Japan doesn't go to war in 1941?

[torten]

Since the Pacific War didn't go too well for Japan, let's presume that in mid-1941, Japan realises that it does not have a chance of taking on the US and winning, and instead decides that peace is the best option. Obviously, this means that Japan will need to address it's oil shortage some other way, and try to get the embargo lifted, which will involve Japan withdrawing from China.

So presuming that Japan withdraws from China in an attempt to get the US to withdraw the embargo, what will happen next?

Will Japan consider war with Germany? A Japanese naval force would be very useful in the Med, and a Japanese division or two would be helpful to the British.

Will Japan be allowed to keep Indochina, Manchuria, Mengjiang, and maybe even Hainan, or will Japan be forced to hand back these areas to their rightful owners?

How will Japan cope in a cold war? Will they drift towards the Soviets as an alliance of convenience, become a US bulwark in south-east Asia, or become a pariah state, maybe supporting the independence movement in the Dutch East Indies, in the hope of getting hold of the sweet oil on offer, and encouraging other ex-western colonies into their sphere?

 

[lionhead]

A major coup in both the Japanese government and the Japanese military will have to happen before they decide anything like that, with that i mean Hirohito would have to be disposed of, something that is beyond ridiculous. A lot of heads rolling and some major defeats and humiliations against the Chinese are also neccesary for them to decide to quit on China.

For them to join the allies, impossible within the timeframe of WWII, the Japanese mindset was not of cooperation with their neighbors, but of Imperialism. They would have to give up on territory in Manchuria, Indochina and Taiwan before the allies would be willing to work with them. Hell, they migth have to give up on Korea. They would have to pay war reparations to China that they can't pay. Which Japanese at that time would agree to that?

A Japan severely weakened by a coup like that and withdrawal from China and off the main Asian continent could even prompt an attack by the USSR for Manchuria and the Sikhalin island.

 

[bsmart]

Lionhead pretty much gets it right.

Agreed that there would be major coup in Japan IF the government attempted to disengage from China. There is no way that Japan would be allowed to stay in Indochina. That was the actual reason for the embargo.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
So presuming that Japan withdraws from China in an attempt to get the US to withdraw the embargo, what will happen next?

Negotiations to withdraw from China, AND French Indochina would definitly result in negotiations for the embargos being lifted. The occupation of Indochina was the primary reason for imposing the 1941 embargos (there had been weak sanctions earlier).

Will Japan consider war with Germany? A Japanese naval force would be very useful in the Med, and a Japanese division or two would be helpful to the British.

If the incentives are large enough. Japan, like Italy, was disapointed by its 'profit' from the Great War. Britain & the US will have to offer some serious economic incentives to attact substantial participation.

Will Japan be allowed to keep Indochina, Manchuria, Mengjiang, and maybe even Hainan, or will Japan be forced to hand back these areas to their rightful owners?

Withdrawing from Indochina is a given. That was the seminal event that led to the 1941 embargos. Chinese terriitory occupied after 1937 will be part of a peace settlement with China. Manchuria is tougher since the KMT claim of soverignity was based on the old imperial arrignement & more than a few Manchurians prefered independance to the KMT, or saw the Japanese as a better bet. To put it another way there was no clear external 'rightful owner' of Manchuria.

How will Japan cope in a cold war? Will they drift towards the Soviets as an alliance of convenience, become a US bulwark in south-east Asia, or become a pariah state, maybe supporting the independence movement in the Dutch East Indies, in the hope of getting hold of the sweet oil on offer, and encouraging other ex-western colonies into their sphere?

I dont know enough about internal Japanese politics to comment. Have read some books, but its more complex than can be answered on that basis. About all I can say is the Zaibatsu were at the core of Japans politics & they would remain influential for some time after a 1941-42 settlement of the China incident.

 

[EternalCynic]

If the incentives are large enough. Japan, like Italy, was disapointed by its 'profit' from the Great War. Britain & the US will have to offer some serious economic incentives to attact substantial participation.

Japan and Germany had been signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact since 1936. Would anyone trust the Japanese as reliable allies against the Germans?

At least Germany in WW1 had token colonies in Asia which the allies could promise to Japan. What incentives could the UK and US promise to Japan? And, how could Japan even trust these promises?

Withdrawing from Indochina is a given. That was the seminal event that led to the 1941 embargos. Chinese terriitory occupied after 1937 will be part of a peace settlement with China. Manchuria is tougher since the KMT claim of soverignity was based on the old imperial arrignement & more than a few Manchurians prefered independance to the KMT, or saw the Japanese as a better bet. To put it another way there was no clear external 'rightful owner' of Manchuria.

Japan will be required to leave post-1937 Chinese territory as a given. But beyond that, the Lytton Report concluded without any doubt that there was no indigenous separatist movement in Manchuria, and that the entire casus belli for Japan's invasion was fictional.

In any case, a Japan that keeps Manchuria will inevitably be at war with China before long. Pre-1937, China was undergoing a Three Year Plan to build a modern army with a supporting military industrial complex. ITTL, China will definitely resume its pre-war plans, and by 1950/55 be in a position to reconquer Manchuria itself. It's unlikely the US - now victorious against Germany - will do anything more than pay lip service about peacefully resolving the dispute. It will be relieved that China - rather than the USSR - has taken it. And besides, a Japan reduced to its small islands leaves the US as the uncontested naval power in the Pacific. Bottom line is, Japan simply cannot keep any part of China indefinitely due to the situation in China and elsewhere.

 

[I want to learn]

Assuming Japan withdraws to Manchuria, Formosa and Korea in 1941 and avoids other major wars, I think the question becomes what happens first: China unites and modernizes such that it can retake Manchuria with overwhelming force, or Japan obtains atomic weapons. I suspect both are on track to happen by the mid 50s. Of course, without Japan fighting to the bitter end, atomic bombs may not get used in the course of ATL WW2.

 

[zert]

IF such a Japanese action could take place, they may be allowed to keep Korea and Taiwan. Manchuria might be a long term withdrawal with the Japanese propping up the puppet government of Puyi.

I have huge doubts Japan would ever try to undertake such a deal, but so many things in WW2 could be considered ASB if not already in OTL.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Japan and Germany had been signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact since 1936. Would anyone trust the Japanese as reliable allies against the Germans?

Its not a matter of "trust". Its a mater of keeping a dagger at Japans throat & incentives to cooperate.

At least Germany in WW1 had token colonies in Asia which the allies could promise to Japan. What incentives could the UK and US promise to Japan? And, how could Japan even trust these promises?

The incentives would be to reduce & eventually remove the embargos. Westerners, particularly Americans are ill informed on how economically devastating those were against Japan. It was not just a 'oil embargo' or a cutting off of scrap steel sales. At the core of it was the cutting off of Japan from the global banking system, or more specifically the freezing of all japanese accounts in the New York and London banks. Not only was all Japnese payments & collections through those banks frozen but all credit was cut off. Japan was deeply dependant on revolving and long term credit with US banks. Its new empire was not yet producing a significant cash flow & the war with China was creating a deep deficit. To bridge the gap Japan had been borrowing as much as it could in the US & to a lesser extent from Britain. This was not just the Zaibatsu for their industrial ventures. One of the ugly little things here is the US banks had been helping the Japanese government fiance their war in China. In 1941 the occupation of Indo China created political conditions in the US where the anti Japanese faction (represented by Roosevelt) could get the support needed to cut off the Japanese loans & freeze their bank accounts.

In 1941 Japan had two options for dealing with the embargo. 1. was to capitulate & negotiate its way of of Indo China & China, 2. Attempt to force the US and Britain through war to accept Japans imperial ambitions.

Japan will be required to leave post-1937 Chinese territory as a given. But beyond that, the Lytton Report concluded without any doubt that there was no indigenous separatist movement in Manchuria, and that the entire casus belli for Japan's invasion was fictional.

That is the foreign version. It may be accurate, but it also fits a political objective of forcing Japan to other goals.

In any case, a Japan that keeps Manchuria will inevitably be at war with China before long. Pre-1937, China was undergoing a Three Year Plan to build a modern army with a supporting military industrial complex. ITTL, China will definitely resume its pre-war plans, and by 1950/55 be in a position to reconquer Manchuria itself. It's unlikely the US - now victorious against Germany - will do anything more than pay lip service about peacefully resolving the dispute. It will be relieved that China - rather than the USSR - has taken it. And besides, a Japan reduced to its small islands leaves the US as the uncontested naval power in the Pacific. Bottom line is, Japan simply cannot keep any part of China indefinitely due to the situation in China and elsewhere.

Chinas ability to create such a military and attempt this goal depends among other things on foreign banks, mostly in the US and Britain to underwrite it. Maybe they would, perhaps they would not. Another question is if the KMT would accquire the ability to organize such a thing, or would it sink further into corruption and stagnation & implode into another warlord era.

 

[torten]

Chinas ability to create such a military and attempt this goal depends among other things on foreign banks, mostly in the US and Britain to underwrite it. Maybe they would, perhaps they would not. Another question is if the KMT would accquire the ability to organize such a thing, or would it sink further into corruption and stagnation & implode into another warlord era.

Which then works very well for Japan, as they can then support certain warlords against others, though I would expect the soviets and Americans to do the same.

 

[EternalCynic]

Its not a matter of "trust". Its a mater of keeping a dagger at Japans throat & incentives to cooperate.



The incentives would be to reduce & eventually remove the embargos. Westerners, particularly Americans are ill informed on how economically devastating those were against Japan. It was not just a 'oil embargo' or a cutting off of scrap steel sales. At the core of it was the cutting off of Japan from the global banking system, or more specifically the freezing of all japanese accounts in the New York and London banks. Not only was all Japnese payments & collections through those banks frozen but all credit was cut off. Japan was deeply dependant on revolving and long term credit with US banks. Its new empire was not yet producing a significant cash flow & the war with China was creating a deep deficit. To bridge the gap Japan had been borrowing as much as it could in the US & to a lesser extent from Britain. This was not just the Zaibatsu for their industrial ventures. One of the ugly little things here is the US banks had been helping the Japanese government fiance their war in China. In 1941 the occupation of Indo China created political conditions in the US where the anti Japanese faction (represented by Roosevelt) could get the support needed to cut off the Japanese loans & freeze their bank accounts.

Such an arrangement would at best buy time before Japan regains the strength to resume its campaign in China. Or, at least until a few uppity colonels decide to expand their fief and present their superiors and the western powers with a fait accompli.

That is the foreign version. It may be accurate, but it also fits a political objective of forcing Japan to other goals.

May I remind everyone that the Lytton report was called for *after* Japan conquered Manchuria, to determine whether Manchukuo was a genuinely independent state which allied with Japan, or a puppet of Japan. Japan made every effort to convince the delegation of Manchukuo's legitimacy (staging pro-government rallies along the delegation's route, etc). The delegation saw right through their BS. And, in any case, Japan's conduct in the decade after it conquered Manchuria left much to be desired.

Chinas ability to create such a military and attempt this goal depends among other things on foreign banks, mostly in the US and Britain to underwrite it. Maybe they would, perhaps they would not. Another question is if the KMT would accquire the ability to organize such a thing, or would it sink further into corruption and stagnation & implode into another warlord era.

China under Chiang's KMT had already demonstrated the potential to accomplish such goals. Most of the warlords had, one but one, been made to heel. The Commies were reduced to a few thousand hicks wandering around the countryside. It probably was Chiang's pushback to Japan's latest salami tactic which led to the generals' more aggressive behavour in July 1937.

All the KMT factions and warlords which *could* have collaborated with Japan had already done so - and who wouldn't? By 1938, China's strategic position was horrendous. Those generals which could ever have collaborated with the enemy would either be safely in retirement in Japan, or literally thrown to the dogs in China.

I wouldn't count on Japan's development of nukes (unlikely before, say, 1960) to retain Manchuria either. Just ask the French in Algeria how useful nukes are in pacifying a restive colony. Or, how nukes didn't save the Soviet empire.

 

[BBadolato]

It Depends, you did have the U.S and Japan in Modus Vivendi talks if you can at least prevent the Japanese from taking Southern Indochina and at least appearing reputable the U.S might not go for the embargo. Still, the thing no Japan in WW2 does not save Japan necessarily, China was still a quagmire where the Japanese could hardly exert that much control in, this in even after having most of their troops there for at least 4 years, They would only have another major offensive just 4 years afterwards.

 

[CalBear]

This was the Final U.S. position aka: The Hull Note(it should be remembered that this was AFTER the U.S. had received Intel that the Japanese were adding force in Southern Indochina, prior to that the U.S. had be ready to present a much less harsh deal including oil for civilian use)

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411126bpw.html

 

[lionhead]

This was the Final U.S. position aka: The Hull Note(it should be remembered that this was AFTER the U.S. had received Intel that the Japanese were adding force in Southern Indochina, prior to that the U.S. had be ready to present a much less harsh deal including oil for civilian use)

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411126bpw.html