The Treaty of Poggio Imperiale
The White Hall of the Villa del Poggio Imperiale
The eventual resolution of the “Bonifacio Question” would not come not from the bickering envoys at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, but from the court of Florence. Months before the signing of the armistice, Foreign Minister Charles Gravier, Comte de Vergennes had approached Grand Duke Karl of Tuscany about some sort of territorial swap and had gotten nowhere, but the Grand Duke had since devised a proposal which he believed would benefit all parties - and, of course, win him acclaim as a great statesman and peacemaker.
The central piece of the Grand Duke’s scheme was the so-called “
Podesteria of Calice,” a territory of about 16 square miles situated ten miles north of La Spezia comprising the villages of Calice, Madrignano, and Veppo. This territory was an imperial fief which had fallen under Genoese influence and was granted to the distinguished patrician family of Doria in the 16th century. In 1710, however, the emperor confiscated the fief from Giovanni Andrea Doria del Carretto as punishment for siding against him in the War of the Spanish Succession. Over Genoa’s objections, the emperor awarded Calice to the Marquis of Mulazzo, who belonged to one of the branches of the Malaspina family which ruled various tiny autonomous lordships throughout the Lunigiana. In 1772 the marquis then sold the fief to the Grand Duke of Tuscany to settle his considerable debts.
The
Podesteria did not compare very favorably to Bonifacio. Bonifacio had some 5,000 inhabitants, while Calice and its associated villages only had around 2,000. These villages were of no particular strategic value and produced nothing of interest aside from the usual agricultural products of a rural mountain community. All that could really be said for it was that the
podesteria was adjacent to Genoese territory, and would thus presumably be more securely held by Genoa than Bonifacio, which the Republic had shown it was incapable of defending. The territory had been Genoese in the past, and since the Grand Duke had only held it for ten years he would not be too chagrined to see it go.
The Podesteria of Calice
The Grand Duke, however, was not making this offer out of the goodness of his heart. What he wanted in return was a territory he believed was owed to him - part of the
Stato dei Presidi, a Neapolitan exclave surrounded on land by Tuscany. Spain had acquired this territory from the partition of the Republic of Siena in 1559 and had heavily fortified it. The
Stato dei Presidi had been an important strategic post during the Spanish golden age, guarding the sea route from Naples to Genoa and the “Spanish Road” beyond, but it lost much of its strategic relevance after the division of the Habsburg inheritance and the revival of the independent Neapolitan kingdom. When King Carlos III of Spain abdicated from Naples in favor of his son Fernando in 1759, he had pledged in the Treaty of Naples to transfer “half of the estate in the territory of the lower Sienese which is called the
Presidios Toscanos” to the Habsburgs in exchange for Austria renouncing its claims to Parma. For various reasons, however, this clause had never actually come into effect, and the whole territory remained in Neapolitan hands.
[A] The Grand Duke suggested to Vergennes that if Fernando was willing to fulfill the terms of the 1759 treaty, he would consider that to be fair compensation for the loss of Calice.
Vergennes remarked ruefully that a peace between Corsica and Genoa now seemed to have everyone in Italy as an interested party, but decided that the proposal was at least worth looking into. King Fernando had already concluded that the
Stato in its present state was little more than a burden on the royal treasury and had drastically cut the garrison force.
[1] It also helped that Tuscan-Neapolitan relations were quite close; Fernando was Karl’s brother-in-law, and the two princes had been discussing a further marriage between their children (although the children in question would not be of age for some years). There was clearly room to maneuver here. For the convenience of the various parties, however - and at the request of the Grand Duke, who wanted the prestige of hosting the talks himself - Vergennes agreed to close the talks at Saint-Germain-en-Laye and open a new conference at the Villa del Poggio Imperiale, a splendid property of the Grand Duke just south of Florence. Corsica would now be represented by the foreign minister himself, Giovan Francesco Cuneo d’Ornano.
The Stato dei Presidi. The town of Porto Longone on the island of Elba, which was also part of the Stato, is not shown.
The Genoese were appalled when they caught wind of the “Calice Plan.” Trading the “Gibraltar of Corsica,” a free and loyal city with a splendid harbor, for some undistinguished mountain villages with less than half of Bonifacio’s population was not merely unfair, but insulting. Yet the Genoese government dared not quit the talks, for France was all that stood between them and a potential Sardinian invasion. The Genoese had sent another mission to Vienna to see if they could obtain parallel guarantees from the emperor that might given them more room to maneuver, but Emperor Joseph was uninterested. He needed French support - or at least acquiescence - for his own political projects in the empire, and was not going to undermine them for Genoa’s sake. The imperial chancery repeated Austria’s commitment to Genoa’s territorial integrity as per the Treaty of Worms, which was certainly a tacit warning to the Sardinians, but Austria would not be sending any more troops to Italy or giving specific guarantees to the Republic.
In fact the Sardinian threat was wildly overblown. Turin had indeed been preparing a move on Genoese territory, although their limited military preparations suggest that they were envisioning some “adjustments” to the border to expand their foothold in the Ligurian Apennines rather than a full-blown invasion. As soon as the French had stepped in, however, the Sardinians backed off. The Savoyard monarchy had been cultivating closer ties with France ever since the 1750s in preparation for some future date when the Franco-Austrian alliance collapsed and Sardinia would be able to count on France’s backing to expand into the Milanese. The king’s ministers had hoped that France’s hesitation to intervene in the “Coral War” meant that France would not interfere, but if that was not the case, a few Ligurian mountain villages were not worth alienating the French and sabotaging Turin’s diplomatic strategy of the past thirty years. The Sardinian minister in Paris retroactively justified his government’s actions as an “intervention” to bring the war to a close, noting the threat posed to commerce, and assured Vergennes that his sovereign had no designs on Genoese territory (save for the
Isole delle Bocche). This satisfied Vergennes, but he continued to use the implicit threat of leaving Genoa to the Sardinian wolves as a means to pressure the Genoese into remaining at the table.
Genoese hopes that they might be able to avoid the loss of Bonifacio or at least negotiate a better deal were soon dashed. Vergennes had already made up his mind that Bonifacio would be ceded, and the Grand Duke had made up
his mind that the fief of Calice was the most he was willing to give up - and since he was not himself a belligerent, there was no way for anyone, even Vergennes, to pressure him into changing his mind. The only questions up for debate at Poggio Imperiale concerned ancillary matters like fishing rights and diplomatic status, and even here it was clear that the “conference” was really about the French crafting an instrument that was satisfactory
to them. Giuseppe Maria Doria, Genoa’s lead representative at Poggio Imperiale, reported to the Serene College that he actually had very little to do; it was clear to him that the French were writing treaty articles behind closed doors and the role he was expected to play was to “sign what is placed in front of me.”
Despite France’s sympathies lying mainly with Genoa, Corsica was slightly more active in influencing the terms of the peace. This had less to do with Cuneo d’Ornano’s skill as a diplomat than the pro-Corsican (or at least pro-
Theo) partiality of the Grand Duke, whose willingness to accept a territory swap was the whole foundation of the nascent treaty. Although Vergennes believed that the Grand Duke was unlikely to back out now because of his own ego and desire for prestige, France could not simply ignore him as they were ignoring the Corsicans and Genoese. Cuneo d’Ornano quickly discovered that he got much further when taking his grievances to the Grand Duke than to the French representatives. This did not mean that Corsica got everything it wanted, but it did mean that Cuneo d’Ornano was not relegated to the role of a completely passive participant as Doria seemed to be, and had some ability to contest undesirable terms if he could convince the Grand Duke that they were too prejudicial to Corsican honor.
It was not until late August that the French presented their final draft. Technically there were
two treaties of Poggio Imperiale, one between Corsica and Tuscany and the other between Corsica and Genoa, although they are almost always referred to collectively as “the Treaty of Poggio Imperiale.” The Corso-Tuscan treaty was brief, and concerned the “sale” of the fief of Calice and the island of Gorgona to the Corsican crown in exchange for 20,000 scudi [about 103,000 livres).
[2] Corsica’s possession of Calice was ephemeral, as it was to be exchanged for Bonifacio in the Corso-Genoese treaty which was signed immediately after. Aside from the usual clauses promising “perpetual peace” and the repatriation of prisoners, as well as the recapitulation of various articles from the Treaty of Monaco, the major provisions of this treaty were as follows:
[3]
- The Republic of Genoa shall cede Bonifacio and its district, including all the Isles of the Straits, to the Kingdom of Corsica.
- The Kingdom of Corsica shall cede the fiefs of Calice, Madrignano, and Veppo to the Republic of Genoa.
- The Kingdom of Corsica and the Republic of Genoa shall not permit their subjects to harvest fish or coral within three miles of each others’ coasts.
- The Kingdom of Corsica shall repeal the provision in its constitution which excludes citizens of the Republic of Genoa from residing within its territory.
- The inhabitants of Bonifacio shall be entitled to become subjects of the Corsican crown and enjoy all the rights thereof, or to maintain their Genoese citizenship, in which case they shall be free to travel to Genoa with all their chattels.
- The Kingdom of Corsica and the Republic of Genoa shall exchange diplomatic representatives within 30 days of the signing of this instrument and will perpetually maintain said representation unless these two states should find themselves at war.
The most glaring omission was the absence of Sardinia, which was not invited to the negotiations at Poggio Imperiale on the basis that they were neither a belligerent nor a facilitator. Vergennes believed that their presence would only complicate matters. The treaty did not recognize their annexation of Maddalena, instead ceding all the disputed islands to Corsica. Vergennes knew that Corsica and Sardinia had probably come to some arrangement over the islands, and if Theo wished to cede them after the fact, that was his business; but Vergennes did not want France to be seen as legitimating Sardinian aggression or abrogating the terms of Aix-la-Chapelle.
On the matter of maritime rights, notionally the entire cause of the war, the Corsicans achieved their original aims. The belligerents would observe the maritime exclusion zone which Corsica had demanded. Corsica, however, did not receive coral fishing rights to the Galitoni which had been part of their maximalist demands. France insisted that this was a matter between Genoa and the Regency of Tunis and not germane to the present negotiations, but it was also another way to mollify the Genoese and convince them that the treaty was not just an instrument of their spoliation.
The final provisions were diplomatic in nature, for Vergennes believed that the lack of diplomatic relations between Corsica and Genoa had been a major contributor to the outbreak of war. In his view, the refusal of each state to send each other diplomats, coupled with Corsica’s blanket ban on Genoese citizens residing in its territory, ensured that relations between the states would remain permanently hostile and prevented disputes between them from being resolved amicably. If the Corsicans and Genoese were to live together peaceably, they needed to be able to talk with one another.
[4]
One major dispute which did not make it into the treaty was the matter of the “Genoese crown.” In 1637 the Genoese had revived the defunct Corsican royal title and crowned all subsequent doges as
doge e re di Corsica (“
Doge and King of Corsica”) in an attempt to claim equal dignity with the other European monarchies. Genoa had been forced to abandon this title by the Treaty of Monaco (the last coronation of a doge as
re di Corsica was thus in 1748), but had not relinquished the royal dignity, continuing to crown its leaders as “
doge e re.” For the Corsicans, this was not merely a matter of diplomatic precedence but a major obstacle to peace. Cuneo d’Ornano argued that because the doge’s royal dignity came
solely from the Republic’s former rule over Corsica, the coronation of the doge as “king” (whether Corsica was mentioned or not) implied a continued claim over the island and was itself “a biennial incitement to war.” Cuneo d’Ornano declared that as long as this continued, the Republic’s commitment to any treaty of peace could not be taken seriously, and Corsica would not accept any Genoese diplomats who purported to represent a “king” in Genoa. But the French would not write such a blatant humiliation of Genoa into the treaty and called Cuneo d'Ornano's bluff; his government
would accept Genoese ambassadors, and would do it gladly, at least if they wanted a treaty confirming their acquisition of Bonifacio.
On September 8th of 1782, Giovan Francesco Cuneo d’Ornano signed the Treaty of Poggio Imperiale on behalf of his sovereign in the
Sala Bianca of the palace. Giuseppe Maria Doria signed on behalf of the Republic, and thereby abolished the last remnant of the Genoese thalassocracy which had once stretched from Liguria to the Crimea.
Corsica’s war had been costly, and victory brought new problems with it. Cuneo d’Ornano had been unable to secure any indemnity in the treaty and the government faced a formidable debt, while the territory it had won came with a population who almost uniformly despised their new rulers. There were diplomatic costs as well, particularly to Corsica’s relationship with France, which had been growing warmer in the 1770s but would steadily deteriorate in the years to follow. Yet the war also gave the kingdom and its young king a certain credibility on the European stage. More than a century had passed since one Italian state had attacked another outside the context of a great power war,
[5] and although Corsica’s victory had not been flawless, they had gotten away with it. The Coral War won Theo and his state some measure of respect from foreign diplomats who were forced to conclude that Corsica, as small and weak as it was, might indeed possess an independent foreign policy.
The consequences of the war for Genoa were quite different. The Republic’s material losses were rather minimal. Between the acquisition of Calice and the subsequent influx of emigres from Bonifacio the Republic lost no significant population, while the debt the government had incurred was manageable. Certainly the Genoese ended the war in a better financial situation than the Corsicans. Yet the “Coral War” effectively ended any remaining pretensions the Republic had to playing a significant role in international affairs, even on the Italian regional stage. Lomellino and his
grande armamento seemed like the last spark of heroism and energy from a demoralized, exhausted state whose elites had resigned themselves to existing on the sufferance of the great powers.
Diplomatic protocol reflected the new reality. Although Cuneo d’Ornano had failed to settle the matter of diplomatic rank in the treaty, the notion that Corsica properly belonged in the
ordo regum (albeit at the bottom of the list) while Genoa belonged among the other petty Italian princes in the
ordo ducum was gradually accepted by most courts. (That had
always been the case in Vienna, as the Empire's statutes forbade any imperial subject from enjoying a dignity greater than the electors - but a foreign king
outside the Empire certainly could.) Even the French, despite having declined to formalize Genoa's abasement, eventually followed the current and gave the Corsicans the precedence over Genoa at Versailles they had long craved. The coat of arms of the
Superba which adorned buildings throughout Genoa and its domain still bore a crown, but the government seems to have decided that explicitly asserting this “dignity” was no longer even worth the trouble. The new
doge elected in 1783 was pointedly
not acclaimed as
doge e re. Quietly, without any fanfare, the city which bore the motto of
respublica superiorem non recognoscens (“republic recognizing no superior”) had accepted its demotion.
North-central Italy c. 1785, after the Treaty of Poggio Imperiale and the cessions of Orbetello and the Isole Intermedie (click to expand)
Footnotes
[1] The removal of most of the Neapolitan garrison had the side effect of completely gutting the local economy. After 200 years as citizens of a fortress-state in which the garrison outnumbered the civilian population, the locals had come to derive much of their livelihood from selling goods and services to the soldiers. The withdrawal of most of the soldiers also meant the withdrawal of their wages from the local economy, which rapidly plunged the state into destitution.
[2] Gorgona was a small, uninhabited island about 25 miles north of Capraia. It was added to the terms of the Corso-Tuscan treaty quite late, and may have been slipped in to give the impression that Corsica was actually buying
something with the money they were paying to the Grand Duke. Cuneo d’Ornano sardonically referred to the island as the “dearest square mile ever purchased.” Theo had expressed an interest in buying the island in previous years, as it was located in a major anchovy fishery and the king hoped its acquisition would aid the declining fishing industry of Capraia - a concern which was even more acute after the Genoese siege left most of Capraia in ruins and its population facing an uncertain future.
[3] The
Stato dei Presidi was not mentioned in the treaty terms, as France and Tuscany had agreed to settle that matter in a separate convention with Naples. The ceded territory was to include all of the continental territory of the
stato aside from the Monte Argentario promontory itself. The ceded territory included more than half of the district’s population, but Naples retained the part with the most military value. Part of the reason that the Corsicans had been forced to
buy Calice was to compensate the Grand Duke, who would not actually gain full control over the territory until 1784.
[4] To avoid the problem of who would send a diplomat first, the French arranged for the parties to dispatch their diplomats on the same day.
[5] The last purely “intra-Italian” war which comes to mind is the Second Genoese-Savoyard War of 1672-73, in which the Savoyard army made a brief and rather ineffective incursion into Liguria which ended in a return to the
status quo ante bellum. Even in this case, however, the Genoese received significant support from Spain.
Timeline Notes
[A] This was indeed part of the Treaty of Naples of 1759 IOTL, but it does not appear that any part of the
stato dei presidi ever fell into Habsburg hands until the Napoleonic era. I have been unable to discover why this clause of the treaty was never actually implemented, but my guess is that it was one of the various Habsburg-Bourbon territorial schemes in the Seven Years’ War (like installing Duke Felipe in the Austrian Netherlands) which was abandoned because of the reverses suffered by Austria and France in that war. Most likely, the agreement was simply overtaken by events.
