Nicopolis (Nicopolis Crusade III)
Though the French had given King Sigsimund many reasons to be dissatisfied with the crusade, ranging from matters military and otherwise, the King of Hungary had made one fundamental misassumption. Enguerrand de Coucy had been correct when he judged that Ottomans would not invade Hungary when they did not show. For Sultan Bayezid had no real intention of invading Hungary at all. But where had he been?
Like all Sultans of the Ottoman Empire Yildirim Bayezid styled himself as a pious holy warrior in the manner of his predecessors, fighting annual campaigns of jihad against infidels to expand the empire. But Bayezid also held a very unreligious fondness for the court luxuries available to him: food, drink, and women. Indulgences that while not necessarily pious, made the Sultan a symbol of conspicuous consumption and popular with his
siaphis and the common soldiers. The Sultan was also known to be notoriously arbitrary and impulsive.
A tale tells that at the Serres Conference the Sultan gathered his Christian vassals to discuss matters of state. On the final night of the gathering the Sultan gave instructions to his janissary guards that the Christian vassals were to be arrested before daybreak and executed first thing in the morning so that their lands could be seized. Yet waking up unusually early the next day, Bayezid decided to rescind the orders before they could be carried out, later eating breakfast normally with his vassals and toasting to their health as they went home. Such behavior undoubtedly played a part in the decision of former vassals like Tsar Ivan Sratsimir and Emperor Manuel Palaiologos to renounce their oaths and escape Ottoman custody at the first opportunity.
While much had been made of the Sultan’s boast to take Buda by spring, which he did state, the Christians were not aware the boast had been made after several rounds of heavy drinking during the victory feast celebrations following the conquest of Bulgaria and Wallachia last year, to the inebriated cheers of his soldiers. This declaration was promptly forgotten by the Sultan the next day, who having taken heavy casualties in placing his vassal in Wallachia, chose to next redouble his efforts in besieging Constantinople. But the Christian world had not forgotten about him.
For eight months of the year Bayezid had been at Constantinople overseeing the long siege of the city. The Byzantine Emperor Manuel II had been a vassal of the Ottomans until recently and Bayezid sought to punish the Emperor for deserting the Ottoman cause. It was there that the Sultan received news of the crusader attack on Nicopolis and the full scale invasion into his Empire. Ironically much like the crusaders at Nicopolis, the Ottomans lacked the siegecraft to breach the legendary Theodosian Walls even after three years of siege and had to content themselves with blockading supplies to the city. Though this had the effect of increasing food prices within Constantinople for the commons, the limited navy of the Ottomans were unable to cut off European ships from entering the Black Sea to supply Constantinople. With the arrival of the crusade, Emperor Manuel even felt secure enough to provide a squadron of galleys to join the Venetian and Hospitaller ships heading to the Danube.
With little progress in the siege, Bayezid eagerly leapt upon the chance to fight a battle instead, for the Sultan would always prefer action over inaction. Summoning his levies, the Sultan force-marched his army north into Bulgaria. Prince Stefan Lazarevic, having not participated in the Siege of Constantinople, was ordered to gather the knights of Serbia and meet with the Ottoman army en route. It was from Bayezid’s hasty warlike nature and his signature use of forced marches such as this one that had earned him the nickname of Yildirim, 'Thunderbolt'. Such was the lightning speed of Bayezid’s advance that by the time the crusader camp became aware of his approach, they were only able to meet once to discuss strategy before he was already there.
The lack of crusader preparedness however was the consequence of more than just Bayezid’s legendary speed. The crusaders had been encamped around Nicopolis for over two weeks, yet in that time had neglected to post sentries or to fortify their camps. Attempts to discuss a plan for when the Ottoman relief army approached were stymied by the efforts of Jean Boucicaut and Philip of Artois, the Count of Eu, who continuously denied that Sigsimund’s scouts had seen Turks to the south, because the Turks were not there. It was only when the veteran Coucy returned to the French camp carrying the head of an Ottoman akinji cavalryman was Sigsimund able to summon a joint war council between the elements of the crusade.
Sigsimund knew to not overrate his own abilities as a tactician. As a king he prided himself on gathering men of talent to serve him and here the Fox put his faith in the strategies of Mircea of Wallachia. No man in Europe had more experience fighting the Ottomans than the exiled Voivode. Even more pertinently, no man had as much experience in
winning battles against the Ottomans, for Mircea had defeated Bayezid at the Battle of Karanovasa and fought to a draw at the Battle of Rovine. Both battles had been exceptionally bloody affairs better known by their nicknames. The former was called the Battle of the Trenches as the Wallachians and Ottomans repeatedly fought over the trenches and palisades guarding the Ottoman camp. The latter known as the Battle of the Marshes, named for the bloody fields of mud the combatants had fought in over the course of a week before Mircea ordered a tactical withdrawal of the Wallachian army. Both battles had been costly in lives for both sides, but had given Mircea a unique understanding of Ottoman tactics and Bayezid’s mindset.
At Nicopolis Mircea proposed that the crusader army be drawn up into three lines to meet the Ottoman attack. Revealing that the Ottomans always deployed their worst troops first, the Wallachian Voivode volunteered that his own Wallachians would make up the first line. The Wallachians had the most experience fighting the Ottomans, and being an army of mainly archers and light infantry were the most well suited to dealing with the Ottoman conscripts. It was also known that Muslim armies employed many archers in their ranks. It must be said, the Ottomans only had so many arrows available and the Wallachian infantry were simply more expendable than their allied cavalry. Such was the cold calculus of war that Mircea was willing to sacrifice his own troops in the first rank as arrow fodder for victory if it would liberate his homeland. At least his archers were able to fire back with their own bows, which would be just as effective against the lightly armored Ottoman line.
The second line Mircea reasoned would be made up by the Hungarians and Transylvanians. Having more infantry contingents than the French, they would be able to relieve the Wallachians once the Ottomans committed their actual army into the battle and fight them on even terms. Finally with the Ottomans softened up, the heaviest component of the crusader army, the French cavalry would form the third line and strike the decisive blow to the battle. Having gained much experience in dealing with French sensibilities the last few months, Sigismund was careful to portray the strategy as allowing the French knights to fight only the worthy opponents, while the Wallachians and Hungarians would separate the the grain from the chaff for them.
Mircea’s battleplan was logical and sound, based on logic and reasoning from his prior encounters with Bayezid. That was also the reason the French refused to accept it, flat out rejecting the plan in the most absolute of terms. Jean of Nevers, Philip of Artois, and the French knights were outraged at the prospect of forming the rear line and following peasants into battle. D’Eu going as far as to say he would rather duel any man who presumed to ride in front of him. The Count of Eu was a renowned tourney knight, at least back in France, but it is likely many of the Hungarian nobles in attendance were sorely tempted to take him up on that offer. While it was true that Mircea’s army was made primarily of the peasant class, Wallachia being a poorer land, the Hungarian crusader contingent had included many of Hungary’s most notable magnates and knights. Many had grown increasingly tired of the unequal treatment they and their king received from their crusader ‘guests’. Sigsimund took the step of abjuring the council before a clash could occur within the war tent.
The end result was that no strategy had been formulated by the time Bayezid’s army had arrived the next morning. Fortunately for the crusaders, the Ottoman Sultan chose to fight a defensive battle, deploying his army upon a hill and politely waiting for the crusading army to draw themselves up into battle formation while he prayed. The outburst of Nevers and D’Eu at the prior war council had guaranteed the French formed the vanguard of the crusader army, while behind them was the rest of the crusader army formed up around the Hungarian contingent. Almost as a last minute decision, the crusaders killed their Turkish prisoners to prevent them from being liberated by a sortie from Nicopolis and threatening the army's rear. Such was the rush to prepare for battle that the men-at-arms neglected to bury the prisoners in the aftermath of the massacre.
On the other side, Bayezid had positioned his army atop a densely wooded hill, the trees to either side ensuring his position would not be easily outflanked. Deploying in traditional Ottoman battle formation, the first line of the Ottoman army was formed by a mass of
akinji light cavalry on the slope of the hill to screen the army. Directly behind the
akinji were the
azabs, poorly armed conscripts.
As predicted by Mircea and Sigsimund both the
azabs and
akinji were irregular components of the Ottoman army, untrained and not expected to last long in pitch battle. One on foot and the other on horseback, both were unpaid classes of soldiers and were considered mere raiders by the regular army. Yet despite their sorry lot in life, they were intensely motivated by the Ottoman doctrine of holy war, and the opportunity for pillage provided to them outside of battle or the opportunity for martyrdom within in. The commander of the division was Evrenos Bey, who’s soldiers called him
Baba and believed that their commander was over a hundred years old. Regardless of the truth, it was clear Evrenos was a popular and long serving gazi with a lifetime of experience available to him.
Behind the conscripts lay Bayezid’s actual army, the janissaries and
sipahi cavalrymen under the command of his sons. As was their custom the
sipahi of Rumelia held the position of honor on the right flank, due to the battle taking place in Europe, while the Anatolian sipahi were positioned on the left flank. Finally on the reverse slope of the hill Bayezid personally commanded his reserves. This included the personal household troops of the Ottoman Sultan, but also the Serbian cavalry under the reluctant command of Stefan Lazarevic. Satisfied with his deployment, now all Bayezid had to do was wait.
Overall the armies were evenly matched in number, with around 24,000 troops on the crusader side and 25,000 for the Ottomans.
The Ottomans would later claim Bayezid deliberately kept his reserves on the other side of the hill to mislead the crusaders on his true numbers and provoke an attack. The truth is there was simply no more room on the hill to place horses and men. The cunning Evrenos did however order the
azab infantry to crouch and lay near the ground, so that from the front they would be concealed behind the horses of the
akinji,
The preliminary shots of the Battle of Nicopolis opened when Evrenos’ horses archers began harassing the French lines, and the crossbows of the French returning fire. Though the light arrows of the akinji firing from horseback did little damage to the heavily armored French men-at-arms, it did succeed in annoying them. As Sigismund notified Jean of Nevers that his forces were delayed in forming up behind them, Nevers consulted with his senior advisors to determine their course.
Enguerrand de Coucy and Jean de Vienne naturally supported waiting for the Hungarians and Germans to be ready before advancing. That much seemed obvious to the two elder knights, as it seemed foolhardy to move to attack the enemy with less than half of the crusader army. The younger knights led by Philip of Artois and Jean Boucicaut however proposed an immediate charge against the Ottoman positions. In the mind of D’Eu, Sigismund’s actions over the last month had been warped into a conspiracy by the King of Hungary to rob the French of their glory. By seeking to place the French knights in the rearline, D’Eu reasoned that Sigismund had planned to monopolize glory in the upcoming battle by fighting the Ottomans without the French. By the calculations of D'Eu therefore the Ottomans were only as strong as a portion of the crusader army, and the strength of French chivalry would be able to do the same and defeat the Ottomans without the assistance of the Hungarians.
Disagreement once again nearly resulted in a clash of arms. This time internally between the French as Coucy called D’Eu presumptuous for his words and D’Eu declared the older knights cowards for their caution. It is possible that a personal element had become involved between the two knights. As Constable, D’Eu was the highest ranking soldier in the Kingdom of France. Coucy however held a higher reputation in the eyes of many and had twice declined promotion to the same rank of Constable D'Eu now held. Jealousy may have resulted in D’Eu to oppose Coucy so that he could obtain the chivalric glory to surpass him. Regardless, D’Eu’s speech won over Nevers, who was closer in age and temperament with him, and reluctantly Coucy and Vienne resigned themselves that if the younger knights charged they would have to go with them or watch Nevers and D’Eu be slaughtered alone. With Nevers and D'Eu at the tip of the formation, and Vienne carrying the French standard, the French contingent began their march.
The advance of the French swiftly dispersed the Ottoman skirmishers, and as they reached the Ottoman lines transitioned into a charge up hill at the
akinji. Evrenos Bey had his men hold position as long as possible to rain arrows at the approaching cavalry, but astonished by how armored the western European knights were ordered his raiders to pull back to the flanks of the battlefield.
The charge of the French therefore did not connect with the Ottoman light horse, but into the line of sharpened stakes hidden directly behind them. It was clear now that the morning wait to allow the crusader to prepare had not been solely out of gentlemanly conduct by the Ottomans. While the crusaders had struggled to draw up a battle formation, Bayezid had taken the morning to allow his
azabs to entrench themselves with a line of wooden stakes facing outward. Horses were impaled and their riders thrown to the ground or speared in the leg along with them. This resulted in further obstacles as the knights coming behind them had to maneuver to avoid trampling over their fellows in addition to the stakes, while also preventing the knights even further back from then riding into
them.
As the French charge came to a halt and turned into chaos, the Ottoman
azabs rose up and swarmed over them, shouting their warcries. The
azabs were unarmored and poorly trained, if trained at all, and died in droves against armored knights skilled in the use of real weapons. But with suicidal disregard for their mortal lives the conscripts surged forward over disoriented and dismounted crusaders, attempting to harm them by any means they could, even if they had to tear them limb from limb. And with the mass of bodies the
azabs had blunted the French charge, preventing them from advancing forward or safely navigating the deadly wall of spikes. In this they fulfilled their role, keeping the Sultan’s enemies in position as arrows came flying in overhead, fired by the archers and janissaries positioned further up the hill.
Yet surprisingly for many of the French knights this situation was considered nearly ideal. The stakes had been an unpleasant surprise, but death was always a risk of battle. Nevers and D’Eu had both somehow survived despite being the very tip of the French charge. As far as they were concerned, the Ottoman infantry had proven to be just as feeble as they expected, and provided plenty of opportunity to slaughter them for chivalric glory. Fully armored and trained in arms their whole lives, once they found their bearings the knights were near unstoppable juggernauts compared to the conscripted Turkish herdsmen and farmers. Dismounting his horse, Coucy fought back a section of the Ottoman line and organized a party to tear the anti-cavalry stakes from the ground. Opening up a gap wide enough that a line of twenty horses could fit through, the French charged once again. This time the courage of the Ottoman infantry broke and they routed to the victorious cheers of the French.
Coucy then attempted to rally the French to reorganize and secure their gains, regrouping to allow the Hungarians to catch up. But D’Eu, having acquired a new horse, rode after the fleeing Ottomans, believing that the entire Ottoman force to have been defeated. Following the Constable, the rest of the French army began a second charge up the hill. But at the crest they were met by the Ottoman
Siaphi. Professional fiefholders who's only profession was as cavalrymen, the eastern counterpart to the feudal knights. Bayezid’s actual soldiers, as Sigsimund had warned. Though more lightly equipped than their knightly counterparts, the Ottoman cavalry began pressing the exhausted French hard on the flanks. To make matters worse Evrenos Bey’s raiders had returned behind them to cut off the French retreat. The encirclement completed, Sultan Bayezid joined the fray with his personal household cavalry divisions.
By the time Sigsimund arrived with the rest of the crusader army he was cursing the French in all seven languages he knew. [1] The French crusaders had neglected to inform their erstwhile allies of their movements but the stream of riderless horses and fleeing men the Hungarians had seen as they marched provided some clue as to the fate of the French. These hints turned to confirmation as they came closer and Bayezid released his
siaphis to confront the German-Hungarian army.
Grimly, Sigsimund gave the order for his army to advance. Though thoroughly displeased with the way the battle had turned, the King of Hungary calculated he still had reason to believe the Christians could carry the day. The charge of the French had resulted in the loss of over a third of the Crusader army, but they had also inflicted enormous casualties upon the Ottoman infantry. Unintentionally, Nevers and D’Eu had played the role of arrow fodder softening up the Ottomans as called for in Mircea’s original battle plan. From his position Sigsimund could see the battle standard of the French held upon the hill by Jean de Vienne. Therefore at least a portion of the French were still fighting and tying down large parts of the Ottoman army on that hill. If SIgsimund could just see off the enemy in front of him, the German-Hungarians could breakthrough and join with the French, and he could enjoy seeing Neves and D’Eu beg his forgiveness. God willing.
With shouts of St. Ladislaus and St. George, Sigsimund’s center engaged the enemy. This time it was the Ottoman cavalry who had become exhausted from hours of fighting, and the Hungarians that were relatively fresh. Fighting fiercely the melee once again seemed in favor of the crusaders. But the two divisions on the flanks lagged behind as Sigsimund advanced, and eventually began withdrawing from the battle entirely without fighting. Sigsimund had been betrayed.
Mircea of Wallachia was the last person who would have cut a deal with the Ottomans. The exiled ruler of Wallachia held the Serbians, Bulgarians, and Greeks in disdain for their forced subservience to the Sultan. Yet his motive for retreating was ultimately the same as their motives for surrendering. With the French having rejected his advice, Mircea saw the battle as hopeless and considered it a higher priority to conserve his forces so that he could liberate Wallachia himself. Sigismund after all had only ever been an ally of convenience, and the French even less than that for the Vovoide. He perhaps might have felt some sympathy for Sigsimund for having to deal with the stubbornness of the French, but the king had in truth not treated Mircea much differently. Hungary had long standing claims over the Danube principalities and Sigsimund had refused to deal with Mircea unless he had subordinated himself as a vassal. Ironically like Lazarevic, Mircea had seen little reason to trade one master for another.
Meanwhile for Stephen Lackfi, Sigsimund had not even been that. The Croatian nobleman had nominally made his peace with Sigsimund previously, but the rest of his family retained their loyalty to Ladislaus of Durazzo, King of Naples. Now having concluded like Mircea that the battle was lost, Stephen Lackfi returned to his old loyalties by ordering the Transylvanians and Szekelys under his command to withdraw from the battle. If Sigsimund and his supporters died at Nicopolis, all the easier for the king across the Adriatic to claim the crown of St. Andrew after all. As Lackfi directed his troops to march home he reflected that Ladislaus had fled Hungary years ago, but his Italian supporters called him the Magnanimous. The Lackfi family had stayed loyal all these years and with Sigsimund's death he would singlehandedly revive his faltering cause and was sure to be rewarded. He may even have to thank Bayezid after the battle.
Witnessing the abandonment of both his flanks, Sigsimund could do nothing in the moment but press forward even harder. Lackfi would have to wait. Fighting with a renewed fury and desperation, the remaining collection of Hungarians, Germans, and Hospitaller knights succeeded in gaining ground against the Turks. With the flanks compromised the leaders of the crusade army knew that if they stopped they would die. From his vantage point on the hill the Ottoman sultan could see his troops wavering. The tired Ottomans would not hold out for much longer. Signalling his flagman, Bayezid sent in his final reserve: the Serbs.
Emerging from the woods Stefan Lazarevic’s cavalry charged directly into the gap left open by Lackfi’s withdrawal. Where the knights of France had been clad in a dazzling assortment of coats and colors the knights of Serbia all wore uniformly darkened armor, called blue iron by their Turkish allies. Unlike the Turkish cavalrymen, the Serbian knights were equipped in equal armor to the western knights and able to fight them on an equal footing. Within minutes these black knights had put the Hungarian advance to a deadstop, and then a full rout. Witnessing the courage and skill of their infidel allies, the Ottoman cavalry turned and renewed their attacks once more, the end of the grueling battle in sight. Seeing his Count Palatine unhorsed and chaos in all directions, Sigsimund knew that there was no hope of rallying now. The King of Hungary could only do what the rest of the crusader remnants were doing: Flee towards the Danube river in hope of finding a boat to escape the battle, under pursuit by Serbs and Siaphis all the way.
The Crusade of Nicopolis had ended in a complete defeat for the crusading host. A dissapointing and painful closing to a vibrant century of crusades. The Balkans would have to wait many more decades to be freed from Ottoman rule. But Sigsimund would remember this day for the rest of his life. As his small fishing boat rowed across the Danube the king was heard repeatedly declaring to his companions: “We lost the day by the pride and vanity of these French” [2]
[1] Czech, German, Hungarian, French, Latin, Italian, Polish
[2] Actual quote by Sigsimund to the Grandmaster of the Hospitallers, who was French.
