Longer Winter War = Operation Barbarossa in 1940?

[Not James Stockdale]

Let's first suppose that a combination of factors leads to significantly increased Finnish readiness during late 1939. This scenario may also require direct Swedish intervention, so that can also be accommodated.

The result of these changes is a comprehensive defeat of the Red Army's second offensive in February of 1940. With the spring thaw coming up in March, April, and early May, there will not be time for the Red Army to muster a third offensive before the summer campaign season. With an enormous proportion of the Red Army distracted by the planned offensive against Finland in May of 1940, could Hitler take advantage of the situation and launched an invasion of the Soviet Union instead of the invasion of France?

How would this invasion progress compared to Operation Barbarossa in 1941, especially with major Soviet forces away from Central Europe? In the OTL situation, the Germans likely benefited more fron the extra year than the Soviets, but the Soviets here are still in the middle of the war against Finland. How does the pre-war French military react to being thrust into a situation where they are allied with the Soviets? With the Swedes directly involved in the war, how would the Anglo-French plans for intervening against the Soviets be impacted?

I know the normal course of a "better Finnish performance in the Winter War" TL is a Hitler-Stalin alliance. That being said, Hitler always considered the Soviets to be the Main Enemy and I think that apparent Soviet weakness on this scale may tempt him to jump east rather than west.

 

[BlackDragon98]

Germans would get defeated on the ground.
In 1940, their tanks were utter crap.
Panzer IIIs with 37mm guns and Panzer IVs with the short 75 were their BEST.
And they didn't have enough of them too.
Much of their panzerwaffe was still Panzer Is and Panzer IIs.
Utterly useless even against a BT-7.

Not enough trucks either.
Nor fuel for that matter.
The USSR supplied most of Nazi Germany's everything.
Declaring war on them in 1940 would spell doom for the Reich.

 

[DrakonFin]

How do you manage to get the Finns to "comprehensively defeat" the February offensive? It is IMO impossible to increase Finnish readiness in late 1939 to such a degree that it will matter. As things stood, Finland was exceptionally ready to fight, its limited resources notwithstanding. We can compare it to different small to middling nations at the time, and it generally comes ahead - Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, say, IMO did generally worse in terms of preparing for war well enough and in a timely, efficient fashion. To really increase Finnish readiness in late 1939 you'd need to change things as back as the early 30s, I'd say. We're talking about things like increasing military training per age cohort (and thus mobilization strength) over several years, buying and introducing more weapons and more modern weapons for the army, etc. These are things that can't be done in late 1939 anymore.

The only way I see this as possible with a POD in late 1939 would be a major number of foreign troops (say, at least two to three full divisions of infantry, with the needed artillery support and logistics, etc) on the ground in Finland by January 1940. These could be Swedish troops, or British or French, the point is that this is what the Finnish military would need to stand its ground. Alone, the Finns will fall back and they will get overwhelmed by early April, even if the February attack is more inept than IOTL. The problem is living force, which the Soviets have and which is running out for the Finns. The troops will try to stand their ground, but they are very tired and frequently short on ammunition. There is not enough relief by reserve units, and such units that can be put together in the interior in the short term are generally not up to snuff in front line conditions. The same units, the same men that have fought and died on the Isthmus have been there since late November, and without major foreign input they will crack before the spring thaw hits in full force.

 

[von Adler]

How do you manage to get the Finns to "comprehensively defeat" the February offensive? It is IMO impossible to increase Finnish readiness in late 1939 to such a degree that it will matter. As things stood, Finland was exceptionally ready to fight, its limited resources notwithstanding. We can compare it to different small to middling nations at the time, and it generally comes ahead - Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, say, IMO did generally worse in terms of preparing for war well enough and in a timely, efficient fashion. To really increase Finnish readiness in late 1939 you'd need to change things as back as the early 30s, I'd say. We're talking about things like increasing military training per age cohort (and thus mobilization strength) over several years, buying and introducing more weapons and more modern weapons for the army, etc. These are things that can't be done in late 1939 anymore.

The only way I see this as possible with a POD in late 1939 would be a major number of foreign troops (say, at least two to three full divisions of infantry, with the needed artillery support and logistics, etc) on the ground in Finland by January 1940. These could be Swedish troops, or British or French, the point is that this is what the Finnish military would need to stand its ground. Alone, the Finns will fall back and they will get overwhelmed by early April, even if the February attack is more inept than IOTL. The problem is living force, which the Soviets have and which is running out for the Finns. The troops will try to stand their ground, but they are very tired and frequently short on ammunition. There is not enough relief by reserve units, and such units that can be put together in the interior in the short term are generally not up to snuff in front line conditions. The same units, the same men that have fought and died on the Isthmus have been there since late November, and without major foreign input they will crack before the spring thaw hits in full force.

I'd argue that the only really vital thing Finland lacked in February 1940 was artillery ammunition - pre-war stocks had ran out and Finland did not have the industrial capacity to produce enough shells on its own (it did fine for small arms ammunition though) in 1939-40 and since Finland used mostly ex-Czarist Russian artillery, there were no other countries (except the Soviet Union, but that is not happening for obvious reasons) that could supply Finland with artillery shells.

There were a lot of British (18pdr - 30), Swedish (7,5cm Kan m/02 - 60), French (75mm mle 1897 - 48) and US (75mm M1917 -200) artillery on thier way, along with plenty of shells (Sweden delivered 334 000 shells) compared to the Finnish 189 76 K/02 available - along with plenty of ammunition, but only 12 of the Swedish guns had time to arrive at the front by February.

The Finnish artillery was forbidden to fire at all unless a breakthrough was imminent in February, which allowed the Soviets to roll up 122mm and 152mm howitzers to fire directly against Finnish fortifications, which could take that punishment from above, but not in direct fire and crumbled. The lack of Finnish defensive artillery fire allowed the Soviets all the time they needed to get their shit on order when deploying for an attack and I'd argue that it was instrumental in the success of the February offensive.

If you have a war scare in the mid-30s, perhaps the Finnish plans to replace the aging 76 K/02 with the 105 VH/37 (Swedish Bofors design adopted in Sweden as 10,5 Haub m/40) could have progressed a bit further - perhaps with some of the guns produced in Sweden instead of at VTT as originally planned (VTT needed several years to create the production line, and due to the Winter War and lack of industrial capacity, it was not up and running until 1943 OTL). Say for example that the 122mm howitzer batteries (12 guns in each regiment) in the light artillery regiments of the Finnish divisions have been replaced with 105 VH/37s by late January since Sweden has a production line both for itself and to supply Finland and can deliver extra pieces. Sweden produces the shells and can supply Finland with those.

That might actually be enough for the February offensive to be delayed enough for more aid to arrive - the Hungarian battalion can arrive at the front. Another 6 000 Swedish volunteers can make it over (they were in training when the war ended) and the massive shipments that arrived OTL in late Fabruary and March from USA, France, Hungary, Britain and Sweden can make a difference at the front.

That said if the Soviet-Finnish War continues into Summer 1940, Hitler will be happy as a cat at the creamery since he can deal with France and the Low Countries completely undisturbed. He's not going to invade the Soviets with the world's strongest army (which the French was considered at the time) at his back.

 

[DrakonFin]

I'd argue that the only really vital thing Finland lacked in February 1940 was artillery ammunition - pre-war stocks had ran out and Finland did not have the industrial capacity to produce enough shells on its own (it did fine for small arms ammunition though) in 1939-40 and since Finland used mostly ex-Czarist Russian artillery, there were no other countries (except the Soviet Union, but that is not happening for obvious reasons) that could supply Finland with artillery shells.

There were a lot of British (18pdr - 30), Swedish (7,5cm Kan m/02 - 60), French (75mm mle 1897 - 48) and US (75mm M1917 -200) artillery on thier way, along with plenty of shells (Sweden delivered 334 000 shells) compared to the Finnish 189 76 K/02 available - along with plenty of ammunition, but only 12 of the Swedish guns had time to arrive at the front by February.

The Finnish artillery was forbidden to fire at all unless a breakthrough was imminent in February, which allowed the Soviets to roll up 122mm and 152mm howitzers to fire directly against Finnish fortifications, which could take that punishment from above, but not in direct fire and crumbled. The lack of Finnish defensive artillery fire allowed the Soviets all the time they needed to get their shit on order when deploying for an attack and I'd argue that it was instrumental in the success of the February offensive.

If you have a war scare in the mid-30s, perhaps the Finnish plans to replace the aging 76 K/02 with the 105 VH/37 (Swedish Bofors design adopted in Sweden as 10,5 Haub m/40) could have progressed a bit further - perhaps with some of the guns produced in Sweden instead of at VTT as originally planned (VTT needed several years to create the production line, and due to the Winter War and lack of industrial capacity, it was not up and running until 1943 OTL). Say for example that the 122mm howitzer batteries (12 guns in each regiment) in the light artillery regiments of the Finnish divisions have been replaced with 105 VH/37s by late January since Sweden has a production line both for itself and to supply Finland and can deliver extra pieces. Sweden produces the shells and can supply Finland with those.

That might actually be enough for the February offensive to be delayed enough for more aid to arrive - the Hungarian battalion can arrive at the front. Another 6 000 Swedish volunteers can make it over (they were in training when the war ended) and the massive shipments that arrived OTL in late Fabruary and March from USA, France, Hungary, Britain and Sweden can make a difference at the front.

That said if the Soviet-Finnish War continues into Summer 1940, Hitler will be happy as a cat at the creamery since he can deal with France and the Low Countries completely undisturbed. He's not going to invade the Soviets with the world's strongest army (which the French was considered at the time) at his back.

I agree that we can certainly improve things with artillery in the 30s. One thing to add from the top of my head would be using coastal artillery guns in railway batteries. J.L. Rikama, considered one of the top minds behind Finnish coastal artillery development in the interwar, had a plan of putting existing 6 inch Canet guns (etc) on railway carriages and in the event of a war deploying them to the Isthmus as rail-mobile batteries. He never managed to get it realized. If additional railway tracks are built along the defensive line(s) there, this would bring a decent addition of heavy artillery on the Isthmus with just a limited outlay of resources. We know that IOTL the coastal guns they could use against the Soviet attack were very useful (in some places perhaps crucially so, like Järisevä where the single, already damaged old 120 mm gun stopped and turned back an an entire Soviet battalion, attacking with armored support, on 19 February), and then most guns stood unused in fixed fortifications along the southern coast.

But then like I said above, a main problem is that Finland had no reserves. If the Finnish armaments are improved, the Soviets can just throw more units and men from their reserves, and more of their own artillery and shells, at the Finnish lines that would get comparatively very little new troops to relieve the tired defenders. To this issue there is no other answer but a bigger mobilization strength already before the war, or then an early outside intervention that brings more troops to the Finnish side.

 

[thaddeus]

That might actually be enough for the February offensive to be delayed enough for more aid to arrive - the Hungarian battalion can arrive at the front. Another 6 000 Swedish volunteers can make it over (they were in training when the war ended) and the massive shipments that arrived OTL in late Fabruary and March from USA, France, Hungary, Britain and Sweden can make a difference at the front.

But then like I said above, a main problem is that Finland had no reserves. If the Finnish armaments are improved, the Soviets can just throw more units and men from their reserves, and more of their own artillery and shells, at the Finnish lines that would get comparatively very little new troops to relieve the tired defenders. To this issue there is no other answer but a bigger mobilization strength already before the war, or then an early outside intervention that brings more troops to the Finnish side.

have always thought it would be an interesting timeline for Hungary to ally with their linguistic (distant) cousins in Estonia and Finland, albeit not "announced" to the USSR? (a cat's paw for Germany, with Hungary expecting German support against Romania in the process?)

although my view Germany made a critical mistake dealing away Finland and the Baltics under the M-R Pact, as they along with Poland had replaced the Soviet trade for much of the 1930's. ( it is possible Germany could not include them in the secret protocols and the Soviets still grab for Finnish territories? as happened with N. Bukovina in Romania)

frankly it is hard to see the ending for this turn of events though? meaning that stalls events into 1941? could the Soviets possibly walk away with little or no gains?

 

[Not James Stockdale]

How do you manage to get the Finns to "comprehensively defeat" the February offensive? It is IMO impossible to increase Finnish readiness in late 1939 to such a degree that it will matter. As things stood, Finland was exceptionally ready to fight, its limited resources notwithstanding. We can compare it to different small to middling nations at the time, and it generally comes ahead - Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, say, IMO did generally worse in terms of preparing for war well enough and in a timely, efficient fashion. To really increase Finnish readiness in late 1939 you'd need to change things as back as the early 30s, I'd say. We're talking about things like increasing military training per age cohort (and thus mobilization strength) over several years, buying and introducing more weapons and more modern weapons for the army, etc. These are things that can't be done in late 1939 anymore.

The only way I see this as possible with a POD in late 1939 would be a major number of foreign troops (say, at least two to three full divisions of infantry, with the needed artillery support and logistics, etc) on the ground in Finland by January 1940. These could be Swedish troops, or British or French, the point is that this is what the Finnish military would need to stand its ground. Alone, the Finns will fall back and they will get overwhelmed by early April, even if the February attack is more inept than IOTL. The problem is living force, which the Soviets have and which is running out for the Finns. The troops will try to stand their ground, but they are very tired and frequently short on ammunition. There is not enough relief by reserve units, and such units that can be put together in the interior in the short term are generally not up to snuff in front line conditions. The same units, the same men that have fought and died on the Isthmus have been there since late November, and without major foreign input they will crack before the spring thaw hits in full force.

These are exactly the kind of changes I would expect to be necessary for the Finns to stop the second offensive - or to hold if off until the mud season. The POD would be anything after Finnish independence in 1918.