The Pacific War is a talked to death topic on the forum, and I wanted to see if I could add something to its most discussed campaign. Let's say that the Japanese fleet trying to invade Port Moresby at the Coral Sea was still turned back, but instead of losing the carrier Shoho, it was just damaged. Then at Midway, the Japanese get lucky and sink the Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown, without permanently losing any of their carriers. However, due to their poor amphibious doctrine, the invasion force under Kiyonao Ichiki (which in OTL was wiped out in the first land battle on Guadalcanal) is devastated and forced to retreat. While the Japanese would view this is as a huge failure, it would probably be for the best, as Midway was too close to Hawaii for the Navy to support with their abysmal logistics. The question now becomes, what does Japan do next? They were still trying to take Port Moresby, and landed troops at Buna and Gona on July 21 and Milne Bay on August 25 to accomplish this historically. With only the Saratoga, Wasp, and Ranger left as carriers, I doubt the US would want to risk invading Guadalcanal in this scenario. Could the Japanese take Milne Bay by sending the roughly 5,000 troops under the command of Kiyotake Kawaguchi they sent to Guadalcanal in late August and early September, instead to Milne? Finally there are long term questions that need answering. According to this excellent article, Guadalcanal was when the Japanese merchant fleet really began to incur losses, resulting in less shipping available for the civilian economy. Without Guadalcanal, how well could the Japanese economy do before shipping losses to submarines gets out of hand? Could the navy decide to divert more resources to protect shipping? Guadalcanal is also when the Japanese Naval Air Force began to suffer irreparable attrition. Without the battle, could they maintain the quality of their pilots with a better rotation and training program?
Japan doesn't lose the Shoho and wins at Midway: Now what?
- Thread starter AbeLincoln1865
- Start date
Operation FS. This was the next step in Japanese plans.
So among other things that force you mentioned is still going to Guadalcanal, the Japanese want that airfield for support of Operation FS.
So among other things that force you mentioned is still going to Guadalcanal, the Japanese want that airfield for support of Operation FS.
No, Japan only sent Kawaguchi to Guadalcanal because of the US invasion. According to page 108 of Bloody Ridge by Michael S. Smith, Kawaguchi was being prepared to be sent to New Guinea. The airfield was already under construction by the Japanese before the US landings in August.
Oh, right, duh, thanks for correcting me.
In that case, looking over the Japanese plans... no. The Japanese wildly underestimated the number of troops in the area and the Army refused to provide any troops due to the vulnerability of Kawaguchi's preferred barge transport to air attack. And in any case, Kawaguchi's 35th infantry brigade was earmarked for the Fiji invasion, with the division-strength South Seas Force allocated to New Caledonia and the division-strength Aoba detachment allocated to another naval invasion of Port Moresby.
BobTheBarbarian
Banned
The Japanese, if I recall correctly, believed there were only about 5,000 allied troops on New Caledonia and that most of them were noncombat (engineers, etc). They would have met a nasty surprise if they tried to land there.
Yes, before. FS pretty much evaporated after Midway anyway.
Yup. They badly underestimated how many troops were on pretty much all the islands they planned to hit. This is rather something of a running theme for the Japanese in the back half of 1942.
Since looks like nobody has said it yet:
Japan loses the war.
It can't be helped, once total war between USA and Japan has started Japan has lost that war.
Killing all 3 American carriers and losing no carrier themselves is a big win. But America will respond with the Essex spam eventually and the Kidou Butai will be overwhelmed.
Midway would still be a strategic defeat for the Kidou Butai in this scenario and, even without the loss of 4 carriers, I really don't see the Japanese doing any better going forward. The US might have to delay several of its OTL actions while it gathers a new fleet together, but once America captures an airfield capable of getting a B-29 to the Home Islands, it's game over.
Do you think the Aoba detachment could have taken Port Moresby had the navy supported it?
BobTheBarbarian
Banned
Even before that, prior to their initial offensive in December 1941/Spring 1942 the Japanese believed the "ABDA" countries had only about half as many troops as were actually present in SE-Asia. Later on at the end of the war they shifted in the opposite direction and believed the United States to possess much greater strength than it actually did (prior to the planned invasion of Japan). The quote about New Caledonia came from JM-45, "History of IGHQ (Army Section)" chart 10, "Estimate of the Enemy Strength, May 1942." (below)
(Also note estimate for Midway Island.)
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I doubt it. By July, when the operation was to be launched, the Australians had roughly two division-equivalents on hand - the veteran 7th division, two independent brigades, and two militia battalions. Even with a brigade assigned to garrison Milne Bay, I have serious doubts about the Japanese ability to take Port Moresby from the sea while outnumbered.
I feel this would likely cause the Japanese to postpone an invasion of Fiji and New Caledonia until New Guinea could be secured for them. If they concentrated all the forces they sent to Guadalcanal on New Guinea, I think at the very least they could take Milne Bay and Wau.
Except the problem is that the post-Coral Sea operational plan called for the New Caledonia and Port Moresby operations to occur basically simultaneously, with the Aoba Detachment setting sail after the South Seas Force sails for New Caledonia.
I should also clarify that the South Seas force and Aoba detachment were not division-scale units; they were more reinforced regiments. Which just further hampers things.
I strongly recommend reading this book on Operation FS, it's a very comprehensive source.
Thanks, I saw this book mentioned in BNC's timeline on Operation FS, but I haven't had a chance to read it. Was the invasion of Fiji by Kawaguchi planned to take place after New Caledonia? In addition, what do you think Japan would do after the destruction of the South Seas Force and Aoba? While these would be rather severe losses, both units were lost in fighting in New Guinea and Guadalcanal in OTL.
The invasion was indeed to take place after the New Caledonia operation; it's likely that this would be cancelled in the event of the South Seas Force and Aoba Detachment being defeated, because having New Caledonia sit astride their supply lines is no bueno for the Japanese.
And it will fail; much like how throwing a reinforced regiment at basically two divisions is not going to go well, doing the same against the Americal division on New Caledonia is also not likely to end well. Ironically, the only island the Japanese would've been likely to take was Fiji, as they actually had a halfway decent estimation of Allied forces garrisoning the islands, namely a brigade of New Zealanders.
Right, I'm curious what Japan would try to accomplish in New Guinea after all this though.
marathag
Banned
They didn't have a plan, beyond sink USN ships till the US comes to terms, and gives Japan everything they dream about.
In the grand scheme of things, the battle of Midway was not decisive.
Significant and morally important, oh yes, but a different result of the battle itself change nothing.
You could have a sudden abnormal storm completely obliterating every single American ship and all the ground troops at Midway without the Japanese having to spend a single round of ammo, and the war ends exactly the same way, Japan get crushed under the American industrial output.
As long as the US are willing to fight, Japan can only lose.
And the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor insured that the US wouldn't make a negociated peace.
The entire Japanese war plan was :
1) lure ennemy fleet into a trap
2) destroy ennemy fleet in a single battle
3) => the war is won (somehow, the how destroying the US fleet would cause the USA to suddenly be conquered by Japan was never "explained" by the Japanese)
Significant and morally important, oh yes, but a different result of the battle itself change nothing.
You could have a sudden abnormal storm completely obliterating every single American ship and all the ground troops at Midway without the Japanese having to spend a single round of ammo, and the war ends exactly the same way, Japan get crushed under the American industrial output.
As long as the US are willing to fight, Japan can only lose.
And the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor insured that the US wouldn't make a negociated peace.
The entire Japanese war plan was :
1) lure ennemy fleet into a trap
2) destroy ennemy fleet in a single battle
3) => the war is won (somehow, the how destroying the US fleet would cause the USA to suddenly be conquered by Japan was never "explained" by the Japanese)