Papua New Guinea also has the Owen Stanley mountain range running east-west, the Kokoda trail ran across it, and is much higher at 10,000 ft plus. Does anyone have any info on problems the RAAF or Japanese air forces had on flying over this range.
Every account I've read about flying over the Owen Stanleys consistently mentions that the risk of colliding with a cloud-obscured mountainside was always very high.
 

Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
There can be no doubt that British operations in the Far East IOTL, were a complete and total cluster fuck, and the loss of Malaya and Singapore was an abject embarrassment for the British establishment. The reasons for this were many and varied, some understandable and partly excusable, while the majority were totally inexcusable and a complete embarrassment. The lack of resources is understandable given just how stretched the British Empire was during the initial phase of the war, but the failure to make the best use of those resources available locally and within the wider Empire, especially those that were still relevant in theatre even though they were obsolete against the German and Italians in Europe. Showed a complete lack of imagination or enthusiasm to think outside of the box, and a serious failure of leadership in the context of the regional situation. In addition the complete failure of the military and civil administration along with the colonial civilian population to face up to the realities of their present situation, was not only inexcusable but showed a serious rot among them. The total resilience to taking even the simplest measures to prepare the colonies for what was to anyone other than the most stupid or bigoted was obviously going to have. Was a sign of just how resilient to any idea that was out of their comfort zone, a large number of people were. Given just how close the Japanese came to failing to capture Singapore IOTL, only goes to show that with a little better preparation, they the Japanese would have had a much harder task ahead of them.

ITTL, the replacement of the top command team, Governor, Ground force and regional commander, Airforce Commander and eventually Naval Command, plus the replacement of a number of senior civil servants, with younger more active people. Has significantly changed the overall landscape, and put in place a ever expanding group of men, who are capable of facing the reality of what their facing, and are prepared to take measures to ameliorate the situation. The changes that have taken place in the leadership, along with the far better preparations military and civilian, and the increasing realisation by all the threat is real and substantial. Basically means that Malaya, Singapore and the DEI, are far better prepared for the oncoming storm, and have a more realistic view. Yes they still lack the modern weapons, such as armoured vehicles, up to date aircraft, the latest antiaircraft and anti tank guns, along with modern aircraft carriers equipped with the latest fighters, and escort destroyers to accompany them, plus high speed coastal patrol boats. However unlike IOTL were the command and control systems civil and military, were at best a disconnected mess, bound to fail once they came under pressure. ITTL a robust and effective command and control system has been established, both military and civil, and stands ready for the rigours it is about to face. Unless the Japanese can get inside the command loop, and destroy it, they face a major problem, as long as the British retain control over their forces, they are going to be incredibly hard to beat.

It doesn’t matter that the Japanese aircraft are to an extent superior to the British, or that in some ways they troops more experienced and motivated. Nor given that the majority of their fleet is right now occupied with events thousands of miles away, and will take considerable time to get to the South China Sea. So the Japanese Navy in no position at present, to totally dominate this region, or provide the support that the ground forces require. And with the requirements of supporting the army in its assault against the Philippines, and its own ambitions in the DEI. Unlike the British and Americans who are just beginning to get into their stride of their naval building programs, the Japanese lack the resources to enter a significant naval building race. The British on their own can outbuild the Japanese in naval and civilian ships, add the Americans to the mix, and between them they will shortly be able to build more ships in a year, than the Japanese can in a decade. The Japanese have a very limited time to achieve all their objectives, and each and every delay is going to multiply the chances of them failing, and it is my personal opinion that the British have done enough, barring stupid mistakes, to enable them to retain Singapore and most of Malaya, until the Japanese assault runs out of steam. And the monsoon effectively closes operations until it’s over, by which time it will be far too late for the Japanese to be able to resume the offensive.

RR.
 
Does anyone have any info on problems the RAAF or Japanese air forces had on flying over this range.
Australians flying through the Kokoda Gap...in rare nice weather, no clouds, no downdrafts: https://www.superstock.com/asset/au...y-mountain-range-buna-district/6177-V53821266

A different air force, a bit later, one downdraft: https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/V...6203/the-tragic-story-of-the-flying-dutchman/

Wildcat civilian aviation in frontier New Guinea, 1927 to WWII: https://parerhistory.wordpress.com/2021/08/08/ray-parer-cut-the-air-paths-of-new-guinea/

My understanding from the many historical mentions, but not in depth, of combat/recon/logistics flying over PNG is that it was a very common occurrence to take off in not-great-but-flyable weather, fly toward the mountains, and encounter a rain squall. You knew from local info that in the commonly present rainstorms in the mountains, the cloud deck often was at ground level, so you mustn't try to get below it. You could try to gain altitude to get you above some of the mountains, but other peaks were too high to go over...plus spending your fuel doing that was likely to get you lost *and* short of fuel. You could try to reverse course and fly out of the weather, without being to see the ground or anything else. If your course to that point had been circuitous through valleys between high mountain peaks, that was very difficult. That's why so many planes flew into jungle mountainsides and were never seen again.
 
There can be no doubt that British operations in the Far East IOTL, were a complete and total cluster fuck, and the loss of Malaya and Singapore was an abject embarrassment for the British establishment. The reasons for this were many and varied, some understandable and partly excusable, while the majority were totally inexcusable and a complete embarrassment. The lack of resources is understandable given just how stretched the British Empire was during the initial phase of the war, but the failure to make the best use of those resources available locally and within the wider Empire, especially those that were still relevant in theatre even though they were obsolete against the German and Italians in Europe. Showed a complete lack of imagination or enthusiasm to think outside of the box, and a serious failure of leadership in the context of the regional situation. In addition the complete failure of the military and civil administration along with the colonial civilian population to face up to the realities of their present situation, was not only inexcusable but showed a serious rot among them. The total resilience to taking even the simplest measures to prepare the colonies for what was to anyone other than the most stupid or bigoted was obviously going to have. Was a sign of just how resilient to any idea that was out of their comfort zone, a large number of people were. Given just how close the Japanese came to failing to capture Singapore IOTL, only goes to show that with a little better preparation, they the Japanese would have had a much harder task ahead of them.
I completely agree with this analyse. How ever I start to compare the present situation with the situation of the 1930ties and early 40ties and I do start to see several parallels in case of leadership and political will with our present time.
The relative simple improvements, tiny alterations in attitude or using more effectivly local resources, are mostly low hanging fruit, as magnificiently described in TL. However to achieve this plainly obviuos improvements you need individual courage to stand out of the mainstream opinion, perception or world view. This would take courage since you will be relentlesly quiestioned, attacked or canceled, to use a modern term. Today you will see the same, especialy amoung the ruling and excecutive elite, if you have an opionion which is opposite of the mainstream census in your bubble ( to use a modern term) than there is a big change you become an outcast and you carreer may be damaged or eventerminated. Most likely this was the same case in the 1930ties and ealry 40ties, in Europe, East Asia and the USA.
Appologies to make a parallel to our present time since I certainly don't want to start a political discussion.
I just want to make clear it takes a lot of mental courage to swim against the stream. This psygological part is often forgotten.
 
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The Owen Stanleys because of their position on the Equator were a major atmospheric disturber. Bad weather was common in the area and while you could fly around it, you often couldn't fly through or under it. The Japanese because of their limited experience and technology had which lacked aero=engines which lacked turbochargers which in turn limited the maximum altitude that they could operate efficiently at. Roughly that equated to approximately 20,000 feet. Most combat occurred at less than this and while it wasn't that much of handicap earlier in the war, with the introduction of the B-29, the Japanese were at a decided disadvantage. Around PNG, the Japanese tended to avoid flying over the Owen Stanleys. The Allies were similarly forced to fly below 20,000 feet.
 
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Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
This was the Yamada Unit. Composite unit; half its members were picked from 3rd Ku (Tokaji squadron) and half from Tainan Ku (Inano squadron). They were originally slated to cover convoys and landing zones, yes, but eventually ended up performing much more in the way of offensive operations, including fighter sweeps and bomber escort. It was fortunate that they were such a small unit, that the Allies' main opposition over Malaya and Singapore was JAAF instead of them, because they dished out very stinging defeats during almost every engagement where they participated.
Hi Sekhmet_D, thank you for this, do you have any more detail on this unit?
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The relative simple improvements, tiny alterations in attitude or using more effectivly local resources, are mostly low hanging fruit, as magnificiently described in TL. However to achieve this plainly obviuos improvements you need individual courage to stand out of the mainstream opinion, perception or world view. This would take courage since you will be relentlesly quiestioned, attacked or canceled, to use a modern term.

I just want to make clear it takes a lot of mental courage to swim against the stream. This psygological part is often forgotten.
Hi Parma, that's a very good point, and as you say, until they are proved right, they are labeled in quite derogatory terms, but that then swings to them being labelled a genius. The truth is often somewhere in between, and the type of character to make that stand is likely to have a number of unsavoury traits about them too, Orde Wingate immediately springs to mind.
 
MWI 41120617 The Ongoing Development Of The Airfields

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
1941, Saturday 06 December:

The big metal blade of the Le Tourneau Carryall bit into the ground, and began slicing off a layer of earth, rolling it into the hopper. In front, the Canadian driver of the D7 Caterpillar tractor pulling it looked back making sure his scrap line was good. Once full, he would pull the load over to the marshy land to the west. Dumping the earth there would help fill it in, clearing away another source of malaria from stagnant infested water. Further over, another Caterpillar, this one fitted with a Le Tourneau bulldozer, was clearing away scrub and tall grasses. The bigger trees had already been cut down, and the stumps chained and pulled out.

The 8th RCAF Airfield Construction Company had only been here 11 days, having arrived in Singapore on 22 November. There they had been married up with their American Lend-Lease earth-moving equipment. Then they moved up to Mentakab, a small town in Pahang, central Malaya, where a large railway siding had been built. They were here to build an airfield about 65 miles west of Kuantan, which would be used to support that area. So far, their efforts had been concentrated on improving their own living quarters, which would later become the airfield’s accommodation area, carving out new roads, and flattening areas to store building materials, such as aggregate, sand, and timber.

The construction and development of the airfields in Malaya and Singapore was moving ahead. With the three dedicated airfield construction companies, 1st New Zealand, 3rd Canadian, and newly arrived 8th Canadian ACCs, the Public Works Department had been partly freed for other works, such as new roads and railway sidings. But the construction of airfields was continued at pace. The main restriction on development was continued hand-to-mouth reliance on shipped cement.

Singapore was pretty well placed with four operational airfields: Kallang with two fighter squadrons, Tengah with two bomber squadrons, Sembawang, somewhat overcrowded with the FAA squadrons, and Seletar, also overcrowded with an assortment of aircraft. North of the Island was a line of three airfields: Batu Pahat, able to operate a single fighter sqn, Kluang, a much bigger airfield, able to operate up to three squadrons, and Kahang, again with accommodation for a single squadron. 1st New Zealand ACC was at Tebrau, in southern Johore, not far from the causeway. They were developing a major bomber base, which when complete could operate four-engine bombers. It was thought the airfield could be operational by the end of January 1942, when at least one hard runway would be completed, along with some of the infrastructure. They were also employed at Bekok, near Labis, 22 miles NW of Kluang, working on a second heavy bomber airfield, although this wasn’t due to be anywhere near ready until late March or early April 1942. And the last airfield they were responsible for was at Gemas, near the main railway junction, again not partly operational until late March or early April.

Central Malaya was far less well developed. At Batu Berendam, just outside Malacca, a light grass airfield suitable for liaison aircraft had been completed, but no further work had been done here. The airfield at Kuala Lumpur was now developing into a major servicing site, along with the big aero engine workshops nearby. To the west, Port Dickson had a grass runway, and could operate a fighter squadron if needed, but the hard runway and a lot more infrastructure was still awaiting construction. That work wouldn’t be complete until end of February 1942 at best. 30 miles north of Kuala Lumpur at Kerling was a grass landing ground for light aircraft, which had potential for development but nothing was planned at present.

Teluk Anson had a grass landing strip, ideal for liaison flights, and seaplane moorings in the river, while at Sitiawan, near Lumet there was a grass airfield that a fighter squadron could operate out of at a push, but little in the way of supporting buildings. Next up was Ipoh, which was operational with a Fairey Battle squadron based there, but the grass runway wasn’t suitable for extending much further, and facilities were somewhat rudimentary. Progress on developing the site was slow, many other places having a higher priority. And then there was Taiping, fully developed into a station for two bomber squadrons, with all the accommodating infrastructure.

Northwest Malaya had the two big airfields at Butterworth and Sungei Patani, both with hard runaways and accommodation for two bomber squadrons, a fighter squadron based at Bayan Lepas airfield, on Penang Island, and another on the old civilian airfield at Alor Star. A third fighter squadron was based at Kuala Kentil, east of Sungai Patani, where there was a simple grass runway airfield, with few buildings and a lot of tents. 3rd Canadian ACC was up here, still adding facilities to the airfields up here, as well as working on Sungai Bakap, about five miles north of the Perak border, close to the railway line.

And lastly there was Northeast Malaya, with two airfields in Kelantan, at Kota Bharu and Gong Kedah, and one in Kuantan down in Pahang. All had grass runways, and everything was heavily fortified with camouflage netting, earthen banks, sandbags, and slit trenches They were defended by a few 3-inch AA guns, and an assortment of scrounged 40mm pompoms and Vickers and Lewis machine guns. All three airfields were crammed with far more aircraft than was suitable, but needs must. Because of the precarious state of defence in Kelantan, no more airfield development was considered.

A whistle blew, which was taken up by other whistles, truck horns, and shouts. Five PM: the working day was done. Vehicles and tools to be secured, time for a shower and change, dinner at 7pm, but a drink first! For the men of 8th Canadian ACC, tomorrow would be an easy day: all dressed up for Sunday service, and then dismissed for an afternoon of sport, or a bit of make and mend, and maybe write a letter for home.
 

Driftless

Donor
The previous post (about airfields) gives me the impression that the Northern perimeter is more advanced, the middle ground of Malaya is much more of a work in progress, and that the Southern Malaya and Singapore heartland is the most developed. Is that fairly accurate? If so, those relative states of preparedness seem logical, given the limited resources and limited time available.
 
Hi Sekhmet_D, thank you for this, do you have any more detail on this unit?
Indeed (gotta love Hata and Izawa's 'Japanese Naval Aces and Fighter Units in WW2')..

Formed 22 November 1941 on Taiwan from detached Tainan and 3rd Ku personnel as stated earlier.

Aircraft strength comprised 14 A6Ms from former unit and 13 from latter unit, plus 3 C5M recon planes from each.

Commander Yutaka Yamada as CO, LCdr Shigehachiro Tokoro as XO, Lts Kikuchi Inano and Tadatsune Tokaji as division officers of respective Tainan and 3rd Ku halves.

Other notable personnel included soon to be aces Kozaburo Yasui, Minoru Honda and Keisaku Yoshimura.

Deployed to Saigon base on 1 December 1941 in preparation for Malaya operation; attached C5Ms performed clandestine photorecon ops over Malaya and Singapore.

Initial missions were providing air cover for Malaya invasion force and, once Kota Bahru airfield was secured, air cover for supply convoys between Indochina and Malaya (8 December to 23 December); successfully defended against several RAF recce and anti shipping sorties.

Inano division was briefly detached (22-28 December) to Miri to support conquest of Borneo; fended off anti shipping sorties by Dutch Glenn Martins.

From 12-29 January 1942, flew escort missions out of Kota Bahru for Genzan Ku bombing raids on Singapore, roughly handling RAF Buffaloes and Hurricanes.

Supported invasion of NEI from 5 February, flying out of bases at Kahang, Bangka and Kuching (leapfrogging in that order).

Key missions during this time included two raids on Batavia (9 and 25 February, again escorting Genzan Ku bombers against Dutch Buffaloes and RAF Hurricanes), and 13-14 February air cover for Palembang landing (during which they annihilated a large force of attacking RAF Hudsons).

Concluded deployment on 15 March; moved to Bangkok the next day and disbanded shortly thereafter with most personnel returning to Tainan and 3rd Kus while others joined Kanoya/253rd Ku.

A6M losses included 1 shot down over Singora, 4 shot down over Singapore and 1 shot down over Batavia (3 pilots lost - of note is that Tokaji's mount was the Singora loss when a recce Beaufort's gunners made him force-land unhurt), plus an additional 5 non combat losses to mechanical failure, fuel exhaustion and bad weather (2 pilots lost); 2 C5Ms and their crews also became battle casualties.

In return, unit achieved at least 23 independently verifiable victories.

Inano, Tokaji, Yasui, Honda and Yoshimura went on to fight in the South Pacific, with only Inano and Honda surviving the war.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
The previous post (about airfields) gives me the impression that the Northern perimeter is more advanced, the middle ground of Malaya is much more of a work in progress, and that the Southern Malaya and Singapore heartland is the most developed. Is that fairly accurate? If so, those relative states of preparedness seem logical, given the limited resources and limited time available.
Hi Driftless, yes that's pretty much it, but you'll get a better idea when I give you the RAF OOB.
 

Fatboy Coxy

Monthly Donor
I am counting the post up to 7 December, like the seconds to midnight at 31 December 😄
Hi Parma, things are going to get real busy now, and I'll advise you all to pay attention to the post's titles, the last four numbers after MWI are the day date, and hour of the day, which will be of great significance.
 
Hi Parma, things are going to get real busy now, and I'll advise you all to pay attention to the post's titles, the last four numbers after MWI are the day date, and hour of the day, which will be of great significance.
Whose time? London, Singapore, tokyo, Washington?

It really make me wonder, is there *any* level of defense of Singapore/Malaya that would cause the Japanese to pull enough Army troops from the Philippines to make a significant difference (just as a guide having MacArthur evacuate/die more than a month later, or even survive without evacuating at all)
 
I completely agree with this analyse. How ever I start to compare the present situation with the situation of the 1930ties and early 40ties and I do start to see several parallels in case of leadership and political will with our present time.
The relative simple improvements, tiny alterations in attitude or using more effectivly local resources, are mostly low hanging fruit, as magnificiently described in TL. However to achieve this plainly obviuos improvements you need individual courage to stand out of the mainstream opinion, perception or world view. This would take courage since you will be relentlesly quiestioned, attacked or canceled, to use a modern term. Today you will see the same, especialy amoung the ruling and excecutive elite, if you have an opionion which is opposite of the mainstream census in your bubble ( to use a modern term) than there is a big change you become an outcast and you carreer may be damaged or eventerminated. Most likely this was the same case in the 1930ties and ealry 40ties, in Europe, East Asia and the USA.
Appologies to make a parallel to our present time since I certainly don't want to start a political discussion.
I just want to make clear it takes a lot of mental courage to swim against the stream. This psygological part is often forgotten.

The Americans were in a similar situation. Adm Hart, CinC AF, with information from China( legation ONI, and Marines in Bejing and Tensin as well as Yangtze Patrol and 4th Marines) as well as CAST and HYPO intercepts, as well as Navy Info from D.C. was preparing for war sooner then later. Every day more of peace was one more day of preparation. However MacArthur, was in his own fantasy world of denial, that war would not come before April of 1942, because that was when he, in his opinion, would be ready.
 
it takes a lot of mental courage to swim against the stream.
until they are proved right, they are labeled in quite derogatory terms, but that then swings to them being labelled a genius. The truth is often somewhere in between, and the type of character to make that stand is likely to have a number of unsavoury traits about them too, Orde Wingate immediately springs to mind.
I agree, although the person who sprung to my mind was Churchill. Now lauded as a great war leader and statesman, but definitely had a few unsavoury traits.
I'll advise you all to pay attention to the post's titles, the last four numbers after MWI are the day date, and hour of the day, which will be of great significance.
You mentioned that earlier in the thread so I've been watching the days count down... :)
Whose time? London, Singapore, tokyo, Washington?
The last chapter was numbered MWI 41120617 (so 1700 on 6th Dec 41) and contained this in the last paragraph: 'Five PM: the working day was done.' So I assume it's Malaya time. I keep meaning to create a time zone comparison table to help me with the countdown, but haven't got round to it yet (RL insists on interfering with my AH time :p).
 
"A whistle blew, which was taken up by other whistles, truck horns, and shouts. Five PM: the working day was done. Vehicles and tools to be secured, time for a shower and change, dinner at 7pm, but a drink first! For the men of 8th Canadian ACC, tomorrow would be an easy day: all dressed up for Sunday service, and then dismissed for an afternoon of sport, or a bit of make and mend, and maybe write a letter for home."-post 5629.

These lads are soon going to be facing an abrupt change in their plans and routines. One hopes in TTL they don't end up building railroads in Thailand.
 
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Ramp-Rat

Monthly Donor
I completely agree with this analyse. How ever I start to compare the present situation with the situation of the 1930ties and early 40ties and I do start to see severel parallels in case of leadership and political will with our present time.
The relative simple improvements, tiny alterations in attitude or using more effectivly local resources, are mostly low hanging fruit, as magnificiently described in TL. However to achieve this plainly obviuos improvements you need individual courage to stand out of the mainstream opinion, perception or world view. This would take courage since you will be relentlesly quiestioned, attacked or canceled, to use a modern term. Today you will see the same, especialy amoung the ruling and excecutive elite, if you have an opionion which is opposite of the mainstream census in your bubble ( to use a modern term) than there is a big change you become an outcast and you carreer may be damaged or eventerminated. Most likely this was the same case in the 1930ties and ealry 40ties, in Europe, East Asia and the USA.
Appologies to make a parallel to our present time since I certainly don't want to start a political discussion.
I just want to make clear it takes a lot of mental courage to swim against the stream. This psygological part is often forgotten.


Possibly the frustration felt by Gort and Park, Gort for what he believed was his unjustified reception of blame for the fall of France, and Park because he felt that far from receiving the recognition he deserved for his leadership of number 11 group during the Battle of Britain. He was passed over for a man who in his mind was an incompetent blow hard, and was also being picked on for being a mere colonial. Gave both men the fortitude to totally ignore what was considered the right way to do things, and instead chose to make the sensible but unconventional choices. Overriding the views of the various dugout fossils that were in place, and stuck in their Victorian at worst, Edwardian at best attitudes, as to what was the right way to do things. And as the young man under their respective commands see what’s occurring, they will feel more emboldened to take risks and forward more modern attitudes. Much the same can be said of the new Governor Caldecott, a man who had during his time in Hong Kong, developed a critical eye, and was far more prepared to see the virtues of the locals than the general run of the mill colonial official. He is far more progressive than the majority of the British Officials, prepared to follow the spirit of the rules, than unquestionably following the strict letter. And in his run in with one of the more rigid officials, over a needed land purchase, he managed to get his way eventually without being sanctioned by London. And the official found himself moved to a different colony, and replaced by someone more flexible, which will have been noted by all the other officials. Note I believe that the ridged British system was advantageous in the majority of occasions, and far better than the often lax system in a lot of colonial administrations. It served to ensure that the British Colonial administration gained a reputation for being essentially incorruptible and despite what some thought fair.

His approach towards the local British commercial interests, such as the planters, dock owners and various mining interests, was totally different to that the had previously been the norm. While he has been very firm with the various unions, he also has been firm with the commercial business interests. And has been prepared to bang the heads together, and make it plain that they have to make concessions to ensure that the vital interests of the colony come first. You want to prolong a strike that has closed the docks and are not prepared to make any concessions, forget it, I will if I need to, make a deal that you will not like. I want the docks open and working, and you can cooperate or not, but if you don’t I might just invoke the fortress rule, and take the docks into government control. He as have Gort, Park, and Layton all as far as is possible working together, towards a single goal, improving the defences of Malaya and Singapore as much as possible given the current lack of resources. In addition they have been working closely with Caldecott, to improve the vital civilian support structure, police, fire and civil defence services, ports and railways, etc. Where there was an opportunity to integrate military personnel with civilian personnel, they didn’t stand on ceremony, but rather cooperated. Both the civilian and military administration, especially the younger members, thanks to the changes at the top, now feel freer to make changes and decisions, without the risk of being subjected to sanctions. Either from the local administration military or civilian, or higher authority in London. These men are now thanks to the example being set at the top, taking a more objective approach far better suited to the local situation, and far more relevant to the present day situation, and not that of the decades past.

RR.
 
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