Malaya What If

[FriendlyGhost]

I agree that the depth charging makes it more likely that Matador is approved, as the British commanders now have convincing evidence that the Japanese are doing something they want to keep hidden (and therefore, very likely, hostile). However, as Regulus wasn't sunk (even not damaged?) then making it into a casus belli in the public's eyes could be difficult, for the reasons noted by Anarch above.

the brief was more about [...] possible first encounters with the Japanese, when to fire, when not

This is basically going over the extant Rules of Engagement. If/when Adm Phillips gets the information about Regulus I'd expect the RoE to be loosened a bit, making it more likely that the British forces either fire first or at least are more ready to fire back after the slightest hint of a hostile act.

 

[HJ Tulp]

Depth-charging Regulus does not jeopardize Japanese operations in Hawaii, nor operations in SEA. As @Butchpfd shows, it takes many hours for word to travel to the other side of the world, and even then, what does it show? Japanese forces are in an aggressive stance. Yeah, the Allies knew that! It barely hints about a SEA attack maybe being imminent but that's it, and certainly doesn't give even a hint of an attack on Pearl Harbour being in the charts.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

US destroyers had dropped depth charges against U-boats in the Atlantic. Citing a depth charge attack as a casus belli would be really stretching it; the attacked side could not prove who actually dropped the depth charges, or that the attackers knew who the target was.

The big difference is that the Atlantic was an active war zone, whereas the South China Sea is not. The overwhelming majority of ships in the South China Sea would be sailing under basic peace time regulations, with all their navigation lights on and not under blackout. As for who had dropped the depth charges, it is obvious, and given that only the Japanese, Americans, British and Dutch have submarines in the area. Either the Japanese have attacked one of their own submarines, or they have in fact attacked one of the other nations submarines. As for stretching it, the British effectively control the international press in the region and along with the Americans basically throughout the world, I didn’t say that they have a big fig leaf, but just one big enough to confuse the world for the moment.

RR.

 

[Derek Pullem]

The issue for notifying Pearl would be complicated 2230 on 6 December HMS Regulus reports depth charging, 2245 Singapore Hq receives and confirms Regulus message notifies Command staff, finally by 0800 on 7 Dec FET( Far East Time) American Staff officer is notified , codes the report message 0845 send message it to Asiatic Fleet HQ by cable. 0850 received by Navy communication center Correigidor, Message decoded and Asiatic Fleet HQ notified, 1200 Admiral Hart gets the message about Regulus, makes decision to notify his command about the incident in particular PatWing 10, 1300 Hart makes the decision to notify Pac Fleet HQ (Kimmel), 1330 Message coded and delivered to Sangley Point Radio ,1400 Sangley Point sends message to Pac Fleet Radio. (12 hours until Japanese aircraft attack Davo , OTL). 2000 Hours Saturday 6 December Message received Pac Fleet radio, duty Officer or CPO logs message, sends to HQ PacFleet, 2100 hours message received at Pac Fleet HQ. Now what happens is there can be complicated. Is there an officer on duty authorized to decode a dispatch from CinC AF to CinC Pac if yes message decoded by 2200 hours and sent to duty Staff officer, who makes decision to or not to notify Adm. Kimmel, or place it in his priority inbox for Monday Morning. If no officer Present does duty officer attempt someone who can decode message. Does officer come in or inform communication center to hold message until normal duty officer arrives..
It is now 2300 hours 6 December Honolulu time what happens?? (7 hours until Antares sighting of Mini Sub and 6 hours until USS Ward attacks Midget Sub)(9 hours until Japanese aircraft attack)

Sorry for being long winded, but in 1941 it was more complicate sending a message 1/3rd of the way around the world in 1941.

That is if the information comes from all the way the front line to Pearl.

What might be more pertinent is that Winston may inform FDR of the British intent to interdict suspected Japanese invasion convoys heading to Thailand and that by itself may be enough to put the USN in the Pacific at a higher level of readiness. That would short cut the comms significantly.

Won't totally mean that Pearl is averted but it may at least be on alert.

 

[Merrick]

Sorry for being long winded, but in 1941 it was more complicate sending a message 1/3rd of the way around the world in 1941.

And this is the best-case scenario, the one where the equipment is all working, the message is recognised as important, people are available to deal with it, no-one decides to send back to Singapore for confirmation.... Given the way the Ward sighting, not to mention the final warning from Washington, was handled OTL, I suspect that even if Asiatic Fleet treats it as a "conflict imminent" warning, the message to Hawaii will likely be located some time in the Peal Harbor aftermath, in someone's in-tray under a pile of irrelevancies.

The butterflies are flapping - Operation Picador could go any way or none (the last being the case where no-one locates anyone until it's too late and Force Z ultimately returns to Singapore following a fruitless sweep of the Gulf of Thailand). I read somewhere recently that the British may have been overconfident because they'd seen how barrage AA fire could break up Italian torpedo attacks. They don't know how good the Japanese are, and those old ships in the Light Squadron, in particular, are very vulnerable if things go wrong. OTOH, those Japanese convoys are juicy juicy targets and if one of the big ones gets hit on the way in, then the Japanese plans are scrambled even if none of the RN ships gets away to boast of the victory.

 

[Driftless]

That is if the information comes from all the way the front line to Pearl.

What might be more pertinent is that Winston may inform FDR of the British intent to interdict suspected Japanese invasion convoys heading to Thailand and that by itself may be enough to put the USN in the Pacific at a higher level of readiness. That would short cut the comms significantly.

Won't totally mean that Pearl is averted but it may at least be on alert.

How quick/slow would the flow of information go from Regulus back to Singagpore and on to London? (I haven't a clue)

If Winston beats other communications to the punch with FDR, Winston can "gild the lily" a bit to help sell British countermeasures. Not enough spin, so that later facts dispute Winston's account, but enough spin to create a useful first impression for FDR.

 

[LegionoftheUnitedStates]

That is if the information comes from all the way the front line to Pearl.

What might be more pertinent is that Winston may inform FDR of the British intent to interdict suspected Japanese invasion convoys heading to Thailand and that by itself may be enough to put the USN in the Pacific at a higher level of readiness. That would short cut the comms significantly.

Won't totally mean that Pearl is averted but it may at least be on alert.

Assuming the alert message is not sent as a telegram and delivered to General Short and Admiral Kimmel after the attack is over...

 

[Butchpfd]

g

That is if the information comes from all the way the front line to Pearl.

What might be more pertinent is that Winston may inform FDR of the British intent to interdict suspected Japanese invasion convoys heading to Thailand and that by itself may be enough to put the USN in the Pacific at a higher level of readiness. That would short cut the comms significantly.

Won't totally mean that Pearl is averted but it may at least be on alert.

You are looking at a similar time frame, though. Coded communications take time each code/ decode cycle will take at least a half hour, plus at a minimum 15 to 30 minute decision/ bureaucratic time lag, and the higher you go, the more the lag grows. OTL, the Japanese destroy code machines and documents notification went out to all commands in the Pacifi, Army and Navy, and because of atmospheric conditions could not be received at Pearl Harbor or Manila. The Message went coded by Western Union to Hawaii, General Short's office received the message mid attack, and Admiral Kimmel as the attack was winding down.

 

[Butchpfd]

g

That is if the information comes from all the way the front line to Pearl.

What might be more pertinent is that Winston may inform FDR of the British intent to interdict suspected Japanese invasion convoys heading to Thailand and that by itself may be enough to put the USN in the Pacific at a higher level of readiness. That would short cut the comms significantly.

Won't totally mean that Pearl is averted but it may at least be on alert.

You are looking at a similar time frame, though. Coded communications take time each code/ decode cycle will take at least a half hour, plus at a minimum 15 to 30 minute decision/ bureaucratic time lag, and the higher you go, the more the lag grows. OTL, the Japanese destroy code machines and documents notification went out to all commands in the Pacifi, Army and Navy, and because of atmospheric conditions could not be received at Pearl Harbor or Manila. The Message went coded by Western Union to Hawaii, General Short's office received the message mid attack, and Admiral Kimmel as the attack was wind

Assuming the alert message is not sent as a telegram and delivered to General Short and Admiral Kimmel after the attack is over...

The report from Hart to Kimmel would have gone out from Sangley Point radio, the most powerful radio station for the USN in the Pacific backed up by a cable message. By this time the U.S. Got. had control of the Pacific cable West Coast to Manila, and Army and Navy had dedicated lines. Still best case scenario the message hits 14th Naval Districe and Pac Fleet about the same time the Ward report comes in, decision cycle and alert goes out between 0700 and 0730, 7 December.

 

[Ramp-Rat]

If the information about the attack on HMS Reguius, manages to reach Pearl Harbour by the evening of the 6th, and into the hands of either Admiral Kimmel or his deputy. What are the chances that it could affect the alert status of the American forces in Hawaii to such an extent that the Japanese dawn attack on the 7th would be seriously affected. To which question my personal perspective is a resounding no, for two reasons. First and foremost the American authorities will want independence confirmation of the information before taking any action, along with instructions from Washington. Secondly it requires the authorities to appreciate the threat that exists, which they perceive to be sabotage, not a direct assault on the Islands. Despite the recent attack by the British on Taranto in the Mediterranean, there was no perception that such an attack could take place against Pearl, without a prior formal declaration of war. Nor it should be noted was this the Japanese plan, their plan was for there to be a formal declaration of war to be delivered in Washington, swiftly followed up by the attack on Pearl. The fact that this wouldn’t give sufficient time for the information of the declaration to be propagated to Pearl didn’t matter, as in Japanese eyes that was the Americans problem. And even if the declaration had been received in Washington and the Americans had by a miracle been able to inform Pearl, very little would have changed in the alert status in Pearl. As previously said the risk as the administration in Pearl saw it was primarily of sabotage attacks, as apposed to an assault on the Island. The Americans were more worried about a naval bombardment followed by an invasion attempt, than they were by an air strike, no one at the time had envisioned, a combined air attack from six aircraft carriers , the normal expectation was that combining more than two aircraft carriers together was unworkable. Pearl was a very long way away from any Japanese base and the Americans fully expected to receive sufficient warning of any approaching Japanese fleet. The idea that the Japanese could assemble a massive fleet containing all of their fleet carriers, leaving all their other fleets devoid of carriers, and sail it across the Pacific to Pearl, without being detected. Never crossed the minds of the United States Navy higher command, it was basically inconceivable at the time. So despite events in the South China Sea, my personal belief is the the Americans in both the Philippines and Pearl Harbour, will ITTL be caught with their thumb up their bum and their brains in neutral. The only officer that has a good chance of being awake and on his game is Admiral Hart, and he unfortunately has the dead hand of MacArthur and Washington constraining his actions.

RR.

 

[Derek Pullem]

g

You are looking at a similar time frame, though. Coded communications take time each code/ decode cycle will take at least a half hour, plus at a minimum 15 to 30 minute decision/ bureaucratic time lag, and the higher you go, the more the lag grows. OTL, the Japanese destroy code machines and documents notification went out to all commands in the Pacifi, Army and Navy, and because of atmospheric conditions could not be received at Pearl Harbor or Manila. The Message went coded by Western Union to Hawaii, General Short's office received the message mid attack, and Admiral Kimmel as the attack was winding down.

"Former naval person" could pick up the phone. May be somewhat cryptic given the lack of scrambler technology but I'm sure that the message could be conveyed that something urgent is coming through the channels right NOW.

 

[Butchpfd]

"Former naval person" could pick up the phone. May be somewhat cryptic given the lack of scrambler technology but I'm sure that the message could be conveyed that something urgent is coming through the channels right NOW.

Time frame for notifying Churchil., will be at least the same and probably longer, Remember message Phillips to Singapore, to HQ Eastern Fleet Ceylon, to Med Fleet Alexandria, to Gib, cable Gib to Lands End/ Portsmouth, Portsmouth to Admiralty Admiralty to War Rooms, to Churchill, Churchill call or not call, concern inadequate info decides. Call,arranges call, makes call by now 4 to 6 hours passed now 1500 London , 6 December, 2100 hours Washington, you are about the time Japanese destroy coding Machine order received. We are at best 60 to 90 minutes ahead of OTL

 

[Derek Pullem]

Time frame for notifying Churchil., will be at least the same and probably longer, Remember message Phillips to Singapore, to HQ Eastern Fleet Ceylon, to Med Fleet Alexandria, to Gib, cable Gib to Lands End/ Portsmouth, Portsmouth to Admiralty Admiralty to War Rooms, to Churchill, Churchill call or not call, concern inadequate info decides. Call,arranges call, makes call by now 4 to 6 hours passed now 1500 London , 6 December, 2100 hours Washington, you are about the time Japanese destroy coding Machine order received. We are at best 60 to 90 minutes ahead of OTL

You miss the point - Churchill gave Gort and Phillips carte blanche on the 5 December and they sailed at 0430 on the 6 December. The depthcharging of Regulus 18 hours later is merely confirmation that the decision taken the day before was correct. I would not be surprised if the British notified the Americans of their intentions as soon as Force Z left port given the fact that it was going to ratchet up tensions with the Japanese and quite likely end up in a shooting match. Which may catch American assets in the crossfire.

No one is expecting Pearl Harbor to be attacked but the fact that the British and Japanese are likely going to war should ramp up their readiness.

 

[Butchpfd]

You miss the point - Churchill gave Gort and Phillips carte blanche on the 5 December and they sailed at 0430 on the 6 December. The depthcharging of Regulus 18 hours later is merely confirmation that the decision taken the day before was correct. I would not be surprised if the British notified the Americans of their intentions as soon as Force Z left port given the fact that it was going to ratchet up tensions with the Japanese and quite likely end up in a shooting match. Which may catch American assets in the crossfire.

No one is expecting Pearl Harbor to be attacked but the fact that the British and Japanese are likely going to war should ramp up their readiness.

If Churchill tells Roosevelt on early 6 December, that forces Roosevelt to take aggressive action, something politically Roosevelt would have to discuss with in er circle.

U.S. is still primarily on a peacetime mode in Continental U. S. Everything takes more time, no one expected that Murphy would take such an active hand in Hawaii, 1. Short and Kimmel slack off alert , 2. Antares warning and Ward attack, low priority. Opana operators cannot tell difference between Kido Butai attack from NNE and 12 B-17s from East, stretched our 30 minutes between 1st and last plane. 3. Duty officer I. Air Control Center officer is an untrained learn on the job officer, who doesn't understand radar. Shit happens! MURPHY WINS!

 

[The Mole's Revenge]

The issue for notifying Pearl would be complicated 2230 on 6 December HMS Regulus reports depth charging, 2245 Singapore Hq receives and confirms Regulus message notifies Command staff, finally by 0800 on 7 Dec FET( Far East Time) American Staff officer is notified , codes the report message 0845 send message it to Asiatic Fleet HQ by cable. 0850 received by Navy communication center Correigidor, Message decoded and Asiatic Fleet HQ notified, 1200 Admiral Hart gets the message about Regulus, makes decision to notify his command about the incident in particular PatWing 10, 1300 Hart makes the decision to notify Pac Fleet HQ (Kimmel), 1330 Message coded and delivered to Sangley Point Radio ,1400 Sangley Point sends message to Pac Fleet Radio. (12 hours until Japanese aircraft attack Davo , OTL). 2000 Hours Saturday 6 December Message received Pac Fleet radio, duty Officer or CPO logs message, sends to HQ PacFleet, 2100 hours message received at Pac Fleet HQ. Now what happens is there can be complicated. Is there an officer on duty authorized to decode a dispatch from CinC AF to CinC Pac if yes message decoded by 2200 hours and sent to duty Staff officer, who makes decision to or not to notify Adm. Kimmel, or place it in his priority inbox for Monday Morning. If no officer Present does duty officer attempt someone who can decode message. Does officer come in or inform communication center to hold message until normal duty officer arrives..
It is now 2300 hours 6 December Honolulu time what happens?? (7 hours until Antares sighting of Mini Sub and 6 hours until USS Ward attacks Midget Sub)(9 hours until Japanese aircraft attack)

Sorry for being long winded, but in 1941 it was more complicate sending a message 1/3rd of the way around the world in 1941.

Thanks for such a detailed description of how complicated long-distance communitcation could be back then. I knew it wasn't as simple as now, but hadn't realised quite how many steps could be involved.

 

[jlckansas]

Time frame for notifying Churchil., will be at least the same and probably longer, Remember message Phillips to Singapore, to HQ Eastern Fleet Ceylon, to Med Fleet Alexandria, to Gib, cable Gib to Lands End/ Portsmouth, Portsmouth to Admiralty Admiralty to War Rooms, to Churchill, Churchill call or not call, concern inadequate info decides. Call,arranges call, makes call by now 4 to 6 hours passed now 1500 London , 6 December, 2100 hours Washington, you are about the time Japanese destroy coding Machine order received. We are at best 60 to 90 minutes ahead of OTL

Regulus was a trip wire position. It would go to Singapore, they would be listening in for the subs to check in, first then on the Theater command link with London bypassing the Navy setup. Basically it would be sent in the most direct way possible from CinC Singapore to the CIGS in London on the Cables. I could see them use multiple ways for this, even using the TransPac to US or Canada and on to UK just to make sure it makes it. Regulus is under direct command in Singapore and not Ceylon and the Naval command would be passing that up to the CinC Singapore not to Phillips afloat except as a passing of information to him.

 

[Merrick]

U.S. is still primarily on a peacetime mode in Continental U. S. Everything takes more time, no one expected that Murphy would take such an active hand in Hawaii, 1. Short and Kimmel slack off alert , 2. Antares warning and Ward attack, low priority. Opana operators cannot tell difference between Kido Butai attack from NNE and 12 B-17s from East, stretched our 30 minutes between 1st and last plane. 3. Duty officer I. Air Control Center officer is an untrained learn on the job officer, who doesn't understand radar. Shit happens! MURPHY WINS!

One thing I've never been able to find out - were the Antares/Ward reports something new, or had the guardships been attacking suspicious whales, oil slicks and floating logs every other day for the last month? There's nothing like repeated false alarms to dull the response to a real one.
Likewise early radar was limited in accuracy and often very flaky in operation - something that OTL would bite the USN repeatedly in the Solomons. Was the signal anything clearer than "airborne contact NNE, maximum range, unknown numbers, unknown altitude", at a time when by pure mischance, friendly aircraft were expected from the North?

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

That is if the information comes from all the way the front line to Pearl.

What might be more pertinent is that Winston may inform FDR of the British intent to interdict suspected Japanese invasion convoys heading to Thailand and that by itself may be enough to put the USN in the Pacific at a higher level of readiness. That would short cut the comms significantly.

Won't totally mean that Pearl is averted but it may at least be on alert.

How would this be different from the "War Warning" issued on 27 November? Pearl Harbor went on alert immediately after that; by 7 December, as there had been no action for ten days, the alert was relaxed. Such a report would be obscure, not definite. Churchill might pass it on, but not as urgent or requiring immediate action; he did not want to "cry wolf".

It's also not clear that it would get to Churchill immediately or during working hours, or that Churchill's message would get to Roosevelt immediately or during working hours. 2230 in Singapore is 1430 in London and 0930 in Washington, but it's Saturday. And 0230 in Hawaii - on Saturday, 6 December.

Which raises a question: the strike on Pearl Harbor was at 0700 on 7 December, which is 1400 in Washington, 1900 in London, and 0300 in Singapore on 8 December. The OTL Japanese landings in Malaya were at 0215 on 8 December. If the Japanese are planning to land on 8 December as OTL, would their invasion fleet be at sea on 6 December? Time zones make this very confusing.

From the Indochina coast to Malaya is about 400 km, which would be about 20 hours steaming at 12 knots. So to arrive at 0200, they would depart at 0600 the previous day (7 December). Which means, I guess, that they would be at sea on 6 December, moving to the assembly area.

I guess we have to remember that the Japanese did everything on Tokyo time (two hours ahead of Singapore time), and that in their orders and records, the strike on Pearl Harbor was on 8 December. So 6 December in Malaya is still over a day from action (on Japan's schedule). Gort has to be very careful not to launch MATADOR too early (or too late). Gort said "I would go Sunday morning...", that is, 0600 on 7 December, which would be about 20 hours before the Japanese landings.

It's about 100 km from the border to Singora, 150km to Pattani (along the road). Arriving before the Japanese would almost certainly provoke resistance from Thai forces. (OTL, Thai forces resisted the Japanese landings for hours, until ordered from Bangkok to stand down.) What Thai forces are stationed at the border or along the road?

 

[Parma]

You miss the point - Churchill gave Gort and Phillips carte blanche on the 5 December and they sailed at 0430 on the 6 December. The depthcharging of Regulus 18 hours later is merely confirmation that the decision taken the day before was correct. I would not be surprised if the British notified the Americans of their intentions as soon as Force Z left port given the fact that it was going to ratchet up tensions with the Japanese and quite likely end up in a shooting match. Which may catch American assets in the crossfire.

No one is expecting Pearl Harbor to be attacked but the fact that the British and Japanese are likely going to war should ramp up their readiness.

They will not ramping up their readiness, or at least not even close to react on the attack which was underway. Due to the simple fact that an attack as it will be at 7th December is unconceivable, as mentioned by R.R.

 

[Butchpfd]

One thing I've never been able to find out - were the Antares/Ward reports something new, or had the guardships been attacking suspicious whales, oil slicks and floating logs every other day for the last month? There's nothing like repeated false alarms to dull the response to a real one.
Likewise early radar was limited in accuracy and often very flaky in operation - something that OTL would bite the USN repeatedly in the Solomons. Was the signal anything clearer than "airborne contact NNE, maximum range, unknown numbers, unknown altitude", at a time when by pure mischance, friendly aircraft were expected from the North? Radar had exact bearing

Whales were taking a beating , all the 4 piper guard DD's were manned by reservists most with less then 6 months active time,, ROTC, OCS, junior officers, CO's were recalled reservists , or hard charging USNA graduates classes 35-38. Radar had correct bearing a reciprocal would have led directly to Kido Butai. More experienced operators would have realized that size of contact was far too large for a formation of B-17s. Opana radar was high location with no clutter on a NW to E arc. Issue was alert was supposed to be still active,
USS Antares made 2 reports, Ward moved to Antaeres location, visual on sub by Ward ,Ward opens fire Number 3 gun gets hit at joint of hull and conning tower, sub dives Ward makes DC attack no sonar contact, no more sub contact until August 2002 ,at 1312 feet 5 miles off Pear Harbor entrance the wreck was found.