietnam.
Retooling is considerably more software driven which also means sending out the same SolidWorks or CATIA set of instructions to CNC machine tools in a thousand U.S. shops on the same day is very doable (thanks to broadband and the cloud computing, a significant advantage over foes.)
While electonics components mfg. and machine tool mfg. have shifted to China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, etc. because we clearly don't plan to fight a major war or remain a manufacturing powerhouse (i.e. deeply shortsighted 40 year trend), thanks to some U.S. industries we still make 25% of the world's manufactured output here and our key trading partners for it in most cases would remain allies and accessible (Canada, Mexico, Britain, Ireland, Germany, Taiwan, Japan, Brazil) along with better internal and neighboring production of feedstocks from iron ore, aluminum, fibreglass, aramid fibers, jet fuel, gasoline, lead, copper, steel, cement, plastics, resins, rubbers, adhesives, etc.).
I think we can make about a million battle rifles a year right now (and do when you count civilian versions) and going back to triple shifts and additional lines (quicker ramp up than aircraft, way simpler product) get to 2-3 million a year by year two (heck we did that in World War I and II with the much tougher tooling up and production constraints.)
Manufacturing could ramp up surprisingingly quickly on simple systems: man-portable or mounted in pickup truck beds 60-80mm mortars, recoilless rifles, .50 cal M2 Machine guns (that took a few months for auto and appliance manufacturers to turn out tens of thousands of what's essentially designed for 1918 manufacturing constraints), aramid-fiber blankets to armor instantly existing SUV's and Pickup trucks since we have DuPont and the Taliban didn't (the Soviets started doing this in the 1950's but it's demanding technology), a copy of the RPG's and M-79 grenade launchers as that's simple stuff too or for that matter thousands of Uzi's since they're designed for a 1945-era small machine shop's production and quite handy for urban warfare defense by little trained civilians (ask the Israelis.) We're also the best prepared to feed a large army but outsourcing footwear and apparel production overseas would bite us hard ("great rifle with amazing optics, tactical apps on your I-Pad, and camo flip flops and a kid's bookbag?")
If it were China or Russia, the very old strategm for dealing with centrally-controlled foes with many unhappy subjects is to cut off the head as quick as possible rather try to conquer every inch of ground (always impossible unless we've taken on Lichtenstein), and command & control centers and national capitals are always high priority targets. Although in our case losing the Pentagon and DC just makes the logistical challenges far simpler and allows faster field reaction for forces in the field just like the days when all communication traveled by sailing ship between field forces and capitals.
Retooling is considerably more software driven which also means sending out the same SolidWorks or CATIA set of instructions to CNC machine tools in a thousand U.S. shops on the same day is very doable (thanks to broadband and the cloud computing, a significant advantage over foes.)
While electonics components mfg. and machine tool mfg. have shifted to China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, etc. because we clearly don't plan to fight a major war or remain a manufacturing powerhouse (i.e. deeply shortsighted 40 year trend), thanks to some U.S. industries we still make 25% of the world's manufactured output here and our key trading partners for it in most cases would remain allies and accessible (Canada, Mexico, Britain, Ireland, Germany, Taiwan, Japan, Brazil) along with better internal and neighboring production of feedstocks from iron ore, aluminum, fibreglass, aramid fibers, jet fuel, gasoline, lead, copper, steel, cement, plastics, resins, rubbers, adhesives, etc.).
I think we can make about a million battle rifles a year right now (and do when you count civilian versions) and going back to triple shifts and additional lines (quicker ramp up than aircraft, way simpler product) get to 2-3 million a year by year two (heck we did that in World War I and II with the much tougher tooling up and production constraints.)
Manufacturing could ramp up surprisingingly quickly on simple systems: man-portable or mounted in pickup truck beds 60-80mm mortars, recoilless rifles, .50 cal M2 Machine guns (that took a few months for auto and appliance manufacturers to turn out tens of thousands of what's essentially designed for 1918 manufacturing constraints), aramid-fiber blankets to armor instantly existing SUV's and Pickup trucks since we have DuPont and the Taliban didn't (the Soviets started doing this in the 1950's but it's demanding technology), a copy of the RPG's and M-79 grenade launchers as that's simple stuff too or for that matter thousands of Uzi's since they're designed for a 1945-era small machine shop's production and quite handy for urban warfare defense by little trained civilians (ask the Israelis.) We're also the best prepared to feed a large army but outsourcing footwear and apparel production overseas would bite us hard ("great rifle with amazing optics, tactical apps on your I-Pad, and camo flip flops and a kid's bookbag?")
If it were China or Russia, the very old strategm for dealing with centrally-controlled foes with many unhappy subjects is to cut off the head as quick as possible rather try to conquer every inch of ground (always impossible unless we've taken on Lichtenstein), and command & control centers and national capitals are always high priority targets. Although in our case losing the Pentagon and DC just makes the logistical challenges far simpler and allows faster field reaction for forces in the field just like the days when all communication traveled by sailing ship between field forces and capitals.
BlondieBC
Banned
You are probably right, I should not have included drones in the list. I was trying to convey that in a long war with hundreds of raw divisions that most of these troops would not be equipped much better than your say average Somali fighters from the 1990's or perhaps some Syrian rebel group without outside assistance. Basically, we have light infantry divisions with a small smattering of things that we would call modern weapons, but instead we would first have to use things that are simple to produce on existing production lines. Modified civilian rifles. Simple mortars with probably just HE quick type rounds with high failure rates. We probably would not use real F150's, but I would not be surprised if the base of our infantry vehicle would not be that far from some existing production civilian vehicle. At best you do something like take a semi-tractor trailer engine, and build a ad hoc production line around it.
TFSmith121
Banned
Don't forget that many designs are intentionally parcelled
True. If you have 3 a/c with decent life cycle numbers that are in the boneyard, you can cannibalize all of one and some of the second to yield one operationally immediately, and another in the pipeline. The third is probably scrap, but still - cheaper than new builds.
Also, although the supply chains may not be able to outfit them entirely, but realize most peacetime a/c production for USG procurement is predicated on a single shift; occassionally two, but (almost) never three...if the subcontractors can provide the materials and components, and labor is immediately available (call back retirees, put the journeymen in charge, graduate the apprentices, and open the hiring halls), that 48-per-year line of whatevers could easily yield 132-per-year, simply by going to triple shifts.
Also, don't forget that many designs are intentionally parcelled out among contractors/facilities/states for political reasons; half the F-18's fuselage is built by NorthropGrumman in California and half of it is built by Boeing (formerly McDaK) in Missouri (IIRC)...both lines could presumably be expanded fairly quickly if necessary - maybe a few months in terms of producing and setting up the required jigs - and there's double the production capacity, at least in terms of airframes.
Engines and avionics and weapons are dicier, but similar patterns are in place in other sectors; there's a reason the EELV program resulted in both the Delta IV and the Atlas V (although the Atlas V engine supply chain is problematic, obviously; go SpaceX). A fair amount of the Cold War industrial infrastructure still exists, although the amount of use it gets is minimal. That "surge" capacity is disappearing as companies merge and facilities are downsized or sold off, but a lot of it is still available.
Even the facilities that are essentially closed under BRAC (Mare Island Naval Shipyard, for example) exist as such, and could be rehabbed and re-opened, given sufficient funding. USAF Plant 42 in Palmdale is another example; it exists, although not much is "officially" being built there at the moment, but the capacity for multiple multi-engine aircraft production lines is quite clear...
There's also the reality that civil aircraft are much more complex and resource-hungry than they were historically; the industrial capacity in terms of materials and labor that goes into business jet production today amounts to the equivalent of a fighter jet production line, if not more so...the capacity of combat aircraft production using - say - the Cessna and Gulfstream facilities - would be pretty significant; presumably whatever is left of Hawker Beechcraft in the US and the VLJ producers add additional capacity.
Then there is the US approach from 1940 - clear off a big enough space and build greenfield, and then lease it to the contractors. That still happens, occasionally.
The points made above about using CATIA CAD-CAM and internet/cloud/fibre-optics to maximize production from small shops is a good one; the model of great big vertically-integrated facilities from the Cold War is not the only way to do it - horizontally-integrated lines with something approaching JIT supply chains are possible in a networked economy. The answer would be to do both, obviously, for "guaranteed procurement success"...
Best,
True. If you have 3 a/c with decent life cycle numbers that are in the boneyard, you can cannibalize all of one and some of the second to yield one operationally immediately, and another in the pipeline. The third is probably scrap, but still - cheaper than new builds.
Also, although the supply chains may not be able to outfit them entirely, but realize most peacetime a/c production for USG procurement is predicated on a single shift; occassionally two, but (almost) never three...if the subcontractors can provide the materials and components, and labor is immediately available (call back retirees, put the journeymen in charge, graduate the apprentices, and open the hiring halls), that 48-per-year line of whatevers could easily yield 132-per-year, simply by going to triple shifts.
Also, don't forget that many designs are intentionally parcelled out among contractors/facilities/states for political reasons; half the F-18's fuselage is built by NorthropGrumman in California and half of it is built by Boeing (formerly McDaK) in Missouri (IIRC)...both lines could presumably be expanded fairly quickly if necessary - maybe a few months in terms of producing and setting up the required jigs - and there's double the production capacity, at least in terms of airframes.
Engines and avionics and weapons are dicier, but similar patterns are in place in other sectors; there's a reason the EELV program resulted in both the Delta IV and the Atlas V (although the Atlas V engine supply chain is problematic, obviously; go SpaceX). A fair amount of the Cold War industrial infrastructure still exists, although the amount of use it gets is minimal. That "surge" capacity is disappearing as companies merge and facilities are downsized or sold off, but a lot of it is still available.
Even the facilities that are essentially closed under BRAC (Mare Island Naval Shipyard, for example) exist as such, and could be rehabbed and re-opened, given sufficient funding. USAF Plant 42 in Palmdale is another example; it exists, although not much is "officially" being built there at the moment, but the capacity for multiple multi-engine aircraft production lines is quite clear...
There's also the reality that civil aircraft are much more complex and resource-hungry than they were historically; the industrial capacity in terms of materials and labor that goes into business jet production today amounts to the equivalent of a fighter jet production line, if not more so...the capacity of combat aircraft production using - say - the Cessna and Gulfstream facilities - would be pretty significant; presumably whatever is left of Hawker Beechcraft in the US and the VLJ producers add additional capacity.
Then there is the US approach from 1940 - clear off a big enough space and build greenfield, and then lease it to the contractors. That still happens, occasionally.
The points made above about using CATIA CAD-CAM and internet/cloud/fibre-optics to maximize production from small shops is a good one; the model of great big vertically-integrated facilities from the Cold War is not the only way to do it - horizontally-integrated lines with something approaching JIT supply chains are possible in a networked economy. The answer would be to do both, obviously, for "guaranteed procurement success"...
Best,
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I am not disagreeing with you but in WW2 very few women were in uniform but a lot were in the factories. Smart manpower usage could up the percentage. Women as well as men would be drafted so some males and females already trained in factory work. Less children per household means less childcare problems. You can double the class size of schools using those teachers to help train solders or factory workers and women will be in combat. While age 49 to be drafted most 59 years old are proably in better shape then the 49s were. In WW2 I doubt many women over 40-50 entered the work force, that figure is a guess. 49-70 men and women add a lot to the war effort. You may not want to put a 55 year old person through Infantry basic training but a lot of jobs to day won't need muscle like paperwork food service, ect
I had read this idea in the other posts so I am throwing it out for comments.
TFSmith121
Banned
One thing here - all the "static" defense forces, i.e.
One thing here - all the "static" defense forces, i.e. CONUS ADA, strategic missile forces, a lot of the current administrative and procurement commands, etc. would get "combed out" and the fit personnel made available would be replaced by limited duty types.
Same with the legions of mid-career types working as aides/staff in the executive and legislative branches, attending school, on leave, assigned as faculty to the academies, war colleges, etc., on detached duty, etc. Mobilizing the active, inactive, and retired reserves does the same, as well as helps backfill behind the activie duty types who get combed out. Same for the state personnel, both federally-funded NG positions and the state-funded and state volunteers (SDF) who are fit and trained. Transfer the USCG to the USN; transfer all the existing USMS, PHS, and NOAA personnel to the appropriate armed services; start the draft to sustain the above.
So from the above, there are a lot of potential cadre for new units that would be made available; likewise, graduate all the junior and senior year students in the academies (both the US and federally-recognized state schools), and all the junior and senior ROTC cadets and expedite their commissioning; organize OCS and retread NCOs as such; direct commissions for specialists (merchant marine officers, licensed transport pilots, doctors, dentists, sworn LE personnel, etc.)
Manpower (including all personnel, obviously) can be used wisely.
Best,
One thing here - all the "static" defense forces, i.e. CONUS ADA, strategic missile forces, a lot of the current administrative and procurement commands, etc. would get "combed out" and the fit personnel made available would be replaced by limited duty types.
Same with the legions of mid-career types working as aides/staff in the executive and legislative branches, attending school, on leave, assigned as faculty to the academies, war colleges, etc., on detached duty, etc. Mobilizing the active, inactive, and retired reserves does the same, as well as helps backfill behind the activie duty types who get combed out. Same for the state personnel, both federally-funded NG positions and the state-funded and state volunteers (SDF) who are fit and trained. Transfer the USCG to the USN; transfer all the existing USMS, PHS, and NOAA personnel to the appropriate armed services; start the draft to sustain the above.
So from the above, there are a lot of potential cadre for new units that would be made available; likewise, graduate all the junior and senior year students in the academies (both the US and federally-recognized state schools), and all the junior and senior ROTC cadets and expedite their commissioning; organize OCS and retread NCOs as such; direct commissions for specialists (merchant marine officers, licensed transport pilots, doctors, dentists, sworn LE personnel, etc.)
Manpower (including all personnel, obviously) can be used wisely.
Best,