Quite frankly they're liable to call in the 38th division, marry it to Kawaguchi's brigade, and try the overland thrust against Port Moresby. Which, of course, is unlikely to go any better than it did OTL.
Japan doesn't lose the Shoho and wins at Midway: Now what?
- Thread starter AbeLincoln1865
- Start date
If I'm not mistaken, taking Milne Bay was part of the plan to take Port Moresby overland. Not to sound like a broken record, but if the Japanese deployed more troops that originally went to Guadalcanal along the Kokoda track and at Milne Bay, would they have a decent shot at taking both areas?
Yeah, basically.
1. Bring the dumb Americans to DECISIVE BATTLE!
2. Defeat the weak Americans in DECISIVE BATTLE!
3. The cowardly Americans will sue for peace.
4. Tenno Heika Banzai!
Was their plan.
They got the decisive battle fetish after reading Mahan and Russo-Japanese War "proving" it to them. But they kinda forgot that decisive battle was the means to take control of the seas and the important part was that control. Instead they focused heavily on that battle and kinda forgot the rest of the doctrine. They did not seem to have much in the way of further plans on how to win the war after winning the decisive battle.
After Midway, Japan doesn't have a lot of fuel to accomplish much of anything. What they did have, they used VERY inefficiently at Guadalcanal IOTL (destroyers are lousy transports). But if they use their resources intelligently, there's room to cause a bit of trouble for the US until the end of 1942. We're probably talking a two carrier, several cruiser force without battleships as their effective strength in the South Pacific however.
So Japan has two choices: go for Port Moresby, or go for FS.
Port Moresby is probably the more sensible option, but the chances aren't good at all. Going overland... well they tried that at Kokoda. It didn't work too well. I'm not sure "sending reinforcements" will work either - Kokoda is a narrow dirt track and the terrain is such that you can't really stray too far from that track. Only so many troops can 'fit' on the front (not to mention having too many will overload the supply trains, which also have to use that track). Japan had more than enough troops in New Guinea - IIRC by sometime in 1943 they had more than 100k there, but that doesn't matter if they can't get to where they're needed.
An alternative is to go by sea, trying the plan they used at Coral Sea again. The chances of this working weren't great in May, but it was still possible. Trying it in August will be harder. The Allies will be expecting them, they've already reinforced the area, and those landing beaches still suck. If Japan rolls 6s, it might just work. But it will be the last offensive action Japan manages (FUEL!).
FS is even more problematic. New Caledonia is impossible to take just because there's the AmeriCal division there, plus they had so many supplies there that Noumea's port literally overflowed with them (ships were crowded outside the port for WEEKS). Samoa is impossible because it is too far away, and there's hardly any decent beaches on Tutuila (the one Samoan island that is actually worth taking) so the Americans know exactly where the landing would happen, and it has lots of US troops on it. Fiji is barely possible in a best-case scenario (my TL), but that depends on an invasion in July (if Midway happens, late August is more likely, by which point the NZers there have been reinforced by Americans), and the Japanese having the same level of luck they had in the Philippines or Singapore, and them having enough fuel to pull it off (doubtful if Midway happens). The New Hebrides can be taken provided they are attacked early enough (American garrisons landed there IIRC in August, one they're there it is game over).
As for the FS plan... let's just say the Japanese didn't know what they wanted to do, or how they were going to do it. They were going to use a force of 9k men (half of which went to Midway, and are thus dead ITTL) to take on defences that when summed up come to something in the range of 50-75k across the different targets (their intelligence was bad, only coming close with regards to Fiji, while severely underestimating the others). The plan wasn't much more detailed than "take A, then take B, then take C" (which islands A, B and C were changed with each version of the plan), and a simultaneous offensive on all three was simply not going to happen (though the latest version of the plan, written not long before Midway, still thought it could). If they try anything more ambitious than Efate after mid-August, they're going to get smoked.
(My TL isn't so much what would happen - it relies on the Japanese sending an entire division - basically the November Guadalcanal army - more than their original plan called for, as well as Singapore-level luck. It is what could happen in a best-Japanese-case scenario.)
But honestly it doesn't matter much anyway - yes the US wins the war eventually, but more to the point, IOTL the Japanese sunk basically all the US carriers in the several naval battles off Guadalcanal. The New Hebrides or Fiji are basically worthless as defensive positions (Nimitz will just bypass them), and the IJN won't be doing anything after the end of 1942 regardless because they're out of fuel. So there's not really much more success Japan could have, even with Midway going perfectly to plan.
- BNC
So Japan has two choices: go for Port Moresby, or go for FS.
Port Moresby is probably the more sensible option, but the chances aren't good at all. Going overland... well they tried that at Kokoda. It didn't work too well. I'm not sure "sending reinforcements" will work either - Kokoda is a narrow dirt track and the terrain is such that you can't really stray too far from that track. Only so many troops can 'fit' on the front (not to mention having too many will overload the supply trains, which also have to use that track). Japan had more than enough troops in New Guinea - IIRC by sometime in 1943 they had more than 100k there, but that doesn't matter if they can't get to where they're needed.
An alternative is to go by sea, trying the plan they used at Coral Sea again. The chances of this working weren't great in May, but it was still possible. Trying it in August will be harder. The Allies will be expecting them, they've already reinforced the area, and those landing beaches still suck. If Japan rolls 6s, it might just work. But it will be the last offensive action Japan manages (FUEL!).
FS is even more problematic. New Caledonia is impossible to take just because there's the AmeriCal division there, plus they had so many supplies there that Noumea's port literally overflowed with them (ships were crowded outside the port for WEEKS). Samoa is impossible because it is too far away, and there's hardly any decent beaches on Tutuila (the one Samoan island that is actually worth taking) so the Americans know exactly where the landing would happen, and it has lots of US troops on it. Fiji is barely possible in a best-case scenario (my TL), but that depends on an invasion in July (if Midway happens, late August is more likely, by which point the NZers there have been reinforced by Americans), and the Japanese having the same level of luck they had in the Philippines or Singapore, and them having enough fuel to pull it off (doubtful if Midway happens). The New Hebrides can be taken provided they are attacked early enough (American garrisons landed there IIRC in August, one they're there it is game over).
As for the FS plan... let's just say the Japanese didn't know what they wanted to do, or how they were going to do it. They were going to use a force of 9k men (half of which went to Midway, and are thus dead ITTL) to take on defences that when summed up come to something in the range of 50-75k across the different targets (their intelligence was bad, only coming close with regards to Fiji, while severely underestimating the others). The plan wasn't much more detailed than "take A, then take B, then take C" (which islands A, B and C were changed with each version of the plan), and a simultaneous offensive on all three was simply not going to happen (though the latest version of the plan, written not long before Midway, still thought it could). If they try anything more ambitious than Efate after mid-August, they're going to get smoked.
(My TL isn't so much what would happen - it relies on the Japanese sending an entire division - basically the November Guadalcanal army - more than their original plan called for, as well as Singapore-level luck. It is what could happen in a best-Japanese-case scenario.)
But honestly it doesn't matter much anyway - yes the US wins the war eventually, but more to the point, IOTL the Japanese sunk basically all the US carriers in the several naval battles off Guadalcanal. The New Hebrides or Fiji are basically worthless as defensive positions (Nimitz will just bypass them), and the IJN won't be doing anything after the end of 1942 regardless because they're out of fuel. So there's not really much more success Japan could have, even with Midway going perfectly to plan.
- BNC
Frankly, no. The Australians had nearly 9000 troops defending the airfield, local air superiority, and a serious firepower advantage. Their transport options are heavily constrained, as they were at Guadalcanal, by the airfield. And without the distraction of Guadalcanal the Australian-American cruiser-destroyer group and B-17s from New Caledonia and the environs can add their firepower.
And even if they do, then what? Still gotta capture Port Moresby, and a large chunk of their forces just got chewed up taking Milne Bay.
This actually would increase British involvement in the Pacific war. The British would be hard pressed to help their American allies (which they already did OTL while managing their own war effort against Japan). Japan would launch operation FS, which would put it a lot of combat with the ANZACs. This would also dangerously cut Australia and New Zealand from the rest of the empire (but it won’t knock the Allies out). Assuming events in Europe go as OTL, the British still create the British Pacific Fleet and is forced to bear more of the blood fighting Japan. China spills more blood too, as Operation Ichi Go was originally scheduled for 1942. The Solomons campaign resulted in the loss of 6-7 Japanese divisions. The Soviets might bear more blood too as more Allied resources go in the Pacific.
Why do people keep saying this across multiple threads?
Yes, ships from the US will have to come further south to get around Fiji, but all the oil is still coming from the Gulf, just as normal. The UK isn't sending anything though the Med so no great change there. Down through the Bite just like OTL. Who wants to go near the DEI?
Enough sundries were produced locally that the US owed Australia at the end of Lend Lease. High performance aircraft and vehicles from the US are going to require more hulls to go south of Fiji, but that is the price of doing business.
*This map makes me want to mispronounce Melbourne with an American accent like an old news reel.
Your map also showed the IJN operating in the Indian ocean, intended to cut off China from supply. Japan winning at Midway would put it in a much stronger position in the Indian ocean. The British OTL was expecting a major Japanese offensive and Churchill was worried that Japan would invade Ceylon. Japan never invaded Ceylon because it’s even more far than Australia and we we know what an invasion of Oz would be like. But the IJN is still a threat. The British OTL sent one of their best admirals, Somerville to take control of the Royal Navy Far East fleet who already had a successful history. Somerville would likely play the same game with the Japanese as he did to the Italians.Why do people keep saying this across multiple threads?
Yes, ships from the US will have to come further south to get around Fiji, but all the oil is still coming from the Gulf, just as normal. The UK isn't sending anything though the Med so no great change there. Down through the Bite just like OTL. Who wants to go near the DEI?
Enough sundries were produced locally that the US owed Australia at the end of Lend Lease. High performance aircraft and vehicles from the US are going to require more hulls to go south of Fiji, but that is the price of doing business.
*This map makes me want to mispronounce Melbourne with an American accent like an old news reel.
If they win at Midway, the war is lost, its that simple. Even if the Americans only lost one carrier, it would have put the Japanese within striking distance of the Hawaiian Islands, which could then be occupied or at least be made worthless as a fleet base, and just like that, Yamamoto's promise would be one step closer to fruition.
At the grand strategy level I suppose you're right, but they did have have plans for the region.
Regarding the Pacific,
(A) Taking Port Moresby in combination with
(B) Taking Fiji, to cut off Aussie land from the US.
Further, (C), they wanted to secure pretty much anything hostile between their "resource areas" in SEA and Japan. Finally, (D) they intended to fortify a load of Islands that the US would need to take or address before moving on to prosecute the home islands.
Regarding the Asian theatre,
(A) Continue to prosecute a war against China, specifically by...
(B) Cutting off the Chinese army from Allied supply, (C), smashing Chinese troop concentrations and (D) clearing the British out of the Non-India portions of SEA.
I'm not saying that they had good plans, just that they did have plans.
Wait a second! I've generally come across people who focus so much on the impossibility of a Japanese victory in the Pacific war that they refuse to analyze threads like this. You my friend, you have a different kind of problem.
The trouble with any Japanese victory in the Pacific, (and don't feel dumb btw, the number of textbooks that support what you said are appalling) is that (A) Japan had no furl, and (B), the US was about to.outproduve Japan about 130 to a dozen-ish over the next couple years. Oh, there are other problems too, but those seems to capture the essence of it.
Edit: the Americans DID lose a carrier at Midway, and had the air wings seriously attrited on both the others. Furthermore, had the Japanese somehow overcome the Americans on the Island (they were looking at landing a short brigade of light infantry against 3 battalions worth of dug in and pre sited troops), Midway is an atrocious jumping off point for Hawaii. There are some pretty good sources free to find online regarding this all.
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Even without the carriers, the Japanese successfully taking Hawaii is damn near impossible. Even reducing it as a fleet base is damn near impossible, the Japanese cannot sustain their carriers that far out long enough to do an appreciable dent to the harbor facilities - and they'd be contending with hundreds of land-based aircraft in the meantime.
What I mean is it puts them within striking distance of Pearl Harbor, making it a worthless base to project power into the greater Pacific. And if Japan is able to seize Pearl after forcing the US to abandon it or invest a colossal amount of resources into clearing the nearby islands, then it wouldn't matter if the Americans are able to outproduce Japan, because their shipyards in the west can be blasted to pieces by naval and air bombardment, as well as the Panama Canal, forcing the Americans to go all the way around the continent.Wait a second! I've generally come across people who focus so much on the impossibility of a Japanese victory in the Pacific war that they refuse to analyze threads like this. You my friend, you have a different kind of problem.
The trouble with any Japanese victory in the Pacific, (and don't feel dumb btw, the number of textbooks that support what you said are appalling) is that (A) Japan had no furl, and (B), the US was about to.outproduve Japan about 130 to a dozen-ish over the next couple years. Oh, there are other problems too, but those seems to capture the essence of it.
Edit: the Americans DID lose a carrier at Midway, and had the air wings seriously attrited on both the others. Furthermore, had the Japanese somehow overcome the Americans on the Island (they were looking at landing a short brigade of light infantry against 3 battalions worth of dug in and pre sited troops), Midway is an atrocious jumping off point for Hawaii. There are some pretty good sources free to find online regarding this all.
Ummmmm with what magical extra fuel reserves and shipping does Japan have to pull this off? Oh and while in theory Pearl Harbor is within theoretical bomber range of Midway as was shown over Germany unescorted bombers are going to have a bad day. And that was with B-17s and B-24s tough and well armed beasts of bombers not the terribly undergunned and weakly built bombers of Japan not to mention Midway is really too small be a practical bomber base.
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McPherson
Banned
Terrain, disease, weather and Australians. The IJA loses big time.
Somerville at Teleuda was relatively ineffective. During the Indian Ocean Raid, he was less than effective. Good admiral? YMMV. Mine does not. I would prefer FLETCHER and TF 16, to be frank about it. At least then I KNOW Japanese flattops will be sunk, even if he "loses".
To quote the chief of the FAA at the time of the Coral Sea when the results came in, when the RN air staff asked him what secrets they should hold back from the Americans... "Tell them everything. We're not very good at this aircraft carrier business. They apparently are."
Operation FS was the IJA/IJN plan to isolate Australia as a base to retake the DEI. The priorities were changed by the Doolittle Raid that demonstrated USN forces based in Hawaii were a direct threat to the core of the Japanese Empire.
By end of March 1942, Combined Fleet Planning, NOT the IJN General Staff Planning, had the following timetable:
After approval by Adm Yamamoto, the plan was reluctantly accepted by Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano in early April.
12 April 1942 Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka, chief of the Plans Division of the Navy General Staff's First Section (Operations) placed an edited version of the Combined Fleet plan before his opposite number in Army General Staff, Major General Shin'ichi Tanaka. Throughout the first three months of 1942, Tanaka had shown unrelenting opposition to any further extension of Japan's eastern defensive perimeter. With specific reference to Hawaii, Tanaka had opposed such an operation on the ground that the logistical and operational problems were insuperable, and anyway, the army could not spare the three divisions deemed necessary to capture Hawaii. With this in mind, the plan shown to Tanaka made no mention of any operation beyond Midway. However, Tanaka astutely recognised that the plan was intended to provide a foundation for an assault on Hawaii after Midway had been captured. He told Tomioka bluntly that an attack on Hawaii would be an unwarranted extension of Japan's eastern defensive perimeter and that the army would not cooperate in any way with the Midway plan.
Despite Major General Tanaka's rebuff, Captain Tomioka prepared a report entitled "Imperial Navy Operational Plans for Stage Two of the Greater East Asia War". The report stated that the Pacific should be given highest strategic priority; that Midway should be seized and the US Pacific Fleet destroyed; Midway would be captured and garrisoned by Imperial Navy marines. Achievement of these objectives would signal the end of revised Stage Two. In Stage Three, Johnston and Palmyra Islands would be occupied. The invasion of Hawaii would take place in Stage Four. It was noted above that the Combined Fleet plan provided for the occupation of Johnston and Palmyra Islands in August 1942, and the invasion of the large island of Hawaii in October 1942.
On 16 April 1942, the Midway/Hawaii plan was submitted to Emperor Hirohito by Admiral Osami Nagano. The anticipated protest from the Chief of Army General Staff, General Sugiyama, did not eventuate.
18 April 1942, the Doolittle raid on Tokyo and other Japanese cities dramatically altered Japan's strategic priorities. The raid stunned Japan's military leaders, and after interrogation of captured American pilots disclosed that the carrier-launched attack had originated from Hawaii, the Imperial Army changed its attitude to operations in the Pacific, and against Hawaii in particular.
19 April 1942, Major General Tanaka informed Captain Tomioka that the Imperial Army had changed its mind about expanding the Pacific perimeters. The army would provide troops for the Midway and Aleutian offensives. He asked for more information about the "Eastern Operation" (i.e. the capture of Hawaii). Tanaka talked about bold initiatives in the Pacific so as to end the war quickly. During the month following the Doolittle Raid, the Imperial Army decided that Hawaii should be captured.
23 May 1942, an order issued by Imperial General Headquarters provided for training of certain army units for an assault on the less strongly defended big island called Hawaii.
3 June 1942 Major General Tanaka instructed his subordinates in the Operations Section of Army General Staff to prepare a feasibility study for an assault on Oahu.
IF the USN can be shorn of its carriers AND the IJN destroys remaining surface units in a 'decisive action' THEN the 'Eastern Operation' would probably proceed.
By 1938 the Navy had expended about $75,000,000 on the Pearl Harbor base, and the Army more than twice that amount on military installations to protect it.
Army from 1935 until the autumn of 1939 accorded the Hawaiian Department top priority in the supply of equipment, and it increased the strength of the garrison by more than 50 percent, from 14,821 to 21,289 between the summers of 1935 and 1938.
Oahu produced only 15 percent of its own requirements in food, but the other islands could readily make up the deficiency in an emergency if communication was maintained with them. The War Department objected in both 1935 and 1937, that its basic argument against broadening the Army mission in Hawaii was the following: "If the Fleet is in the Pacific and free to act, Oahu will be, with the completion of the existing defense project, secure against any attacks that may be launched against it. It is only in the case that the Fleet is not present or free to act that the security of the Hawaiian Islands can be seriously threatened."
By end of March 1942, Combined Fleet Planning, NOT the IJN General Staff Planning, had the following timetable:
- Midway and Aleutian islands to be seized in early June 1942, triggering a decisive battle that would complete the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet;
- Johnston and Palmyra Islands were to be occupied in August 1942;
- the attack on the large island of Hawaii would begin in October 1942,
- and culminate in an assault on Oahu in March 1943
After approval by Adm Yamamoto, the plan was reluctantly accepted by Chief of the Navy General Staff, Admiral Osami Nagano in early April.
12 April 1942 Captain Sadatoshi Tomioka, chief of the Plans Division of the Navy General Staff's First Section (Operations) placed an edited version of the Combined Fleet plan before his opposite number in Army General Staff, Major General Shin'ichi Tanaka. Throughout the first three months of 1942, Tanaka had shown unrelenting opposition to any further extension of Japan's eastern defensive perimeter. With specific reference to Hawaii, Tanaka had opposed such an operation on the ground that the logistical and operational problems were insuperable, and anyway, the army could not spare the three divisions deemed necessary to capture Hawaii. With this in mind, the plan shown to Tanaka made no mention of any operation beyond Midway. However, Tanaka astutely recognised that the plan was intended to provide a foundation for an assault on Hawaii after Midway had been captured. He told Tomioka bluntly that an attack on Hawaii would be an unwarranted extension of Japan's eastern defensive perimeter and that the army would not cooperate in any way with the Midway plan.
Despite Major General Tanaka's rebuff, Captain Tomioka prepared a report entitled "Imperial Navy Operational Plans for Stage Two of the Greater East Asia War". The report stated that the Pacific should be given highest strategic priority; that Midway should be seized and the US Pacific Fleet destroyed; Midway would be captured and garrisoned by Imperial Navy marines. Achievement of these objectives would signal the end of revised Stage Two. In Stage Three, Johnston and Palmyra Islands would be occupied. The invasion of Hawaii would take place in Stage Four. It was noted above that the Combined Fleet plan provided for the occupation of Johnston and Palmyra Islands in August 1942, and the invasion of the large island of Hawaii in October 1942.
On 16 April 1942, the Midway/Hawaii plan was submitted to Emperor Hirohito by Admiral Osami Nagano. The anticipated protest from the Chief of Army General Staff, General Sugiyama, did not eventuate.
18 April 1942, the Doolittle raid on Tokyo and other Japanese cities dramatically altered Japan's strategic priorities. The raid stunned Japan's military leaders, and after interrogation of captured American pilots disclosed that the carrier-launched attack had originated from Hawaii, the Imperial Army changed its attitude to operations in the Pacific, and against Hawaii in particular.
19 April 1942, Major General Tanaka informed Captain Tomioka that the Imperial Army had changed its mind about expanding the Pacific perimeters. The army would provide troops for the Midway and Aleutian offensives. He asked for more information about the "Eastern Operation" (i.e. the capture of Hawaii). Tanaka talked about bold initiatives in the Pacific so as to end the war quickly. During the month following the Doolittle Raid, the Imperial Army decided that Hawaii should be captured.
23 May 1942, an order issued by Imperial General Headquarters provided for training of certain army units for an assault on the less strongly defended big island called Hawaii.
3 June 1942 Major General Tanaka instructed his subordinates in the Operations Section of Army General Staff to prepare a feasibility study for an assault on Oahu.
IF the USN can be shorn of its carriers AND the IJN destroys remaining surface units in a 'decisive action' THEN the 'Eastern Operation' would probably proceed.
By 1938 the Navy had expended about $75,000,000 on the Pearl Harbor base, and the Army more than twice that amount on military installations to protect it.
Army from 1935 until the autumn of 1939 accorded the Hawaiian Department top priority in the supply of equipment, and it increased the strength of the garrison by more than 50 percent, from 14,821 to 21,289 between the summers of 1935 and 1938.
Oahu produced only 15 percent of its own requirements in food, but the other islands could readily make up the deficiency in an emergency if communication was maintained with them. The War Department objected in both 1935 and 1937, that its basic argument against broadening the Army mission in Hawaii was the following: "If the Fleet is in the Pacific and free to act, Oahu will be, with the completion of the existing defense project, secure against any attacks that may be launched against it. It is only in the case that the Fleet is not present or free to act that the security of the Hawaiian Islands can be seriously threatened."
After the battle they were in less of a position to go on the offensive. Sure, the Midway invasion force would have failed even if they'd won at sea, but the major victory at Midway was the sinking of the four Japanese carriers (also one heavy cruiser but the carriers were more important).
It wouldn't just be Americans clamoring for more British involvement. An American defeat at Midway would have Australia and New Zealand screaming bloody murder if the Brits didn't direct more resources to the Pacific. Sure successfully invading and occupying those countries is beyond Japan's capabilities but that's not the same thing as people at the time not fearing it. If the Japanese captured more of the Aleutians, you could get the Canadians joining that chorus.
We Americans did lose one carrier, the Yorktown. Even if the battle at sea was a Japanese victory it's unlikely they'd be able to capture the island. Even if ASB destroyed all the US forces involved in the battle (and the ones on the island), Midway would only make for a suitable base of operations for seizing Hawaii if the American commanders drank enough lead paint to make them completely ignore the Pacific war while Japan builds up it's supply lines and logistics.
McPherson
Banned
Did Yamamoto explain to IGHQ that he would probably be unable to scrounge up the 200 freighters (800,000 tonnes of shipping) for the logistics lift for Hawaii because it had already been SUNK by the inept Americans?
I think at the end of 1942 they were only 89,000 tons down (not 800,000) as they had captured about 1m tons of shipping at the start of the war. (this is including the Solomons Campaign).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allied_submarines_in_the_Pacific_War
Pearl Harbor isn't really in striking distance of Midway. Neither is the West Coast or Panama really in striking distance of Pearl Harbor.