It's based on the quality of your fleet. A rate is a description of a ships firepower and size.
King Theodore's Corsica
- Thread starter Carp
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Flying Squadron
Flying Squadron
The 14-gun Genoese Xebec Veloce
The 14-gun Genoese Xebec Veloce
To this point in the siege the town of Capraia itself had largely escaped damage, but after the garrison’s sortie on the night of February 4th, Colonel Augustin Grenier turned his attention to the settlement west of Fort Federico. Genoese soldiers seized control of the Church of San Nicola, just 250 yards from Fort Federico, to use as a strong point. The Corsicans attempted to drive them out, but were repulsed. Soldiers tore down houses to build fortifications and both sides bombarded the town with artillery, collapsing buildings and starting fires. By February 7th, most of the town was in ruins.
Colonel Grenier was not merely punishing the locals for their resistance - he had a plan. Grenier was betting that his incursion into the town and the construction of batteries and ramparts so close to the fort had pulled the garrison’s attention in that direction. In the pre-dawn light of the 8th, a picked force led by his own Swiss grenadiers attempted to scale the southern face of the fort. The attackers succeeded in closing into musket-range before there was any response from the garrison, but the attack faltered at the base of the wall as the Genoese struggled to get their ladders into position while the defenders hurled grenades and large rocks down from the parapet.[1] Now that the defenders were alerted, the Genoese officers realized that they were too numerous and well-armed to be overcome with an escalade, and they sounded the retreat.
This was another unwelcome setback on the heels of the night sortie a few days earlier. The Genoese counted 33 dead, wounded, or captured - not a huge number, but a significant loss to an initial force of only 480 men. Seemingly unable to either starve the fort out or take it by a coup de main, Grenier decided the only option was to break the fortress and its defenders by a sustained bombardment. His ability to do this was hampered by his damaged guns, but these could be repaired; the real issue was the availability of gunpowder and ammunition, which would have to be brought from Genoa. Grenier made his needs known to Lomellino, but within a few days the storm would roll in and make resupply from Genoa temporarily impractical.
The Corsican main squadron under Admiral Guglielmo “Lorenzo” Lorenzi waited out the storm at Porto Vecchio, where the crews made repairs and the admiral and his captains considered their next move. His first priority was to break the blockade of Bastia. Lorenzo did not believe he had the strength to face the grande armamento even without the benefit of their galleys, but if he threatened to reach Capraia the Genoese would surely be compelled to withdraw to protect the island rather than keep up the blockade.
When Lorenzo’s squadron reached Bastia on the 14th, however, he found that the Genoese had left the Bastia roadstead days before. Corsican ships had caught occasional glimpses of Genoese ships to the northeast, presumably keeping the cordon around Capraia, but strong winds made station-keeping difficult. Lorenzo knew that the Genoese did not have any good anchorages near Capraia, and it was possible that Lomellino’s fleet had been driven off, dispersed, or damaged. But Lorenzo still assumed that he was outnumbered and outgunned, and tried to dampen the optimism of his superiors who maintained their low opinion of the Genoese. While neither side had covered itself in glory in their last engagement, the Genoese had at least proved that they could fight.
Reasoning that a direct confrontation was inadvisable even with his full force, the admiral made the controversial decision to split his fleet. The first squadron would be led by the admiral personally and composed of his fastest and most powerful ships - the “Archipelago corvettes” (the Lacedemone, Arcipelago, and Idra) and the large tartane Medusa. The second squadron would include the pinque Rubea, the naval tartanes (Ventura, Zeffiro, and Delfino), the privateer felucone Giraglia, and a number of armed gondolas. If the first squadron could merely draw the Genoese away from Capraia for a day - perhaps even just a few hours - the second squadron would have an opportunity to rush provisions, arms, and men to the garrison.
Commissioner-General Lomellino, meanwhile, was struggling against the weather. After sending the galleys, most of the light ships, the recaptured L’Africano, and two other damaged ships (the Giustizia and San Maurizio) back to La Spezia, he had lifted the blockade of Bastia and sheltered at the Cala di Ceppo on the eastern coast of Capraia. This offered some protection from the northerly wind, but on the 13th the wind had abruptly shifted to the prevailing southeasterly libeccio, causing several of his ships to slip their anchors and nearly run aground. The fleet had been forced to run to leeward and ended up some twenty miles northeast of Capraia. The armamento laboriously clawed their way back to the island over the next few days, and had only recently regained their positions off Fort Federico on the 17th when the Genoese xebec Veloce sighted Lorenzo’s squadron approaching from the south.
Corsican First Squadron - 4 ships, 56 guns
Lacedemone (18)
Arcipelago (14)
Idra (12)
Medusa (12)
Genoese Grand Armament - 9 ships, 105 guns
Vendicatore (20)
Veloce (14)
Nostra Signora del Succorso (14)
Santissima Annunziata (12)
San Romolo (12)
Nostra Signora di Pontelungo (10)
Maddalena (8)
Santa Maria delle Vigne (8)
Formara (7)
Lacedemone (18)
Arcipelago (14)
Idra (12)
Medusa (12)
Genoese Grand Armament - 9 ships, 105 guns
Vendicatore (20)
Veloce (14)
Nostra Signora del Succorso (14)
Santissima Annunziata (12)
San Romolo (12)
Nostra Signora di Pontelungo (10)
Maddalena (8)
Santa Maria delle Vigne (8)
Formara (7)
Lomellino had nine warships to his enemy’s four, but it would take time to bring them together into a fighting formation, and as the Corsicans held the weather gage they could choose when - and whether - to engage. Lorenzo did not know the exact disposition of the Genoese ships, but it was clear they were quite spread out. The admiral set the Lacedemone towards the most easterly sail he could see, and as the fleets drew closer he raised the Maltese ensign on his mizzen, his signal for the squadron to raise courses, run out their guns, and prepare for combat.[2] In response, Lomellino signaled to the fleet to form a line behind the Vendicatore and set an easterly course. The fleet responded sluggishly, but the Corsicans were still several miles away and the Genoese line slowly began to take shape.
Having given every impression that he was spoiling for a fight, Lorenzo abruptly broke off the engagement. The Lacedemone turned sharply to port, unfurled its courses, and began sailing approximately northwards with all speed. Each of the Corsican ships followed him in turn. The Vendicatore turned to match this new heading and Lomellino gave orders for each ship to wear in turn and follow the flagship. Most of his ships performed this maneuver competently, but the large pinque Nostra Signora del Succorso was slow to wear, while the Veloce and Formara - far in the rear - either misunderstood their orders or did not see the signals and began turning as soon as they saw the Vendicatore turning rather than waiting their turn.
This botched maneuver threw the Genoese fleet into some confusion, which Lorenzo used to make his escape to the north. Soon, however, he sighted more sails to the northwest. These were the Santissima Annunziata and the Santa Maria delle Vigne, which had been stationed north of Capraia. Lorenzo had not expected this additional element and may have initially thought to escape through the gap between them and the rest of the fleet, but as the two pinchi sailed towards him and then rather belatedly turned away it became clear they were not trying to cut him off. Perhaps succumbing to the corsair’s instinct, Lorenzo pursued them, and the Arcipelago broke from the line to try and double them on the port side. The Lacedemone and Arcipelago proved to be faster ships than their adversaries, and soon they were ranging the pinchi with their bow chasers.
After nearly an hour of pursuit, the Lacedemone came up on the S.M delle Vigne and opened fire with broadsides. The 8-gun pinque was completely outclassed and fell back after taking serious damage and having several spars shot away. The 12-gun Santissima Annunziata shortened sail to drop back and assist. This ship initially held its own against the Lacedemone, giving as good as it got until the Arcipelago caught up on its port side, turned, and delivered a devastating volley that smashed the ship’s rudder and landed several penetrating shots to her hull. Because the ship was heeled to leeward in the strong wind, at least one of these shots hit her exposed waterline. With the ship now uncontrollable and taking on water, her captain struck her colors rather than continue to be raked by two larger and better-armed vessels.
Lomellino could see all of this happening, but could do little about it. Once the fleets passed north of Capraia the wind turned almost westerly, making a direct intercept course impractical. The best he could do was to chart a similar course and hope the wind changed in his favor. The Veloce, which was closer, engaged several Corsican ships from long range, but was unable to inflict any significant damage. Lomellino kept up the chase, giving Lorenzo a nail-biting experience as his crew rushed to make repairs to her rigging. While the Vendicatore could keep up with the Corsicans, however - and might even have caught them - many of Lomellino’s other ships were out of position or lagging behind. With two of his ships already disabled, he was not eager to launch his flagship into the fray without adequate support, and he was wary of being drawn too far from Capraia - although as he would discover, he had already been drawn far enough. The Vendicatore eventually broke off the pursuit and turned back to assist the fleet’s damaged ships.
Phases of the Naval Battle of Capraia, beginning just before the Corsican squadron's turn northwards. Ships are not shown to scale and ship positions are approximate.
Like Lorenzo’s and Lomellino’s previous engagement, the Battle of Capraia is probably best described as inconclusive. The main Genoese force, including Lomellino’s flagship, was never engaged. The Genoese lost one ship, the Santissima Annunziata, which sank before nightfall after her remaining crew was rescued; the Corsicans had forced the S.M delle Vigne to strike as well, but had to leave her behind in the pursuit. The battle did not appreciably alter the situation at sea, as the grande armamento remained stronger than Lorenzo’s fleet and was soon reinforced by the return of the Giustizia and San Maurizio from La Spezia. Some criticized Lorenzo for not taking full advantage of the disarray of the Genoese fleet by pressing the attack, but the admiral was always adamant that this would have meant wagering the entire outcome of the war on a throw of the dice - and with poor odds, at that.
The battle starkly illustrated the Genoese fleet’s greatest flaw - leadership. Although the Genoese were skilled sailors, even captains with combat records like Lomellino had no experience with fleet operations of this size. Lorenzo was no better, but his four ships - which began the engagement already in formation - proved much easier to handle than Lomellino’s nine. Moreover, the Genoese usually either entrusted hired ships to the command of their original civilian captains or gave command to a naval officer with the civilian captain as his first officer. Merchant captains knew their ships well, but did not necessarily know anything about combat maneuvers. Yet Genoese naval officers were not always a better choice - in Genoa, naval officers were by definition galley officers, and although some like Lomellino had “cross-trained” with the sailing ships of the Deputation many were unfamiliar with maneuvering a sailing ship and keeping a line formation (which was not the method in which galleys engaged). In contrast, Lorenzo’s captains all had sailing experience and most had cruised in small detachments under the Maltese flag. The admiral knew his subordinates and had been sailing with all of them for at least a year, and he was clearly in his comfort zone leading a small flotilla. Lomellino may be faulted for the poor initial disposition of his fleet - although this was partly due to the weather and the demands of the blockade - but he was also let down by untrained subordinates who proved unable to act efficiently as a team, responded slowly to orders, and could not keep up with the coordinated maneuvers of the opposing fleet.
While the naval engagement did not significantly alter the balance of power at sea, it was to prove decisive on land. In Lomellino’s absence, the Corsican “second squadron” reached Fort Federico and was able to land tons of supplies, arms, and ammunition without interference. The squadron also landed more than a hundred fresh soldiers and marines under Lieutenant-Colonel Gio Carlo Paganelli (of Korsikanskiy legion fame), who assumed overall command of Corsican forces. Paganelli took advantage of this window of opportunity to launch an attack on the Genoese positions on the hill of La Fica, attacking from the fort to the north while the Rubea and Vetura bombarded the Genoese from the east. The defenders were driven from their works, and were forced to spike the very same guns that they had just repaired to prevent this artillery from being used against them.
Fort Federico in 1910
Paganelli followed up this success by launching an attack against Genoese positions to the west. The loss of La Fica left the Genoese positions at Church of San Nicola and the western fringe of the town dangerously exposed and Colonel Grenier was forced to pull back, but his forces made a stand on the ridge of Monte Persalle half a mile southwest of the fort and resisted every attempt by the Corsicans to drive them off. Paganelli had similar numbers, but without the benefit of surprise (and coastal bombardment) the Genoese regulars stood fast against Paganelli’s motley assortment of provincials, naval infantry, and militia. With their momentum exhausted, the Corsicans fell back to the positions they had captured, and Grenier would go on to regain much of the ground he had lost. The real damage, however, had already been done. Paganelli had not merely spiked the Genoese heavy guns his forces had seized, but instructed his men to mangle them with sledges - deforming muzzles, knocking off trunnions and cascabels, and smashing their carriages. Most of Grenier’s heavy guns were now useless.
The blockade of Capraia would continue, at least for a while. Lomellino still possessed the superior fleet, and Grenier still had the superior army - albeit with a much narrower advantage than he had possessed before. But nearly all the progress Grenier had made in the siege thus far had been undone. The Corsican forces had expanded their perimeter south of the fort, they were better stocked with provisions than when the siege had started, and the garrison was the strongest it had ever been. Fort Federico had been seriously damaged and had several pieces of artillery knocked out of action, but the loss of his positions and guns meant that there was not much Grenier could do to stop the garrison from repairing and shoring up their defenses. Lomellino still had no good solution to stopping Capraiese gondolas from reaching the garrison, and there was no telling when Grenier would receive the guns and ammunition he needed to resume the bombardment in earnest. Even food was becoming scarce, as the recent weather had interrupted Genoese resupply efforts. The invasion of Capraia was over, even if its protagonists were not yet willing to admit it.
Footnotes
[1] While grenades had fallen out of favor for battlefield use early in the century, they were still regularly used in sieges (by both defenders and attackers) and sometimes in naval warfare (for boarding actions). These munitions were simple devices - typically, a hollowed-out iron sphere (often about the size of a 4-pounder cannonball) filled with gunpowder and lit by a short length of match cord. The manifest of the “syndicate fleet” listed 2,000 grenades, and hundreds more were captured from the Genoese presidi. In 1781 Corsican armories still had a large quantity of these grenades (or at least hollow shells ready to be filled with gunpowder) in stock.
[2] The “courses” of a square-rigged ship are its lowest set of sails. Ships in combat always needed to keep some sail set to maintain steerage way (the minimum speed needed to effectively steer the ship), but unless in a chase ships generally did not engage with full sail set. High speed made accurate gunnery very difficult, and a full set of sail made an enormous target for enemies trying to damage the ship’s rigging. The courses, being the sails closest to the deck, were particularly susceptible to damage and could easily be set on fire by stray sparks from the ship’s own guns. A warship approaching with courses furled thus suggested that it was seeking action rather than trying to escape.
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A nice little bit of gun-running action to keep everyone on their toes! The Genoese don't seem to have much in the way of a clear path forward, but neither do the Corsicans. A decisive sea battle or defeat on Capraia doesn't even seem like a war-ender at this point, though I expect either happening would have Austria, Britain, France or Spain stepping in to sort it out at long last.
This is I think the pebble tipping the scales here. The Great Powers likely hoped Genoa would either slap Corsica enough to get her 'back in place' or at least get a status quo antebellum peace. Its not pleasing to anyone in power for Corsica to start making trouble on its own.
But Genoa to the Powers just keeps fumbling. Bonifacio was stunning, but could be excused to a degree as a fluke, or good luck for Theo. But Capraia was their big chance to make up for that. And now their progress there has been undone setting them effectively back to square one.
True, Genoa still dominates the waves in this war but the fact they haven't swept the Corsicans yet is also humiliating. And bear in mind the Genoan government watching the expenses. All those lost artillery pieces and the elite mercenaries that were killed; and for nothing. Unless they pay to get more artillery to Capraia its a waiting game to starve the fort out, made all the longer so long as the gondolas keep sneaking in.
So for the movers and shakers this war is a farce hat has ceased to be funny and is getting less amusing by the day. Better to end it before it gets worse, as Genoa keeps making the situation worse. Because as it was many would realize it would e an uphill battle to get Theo to give up Bonifacio short of occupying parts of Corsica proper; Capraia was no sure thing. Because the king made the taking of Bonifacio a personal achievement and therefore returning it will be egg right on the royal face. The dynasty of Corsica may be the poorest crown in Europe, in many senses of the word, but that doesn't mean others won't see that its still the pride of ruler. A young ruler looking to prove himself, and by extension his dynasty's right to rule.
So, easier to let him keep his prize and punish him by emptying his wallet instead; and putting a new set of IOUs in there. Genoa won't like it but I supsect the powers are quite sick the Republic's perceived incompetence in his matter anyway. It will be seen as their war to lose, and somehow they lost it.
The mention of Lomellino's popularity among the Genoese masses and the staggering degree of control he has over the Genoese military makes me think that the stalemate perhaps ends due to the collapse of Genoa's ability to fight, due to internal political turmoil. One can imagine Lomellino's political opponents seeing his failure here as an opportunity to clip his wings or get rid of him entirely, and Lomellino not taking that in stride.
Even if he does so, the dismissal into ignominy of the progenitor of this whole operation could easily deny the Genoese ships the driving force that might have otherwise helped lead them into slowly getting a grip on fleet tactics after all their painful experience and led to their eventual victory over the Corsicans. Sacking a senior officer you don't really have a hope of replacing with a better one, in the middle of the campaign, is just snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.
This is late republican Genoa we're talking about, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory is the one thing they're consistently capable of.
While I do love Genoa and it's republic its entirely correct at this point to say that it's basically a upjumped city council acting as a state.
More to the point, unlike it's heyday it is a jumped up city council that lacks the wealth, trade links, top-tier fleet, and/or great power backing to make those pretentions good.
"Elite mercenaries" is overselling it a bit - and while I know you were really speaking more to their cost than their combat ability (which is fair; they do indeed cost more than Ligurians), I thought I might as well take some air out of the idea that these foreign units must be a particularly formidable force.
States in this period usually recruited foreign regiments because a) it was an additional source of manpower beyond the state's own citizens (particularly relevant for smaller countries like Sardinia, which had very limited domestic manpower) and b) because of their assumed political reliability. The latter is why so many states had "Swiss Guards," and it's the main reason Genoa is so invested in them. After 1750 ITTL, the oligarchy concluded that it couldn't afford to skimp on soldiers who could be counted on to fire upon the Republic's own unruly citizens if necessary. Yet although popular wisdom of the time might have been that Swiss and Germans are more "martial" by nature than Italians, there's nothing particularly elite about the Sprecker and Grenier regiments. Genoa's last war was in 1749 (or 1750 if you count civil wars), and western Europe hasn't been at war since 1760. Their senior officers are likely to be veterans - in fact General Petriconi and Colonel Grenier are both veterans of the French army who were fighting on the same team in the late 1750s - but all those 20 and 30-something Helveto-German enlisted men and NCOs are unlikely to have any prior combat experience. There's no reason to assume they fight any better than the Ligurian soldiers of the Sarzana regiment who are also on Capraia.
The main advantage that the Genoese on Capraia have over the Corsicans is that they are regulars, and thus have spent a lot more time training, drilling, and living under military discipline than the part-time provincials and local militia manning the garrison. That difference in quality is less noticeable when the militia are fighting behind strong defenses, but it's more evident in the field, which is why Grenier's men were able to hold off Paganelli's attacks with relative ease once they were able to consolidate their forces and rally somewhere they weren't being hammered by Corsican artillery. The only Corsican regulars on the island are Paganelli's recently-landed marines - a rather tough bunch of Corsicans and expatriate Greeks, many of whom are veterans of the Cretan campaign - but this unit was constituted only recently (so recently they don't even have uniforms yet) and isn't really trained up to continental line infantry standards, and there are only about 40 of them on the island.
Understood thanks for clarifying.
You are correct that I more saw them as elites in terms of expense than ability; but I am very pleased with the info you gave on their status vs the Ligurian troops.
Also bad for the Genoese, as you said that the garrison now has some veterans to stiffen their discipline in the fort. only forty as you say, but that's forty more than they had before.
I wonder what the Republic's leadership will do after this setback? If they'll use it as an excuse to rein in their borderline rogue admiral. If so they will likely try and frame him as incompetent to the masses, but given the distrust the Genoese have for their government would that take?
Hard to blame them for that distrust. If I was Genoese I would distrust the government too.
Quite so. And such unrest in the streets of Genoa would be another step toward victory for Corsica in this war. One could even hope it might lead to Genoa getting its act together with real reform happening.
Local political heirarchies tend to be much better at perpetuating their continued existence than perpetuating success. Genoa will probably limp on, as a glorified city council with great ambitions but subpar-at-best resources.