Decidedly off topic, but as a sidebar...
The RN captured one sub after forcing them to beach themselves. They dropped over 200 ASW weapons while trying to hunt the other down. That seems a little like overkill for a navy "swanning round blissfully unaware"...
The ASW officer responsible for that prosecution (Chris Perry) was the man I cited for that conclusion about the RN swanning about... and instances of RN mistakes made in battle.
START 27.00 in about USS Catfish (ARA Santa Fe).
Sheer luck and good guessing caught the Santa Fe in the act of submergence.
Blue and Blue free for all during the prosecution... Start at 30.00. This was similar to a United States army free for all during the Gulf War where some US air cavalry helos in direct Overwatch support during a confused armor engagement, broke their fire control discipline and an Apache KILLED a Bradley and an M113 full of American soldiers (2 dead, many wounded) because a US officer, who was supposed to manage the battle got "buck fever" and wanted to target service something instead of strike coordinate and assign the targets in response to positive ground control. HE did the shooting.
The British were actually lucky that time at South Georges in their own wild ordnance launches against the Santa Fe. They could have killed each other.
HMS Sheffield is an example.
The Type 42 destroyer was designed as an air defence ship and built to a tight budget resulting in
a slightly compromised platform. The main Sea Dart system was usually very effective against medium and high altitude targets but the fire control radars did not have the ability to successfully track low-level targets. Although the sea-skimming missile threat was well understood and the RN possessed their own ship-launched Exocets, the entire Royal Navy fleet of the time lacked effective Close In Weapons Systems (CIWS). (The only exception were the new Type 22 frigates armed with very effective Sea Wolf). This was a glaring institutional failure that is hard to explain, especially as the Soviets had many potent anti-ship missiles. Space and funding constraints would not allow the fitting of the Sea Wolf missile on the Type 42 and the only back-up weapons were 2 manually-aimed 20mm Oerlikon cannons, dating from WWII. The Sea Dart was not always reliable and it seems extraordinary that a cheap second line of defence consisting of several modern 20 or 30mm cannon mounts had not been fitted. The Sheffield also lacked basic electronic jammers that could confuse missile radars. The best option would have been the Phalanx CIWS that had been in development since 1973 and was proven in service with the US Navy by 1980. Phalanx is entirely automated and would almost certainly have saved the Sheffield. It was hurriedly purchased by the RN and subsequently fitted to many surface ships, it is still in service today.
Let me continue.
There also existed many shortcomings in warship design and equipment fit that were quickly exposed by the Exocet strike. The use of formica panels were a hazard that created lethal flying shrapnel shards when subject to blast. Some escape hatches were found to be too small for men dressed in breathing apparatus. The Rover portable fire pumps were unreliable and there was inadequate fire-fighting equipment held onboard most ships. There was insufficient attention to the dangers of smoke in the design of ventilation and provision of fire curtains. Standard issue nylon clothing was found to have melted in contact with fire, severely exacerbating burns. The ship contained PVC cable insulation and foam furnishings that gave off toxic fumes in a fire.
Furthermore. (Start pp 57.)
The Sheffield was killed by fuel fires ignited by Exocet missile fuel and not by missile blast. Atlantic Conveyor was lost the same way. The RN Sheffield crew and the Atlantic Conveyor fought and lost ship fires very similar to those that almost cost the USN the USS Stark. That indicates inadequate damage control training that is aggravated by poor shipwrighting. But
USS Stark was not too dissimilar to HMS Sheffield as to ship construction mistakes made.
(pp 59.)
HMS Antelope
Survived the dud bomb hit, but was own goaled when the EOD team removing the supposed inerted ordnance somehow set it off and started a fire when they tried to remove the bomb. Fires swept through the ship and once again the British RN crew lost the fire fighting battle and Antelope had to be scuttled.
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Now back to the Essex and lessons to be applied. (^^^) from above.
Whether the Essex enters into RN service in 1972 or the HMS Hermes is fully restored or the HMS Bulwark is retrofitted back to CATOBAR status...
the important things to remember about aviation ships and aircraft carriers is that they are floating bombs. FIRE kills these ships. Firefighting saves them.
Old aircraft carriers have leaky fuel lines, defective purge ventilation and obsolete automatic fire mains. Magazines and hidden spaces inside the hull, especially in the stern steer control and the bilges contain unseen and or ignored fire hazards (Usually forgotten oiled cleaning rags in a stores locker are a culprit.). To bring an Essex up to acceptable SLEP standard for modern aviation operations for the RN or the USN would require a massive overhaul to fix those firefighting problems.
And I cannot emphasize that in the 1970s, neither navy had kept up their WW II damage control proficiency or ethos. The sailors have to be willing to stand and DIE fighting a fire to save their fellow sailors and their ship. That is a hard lesson to learn. When all you have is sea water and an ax and the linoleum burns around you, you have to stay and try, no matter the urge to run..
