Ashore communications were spotty. The assistant Division commander failed to establish a forward CP ashore. The battalion an regimental commanders had to improvise their own command network. The sucess of the junior regiment commander Col Shoup in that effort got him a medal.
Perhaps the key to winning the battle was the radio link to the destroyers doing fire support stayed strong. A few hours into the battle a group of Japanese were spotted moving between two entrenched positions. Rapid response from a destroyer killed the Japanese Garrison commander & his tactical staff. That paralyzed the defense for the remainder of the first day. No coordinated counter attack developed.
The Navy pilots assigned to tactical air support lacked the necessary training. They had received the assignment a few weeks earlier and had too little traning time. The commanders on the ground had to repeatedly waive them off for attacking the Marines and Navy men on the island. They had trouble understanding the signals and orienting on the ground targets.
A big part of the issue here is that Japanese doctrine was geared toward unopposed landings which is a great approach if there is a place you can land that is undefended or lightly defended. When the only place to land is defended (heavily at that), you're kind screwed.
From everything I read the Japanese would have been slaughtered. They were doing an amphibious invasion against a heavily fortified marine corps defense battalion in a heavily fortified position with a narrow beach approach , outnumbering them only two to one with probably very little shore bombardment, if any. While the Marines had two 5* guns and no less than 24 Browning M2 heavy machine guns.
Don't forget all the machine guns that can be scavenged from written off aircraft...which would be a fair few assuming they have some spare tri/bipods to mount them on.Actually, this is drastically undercounting USMC firepower on Midway. They had:
2 - 7" batteries (4 guns)
3 - 5" batteries (6 guns)
8 - 3" batteries (28 guns) [6 USMC defense battalion batteries of 4 guns and 2 USN manned batteries of 2 guns]
Plus the machines guns you mentioned.
Actually, this is drastically undercounting USMC firepower on Midway. They had:
2 - 7" batteries (4 guns)
3 - 5" batteries (6 guns)
8 - 3" batteries (28 guns) [6 USMC defense battalion batteries of 4 guns and 2 USN manned batteries of 2 guns]
Plus the machines guns you mentioned.
Don't forget all the machine guns that can be scavenged from written off aircraft...which would be a fair few assuming they have some spare tri/bipods to mount them on.
Its far easier to replace light infantry as compared to gunners, engineers, navigators, etc. not to mention the fact that Japan had only 18 heavy cruisers with a grand total of 2 more barely starting construction at the time of MidwayI imagine some DDs and CLs go down too...maybe even a CA. That would probably hurt worse than Ichiki's force in the long run.
Trivia note: The singer actor Eddie Arnold was a Navy Lt jg. Commanding a utilty boat with the mission of salvaging broken LVT & other boats. Arnold instead spent the first day with his mechanics and medical corpsmen he begged off the ships dragging wounded men off the reef, under Japanese fire. His effort got him a medal and provided a early hint of the condition of the early assault.
Its far easier to replace light infantry as compared to gunners, engineers, navigators, etc. not to mention the fact that Japan had only 18 heavy cruisers with a grand total of 2 more barely starting construction at the time of Midway
One does wonder why the IJN didn't lay down four to six heavy cruisers in 1940/early 1941 to replace their inevitable war losses...probably due to the army using up way to many resources in ChinaYeah, the heavy cruisers Japan started the war with were the only ones she was going to have. They were, literally, an irreplaceable resource.
One does wonder why the IJN didn't lay down four to six heavy cruisers in 1940/early 1941 to replace their inevitable war losses...probably due to the army using up way to many resources in China
Well...limited slipways, limited resources.
Just another manifestation of how Japan was only set up for a short war.
Japan knew it was screwed in a long one, that if it didn't win quickly the US would overwhelm it.
And yet, strangely, they seemed so very confident that they could avoid a long war.
I wonder if a different strong willed Japanese commander,after looking at a map,decided to go on the defensive. Use what fuel and slave labor they had to fortify anything that could serve as a airbase by the USA,load them up with troops and provisions. On islands they couldn't defend,sow them with germs,infected livestock,infected prisoners...Probably not possible given all I've read about the worldview of the Japanese Army.
Its far easier to replace light infantry as compared to gunners, engineers, navigators, etc. not to mention the fact that Japan had only 18 heavy cruisers with a grand total of 2 more barely starting construction at the time of Midway
Yeah, the heavy cruisers Japan started the war with were the only ones she was going to have. They were, literally, an irreplaceable resource.