I had a soc.history.what-if post on this in 2010:
Ryukyu (Liu-ch'iu) Islands, Republic of China?
"[By 1942-3] The governments ranged against Japan began to discuss openly
the problems which would arise with Japan's defeat. The Chinese hastened
to announce that they intended to claim not only Manchuria and Formosa but
the Ryukyu Islands as well. On July 7, 1942, Sun Fo [President of the
Legislative Yuan, ex- and future Premier, and son of Sun Yat-sen]
announced China's determination to recover the Ryukyus; Foreign Minister
T. V. Soong repeated the claim in November; Chiang Kai-shek referred to
China's 'loss of the Liu-ch'iu Islands' in the unexpurgated Chinese
edition of his manifesto *China's Destiny,* published on March 10. 1943;
and Chinese spokesmen in the United States found opportunity to bring the
claim to the attention to the American public."--George H. Kirk, *Okinawa:
The History of an Island People*, p. 464.
http://books.google.com/books?id=vaAKJQyzpLkC&pg=PA464
"*Ta-kung-pao* editorials in January 1943 asserted that the wartime
coalition should see to the independence of Korea and the retrocession of
Taiwan, the Ryukyus (Liuchius) and Manchuria to China."--*The Cambridge
History of China, Volume 13: Republican China, 1912-1949, Part Two*, p.
532.
http://books.google.com/books?id=Fxs3ROaIhPMC&pg=PA532
The Chinese claim to the Ryukyus is also discussed by Xiaoyuan Liu, *A
Partnership for Disorder: China, The United States, And Their Policies
For The Postwar Disposition Of The Japanese Empire, 1941-1945* (Cambridge
University Press 1996). As Liu notes, (pp. 77-80) even some Chinese were
aware of the questionable nature of the claim:
"Another insular possession of Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, did not occupy a
primary position in wartime foreign policy planning in either China or the
United States. Before the Cairo Conference, Chinese official thinking on
the subject was at best confused. Publicly, the Chinese government
included these islands in China's lost territories. But when the
aforementioned *Time-Life Fortune* memorandum suggested that these islands
should also be part of the string of international bases in the Pacific,
Chonqing did not protest in any manner, as it did in the case of Taiwan.
The reason was that, at the time, the Chinese government itself did not
have a definite policy on these islands.
"After China's war with Japan began, within KMT circles Chiang Kai-shek
tended to put the Ryukyu Islands and Taiwan in the same category. Once,
he suggested mistakenly that the Ryukyu Islands had come under Japan's
control as a result of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Consequently,
after the beginning of the Pacific war prompted the Chinese government to
adopt formally the 1894-1895 war as the time line for its territorial
readjustment with Japan, KMT leaders also included the Ryukyu Islands in
their list of China's lost territories. Historically, however, the Ryukyu
Islands and Taiwan had had different relations with China, and they had
been seized by Japan in different circumstances. Briefly, the Ryukyu
Islands had never been a formal part of China, as Taiwan had, nor had
Japan's conquest of the islands taken place during the war of 1894-1895.
For more than a century and a half, before Japan made these islands into
an 'Okinawa Prefecture' in 1879, the rivalry between China and Japan over
the suzerainty of the Ryukyu Islands, a quasi-independent kingdom, had
been growing. The government of the Qing Dynasty had eventually lost its
tributary patronage over the Ryukyus through an ambiguous and gradual
process. Therefore, in the war years, Chongqing's claim of sovereignty
over the Ryukyu Islands in reference to the war of 1894-1895 would not
be able to stand careful scrutiny at international peace conferences.
"Some Chinese officials were cognizant of the confusion. In June 1942,
Waijiaobu [Chinese Foreign Ministry] official Yang Yunzhu told John
Service of the U.S. embassy that the overture on China's recovery of the
Ryukyu Islands was one of those 'unfortunately inevitable... [and]
exaggerated statements by private individuals concerning [China's] war
aims.' The truth, according to Yang, was that the people living in these
islands were not Chinese, and the islands themselves, though at one time
existing within the tributary system of China, had been entirely separated
from China for almost eighty years. Unimportant economically and
strategically to China, the Ryukyu Islands were now in effect an integral
part of Japan. Yang firmly stated that the Chinese government would not
expect the return of these islands in the peace settlement. Although
expressing what he believed proper, Yang failed to anticipate T. V.
Soong's aforementioned statement on China's war aims of November 1942 and
Chiang Kai-shek's book, *China's Destiny,* both asserting that China
wanted to recover the Ryukyus.
"Knowledgeable officials within the Chinese government remained doubtful
even after Soong and Chiang publicly committed themselves to Chinese
sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands. For instance, in May 1943, Xu Shuxi,
adviser to the Foreign Minister and director of the Western Asiatic
Affairs Department of the Waijiaobu, pointed out in a memorandum to Soong
that, in contrast to Taiwan but similar to Korea, the Ryukyu Islands had
been a semisovereign state before their annexation by Japan. China's
traditional 'rights' over the Ryukyus were obsolete in the twentieth
century; therefore, China should not attempt to recover them. According to
Xu, the only realistic course for the Chinese government was to support
these islands' freedom from Japan. Yet, Xu doubted that, without its
own independence movement, the formerly insular kingdom would be able to
achieve self-government. Therefore, a period of international supervision
and assistance was in order. Xu emphasized that no matter what type of
international administration was established for the Ryukyu Islands at
the end of the war, its eventual purpose must be to set these islands
free from Japan. Japan must not be allowed to use them again as bases of
aggression. Soon, at the Cairo Conference, the Chinese government would
make an effort to redefine its postwar intention toward the Ryukyu
Islands. But, as is shown in Chapter 6, the effort would not be very
effective in altering the public image, fostered by Soong and Chiang, of
Chongqing's postwar ambition concerning the Ryukyu Islands.
"Before the Cairo Conference, despite President Roosevelt's general
interest in the Pacific islands, the Ryukyus seemed to escape his
attention. During the first two years of the war, in the State Department
the Ryukyu question was also considered only tentatively. In the summer of
1943, when contemplating the subject, the Territorial Subcommittee of
the State Department treated it as a sequel to the Allied policy toward
Taiwan. The predominant concern was that these islands' strategic location
lay 'athwart the approaches to the China coast and parallel to the great
circle trade route.' The Territorial Subcommittee did not think Chinese
control of the Ryukyu Islands would be a proper solution. First, in view
of the fact that the Chinese in the past had allowed these islands to pass
to Japanese control 'by default,' Chongqing's current claim for
sovereignty was at best 'tenuous.' Furthermore, should the Ryukyu populace
really want to be freed from Japanese rule, they would not necessarily
welcome a Chinese government, which would be even more alien to them than
the Japanese. An alternative to Chinese control could be international
administration if these islands had to be separated from Japan. But in the
subcommittee's opinion, the prospective international agency should
concern itself only with military matters, leaving civil administration to
the Japanese. The inclination was, therefore, to allow Japanese control to
continue. It was held that after Japan was disarmed and deprived of the
Mandated Islands, Korea, and Taiwan in the postwar years, the Ryukyu
Islands alone, even in Japanese hands, would no longer constitute a threat
to the security of other nations. Of course, these islands must be
thoroughly demilitarized as well. The principle of self-government, in the
subcommittee's opinion, did not seem to have a very strong case here.
Japanese efforts at assimilation of the islanders seemed to have been
quite successful: 'Through education, conscription, and [a] closely
supervised system of local government, the population undoubtedly has come
to consider itself an integral part of the Japanese Empire'...
"The divided opinions among Chinese officials on the Ryukyu Islands
typically reflected the confusion experienced by the Chinese government in
trying to reestablish China's traditional influence in East Asia in a
modern context. To wartime Chinese-American diplomacy, legal arguments
for or against Chongqing's claim on the Ryukyu Islands eventually proved
secondary. The two governments' potential disagreement was really over
whether these islands should be allowed to remain under Japanese control;
and China's and America's different geostrategic interests in the Pacific,
not their views of the legal status of the Ryukyus, were decisive..."
http://books.google.com/books?id=x8b4an0T0twC&pg=PA77
According to Liu (p. 120) in preparation for the Cairo summit, the
National Military Council and the Supreme Council of National Defense
prepared programs on the Chinese government's attitude toward the
forthcoming peace, which would include Japan's returning to China
Manchuria, Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Ryukyu Islands; however, "For
the Ryukyu Islands, depending on circumstances, Chongqing could afford to
be flexible to the extent of accepting international control."
http://books.google.com/books?id=AtdhqyKYf1wC&pg=PA120
Anyway, what was actually discussed about the Ryukyus at Cairo? According
to China's "fifth memorandum" about proposals to be submitted to President
Roosevelt, Chiang was to propose the following:
"C. Territorial
1. Recovery of all Chinese territories (to be specifically defined e.f.
[sic] Manchuria, Liaotung Peninsula, Formosa, *Liu Choo Islands* [emphasis
added] and Hong Kong)."
http://books.google.com/books?id=AtdhqyKYf1wC&pg=PA308
The Chinese "summary record" of the Conference gives a curious impression:
that FDR offered China the Ryukyus, *and Chiang turned him down!*:
"The President then referred to the question of the Ryukyu Islands and
enquired more than once whether China would want the Ryukyus. The
Generalissimo replied that China would be agreeable to joint occupation of
the Ryukyus by China and the United States and, eventually, joint
administration by the two countries under the trusteeship of an
international organization."
http://books.google.com/books?id=x8b4an0T0twC&pg=PA310
According to Liu (p. 137), this impression is misleading:
"With regard to the status of the Ryukyu Islands, the summary record
conveys the wrong impression that President Roosevelt was the one who
brought up the subject and was anxious to offer it to China. In concert
with Chiang's original plans for the Cairo Conference, the fifth
memorandum clearly indicated Chongqing's intention to regain the Ryukyu
Islands along with other lost territories. Instead of being generous,
Roosevelt's attitude toward the subject must have put Chiang on the
defensive, for, as the record indicates, Chiang appeared flexible and
indicated his willingness to participate in a joint American-Chinese
administration of the Ryukyus on behalf of the postwar international peace
organization. This position constituted a retreat from both the
memorandum and Chiang's own earlier claim regarding the Ryukyus that had
been made public in his book *China's Destiny*. But, it should be
recalled, the retreat was a contingency anticipated in Chiang's original
plans. After the meeting with Roosevelt, Chiang explained his stand in
his diary, saying that he had proposed to the president a joint American-
Chinese control of those islands to end the Americans' anxiety (about
China's expansionism?). Later, within KMT circles, Chiang also admitted
that the Ryukyus had been part of Japan for so long that it would be
better to institute joint American-Chinese control for security purposes
rather than to restore China's unilateral influence there.
"Unfortunately for Chiang, his gesture of self-denial over the Ryukyu
Islands at that meeting was somehow obscured by the back-and-forth
translation between the two languages. The task was performed with
difficulty by Song Meiling, who in the opinion of Churchill's doctor in
Cairo, 'was always tired' that day because of lost sleep over her nettle
rash. Whatever the reason might be, Chiang's proposal did not get across
to the president. After his meeting with Chiang, Roosevelt remembered
only what he learned from the fifth memorandum and continued to believe
that the Chinese government was anxious to obtain the Ryukyu Islands..."
http://books.google.com/books?id=AtdhqyKYf1wC&pg=PA137
OK, let's grant that giving China the Ryukyus would be wrong from the
viewpoint of self-determination (the Okinawans and other island peoples
may not have been *exactly* Japanese, but they were linguistically and
culturally closely related to the Japanese, and in no sense were they
Chinese) and dubious from the viewpoint of history: though the Ryukyuan
kings for centuries paid tribute to China, as early as the seventeenth
century the southern Kyushu fief of Satsuma exercised control over the
islands. China did object when Japan formally ended the Ryukyu Kingdom
and established a "Prefecture of Okinawa" in 1879; but by 1891 (three
years before the Sino-Japanese War) even the official *Peking Gazette*
(which as late as 1890 had published occasional notices of the Ryukyus as
a "tributary state") started to treat Ryukyu matters under "Foreign
Affairs." Kerr, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People*, p. 392.
Still, Chiang *did* want the Ryukyus (even if he was willing to accept
joint American-Chinese administration as a fallback position) and what if
FDR had in fact agreed to let him have them? (Why would he do so? Well,
it was wartime and Japan was the enemy. Besides, FDR was unable or
unwilling to grant many of Chiang's requests--e.g., the endless appeals
for more aid--and he may have figured that granting this one would be a
harmless way of mollifying Chiang, especially if it is agreed that while
sovereignty on the islands will "revert" to China, the US will get to keep
troops there.) We would then get the curious situation that after 1949,
the Republic of China would be limited (apart from minor islands) to (a)
Taiwan, whose loss had been taken for granted by China until World War II
[1]; and (b) the Ryukyus, a chain of islands which had never really been
part of China and which were inhabited by people who considered themselves
Japanese, or at least certainly not Chinese. The Nationalist Chinese had
trouble enough governing their fellow Han Chinese on Taiwan--think of the
troubles the Okinawans and other Ryukyuans would give them. Meanwhile,
there would still be irredentist sentiment in Japan. (After all, in OTL
the Kurile Islands dispute
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kuril_Islands_dispute remains unresolved.)
And if after 1950 the Communist takeover of the Chinese mainland and the
Korean War lead the US to maintain a massive military presence on the
Ryukyus, the resentment, both in Japan and on the Ryukyus, will be
directed not only against Chiang but especially against the US. (There
was--and is--of course much resentment of the US military presence in
Okinawa in OTL. But at least in OTL, the US even in the 1950's did
acknowledge Japan's "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa and the other
Ryukyus, and did ultimately return them to Japanese control.)
[1] "Taiwan's loss, interestingly enough, had been taken for granted.
Until Japan's defeat in the war of 1937-45 seemed likely, no Republican
government had challenged the legality of the Treaty of Shimonoseki by
which the Qing had ceded the island to Japan; and for no major political
movement, including the Communists, had it been *terra irredenta.*"
William C. Kirby, "The Internationalization of China: Foreign Relations
At Home and Abroad in the Republican Era," p. 185, n. 25 in Frederick
Wakeman, Jr. and Richard Louis Edmonds (eds.) *Reappraising Republican
China* (Oxford University Press 2000).
http://books.google.com/books?id=GNLWtjV_MDwC&pg=PA185