King Theodore's Corsica
- Thread starter Carp
- Start date
Maybe not so much- the whole war was kicked off with the Spanish bringing Corsica's coastal defenses back up to spec, and from the beginning the original Genoese works in Bastia were always designed with seaward attack in mind. Neither Corsica nor Genoa has the first rate fleet of frigates and ships-of-the-line that would be almost certainly necessary to be able to breach the harbor and fire the port.
The final showdown approaches, the Genoese have the numbers and national fervor going for them, but it seems the Corsican ships on average outgun their Genoese counterparts individually even if they are lacking in numbers. The battle is sure to be bloody with two experienced naval commanders at the helm, even if this type of engagement is new for them, naval combat and such is certainly nothing new for either leader. I assume given his past as a pirate and his ships being more well armed and less numerous, that Lorenzo is gonna go for hitting the Genoese fleet hard and fast and attempt breaking it up to defeat its parts in detail. Or if he can avoid pitched battle altogether he'll go for separating off parts of the fleet and destroying them before going for the coup de grace once he has assured superiority. Long live King Theodore II, Corsica has to win this.
I love how Carp still manages to find historical people to flesh out the cast of characters this far along from the PoD
As @Herucalmo suggested, neither fleet really has the firepower to take on a citadel like Bastia. Even the most formidable ships on each side, the Vendicatore and Lacedemone, are both xebec-built (with a low and fairly light hull) so neither of them are carrying heavy guns. The main gun being used by both fleets is the 6-pounder, although some of the larger pinques (being more capacious and sturdily built) might conceivably have some 7-9 pdr sakers in their arsenals and the Corsican galiots have one 9-pdr centerline gun each. The smaller ships, like the Corsican tartanes and Genoese brigantines, only have 3 or 4 pdr guns. The Minerva is truly missed here; not only did it have 26 guns, but it was the only ship of the "Archipelago Fleet" to use 9-pdr guns as its main armament, and thus would have easily outclassed the Vendicatore (Minerva's 117 lb broadside vs. Vendicatore's 60 lb broadside - nearly twice the weight!).
The major exceptions to all this light artillery are the Genoese state galleys, which each have a single massive 36-pounder centerline gun. These could certainly deal significant damage to Bastia's citadel, but Lomellino only has four of them, and even full-size galleys are relatively flimsy ships that won't withstand the 24 pdr shot that Bastia is going to be throwing back at them for very long.
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Personally my money on what ultimately decides this campaign and breaks the larger strategic and geopolitical paralysis of the Coral War is that the Genoese just frankly don't have much to offer the Capraiesi anymore, the Kingdom of Corsica granted their pieves the right to send electors to the Consulta and to address some of their own notables as noblemen, to stand side by side with all the grandees of Corsica. The general Neuhoff tack of free trade and international neutrality left the Capriesi free to export their fish and continue their other small time commerce and also, for less savory profits, continue as part of the nautical tradition of Corsican pirates serving with the Knights of Malta. However lukewarm Capraia was on the project of the Corsican nation in its smuggling and sympathies but no real revolutionary action, now the Capraiesi are probably going to legitimately resist Genoese invasion and make it no armed picnic, as King Frederico's bloodless conquest was.
And if there is indeed an actual siege against Capraia's citadel, borne on the back of such contested waters, then even if the Genoese are slowly winning Corsica can now be the one to win by running out the clock much as Genoa once relied on its presidial forts. Sitting down at the peace table with Capraia as still a battle and useless as a bargaining chip while Bonifacio is as firmly occupied as ever is pretty much a guarantee of Corsica keeping it.
And if there is indeed an actual siege against Capraia's citadel, borne on the back of such contested waters, then even if the Genoese are slowly winning Corsica can now be the one to win by running out the clock much as Genoa once relied on its presidial forts. Sitting down at the peace table with Capraia as still a battle and useless as a bargaining chip while Bonifacio is as firmly occupied as ever is pretty much a guarantee of Corsica keeping it.
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The Smugglers' Isle
The Smugglers' Isle
A gondola of the Ligurian type used in 18th century Capraia
A gondola of the Ligurian type used in 18th century Capraia
On January 20th, the ships of the grande armamento arrived off the coast of Capraia. The Corsicans had known the Genoese were on the move ever since the Arcipelago had sighted them at the La Spezia roadstead on the 15th, but their exact destination was unclear. The Corsican Navy had decided against seeking a confrontation, even though this would allow the Genoese to reach their objective and potentially land troops; it was clear that Admiral Lorenzo’s squadron was outnumbered, and as this was the only squadron of Corsican warships there would be no recovery from a serious defeat.
The commandant of Capraia, Major Basilio Corsi, had been preparing for an attack for nearly two weeks. In December his garrison consisted of just 35 provincial soldiers plus the Compagnia Capraiese, an 80-man company of uniformed militia. Bastia had sent him another 60 soldiers as well as several bombardieri in January as well as provisions and ammunition, but could not devote its full resources to the island given that the Genoese objective was not certainly known. Just a few days before the Genoese arrival, Major Corsi had evacuated his soldiers’ families to Bastia along with hundreds of Capraiesi. If there was a siege he would only be able to protect and provide for his own garrison, not all two thousand of the island’s inhabitants.
Capraia’s relationship to the Corsican national project had initially been rather tenuous. There had never been any “revolutionary activity” on the island until it was captured by Prince Federico and his soldiers in 1747. In the 1730s and 40s the Capraiese padri dei comune had assured the Republic’s commissioner of their “perfect loyalty” and even petitioned Genoa to strengthen the island’s defenses against the rebels. Capraiese smugglers were crucial to the rebel cause, but this is explained more readily by self-interest than sympathy for the insurgents; even Genoese traders were known to move contraband if there was good money to be made, and the Genoese blockade of Corsica made life difficult for the islanders. The Republic’s entry into the War of the Austrian Succession - and thus into war with Britain - further disrupted their livelihoods and made the Genoese government look feeble and powerless. When it became clear that the rebel force which landed in 1747 did not intend to plunder them, the Capraiesi chose to surrender without a fight rather than tie their fate to the hapless Republic - but that did not mean that they had any special attachment to Theodore or his kingdom.
Independence had brought great changes to the island’s political status. Capraia became a part of the Capocorso lieutenancy and sent procuratori to the consulta generale each year. Neither Theodore I nor Federico elevated any Capraiesi to the hereditary nobility, but the appointed Genoese commissioner was replaced with a locally-elected podesta.[1] Although he was not much loved on Corsica, King Federico became quite popular in Capraia. Theodore I had never set foot on the island, but Federico visited twice, once as a conqueror and once as a king. He had paid particular attention to Capraia during his brief reign, establishing the Compagnia Capraiese and granting the islanders increased administrative and judicial autonomy to mitigate the trouble of having to sail twenty miles to the provincial capital of Rogliano. Federico ordered repairs and improvements to the island’s citadel, the Forte di San Giorgio - and, judging this name to be too Genoese, renamed it “Forte Federico.”
Despite economic headwinds, the island had done reasonably well under Corsican rule. The abolition of any tolls or tariffs between Capraia and Corsica was a boon to the Capraiesi, and the constitutionally limited price of salt was especially welcome on an island whose principal industry was the manufacture of salt fish. None of this could arrest the decline of the local fishing industry, which suffered from competition with increasingly numerous Neapolitan fishermen using superior longline techniques. After 1749, however, the Capraiesi adapted to this challenge by moving into commercial transportation, and soon came to dominate commerce and transport between Corsica and Italy, particularly the Bastia-Livorno route.[2] This economic shift meant that Capraia was more closely integrated with the Corsican economy than ever before. Capraiesi who could not afford their own gondolas frequently migrated to Corsican presidi or sought employment with the Navy, creating further ties between the islands. The Capraiesi remained proud of their distinct identity, but many - particularly those under 40 - now viewed this as a Corsican identity, not so different from the particular regional pride of a Balagnesi or a Castagniccian. In 1747 the locals had deemed their government to be not worth one drop of Capraiese blood, but in 1782 many would put themselves at great risk to defend the Bastia regime.
Major Corsi was well-served by the loyalty of the inhabitants. Landing on Capraia was difficult because the island’s only natural harbor was controlled by Fort Federico, and Corsi posted volunteer lookouts across the island to monitor the Genoese vessels. Corsi managed to hold off the landing for several days by marching to wherever the Genoese attempted to disembark; a contested landing on a thin, wave-wracked shingle beach was simply too dangerous, particularly given that the Genoese did not know how strong the island’s garrison actually was. Not until the 24th were the Genoese forces able to make landfall in force at the Cala di Ceppo on the island’s eastern shore thanks to supporting bombardment from his galleys. The garrison and the Capraiese militia attempted to prevent the enemy from moving inland and managed to push back the initial landing force of Swiss grenadiers, but once the Genoese began landing more companies Corsi pulled his forces back to the fort.
Commissario generale dell’Armamento Cesare Lomellino left these land operations to the Swiss officer Colonel Augustin Grenier and focused on the daunting task of blockading the island. Resupplying Bonifacio from Genoa required a voyage of some 250 miles through hostile waters, but Capraia was only 20 miles from Rogliano and 30 miles from Bastia. Lomellino had to blockade an island which could be reached from numerous Corsican harbors and beaches within just a few hours - and which was populated almost entirely by seasoned mariners with small, nimble boats who could almost navigate these waters in their sleep.[A] Colonel Grenier was eventually able to close Capraia’s harbor with his guns, but boats could still reach the garrison by landing at the Scalo di San Francesco, a small rocky beach about 200 yards from the fort.
Map of northeastern Capraia including the town and fort
Lomellino soon found that none of his proper warships were capable of catching the Capraiese gondolas, leaving him almost totally dependent on a handful of light ships. He begged his government for armed gondolas, feluche, brigantini, and any other small craft which he could use to tighten the net. These craft were better suited for the task of interception than the pinchi and sciabecchi, but they were themselves vulnerable to attack. Captain-Lieutenant Giuseppe Ramarone, a Capraiese officer in command of the Medusa,[3] gave a superb demonstration of this vulnerability by slipping out of Bastia harbor and overpowering two Genoese brigantines off Macinaggio. He sank one, captured the other, and managed to return with his prize to Bastia without losing a single man.
Lomellino reacted by moving the focus of his blockade from Capraia to Bastia itself. Although this may have made the encirclement of Capraia less effective - only two pinchi and Lomellino’s light ships were left to watch the island - it bottled up Corsica’s entire navy at Bastia while inflicting economic pain on the Corsicans. The fact that the French envoy did nothing to stop this infuriated the Corsican government, which noted ruefully that the French envoy in Genoa had demanded the cessation of Lorenzo’s siege of that city almost immediately. Bastia, however, was not Genoa, and the local envoy would only go so far as to send a communique to Paris asking for instructions.
Admiral Lorenzo’s passivity had put him in a difficult position. It had seemed as though he might be able to thwart the operation on Capraia simply by using his squadron as a “fleet in being” with the occasional opportunistic strike, but the blockade of Bastia alarmed the government and reports from Capraia suggested that even though supplies continued to get through the cordon, Fort Federico might not stand indefinitely against Genoese land bombardment. Although very reluctant to leave the safety of Bastia’s citadel, Lorenzo began planning for a breakout. He did not have to take on the Grand Armament; if he could simply escape, the blockade of Bastia would become untenable and Lomellino would have to pull back to Capraia.
On February 11th, early morning fog and a bracing northerly wind gave the admiral an opportunity. Led by the Lacedemone, six Corsican warships exited Bastia harbor and charted a southerly course. Lorenzo had decided to leave the smaller tartanes behind, deeming them too weak to fight Genoese warships and more useful to harass the enemy from Bastia. The admiral’s squadron thus consisted of Lacedemone (18), Arcipelago (14), Idra (12), Medusa (12), L’Africano (10), and Rubea (8). Despite the fog, this movement was sighted by the xebec Giustizia and the Genoese fleet moved to intercept.
The engagement at Bastia demonstrated the shortcomings of both commanders. Although Admiral Lorenzo and Commissioner-General Lomellino were both extremely experienced mariners and naval commanders, both the corsa and the controcorsa were usually only conducted with “squadrons” of two or three ships. Neither commander had ever led a fleet of this size in battle and both fleets suffered from communications problems. On this day these problems were more acute for the Genoese, but only because they had a much larger fleet to coordinate (at least 12 ships to Lorenzo’s 6) and it was easier for Lorenzo to make plans with his captains in port than for Lomellino to make his will known to every ship in his blockading squadron. Lorenzo’s escape attempt, however, was delayed by Bastia’s small harbor, which forced the vessels to slowly exit one at a time.
The result was a rather confused and ill-coordinated affair. Lacedemone and Arcipelago teamed up on Giustizia and inflicted heavy damage on the xebec, but Lorenzo was forced to break off the attack because his pinchi had fallen behind and were now being attacked by several Genoese ships. During this maneuver the Idra either did not see or failed to take notice of the admiral’s signals and very nearly rammed the Arcipelago, while the crew of the Genoese pinco San Maurizio mistook L’Africano for a friendly ship (it was, after all, a captured Genoese vessel) and were very surprised to receive a broadside that raked their ship from stem to stern. A running battle to the south continued for another hour. Although Lorenzo seems to have had the upper hand initially, his slow start and the lifting fog allowed the Genoese to begin coordinating and concentrating their ships. Unluckily, a cannonball (possibly from the Vendicatore) succeeded in taking down the mizzen mast of the L’Africano, slowing the ship to a crawl. The admiral briefly considered making a stand, but his disadvantage was growing - the Genoese galleys were now approaching from the rear, and soon he would be outnumbered two to one. He decided to break off to the south with the rest of his ships, leaving the L’Africano behind. She fought several Genoese ships on her own for about 20 minutes and then struck her colors after a 36-pound ball from the galley Libertà tore into her stern.
Both sides claimed victory at the “Battle of Bastia.” Lorenzo had achieved his primary objective of escaping from Bastia with his squadron, but losing the L’Africano was certainly a setback given that he was already badly outnumbered. Lomellino had forced Lorenzo to flee and had (re)captured the L’Africano, but the Corsican squadron was still a potential threat and several of his own ships were seriously damaged. Lomellino did not attempt to pursue; aside from the damage to his ships, the northerly tramontane was picking up and Lomellino could tell that a storm was coming. Lorenzo sheltered his squadron at Porto Vecchio, while Lomellino sent his galleys and damaged ships back to La Spezia while the rest of his fleet returned to its station off Capraia. The two commanders would meet again, but not until the storm had passed.
18th century plan of Fort Federico
Meanwhile, Commandant Corsi and Colonel Grenier dueled on land. Fort Federico had only received two 12-pounder guns from the recent Spanish armament and was still reliant on its Genoese arsenal. This was the usual assortment of old and mismatched pieces, but they had at least been brought to serviceable condition as part of Federico’s repairs in the 1770s. They were not all excellent guns, and some of the more unusually sized pieces had only limited amounts of ammunition, but they did all work.
Arsenal of Forte Federico, January 1782
One 22 pdr half-cannon
One 21 pdr bronze culverin
One 16 pdr bronze half-culverin
One 13 pdr bronze half-culverin
Two 12 pdr iron Spanish guns
Two 7 pdr sakers
Two 4 pdr falcons
Two 1 pdr falconets
Five ½ pdr perriers
By February 3rd the Genoese had advanced to the hill of La Fica only 400 yards from the fort and had moved several heavy guns to that position.[B] On the night of the 4th, Captain Filippo Andrei, Corsi’s second-in-command, led a detachment out of the fort along a coastal path and surprised the defenders. Andrei himself was wounded, but his night raid succeeded in spiking two guns and blowing up a magazine before his party was repulsed by the Genoese defenders.
This attack delayed Grenier’s plans, but did not derail them. It was becoming clear that while the Genoese pickets could attenuate the flow of supplies to the fort, they could not cut it off. This meant that the fort would have to be seized by force. Although Forte Federico was a 16th century construction, it was a rather solid edifice of masonry and natural stone; Grenier could do serious damage to the walls and battlements, but it was not really possible to "breach" this fortress. Even once the defenders' guns were silent and the battlements had been smashed into ruin, the attackers would still have to resort to escalade with ladders of at least 30 feet. Grenier began planning a surprise attack on the fort to probe the strength of its garrison, but if the defenders proved strong and alert enough to repel such an attack, a direct assault was the only option. Grenier hoped to do as much damage as possible to the fort with his artillery before he was forced to that extremity.
Footnotes
[1] The three padri dei comune (“fathers of the commune”) who had existed under Genoese rule continued to exist after 1747, albeit alongside an elected podesta instead of an appointed commissario. These offices tended to be dominated by a few large and well-established Capraiese extended families, most notably the families of Danove, Cuneo, and Salaro. All three could trace their origins back to the 1540s, when the island was ravaged by Dragut and subsequently resettled and fortified by the Republic.
[2] In the 1720s the Capraiesi had maintained nearly 50 small fishing boats, whereas in 1774 the Corsican authorities only counted 16; but to this they had added 34 “large boats” of 300 cantari and 14 “medium boats” of 100 cantari for moving goods and people. The cantaro was a standard Genoese unit of measurement equal to 150 Genoese pounds, or about 105 English pounds. A 300 cantari “large boat” could thus carry approximately 15¾ tons of cargo. This was still a rather small vessel, but it was well suited for short-range coastal trade; by comparison, the small two-masted schooners often used for coastal trade in colonial America in the 1700s seem to have averaged around 20 tons burthen. All these boats were referred to as “gondolas.”
[3] In the Corsican Navy of the 1780s the highest rank (behind Lorenzo’s idiosyncratic title of “admiral”) was that of capitano di mare e guerra, “captain of sea and war,” or just “captain” for short. Only these officers had a license to command one of the king’s warships - that is, frigates and corvettes - while lesser ships were commanded by lieutenants. The acquisition of new vessels during the war prompted the navy to create the intermediate rank of capitano tenente (captain-lieutenant), which was given to senior lieutenants deemed fit to command small warships without having to greatly expand the ranks of “full” captains. Admiral Lorenzo’s first officer on board the Lacedemone was also rated as a captain-lieutenant.
Timeline Notes
[A] The Genoese writer Giuseppe Maria Mecatti attested to the skill of the Capraiesi at running blockades. In regards to a French convoy sailing from Toulon to besieged Genoa in 1747, he wrote that “notwithstanding the fact that the English ships crossed everywhere, they did not manage to take even a single ship. This was praised by some as a marvel, by others it was attributed to fate, and by many to the skill of the Capraiesi, who led these people in many gondolas made according to the custom of their country, and with which they were well accustomed to traveling the sea…” The failure of the Pragmatic Allies to isolate Genoa from reinforcements and supply proved decisive, as with Genoa as an “ulcer” in their rear the allied offensive into Provence could not be sustained. The city held out against Austro-Sardinian armies until the end of the war.
[B] Yes, I know this is a bad word in Italian. What can I say, that’s what it’s called on the map. In the Corsican dialect, fica just means “fig tree.”
Frederico seems like a very difficult challenge. Only able to attack on one side means concentration of all men on both sides on that front, and the Genoese will be charging upwards against a wall-mounted opposition.
The Corsican navy botching an escape attempt feels logical, as is the Genoese failure to close that attempt. Certainly in some cases it feels like both sides are fumbling around each other, rather than it being a decisive and engaging battle of wits and counter-wits. Which makes sense, because war isn't clean.
The Corsican navy botching an escape attempt feels logical, as is the Genoese failure to close that attempt. Certainly in some cases it feels like both sides are fumbling around each other, rather than it being a decisive and engaging battle of wits and counter-wits. Which makes sense, because war isn't clean.
That particular diagram is a little more schematic than actual. The south side was also approachable, as seen here (north is down in this map):
The La Fica battery is positioned to the south of the fort, so this is what Grenier is mainly focusing on. This was also the place where the Paolists considered scaling the fort when they attacked the island IOTL, although ultimately the garrison surrendered before that became necessary. Unfortunately the complete layout of the fort is not evident on a modern map because there was a massive collapse in the 19th century that dumped a substantial part of the building into the sea. The collapse is evident on Google Earth:
Even with two approachable faces instead of one, this is still a difficult position to take by escalade if the opponent is prepared and ready. The entire western and southern faces together are less than 600 feet long, which is a reasonable frontage to hold with ~200 people.
I can see this war ending with Corsica essentially needing to build a new navy from scratch, but retaining Capraia by the skin of their teeth. The Genoese have constantly had problems with having enough modern guns on their fortifications, I doubt their artillery corps is that much better armed. A few more guns spiked during a sortie, or some lucky counter-battery fire, and they are unable to break the fortress. Even with the best admiral they have had in generations and a professional Swiss mercenary leading the expeditionary force, the Genoese are not going to have a very long bench of able officers to call upon. Now, Genoa has been a naval power for centuries, so even as much as it has declined, the naval officers are likely to be the best of the best they have, but Grenier could well soon want to kill his nominal subordinates more than the Corsicans resisting him.
Also, at any point, the Pope might decide that seizing the Deputation's naval assets is grounds enough to take action against Genoa. Excommunication would be a good enough excuse for anyone wanting a bit of Ligurian coastline to jump into the war. Genoa angering the papacy could also be an excuse for France to press for peace just a slight bit more proactively.
Also, at any point, the Pope might decide that seizing the Deputation's naval assets is grounds enough to take action against Genoa. Excommunication would be a good enough excuse for anyone wanting a bit of Ligurian coastline to jump into the war. Genoa angering the papacy could also be an excuse for France to press for peace just a slight bit more proactively.
I think at this point excommunication is completely off the table, the utterly aghast and fierce reaction from the crowned heads of Europe just for excommunicating Theodore I- an almost openly Deist Freemason and Rosicrucian occultist of a king directly attacking the infrastructure of the Church connecting the Papacy to Corsica, I think spells out the end of Excommunication as something the Church can levy against the kings and potentates of Italy. If simply illegally seizing Church property for your own temporal ends was a crime, then its one France and Spain and Austria are all equally guilty of, and thus, no crime at all.
Will Lorenzo be able to distract the Genoese force with his fleet enough to disturb the siege? Are they still maintaining a blockade of Bastia?
My guess is this war will end in a Pyrrhic victory for Corsica. Genoa will not be able to take Caparia or otherwise leverage Theo to give up Bonifaccio, and the great powers will not be interested in helping Genoa clean up its own mess in yet again being beaten by third rate power. But they wont be interested in letting Corsica be the tail that wags the dog. Corsica won't get the disputed isles in the strait as an insult to injury, and more importantly be forced to pay a hefty sum to Genoa.
The reparation alongside wartime expenses will be decades long setback and sour Theo on war. His reign will shift to one of building up his kingdom, starting with finances, rather than expanding it. So Theo gets a legacy as the good king among his people for both unifying Corsica and his works later on. For Genoa the money will go to waste and that will trigger a new round of unrest as that once might state continues its decline. Unless someone does seize the state and is able to both make much needed reforms and avoid the powers intervention.
The reparation alongside wartime expenses will be decades long setback and sour Theo on war. His reign will shift to one of building up his kingdom, starting with finances, rather than expanding it. So Theo gets a legacy as the good king among his people for both unifying Corsica and his works later on. For Genoa the money will go to waste and that will trigger a new round of unrest as that once might state continues its decline. Unless someone does seize the state and is able to both make much needed reforms and avoid the powers intervention.
calling Corsica even as a third rate power is very generous but I agree with all your other points really
Same here, though I wish for some way for Corsica to avoid such reparations.
Technically Corsica has never been more than a sixth-rate power, and she isn't even that anymore, ever since she lost the Minerva.
Well I'm not sure how exactly the rating system works; but I dare say that only makes Genoa's predicament even more disgustingly disgraceful too the great powers.