Malaya What If

[Amir]

There‘s a touch of irony in the failure to destroy the Clark-Stotsenberg and Subic Bay/Olongapo complexes since the Japanese were able to move in and almost immediately start using the facilities to support their operations against Bataan and the Defenses of Manilla Bay. This included using the Subic Bay area to stage amphibious forces and land supplies as well as basing their air support out of Clark.

It would be an interesting wargame to examine the effects of the retention of Fort Wint rather than abandoning it under hazy circumstances in late December 1941. The fort could provide some fires into the Japanese positions on the reverse slopes of the Mt. Natib and others, as well as forcing the Japanese to neutralize the fort before clearing the mines in Subic Bay. Given that it took the Japanese over two weeks after the abandonment to occupy the area anyway due road damage and logistic disruption, a defense would have pushed that timeline further back and forced either neutralization by siege or a deliberate assault (likely given IJA tactics at the time) which would have imposed more disruption to the IJA‘s overall plan. The likely outcome for the Americans is that a defense of Wint buys them another few weeks to consolidate the Bataan position possibly leading to an extension of the overall siege and buying more time to set conditions for resistance warfare in the archipelago.

There are similarities in the Fort Wint/Subic Bay situation, the failure to destroy Clark and Stotsenberg, and the abandonment of Penang (Batu Muang and the other fortified places) and the northern Malaya airfields. Like most things, it comes down discipline and command and control. Forces in Malaya will need to have clear denial plans for all facilities, criteria for abandoning and destroying them (or holding them until such time as conditions are met), the means of destruction, and most importantly the authority and discipline to execute. It’s an unfortunate fact that the worth of holding some places is more important than the force tasked to hold. Fort Wint and Penang would likely have become “die in place” positions if held. But, they would likely have complicated and delayed the enemy in both instances, contributing to the success of the overall force.

 

[Butchpfd]

There‘s a touch of irony in the failure to destroy the Clark-Stotsenberg and Subic Bay/Olongapo complexes since the Japanese were able to move in and almost immediately start using the facilities to support their operations against Bataan and the Defenses of Manilla Bay. This included using the Subic Bay area to stage amphibious forces and land supplies as well as basing their air support out of Clark.

It would be an interesting wargame to examine the effects of the retention of Fort Wint rather than abandoning it under hazy circumstances in late December 1941. The fort could provide some fires into the Japanese positions on the reverse slopes of the Mt. Natib and others, as well as forcing the Japanese to neutralize the fort before clearing the mines in Subic Bay. Given that it took the Japanese over two weeks after the abandonment to occupy the area anyway due road damage and logistic disruption, a defense would have pushed that timeline further back and forced either neutralization by siege or a deliberate assault (likely given IJA tactics at the time) which would have imposed more disruption to the IJA‘s overall plan. The likely outcome for the Americans is that a defense of Wint buys them another few weeks to consolidate the Bataan position possibly leading to an extension of the overall siege and buying more time to set conditions for resistance warfare in the archipelago.

There are similarities in the Fort Wint/Subic Bay situation, the failure to destroy Clark and Stotsenberg, and the abandonment of Penang (Batu Muang and the other fortified places) and the northern Malaya airfields. Like most things, it comes down discipline and command and control. Forces in Malaya will need to have clear denial plans for all facilities, criteria for abandoning and destroying them (or holding them until such time as conditions are met), the means of destruction, and most importantly the authority and discipline to execute. It’s an unfortunate fact that the worth of holding some places is more important than the force tasked to hold. Fort Wint and Penang would likely have become “die in place” positions if held. But, they would likely have complicated and delayed the enemy in both instances, contributing to the success of the overall force.

At this time Olopongo Naval Station hosted ACR US Rochester, in ordinary since iirc. 1937 The Olopango Marine Battalion, Aka 3rd Battalion 4th Marines and the Supply Depot and training area for USMC units, including for 4th Marines, one of the Patrol Squadrons of Pat Wing 10, with their tender and fuel stocks, the Dewey Dry Dock and shore shops.
When the Navy and Marines evacuated Olopango all buildings on the base were burned( concrete buildings only gutted), machinery damaged, Rochester scuttled in deep water. Dewy dock and all vessels were moved to Mirivales on Bataan after the war warning. Small craft moved when the base was evacuated.
The 4th Marines arrived at Bataan by truck an boat, with 6 months rations and field uniforms for 2,000 men, 10 days ammunition for all weapons small arms, .30 and .50MG, 60mm mortars, 24 x .50 AAA MG, 12 x M-3 X 3" AAA
Fort Wint is another of the wonders of the Army in the PI

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The first US Tank on Tank engagement of WW2 was a single platoon of M3 Stuarts in the Philippine's

It was supposed to be a company sized force but the fuel supplies did not reach them prior to the attack into a known Japanese force and so the unit pooled its fuel to give enough for 5 tanks to advance.

Another issue presented itself in that the tanks had not been able to test fire their guns after the tanks had arrived and the Lt commanding the platoon did so with his tank as they moved up to the enemy position only for the gun to not to 'return to battery' after firing rendering it useless.

Upon engaging the enemy the Lt's Tank was hit by a shell from a Ha Go and disabled and the crew became POWs the other 4 tanks managing to get away.

The M3 on paper is a better tank than a Ha Go but the 2 Battalions in the Philippine's were hamstrung by several factors

Training and Experience was lacking compared to their Japanese counterparts

Logistics was appalling with the units being orphaned within the Philippines military structure

The M3 Stuart Tank was a new design for the US Army and most of the crews of the 194th and 192nd battalions had been training on M2 light tanks and first saw an M3 when they got on the ships carrying them

There was no HE rounds supplied with the Tank forces only AP - I once saw a very good US ammunition guide showing how many rounds where produced etc and when and it claimed that 37mm HE ammo did not start production until Feb 42 and canister in April 42 (with the 37mm cannister first used at Alligator Creek) - however the link no longer works - but another source I read simply stated that no HE ammo was sent (?).

Not sure why maybe a doctrinal thing, a cockup or simply the ammo was not then available?

HE Ammo was Macgyvered up locally by attaching HE warheads from the Philippine Army M1916 TRP 37mm guns to the more modern AT round cases

 

[Butchpfd]

The first US Tank on Tank engagement of WW2 was a single platoon of M3 Stuarts in the Philippine's

It was supposed to be a company sized force but the fuel supplies did not reach them prior to the attack into a known Japanese force and so the unit pooled its fuel to give enough for 5 tanks to advance.

Another issue presented itself in that the tanks had not been able to test fire their guns after the tanks had arrived and the Lt commanding the platoon did so with his tank as they moved up to the enemy position only for the gun to not to 'return to battery' after firing rendering it useless.

Upon engaging the enemy the Lt's Tank was hit by a shell from a Ha Go and disabled and the crew became POWs the other 4 tanks managing to get away.

The M3 on paper is a better tank than a Ha Go but the 2 Battalions in the Philippine's were hamstrung by several factors

Training and Experience was lacking compared to their Japanese counterparts

Logistics was appalling with the units being orphaned within the Philippines military structure

The M3 Stuart Tank was a new design for the US Army and most of the crews of the 194th and 192nd battalions had been training on M2 light tanks and first saw an M3 when they got on the ships carrying them

There was no HE rounds supplied with the Tank forces only AP - I once saw a very good US ammunition guide showing how many rounds where produced etc and when and it claimed that 37mm HE ammo did not start production until Feb 42 and canister in April 42 (with the 37mm cannister first used at Alligator Creek) - however the link no longer works - but another source I read simply stated that no HE ammo was sent (?).

Not sure why maybe a doctrinal thing, a cockup or simply the ammo was not then available?

HE Ammo was Macgyvered up locally by attaching HE warheads from the Philippine Army M1916 TRP 37mm guns to the more modern AT round cases

According to the Data on the Pensacola convoy, there was between 9,600 rounds of 37 MM AAA ammunition in the convoy. What is interesting is that there were no M1A2 37MmAAA guns in the Philippines. The only aircraft in the convoy were P-40 E models with .50 Cal mgs and A-24 Dive Bombers ( AAC version of the SBD-3) with .50 and.30 Cal mgs, nor were there any M2A1 x 37mm Automatic AAA on board. the 37mm would only have use in the Philippines in 37 mm tank guns or anti tank guns. the types were AP-Shot, and HE-T ( High Explosive - tracer).proportions were not listed.

 

[Amir]

At this time Olopongo Naval Station hosted ACR US Rochester, in ordinary since iirc. 1937 The Olopango Marine Battalion, Aka 3rd Battalion 4th Marines and the Supply Depot and training area for USMC units, including for 4th Marines, one of the Patrol Squadrons of Pat Wing 10, with their tender and fuel stocks, the Dewey Dry Dock and shore shops.
When the Navy and Marines evacuated Olopango all buildings on the base were burned( concrete buildings only gutted), machinery damaged, Rochester scuttled in deep water. Dewy dock and all vessels were moved to Mirivales on Bataan after the war warning. Small craft moved when the base was evacuated.
The 4th Marines arrived at Bataan by truck an boat, with 6 months rations and field uniforms for 2,000 men, 10 days ammunition for all weapons small arms, .30 and .50MG, 60mm mortars, 24 x .50 AAA MG, 12 x M-3 X 3" AAA
Fort Wint is another of the wonders of the Army in the PI

Yeah- I wouldn’t give a landward defense much of a chance other than a die-in-place, but the navy and marines did collapse out of Olongapo and Cavite as well as they could all things considered. All accounts point to them having better ration, clothing, fuel, and personal demand (cigarette) supply scales than the US Army or the PA. In addition, the 4th Marines were able to retain enough ammo to conduct rudimentary familiarization training for its ad hoc Amr and Navy augmentees on Corregidor. Marine Barracks Olongapo and the Special Battalion at Cavite likewise benefitted from a fairly orderly withdrawal process, another credit to Hart and the Asiatic Fleet staff.

Holding Fort Wint would have been a hopeless post, similar to Wake in that the enemy had every advantage to isolate and reattack until successful. However, even a skeleton garrison would prove its worth by constituting a threat (capability, intent, opportunity) to Japanese surface traffic into the harbor. This would require some form of reaction on the Japanese part. Not exactly the best moment of the coast artillery.

 

[Amir]

The first US Tank on Tank engagement of WW2 was a single platoon of M3 Stuarts in the Philippine's

It was supposed to be a company sized force but the fuel supplies did not reach them prior to the attack into a known Japanese force and so the unit pooled its fuel to give enough for 5 tanks to advance.

Another issue presented itself in that the tanks had not been able to test fire their guns after the tanks had arrived and the Lt commanding the platoon did so with his tank as they moved up to the enemy position only for the gun to not to 'return to battery' after firing rendering it useless.

Upon engaging the enemy the Lt's Tank was hit by a shell from a Ha Go and disabled and the crew became POWs the other 4 tanks managing to get away.

The M3 on paper is a better tank than a Ha Go but the 2 Battalions in the Philippine's were hamstrung by several factors

Training and Experience was lacking compared to their Japanese counterparts

Logistics was appalling with the units being orphaned within the Philippines military structure

The M3 Stuart Tank was a new design for the US Army and most of the crews of the 194th and 192nd battalions had been training on M2 light tanks and first saw an M3 when they got on the ships carrying them

There was no HE rounds supplied with the Tank forces only AP - I once saw a very good US ammunition guide showing how many rounds where produced etc and when and it claimed that 37mm HE ammo did not start production until Feb 42 and canister in April 42 (with the 37mm cannister first used at Alligator Creek) - however the link no longer works - but another source I read simply stated that no HE ammo was sent (?).

Not sure why maybe a doctrinal thing, a cockup or simply the ammo was not then available?

HE Ammo was Macgyvered up locally by attaching HE warheads from the Philippine Army M1916 TRP 37mm guns to the more modern AT round cases

I’d recommend reading LT Morin’s story if you can find it. Gives a great example of the state of preparedness of the recently raised US formations.

Morin, 2nd Lt. Benjamin R. - Bataan Project

Bataan Project is dedicated to the heroes of World War 2 who fought on the Philippines and suffered as POWs.

bataanproject.com

Rev. Benjamin ‘Ben’ R. Morin, soldier who survived Japanese POW camps, dead at 94

<p>Ben Morin was beaten, tortured and starved in Japanese POW camps for almost all of World War II, but he was not ruined by his ordeal.</p>

chicago.suntimes.com

 

[Cryhavoc101]

According to the Data on the Pensacola convoy, there was between 9,600 rounds of 37 MM AAA ammunition in the convoy. What is interesting is that there were no M1A2 37MmAAA guns in the Philippines. The only aircraft in the convoy were P-40 E models with .50 Cal mgs and A-24 Dive Bombers ( AAC version of the SBD-3) with .50 and.30 Cal mgs, nor were there any M2A1 x 37mm Automatic AAA on board. the 37mm would only have use in the Philippines in 37 mm tank guns or anti tank guns. the types were AP-Shot, and HE-T ( High Explosive - tracer).proportions were not listed.

I know that a lot of equipment intended for the Philippine army was still in warehouses in the USA on Dec 7th and never arrived - so perhaps AAA was intended to be sent in future ships?

 

[Butchpfd]

I know that a lot of equipment intended for the Philippine army was still in warehouses in the USA on Dec 7th and never arrived - so perhaps AAA was intended to be sent in future ships?

Ran some numbers; while listed as AAA ammunition, it is the same rounds as for the 37mm AT gun, and the 37mm Gun in M-3 light tanks. 9600 rounds, at the break down of 1 HE tracer in 5 rounds, is 1,920, the remainder is AP shot. With just the 108 M3 tanks in the Philippines the total 9600 rounds is 88 per tank, with 18 being HE. That is only half load of 176 rounds carried per tank. That is not counting any released to 37mm AT units.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Ran some numbers; while listed as AAA ammunition, it is the same rounds as for the 37mm AT gun, and the 37mm Gun in M-3 light tanks. 9600 rounds, at the break down of 1 HE tracer in 5 rounds, is 1,920, the remainder is AP shot. With just the 108 M3 tanks in the Philippines the total 9600 rounds is 88 per tank, with 18 being HE. That is only half load of 176 rounds carried per tank. That is not counting any released to 37mm AT units.

Is it the same round?

Both listed as 37×223mm (but this is where I get all 'rain man') the AAA rounds are listed as SR (Semi Rimmed) and the AT rounds as R (Rimmed) so I do wonder if the cases where different and not compatible?

I looked up the ammo on Bulletpicker.com

Here for the AAA ammo

and here for the AT ammo

It does look like the cases are different and not compatible with each other?

Bloody hell I'm a nerd

 

[Butchpfd]

Is it the same round?

Both listed as 37×223mm (but this is where I get all 'rain man') the AAA rounds are listed as SR (Semi Rimmed) and the AT rounds as R (Rimmed) so I do wonder if the cases where different and not compatible?

I looked up the ammo on Bulletpicker.com

Here for the AAA ammo

and here for the AT ammo

It does look like the cases are different and not compatible with each other?

Bloody hell I'm a nerd

Then the question becomes wrong ammunition or mislabeled shipping papers. I have never seen a pic of a crate of 37mm ammo carried by the convoy. Also it depends if the ejection mechanism will pull the cartridge. However the AT and Tank guns were manual vertical falling block breachblocks, I looked at pics of breachblock and the 37 mm cases, imo, the cannon extractors could pull the semi-rimmed cases. It would make sense that you could use the auto ammo in the Tank and AT guns in an emergency.

 

[lgkmas]

Then the question becomes wrong ammunition or mislabeled shipping papers. I have never seen a pic of a crate of 37mm ammo carried by the convoy. Also it depends if the ejection mechanism will pull the cartridge. However the AT and Tank guns were manual vertical falling block breachblocks, I looked at pics of breachblock and the 37 mm cases, imo, the cannon extractors could pull the semi-rimmed cases. It would make sense that you could use the auto ammo in the Tank and AT guns in an emergency.

I am getting confused by this. Surely an AAA round is a timed HE round. Solid shot is virtually useless as an AAA round as it means you have to get a direct hit. As anti-personnel rounds for the M3, yes, it does have some viability. The M54 HE round fired by the 37mmAA gun had a self destroying tracer which blew up the shell after 10,500 feet vertical travel. The M59A1 was an AP round.
Hogg notes that "Ammunition was interchangeable between the M3 (anti-tank gun) the M5 (tank gun) and the M6 (tank) gun and between the M1 (AA gun) and the M4 (aircraft) gun." I am not sure if he means all those guns could fire the same ammunition. But as i said above, why would an AA gun want to fire solid shot?

 

[pjmidd]

But as i said above, why would an AA gun want to fire solid shot?

when its being used in desperation on ground targets? German 88's for example were originally meant to be just AA, not until Spain where they were used as ad hoc bunker busters did thought go to a ground role.

 

[Errolwi]

I am getting confused by this. Surely an AAA round is a timed HE round.

Smaller AA rounds are often impact, not timed. But yes HE, not solid.

Full text of "TM 9-1901 Artillery Ammunition, 1944"

a. General. The M56 Fuze (fig. 169) is known as a supersensi-
tive type because its mechanism is arranged to function on light im-
pact. It is used with 37-mm high-explosive shell in both antiaircraft
and aircraft guns.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Smaller AA rounds are often impact, not timed. But yes HE, not solid.

Full text of "TM 9-1901 Artillery Ammunition, 1944"

Having read that very useful document (thank for that) it does mention under the 37mm M74 AP shot entry that -

SHOT, FIXED, A. P., M74, W /TRACER, 37-MM AUTO.
GUN, M1A2 (fig. 34), has the same shot as that used in the correspond-
ing round for 143, M3A1, MS, M5A1, and M6 Guns (par. 43). However,
when fired from the M1A2 Gun, it is assembled with the M 1 7 Cartridge
Case, which has an extractor groove. The tracer bums for 2,000 yards.

That does not mean that the M1 AAA ammo does not conversely work in an M3 AT or similar guns - but I suspect from that entry that the cartridge cases are different and not compatible.

 

[Butchpfd]

I am getting confused by this. Surely an AAA round is a timed HE round. Solid shot is virtually useless as an AAA round as it means you have to get a direct hit. As anti-personnel rounds for the M3, yes, it does have some viability. The M54 HE round fired by the 37mmAA gun had a self destroying tracer which blew up the shell after 10,500 feet vertical travel. The M59A1 was an AP round.
Hogg notes that "Ammunition was interchangeable between the M3 (anti-tank gun) the M5 (tank gun) and the M6 (tank) gun and between the M1 (AA gun) and the M4 (aircraft) gun." I am not sure if he means all those guns could fire the same ammunition. But as i said above, why would an AA gun want to fire solid shot?

Hogg is correct. The HE was a contact round and the shot was a great big. slug. I am just going by what is posted In the U.S. Army information. Remember, this was a 1939 design, an really like an upsized. M-2 HBMG,there was a later cannister round.

 

[Butchpfd]

Having read that very useful document (thank for that) it does mention under the 37mm M74 AP shot entry that -

SHOT, FIXED, A. P., M74, W /TRACER, 37-MM AUTO.
GUN, M1A2 (fig. 34), has the same shot as that used in the correspond-
ing round for 143, M3A1, MS, M5A1, and M6 Guns (par. 43). However,
when fired from the M1A2 Gun, it is assembled with the M 1 7 Cartridge
Case, which has an extractor groove. The tracer bums for 2,000 yards.

That does not mean that the M1 AAA ammo does not conversely work in an M3 AT or similar guns - but I suspect from that entry that the cartridge cases are different and not compatible.

IMO as Amir and I discussed it is quite possible the 37mm were mislisted on the ships manifest. 9, 600 rounds is very few for an automatic weapon, but 1/2 a full loadout for 108 M-3 light tanks,

 

[JWilly48519]

Early war AA cannon rounds are just HE rounds with a more complicated fuze. Change out the fuze, or set it to maximum, and you have an HE round.

Maybe the shells would have to be changed from one propellant case, for AA guns, to another for tanks. But if that had to be done, I'd rather do it with WWII-vintage AA (HE) rounds than WWI-vintage 37mm infantry gun rounds, that likely had very thin shell walls because they were designed to be fired at low velocity with relatively much less propellant. AA gun HE shells, because they needed maximum muzzle velocity and effective ceiling, were designed to be fired with maximum propellant.

 

[Butchpfd]

Early war AA cannon rounds are just HE rounds with a more complicated fuze. Change out the fuze, or set it to maximum, and you have an HE round.

Maybe the shells would have to be changed from one propellant case, for AA guns, to another for tanks. But if that had to be done, I'd rather do it with WWII-vintage AA (HE) rounds than WWI-vintage 37mm infantry gun rounds, that likely had very thin shell walls because they were designed to be fired at low velocity with relatively much less propellant. AA gun HE shells, because they needed maximum muzzle velocity and effective ceiling, were designed to be fired with maximum propellant.

According to the ammunition charts the WW II rounds were all High velocity..

 

[kent]

The more I read of this the more it shows how goofed up Mac Arthur and crew was......

 

[Amir]

MacArthur and the USAFFE staff definitely own part of the blame for the state of materiel preparation. However, the supply lines and logistics support from the mainland was equally lacking. Reading over the various convoy manifests in The Fall of the Phillipines and other works there’s a palpable sense of “doing something for the sake of doing something”. Mortars with no ammo, aircraft without maintenance equipment, crews without aircraft, artillery without sights or fire control.

it seemed like everyone knew the war was going to start and was just trying to throw as much material into the PI as possible rather than waiting to build combat configured loads or ship complete unit sets of material.