Again I'm struck by the sheer intensity of the reaction against Societism. We really don't have a clear parallel in OTL - even the most absurd extremes of anti-communism fell far short of LTTW's bizarre mandatory celebrations of ethnic cleansing. In a lot of ways it seems to have more in common with the knee-jerk rejection of eugenics and human improvement that the Nazis left us with, but seemingly an order of magnitude larger.
I can't wait to see the origins of all this.
Having just gotten heavily into "Axis of Andes" I am also very intrigued to see how you'll construct a genuine South American superpower.
When the time comes I also have a mind to irritate you with any number of economic issues, but now.... now is a time for celebration.
Really all these points go together: one of the main themes of this work is to expound my view that people in OTL tend to waaaaay overrate the importance of economic issues when attempting to interpret history and politics, something which of course our friend Karl Marx is largely responsible for: even his enemies basically allow him to set the playing field and argue within his own defined boundaries, rather than suggesting that that's not the only game in town to start with. I'm going for something roughly analogous here, with the primary 'theory of history' being based on identity rather than wealth, Sanchez as the loose analogue to Marx and his Diversitarian opponents again allowing him to define what the game is and playing it against him, rather than just saying 'actually maybe identity just isn't such the important all-defining issue you say it is to start with?'
Naturally we are all somewhat blinded by OTL bias on this: the choice of identity as the alternative 'all-defining issue' on my part is clearly influenced by the fact that it is the only occasional competitor to economics in OTL when defining political spectra and historical interpretation. Two OTL examples of identity dominating over wealth to define a political landscape and historical interpretation are Northern Ireland and Belgium. But in OTL these are regarded as aberrations, at least so long as the West remains the dominant contributor of ideas to global interpretations of history. My point is that there are probably thousands of alternative issues that could become the 'all-defining one' people fight ideological wars to the death over, it's just that identity is probably the easiest one for us to see and thus the obvious choice for me to write about.
With that in mind, I enjoy it when people sometimes criticise LTTW as not being economically well grounded, for example suggesting that country X could not be as powerful as it is painted as being on economic grounds, because it shows me that I am writing the way I want to write. People in TTL would find it a very alien attitude to suggest that a country's power and influence is so tied to its economic potential (resources, industrial output, etc.), and also would find the ways in which we measure it to be rather strange. You can see similar examples of philosophical disconnect just within OTL if you vary viewpoints based on chronological time back and forth rather than parallel timelines side to side. The obvious one being that people back in the 17th century or so would find our notion that there is no fixed amount of trade in the world that countries must compete over to be completely mad.
Similarly, modern historical interpretations of things like, say, the revocation of the Edict of Nantes almost always take the tone of 'Louis XIV was foolish to do this because it meant most of the Huguenots went to England, thus depriving France of these educated industrious people and gifting them to France's enemy'. This is not an interpretation that can be found in works about the incident written prior to the 19th century when the ideological ideas the assumption is based on were concocted. It is equally valid to say 'Louis XIV was wise to do this because it purified France's national identity, tying the newly centralised state to religious conformity, and allowed the Bourbons to make realistic threats to the Papacy that they might break with Rome and create a national state church, giving them greater influence when seeking to alter the balance of power within Europe with Papal backing'. But you'll never hear this said nowadays, because it is just assumed that France's economic power is
intrinsically more important than the coherency of France's identity, as though there are no circumstances in which having the latter would objectively benefit French interests more than the former. Again, identity is probably far from the only issue in which you could draw this distinction, it's just the most obvious one to me because of how OTL has shaped our minds.
So here, via the extracts from the in-timeline books, I am not only presenting a world in which history has gone differently, but where histor
iography has gone differently as well, and people do not necessarily focus on the same things we do when seeking to interpret the currents of history. Is that clear?