Max US mobilization?
- Thread starter Mookie
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I think you're underselling the possibility of tooling up economies to the challenge.
But what it would undeniably mean is that to support the fight, we'd all end up being a lot poorer. People often forget that WW2 was fought by the combatants essentially converting all civilian manufacturing to war production beyond the bare minimum necessary to sustain the infrastructure, and shutting down anything that couldn't be brought to bear on the war effort.
TFSmith121
Banned
Standard ratio for an industrialized power
Standard ratio in an industrialized power is 10 percent of the total population can be diverted from the economy for military duty; obviously, this skews toward males in the age 20-30 cohort, but it gives you a ballpark. Obviously, one can only get those numbers from a population that will accept conscription for the duration; all volunteer forces (India in WW II, for example) bring in so many complications that there is no ballpark.
More than 10 percent in a conscription regime, however, and labor force demographics for production take a hit; less than that, and the effectiveness of the field forces should improve, given selectivity (fewer Cat IIIs and Cat IVs, to use the US terminology)...of course, the farther one goes in selectivity, the smaller the deployable field forces, which causes real problems in terms of generating combat power in the active theater(s).
Note that the above numbers do not differentiate between ground forces, maritime forces, and air forces; the 10 percent figure is simply a total. One can organize those numbers however one wishes. There is also some room around the edges for civilian specialist labor pools (merchant mariners, for example) that can be conscripted or organized into auxiliaries. Home defense forces (ADA, facility security, etc.) can also be part-time, if organized well, which fuzzes things out somewhat.
The US ratio for deployed ground combat forces in WW II (Army) was about 5-1; the Marines did better, because so much of their service force requirements were provided by the Army and Navy.
So, in a REALLY ballpark way, if one has a country of 100 million that will accept conscription, one can estimate the numbers as 10 million in the military (i.e., outside of the production economy), of which presumably 2 million could be at the sharp end (ground forces). Given sufficient (~10 percent) cadre, a combat division filled through conscription can be overseas and ready for action within 18 months; less if the cadre is larger and selectivity is used for the fillers and replacements, especially if volunteers are called for (airborne, marines, etc.)
The above numbers are based on the US WW II experience, plus various studies at the ICAF; one final thing to keep in mind is the above numbers are just that, with no consideration of procurement, transportation, theater conditions, sustainment, etc.
In specific terms, the US is and has been closer to being an autarky (vertically and horizontally) than any other power in the world, for most of the past two centuries; whatever resources are not immediately available within the borders of the US can be (generally) replaced, stockpiled, or secured from (essentially) friendly neighbors. These include both natural, technical, and human resources, which is not (generally) true for the other major powers. The US also has a superb defensible position, in relation to the other major powers (defined however one wishes) which all have in common their location in Eurasia, with less significant maritime frontiers.
Given the above, keep in mind that US practice and experience may not be entirely applicable to a Eurasian power engaged in mobilization without a maritime element. However, as essentially the only example of a modern nation state that engaged in total war but entirely at oceanic distances, the US practice makes some sense as a base case.
Best,
Standard ratio in an industrialized power is 10 percent of the total population can be diverted from the economy for military duty; obviously, this skews toward males in the age 20-30 cohort, but it gives you a ballpark. Obviously, one can only get those numbers from a population that will accept conscription for the duration; all volunteer forces (India in WW II, for example) bring in so many complications that there is no ballpark.
More than 10 percent in a conscription regime, however, and labor force demographics for production take a hit; less than that, and the effectiveness of the field forces should improve, given selectivity (fewer Cat IIIs and Cat IVs, to use the US terminology)...of course, the farther one goes in selectivity, the smaller the deployable field forces, which causes real problems in terms of generating combat power in the active theater(s).
Note that the above numbers do not differentiate between ground forces, maritime forces, and air forces; the 10 percent figure is simply a total. One can organize those numbers however one wishes. There is also some room around the edges for civilian specialist labor pools (merchant mariners, for example) that can be conscripted or organized into auxiliaries. Home defense forces (ADA, facility security, etc.) can also be part-time, if organized well, which fuzzes things out somewhat.
The US ratio for deployed ground combat forces in WW II (Army) was about 5-1; the Marines did better, because so much of their service force requirements were provided by the Army and Navy.
So, in a REALLY ballpark way, if one has a country of 100 million that will accept conscription, one can estimate the numbers as 10 million in the military (i.e., outside of the production economy), of which presumably 2 million could be at the sharp end (ground forces). Given sufficient (~10 percent) cadre, a combat division filled through conscription can be overseas and ready for action within 18 months; less if the cadre is larger and selectivity is used for the fillers and replacements, especially if volunteers are called for (airborne, marines, etc.)
The above numbers are based on the US WW II experience, plus various studies at the ICAF; one final thing to keep in mind is the above numbers are just that, with no consideration of procurement, transportation, theater conditions, sustainment, etc.
In specific terms, the US is and has been closer to being an autarky (vertically and horizontally) than any other power in the world, for most of the past two centuries; whatever resources are not immediately available within the borders of the US can be (generally) replaced, stockpiled, or secured from (essentially) friendly neighbors. These include both natural, technical, and human resources, which is not (generally) true for the other major powers. The US also has a superb defensible position, in relation to the other major powers (defined however one wishes) which all have in common their location in Eurasia, with less significant maritime frontiers.
Given the above, keep in mind that US practice and experience may not be entirely applicable to a Eurasian power engaged in mobilization without a maritime element. However, as essentially the only example of a modern nation state that engaged in total war but entirely at oceanic distances, the US practice makes some sense as a base case.
Best,
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One thing I want to say about production, I'm fairly certain that the Allies had given what they saw as impossible quotas to try to get their factories to throw everything in to try to reach them and then were left with the very surprising results that production exceeded those quotas. I think people would be similarly suprised today by production that actually happened in a total war.
Also discussions about the other side not giving you time to rest when you're attempting to retool ignore the fact that your opponent needs to retool just as badly as you in a protracted war, so you would end up with a very violent opening and then a decline in fighting while both sides gear up, and then a return to extreme violence.
Also discussions about the other side not giving you time to rest when you're attempting to retool ignore the fact that your opponent needs to retool just as badly as you in a protracted war, so you would end up with a very violent opening and then a decline in fighting while both sides gear up, and then a return to extreme violence.
Riain
Banned
I'd suggest that current weapons are cost effective, they produce good exchange rates against current threats, so any efforts to simplify them would be the wrong way to go. It's the munitions they use that would be the problem, although that would be easier to solve through new production.
To what extent would reactivating stuff from the boneyard be effective in a year long war? How many mothballed fighters (for example, tanks/APCs if anyone knows) could be added to an inventory within a year-18 months that way?
To what extent would reactivating stuff from the boneyard be effective in a year long war? How many mothballed fighters (for example, tanks/APCs if anyone knows) could be added to an inventory within a year-18 months that way?
Wouldn't it be possible to upgrade old equipment to modern standards during a protracted war?
Doesn't the Russian army have a lot of T-72's which have been upgraded to T-80 standard...I'm not sure the US keeps M-60's and older tanks in reserve in 2014, but couldnt all the M1A1's be upgraded to the standard of M1A2s? Same with aircaft, the USAF has had the same B-52's in service for nearly half a century, as have the Russians with the TU-95 bombers.
Doesn't the Russian army have a lot of T-72's which have been upgraded to T-80 standard...I'm not sure the US keeps M-60's and older tanks in reserve in 2014, but couldnt all the M1A1's be upgraded to the standard of M1A2s? Same with aircaft, the USAF has had the same B-52's in service for nearly half a century, as have the Russians with the TU-95 bombers.
TFSmith121
Banned
Rule of thumb for operational equipment at M-Day:
Rule of thumb for operational equipment at M-Day, given a rational level of preventive maintenance, peacetime operational use and wastage, updating electronics/avionics/etc., and no major SLEP-level re-builds:
Maybe 50 percent of the production run within M-Day minus 10 years (this is very rough; obviously it varies widely based on the item/system) should be functional (or can be made functional enough) to put into the hands of troops. The rest are for training, cannibalized, hangar queens, in transit along the way in the supply chain, etc. This includes no war reserve stocks; if you want a war reserve worth having, cut the 50 percent number above in half, and that gives you the number available for operational units plus a 100 percent war reserve. That may or may not last very long, given the operational tempo, but at least it gets you past the "everything in the shop window" level of TO&E.
Material produced in the second decade prior to M-Day probably tops out around 25 percent functionality of the entire production run; available for operational use is probably 12 percent.
Third decade prior to M-Day drops to 6 and 3 percent of the production runs; fourth decade drops to 3 and 1.5 percent.
Obviously, these number vary HUGELY based on how hard something gets used (in terms of aircraft, think engine and airframe LCC), but as a VERY rough rule of thumb, figure if your country built:
100 airplanes in 2001-2010, probably 50 of them can be regarded as operationally capable in 2015, and so with a 100 percent war reserve, you can equip two squadrons of 12 each and have one as the group commander's bird.
If your country built 100 in 1991-2000, probably 25 are operational and 12 can equip a third squadron.
If your country built 100 in 1981-1990, probably 12 are operational and you could equip an training flight with six of them.
If you built 100 in 1971-1980, maybe a half dozen are flyable, but I'd convert them to drones or something similar rather than waste a pilot in them.
Now, granted, if you baby something and tear it down and rebuild from the rivets up, you can probably keep it going forever - as witness the B-52 and KC-135 - but even that gets to be questionable for a lot of reasons. IF everything has been replaced except the airframe itself, and the airframe has been stripped and rebuilt, is it still the same bird?
Sort of...
And the above is all if country A built it and hung on to it; if Country B got it from Country A (or even third-hand, from Country C), it is really a question of how friendly countries A and B are, and if Country B can even get access to Country A's spare parts barns and supply chain(s)...
Call it the Lend-Lease effect.
Best,
Rule of thumb for operational equipment at M-Day, given a rational level of preventive maintenance, peacetime operational use and wastage, updating electronics/avionics/etc., and no major SLEP-level re-builds:
Maybe 50 percent of the production run within M-Day minus 10 years (this is very rough; obviously it varies widely based on the item/system) should be functional (or can be made functional enough) to put into the hands of troops. The rest are for training, cannibalized, hangar queens, in transit along the way in the supply chain, etc. This includes no war reserve stocks; if you want a war reserve worth having, cut the 50 percent number above in half, and that gives you the number available for operational units plus a 100 percent war reserve. That may or may not last very long, given the operational tempo, but at least it gets you past the "everything in the shop window" level of TO&E.
Material produced in the second decade prior to M-Day probably tops out around 25 percent functionality of the entire production run; available for operational use is probably 12 percent.
Third decade prior to M-Day drops to 6 and 3 percent of the production runs; fourth decade drops to 3 and 1.5 percent.
Obviously, these number vary HUGELY based on how hard something gets used (in terms of aircraft, think engine and airframe LCC), but as a VERY rough rule of thumb, figure if your country built:
100 airplanes in 2001-2010, probably 50 of them can be regarded as operationally capable in 2015, and so with a 100 percent war reserve, you can equip two squadrons of 12 each and have one as the group commander's bird.
If your country built 100 in 1991-2000, probably 25 are operational and 12 can equip a third squadron.
If your country built 100 in 1981-1990, probably 12 are operational and you could equip an training flight with six of them.
If you built 100 in 1971-1980, maybe a half dozen are flyable, but I'd convert them to drones or something similar rather than waste a pilot in them.
Now, granted, if you baby something and tear it down and rebuild from the rivets up, you can probably keep it going forever - as witness the B-52 and KC-135 - but even that gets to be questionable for a lot of reasons. IF everything has been replaced except the airframe itself, and the airframe has been stripped and rebuilt, is it still the same bird?
Sort of...
And the above is all if country A built it and hung on to it; if Country B got it from Country A (or even third-hand, from Country C), it is really a question of how friendly countries A and B are, and if Country B can even get access to Country A's spare parts barns and supply chain(s)...
Call it the Lend-Lease effect.
Best,
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Not Really, The ships that made up the primary combat fleets were designs (with few exceptions) that had been put into production in 1941 or so. They were all improved versions of the pre-war ships they replaced
The Simpler, 'War Emergency Only' designs (The CVEs, DEs, etc) were used in secondary roles. the only 'emergency only' designs that I can think of that went into front line service were the Independence class CVLs
Splendid break-down, TF! Spoken like a logicstical professional!
The main issue when talking about mobilization is what foe are you fighting?
Russia? China? Arcturans in city-sized invasion ships? Zombies?
There's a point where more troops doesn't translate to more combat power.
Tooth to tail ratio is just the beginning.
Fighting Russia to the bitter end house-to-house is a little silly. S/b's pulling the nuclear trigger before it gets to that point.
To cripple the US economy, you don't have to have 3000+ warheads glassing every town above 50K.
I'd say 100 would be enough to make it difficult to fight at more than a 1920's level AFTER five years' recovery with a really good recovery plan.
The Russians have more ground to cover but are more concentrated. One Trident sub strike could effectively cripple the Soviet warmaking capability by ITSELF roughly three times over.
So, that's why nobody's really taken the idea of an all-conventional NATO-WARPAC war terribly seriously since the 1950's.
Conventional forces need too much care and feeding of both the troops and machines. Too many of either thrown into combat for too long and too hard means you're left with cripples and junk.
As folks have proposed raiding the boneyards or resurrecting simpler designs that COULD be mass-produced, too much retooling time and loss of effectiveness per unit means it becomes an ever-more-expensive loser in resources to ever-smaller gains.
The great irony of modern warfare is that to quote MikeTurcotte, modern "knights" (M1's, Ohio-class subs, MLRS, AH-64's, F-22's) require a fully-functional economy and logistical train to run at peak effectiveness.
To tie them up can be done for pennies on the dollar to a power willing to take the horrific casualties.
The big discussion in Pentagon-land is how good is good enough to be competitive w/o bankrupting the treasury?
Do you equip a few squadrons of F-22's that could sweep the skies, IF they're 100% effective as advertised
vs the vastly larger air fleets with F-15's, F-18's and other 4G fighters with upgraded avionics?
That debate extends throughout every branch of the military.
The main issue when talking about mobilization is what foe are you fighting?
Russia? China? Arcturans in city-sized invasion ships? Zombies?
There's a point where more troops doesn't translate to more combat power.
Tooth to tail ratio is just the beginning.
Fighting Russia to the bitter end house-to-house is a little silly. S/b's pulling the nuclear trigger before it gets to that point.
To cripple the US economy, you don't have to have 3000+ warheads glassing every town above 50K.
I'd say 100 would be enough to make it difficult to fight at more than a 1920's level AFTER five years' recovery with a really good recovery plan.
The Russians have more ground to cover but are more concentrated. One Trident sub strike could effectively cripple the Soviet warmaking capability by ITSELF roughly three times over.
So, that's why nobody's really taken the idea of an all-conventional NATO-WARPAC war terribly seriously since the 1950's.
Conventional forces need too much care and feeding of both the troops and machines. Too many of either thrown into combat for too long and too hard means you're left with cripples and junk.
As folks have proposed raiding the boneyards or resurrecting simpler designs that COULD be mass-produced, too much retooling time and loss of effectiveness per unit means it becomes an ever-more-expensive loser in resources to ever-smaller gains.
The great irony of modern warfare is that to quote MikeTurcotte, modern "knights" (M1's, Ohio-class subs, MLRS, AH-64's, F-22's) require a fully-functional economy and logistical train to run at peak effectiveness.
To tie them up can be done for pennies on the dollar to a power willing to take the horrific casualties.
The big discussion in Pentagon-land is how good is good enough to be competitive w/o bankrupting the treasury?
Do you equip a few squadrons of F-22's that could sweep the skies, IF they're 100% effective as advertised
vs the vastly larger air fleets with F-15's, F-18's and other 4G fighters with upgraded avionics?That debate extends throughout every branch of the military.
1944 - 1945 US industry also armed a couple million more men ground, air , and naval forces from other nations. ie: eight French divisions and six fighter/bomber wings in 1944; or two Brazilian divisions in 1945.
That number assumed large scale arming of foreign manpower. ie: Were Britain to fall then Canada would be replacing Brit designs with US models.
Agriculture takes less than 1% of the U.S. population and manufacturing's less than 16% with far higher productivity per worker than previous wars (only about half of U.S. production capacity in 1942-45 went to war production, the rest remained on consumer and business production which made a big difference in not crippling the war effort while the other combatants tried to get to 70-80% war production but that kept draining their overall capacity (i.e. Germany couldn't mine enough coal, build enough railroad tracks/locomotives/rail cars, raise enough food, make enough cloth, etc. so the workforce got less productive as it starved in the dark.) So we'd be drafting waiters, baristas, financial services, call centers, retail clerks, etc. (think the contestants on most reality shows), although a surprisingly small proportion of the American population is in the health, athleticism, education, brains, attitude etc. to meet current standards (Atlantic Monthly had a long piece on that two years ago, 1 in 85 guys who show interest to a recruiter were completing Basic Training in 2010.)
Training extremely raw material into modern American soldiers, let alone for the technical specialties that take a year or more of military schools, would be the big scale-up problem. Shortening training of troops always means higher casualties and lower effectiveness/morale (they notice they don't know nearly enough as they enter combat.) The expectations/know-how for modern soldiers is far more complex than conflicts before the 1980's (upside is there's several million veterans of combat within the past 20 years, the U.S. after 13 years of combat has the most "blooded" troops, equipment, and doctrine of any advanced nation now. That'd be a quite significant advantage.
In earlier wars far more of the recruits came from farm work, logging, mining, construction, and other outdoors work in all weather with a variety of tools, equipment, logistical challenges and raw nature. Far more had hunted, hiked, walked for miles routinely, used maps and compasses, traveled off road on foot, camped out with minimal gear/shelter, and been Boy Scouts than the current pool (although they're far better prepared for the electronics side so operating drones, encrypting communications, using GIS and satellite imagery, intelligence gathering, paintball-style tactics, more know some martial arts, and some are in exceptional condition with oddly useful skills like rock climbing, geocaching, marathon running, etc. so maybe it balances out.)
For quick and cheap, small arms we can produce by the millions now and switching to the Kalashnikov platform at U.S. auto parts factories would exponentially grow that.
Javelins, Bushmaster Ammo, Abrams and Paladin shells, air to air, air to ground, ground to air missiles would be a scale-up challenge as they get expended so fast and take time to build on the few production lines for them. We ran through years of accumulated stockpiles of those in Bosnia and Gulf War I but must have expanded our production capacity on those a lot for this past two wars' consumption.
Building lots of drones both planes and copters would be a practical solution as mentioned above with hundreds of small firms getting into that now, far less materials requirements or for that matter not needing huge Boeing complexes to make them would be both quick and a force multiplier.
Making combat helicopters in volume again would be less challenging than F-22's/F-35's but not by that much so what we'd start with is likely all we'd have and I think (don't know) the older helicopters the National Guard and Reserve have would have to be used far behind our lines.
Figure hacking, electro magnetic pulses from aircraft (see Jane's) , photoshopped images and faked video (a big deal with WWII technologies) , and other new methods for screwing with the enemy would be wild cards as they have been the past 20 years or so.
I think we could probably field 5-10 million using every veteran along with current and fresh recruits with pretty thin equipment and support technologies.
Interesting question.
Training extremely raw material into modern American soldiers, let alone for the technical specialties that take a year or more of military schools, would be the big scale-up problem. Shortening training of troops always means higher casualties and lower effectiveness/morale (they notice they don't know nearly enough as they enter combat.) The expectations/know-how for modern soldiers is far more complex than conflicts before the 1980's (upside is there's several million veterans of combat within the past 20 years, the U.S. after 13 years of combat has the most "blooded" troops, equipment, and doctrine of any advanced nation now. That'd be a quite significant advantage.
In earlier wars far more of the recruits came from farm work, logging, mining, construction, and other outdoors work in all weather with a variety of tools, equipment, logistical challenges and raw nature. Far more had hunted, hiked, walked for miles routinely, used maps and compasses, traveled off road on foot, camped out with minimal gear/shelter, and been Boy Scouts than the current pool (although they're far better prepared for the electronics side so operating drones, encrypting communications, using GIS and satellite imagery, intelligence gathering, paintball-style tactics, more know some martial arts, and some are in exceptional condition with oddly useful skills like rock climbing, geocaching, marathon running, etc. so maybe it balances out.)
For quick and cheap, small arms we can produce by the millions now and switching to the Kalashnikov platform at U.S. auto parts factories would exponentially grow that.
Javelins, Bushmaster Ammo, Abrams and Paladin shells, air to air, air to ground, ground to air missiles would be a scale-up challenge as they get expended so fast and take time to build on the few production lines for them. We ran through years of accumulated stockpiles of those in Bosnia and Gulf War I but must have expanded our production capacity on those a lot for this past two wars' consumption.
Building lots of drones both planes and copters would be a practical solution as mentioned above with hundreds of small firms getting into that now, far less materials requirements or for that matter not needing huge Boeing complexes to make them would be both quick and a force multiplier.
Making combat helicopters in volume again would be less challenging than F-22's/F-35's but not by that much so what we'd start with is likely all we'd have and I think (don't know) the older helicopters the National Guard and Reserve have would have to be used far behind our lines.
Figure hacking, electro magnetic pulses from aircraft (see Jane's) , photoshopped images and faked video (a big deal with WWII technologies) , and other new methods for screwing with the enemy would be wild cards as they have been the past 20 years or so.
I think we could probably field 5-10 million using every veteran along with current and fresh recruits with pretty thin equipment and support technologies.
Interesting question.
Redhand
Banned
While the depletion of advanced weapon systems seems to be clear, a low tech infantry war (no nukes) is not guaranteed to ensue. The possibility of a phony war fought at sea or in the air is quite possible. Expect a socialmedia war and a cyberwar to also happen. I can't honestly think many western countries would be able to conscript their military age population for a modern war. They're too busy taking selfies and adopting hipster culture. Any other countries would quickly face mass starvation and disease or civil strife if pushed too far. The exception would be the Middle East as their is the religious factor to consider.
TFSmith121
Banned
Reaklly tough to say; if they're just airframes,
Really tough to say; if the airframe LCC is still reasonably in the black, with a teardown, new or remanufactured engines, and replacement avionics, weapons, crew fittings, etc., you probably can come up with an operational aircraft...cheaper than a new-build, but not necessarily a LOT cheaper.
Planes that get flown a lot wear out.
Best,
Really tough to say; if the airframe LCC is still reasonably in the black, with a teardown, new or remanufactured engines, and replacement avionics, weapons, crew fittings, etc., you probably can come up with an operational aircraft...cheaper than a new-build, but not necessarily a LOT cheaper.
Planes that get flown a lot wear out.
Best,
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TFSmith121
Banned
Thanks, I guess...I've been called worse!
Thanks, I guess...I've been called worse!
I remember the joke about the YF-15 before the procurement decision is that if they performed as advertised, the USAF would only need three...one in Europe, one in the Pacific, and one as a spare.
Best,
Splendid break-down, TF! Spoken like a logicstical professional!
Do you equip a few squadrons of F-22's that could sweep the skies, IF they're 100% effective as advertised
That debate extends throughout every branch of the military.
Thanks, I guess...I've been called worse!
I remember the joke about the YF-15 before the procurement decision is that if they performed as advertised, the USAF would only need three...one in Europe, one in the Pacific, and one as a spare.
Best,
TFSmith121
Banned
More than that, actually;
The eight French divisions equipped under the 1943 ANFA agreement were followed by another 8 in the liberated manpower program.
Putting aside what was delivered to the Brazilians for use at Brazil, it was only one division that went to Europe, but you can also add the three ROC divisions of X Force and at least partial equipment for the 30 planned for the Y Force.
Then there's the Philippines Commonwealth Army (12 "light" or maybe 8 TO&E division equivalents in 1941-42, plus the 12th Division in 1945-46...
Almost all the British, Commonwealth, and Polish armored divisions (in the west) had US-manufactured equipment, including 3 of 4 tank battalions and at least one or more of the SP FABs...
Best,
The eight French divisions equipped under the 1943 ANFA agreement were followed by another 8 in the liberated manpower program.
Putting aside what was delivered to the Brazilians for use at Brazil, it was only one division that went to Europe, but you can also add the three ROC divisions of X Force and at least partial equipment for the 30 planned for the Y Force.
Then there's the Philippines Commonwealth Army (12 "light" or maybe 8 TO&E division equivalents in 1941-42, plus the 12th Division in 1945-46...
Almost all the British, Commonwealth, and Polish armored divisions (in the west) had US-manufactured equipment, including 3 of 4 tank battalions and at least one or more of the SP FABs...
Best,
Riain
Banned
It's not really cost that I'd be worried about as much as production capacity. In recent years the Super Hornet production rate was 48 aircraft per year, perhaps this could be pushed up in an emergency, but the 12-18 month war is going to see only about 100 new Super Hornets.
But in the same timeframe I would have thought that reactivation units could return reasonably modern F16s and F18s to service, perhaps with some upgrades and the R4 or whatever service that saw them be put into storage in the first place. So in the 12-18 month war the US could get 100 new Super Hornets and 100 old classics to go some way to cover attrition losses.
Todays weapons are high tech. You can quickly train somebody to put rivets in a truss, you cannot quickly train somebody to husband the production of wafers for integrated circuits.
Since mid-1950 there is no possibility of a long duration conventional conflict like WWII. The US would exhaust material/ammunition reserves in a few months at best and then either surrender or go nuclear.
Since mid-1950 there is no possibility of a long duration conventional conflict like WWII. The US would exhaust material/ammunition reserves in a few months at best and then either surrender or go nuclear.
The Viet Nam war strained US reserves and arms production as it existed in the mid 1960s. In theory a full industrial mobilization could have done a lot more, but the cost would have been unaffordable. The cost of just the Viet Nam war badly aggravated US economic problems that emerged post 1967 & into the 1970s.