Japan attacks the USSR in 1941.

[englander1]

The plan below was favoured by what was know as the Strike North Group in the Japanese government which was backed by most the army but oppossed by most the Navy who wanted to move South.

Japanese operational planning was revised in 1934: the opening round of a hypothetical war with the USSR was contemplated in the neighborhood of the Manchurian frontiers. In 1934 the Soviet Tupolev TB-3 (ANT-6) four-engined "Super Heavy Bomber", reportedly capable of striking the Japanese home islands, was deployed in the Maritime province of Siberia (the first direct threat to the Japanese islands). In view of this situation the Japanese Army Staff effected radical changes in its operational planning for eventual hostilities with the Soviet Union:

1. From a mobilizable force of 30 fully equipped ground divisions, some 24 were earmarked for commitment to operations against the USSR.
2. Great importance was to be attached to air operations from the very outset of war.
3. Japan should seek to wage battle on Soviet soil from the beginning of hostilities.
4. The primary axis of offensive operations should be eastward, from Manchuria.
5. Submarine bases and bomber aircraft sites aimed at Japan must wiped out at the beginning.
6. After the success of eastward operations, forces should be deployed for an offensive northward, the objective being the Lake Baikal district.

The idea of launching an eastern offensive was first conceived at the time of the new plan of 1934. Three years later Japanese operational planning was again revised:

1. At the outbreak of a war, the forces stationed in Manchuria will mount an offensive against the Soviet Union; reinforcements thereafter dispatched from homeland will join in the attack. This plan differed from its predecessor, which had called for an offensive only after the reinforcements had arrived in Manchuria.
2. After successfully concluding the eastern offensive, Japanese forces should not immediately drive toward the Lake Baikal region, but should instead consolidate along the Hsingan Mountains Range and prepare for subsequent operations.
3. Operational planning against must attach prime importance to actions against both China and the Soviet Union.

 

[gathart]

Most likely it will end up in a Japanese defeat

They fought a small border war, but the Russian were able to route the Japanese.

I think with the industrial power of the USSR, more natural resources, their superior tank force and a better military leader (Zhukov) will make it a no-no for the Japanese Empire to attack. If Germany will attack the USSR and Japan attacks simultaneous and is able to gain quickly teritory and able to penetrate Siberia then they have a change.

It also would mean no USA involvement (would they sacrifice their young man for the communists? I think not.) and a defeat of the USSR more likely.

 

[englander1]

If the Strike North group had won the argument and instead of invading Indo-China in 1940 (means no oil sanctions and much less other trade sanctions) and attacking (Pearl Harbour) in 1941 they had moved North there Air cover and Navy could have quickly taken the coastal area but deeper penetration would have been very tough indeed against Soviet Armour.
The main difference however would be the Soviet counter-attack in December 1941 and onwards would have had far fewer divisions available as many which where used for this at the time in our scenario would now be tied down in East Asia.

 

[Roberto]

If the Strike North group had won the argument and instead of invading Indo-China in 1940 (means no oil sanctions and much less other trade sanctions) and attacking (Pearl Harbour) in 1941 they had moved North there Air cover and Navy could have quickly taken the coastal area but deeper penetration would have been very tough indeed against Soviet Armour.
The main difference however would be the Soviet counter-attack in December 1941 and onwards would have had far fewer divisions available as many which where used for this at the time in our scenario would now be tied down in East Asia.

You're overestimating what the Soviets thought of the Japanese. They would completely ignore the Far East if something closer was at stake (the Eastern European front).

 

[englander1]

Japanese Army High Command estimated that the strength of the Soviet Far East Army (east of Lake Baikal) before the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 totaled some 800,000 troops, built around:

• 23 infantry divisions
• 1,000 planes
• 1,000 tanks
• 105 submarines

Many of these Divisions where transfered West when Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and slightly before that time as the Kwantung Army had several hundred thousand men shipped south in late 1941 allowing the Soviets to weaken slightly their Eastern Defences.

 

[bouscher]

Only if the Japs attacked with the Jerries would an attack succeed.

The Soviets were close to collapse during the battle of Moscow and later on at Stalingrad, and I do think that if the Japs did make their move during one of these critical battles, the war might have turned to the Axis side.

 

[Newblue]

Were there confirmed oil deposits east of the Urals in 1941?

If not, IMO the Japanese would never strike north.

But if so, this question becomes much more interesting. Some possible consequences include:

-Japan gets a free ride through east and northeast Asia for quite some time
-Germany gets the same in the western USSR and Europe
-Despite Lend-Lease the USSR is defeated and a remnant flees southeast to reinforce Mao and in the long run, defeat Japan in China
-The US does not get into the war, but the Commonwealth can still use Lend-Lease, their untouched Australasian colonies and nuclear weapons development to eventually stalemate or defeat the Germans
-The Japanese Army is ascendant in their political councils
-After World War II imperialism continues and the UN never is born

 

[CalBear]

This is pure ASB territory.

You have to get the Japanese to leave China alone, starting all the way back in 1931. This in itself completely alters the basic thinking of the Japanese military AND political system to the point of impossibility.

The Japanese obsession with China extended well back before the "Western opening" of Japan, arguably all the way back to the 16th Century. China was both a potential threat (if it's warring factions could be brought under central contro) and a source of almost unlimited materials (not to mention forced labor). Japan wad already defeated the Chiness in 1894-95 and, unlike the USSR, had not reorganized its military. China was, simply put, in Japan's eyes, ripe for the taking.

The USSR, conversely, had, following the Revolution, greatly improved its military presesnce in Asia (due in no small part to Japan's expeditionary force that did not exit Soviet territory until 1922). By the early 30's, while not up to the standards of Britain, the USSR had a reasonably well consituted combined arms force, poorly led, but, as was later demonstrated, stoutly manned. Moreover, the Japanese had tried the Red Army twice, once in 1938 and again in 1939; the 1938 incident resulted in the Japanese for a disengagement while the 1939 incident resulted in a crushing defeat of what was, at the time, Japan's best field force. Despite this, Japan chooses to attack again in 1941?

This decision is made due to the presence of an obsolecent (by 1938 obsolete) bomber that would not survive in a modern combat enviroment, something known by the Japanese High Command from encounters with the TB-3 during the border incidents of '38 & '39 (the RECORD height achieved by the aircraft was 6606 meters, in a specially modified format, regular models were limited to 4,000 meters and a top speed of 190 kph/120 mph)? The aircraft lacked such items as retractable landing gear, self sealing tanks and enclosed cockpits. The USSR modified most of the Tupolevs for use as transports after they suffered horific losses in the first few months of the war.

I will not even begin to go into the overwhelming advantages that the Red Army enjoyed over the IJA by 1941, these have been mentioned in other threads time & again except to say the IJA NEVER successfully engaged a combined arms force anywhere. Japan's victories against "Western" ground forces , while impressive from the planning perspective, ALWAYS involved colonial forces that were both taken by surprise and were unable to either resupply or reinforce.

 

[NFR]

1.) There never was any 'Maritime province of Siberia'. The 'Maritime' province lies in Soviet FAR EAST.
2.) For every division sent west to fight the fascists, one reserve division was activated. They were not as well trained nor well-equipped, but more than adequate for situational defence against Japanese, an army that is by 1941 optimized for anti-partisan warfare and against lightly armed infantry forces.
3.) Soviet Union ALREADY begun counter attacking in Moscow BEFORE arrival of reinforcements from the East. Likely result of invasion would have been Germans pushed back less. Ironically, this may not be bad for Soviet Union in the long run. Stalin may elect not to pursue ambitious offensive in beginning of 1942, and events would probably turn out similarly.
4.) Japan, being unaquainted with alien space bats, do not have the troops available. By 1941, she is already very much tied down in China. Count the number of divisions (around a dozen plus independent regiments) deployed against South East Asia, and add that to the Kwantung army. Assess likelihood of said men against Soviet Union. Remember, the Soviet Union does not have to even win - just stall. I think you vastly underestimate the logistical problems of continental-scale campaign.

 

[Boom22]

This quite possible if you make those border skrimishs in 38-39 (I think) stalemate Histocally the Soviets. As well let's say the Japanese bomb a Russian installiation instead of Pear Harbour in December Japan gets the same resources it's after and the Soviets are unable to retaliate because of Germany in the West.

 

[englander1]

The Kwantung Army had 700,000 men in Manchuko ready for the invasion of the USSR in 1941 should the right moment arrive.
However when it was decided to strike South this army was striped down.
I still think the Japs would have struggled greatly in taking anything other than Coastal regions.

 

[NFR]

The Kwantung Army had 700,000 men in Manchuko ready for the invasion of the USSR in 1941 should the right moment arrive.
However when it was decided to strike South this army was striped down.
I still think the Japs would have struggled greatly in taking anything other than Coastal regions.

Yes, of that I am aware of, I did mention the Kwantung Army. However, this force was not geared for strategic offensive against Soviet Union - there were attempts at improving it for the job, but the Japanese began to show lack of enthusiasm after it became more apparent that Soviet Union was not rotten structure waiting to be pushed down. Actually, some of the war-planning read like material of a fantasist - pushing as far as Soviet Central Asia (!), andn even the most prudent and consevative plans call for eventually capturing Chita... their perception of requirement in logistical structure and armoured strength also seems sadly lacking.

Regardless, I do agree that they could have maintained occupation in areas surrounding Manchuria and on the coast, especially with naval supremacy (but it would be unbelievably ugly, Red Army and Pacific Fleet was fortifying everything. Vladivostok would have been like Sevastopol), and in general probably an even worse idea than invading South (short of invading America).

Part of motivation of attacking South, was due to embargo and lack of oil and other raw material, tin, rubber, etc. Attacking Soviet Union would have gained them very little of that while being very expensive in blood and treasure (and oil!)... I don't see there as being sufficient incentive.

But, given Japanese strategic planning in that period, I don't believe it is impossible. I do believe that, however, PoD has to be before 1938-9 - as by that time it seems Japan was pretty set on going South - requirements of war and achievement against Soviet Union being motivators.

 

[Uber_Amoeba]

The Japanese, perhaps after a few minor successes, get beaten like a red-headed stepchild by superior Soviet arms, armour, and aircraft, probably suing for peace with only the minimal loss of a chunk of Manchuria (possibly going towards a Greater Mongolia). The Kwantung Army is humiliated.

Meanwhile, in the West, the Germans reach Moscow, and promptly get annihilated at the end of a long logistics nightmare rushing into a meatgrinder wherein the Soviet can bring in fresh troops and supplies every day without a problem. Ironically, this ends up being an advantage for the Soviets, as Hitler concentrates vast numbers of men on the hopeless cityfight of Moscow, and, having kept up an unmoving offensive for the entire spring and summer in Moscow, the German Army breaks down far earlier than OTL. The Soviets make some gains in '42 as the Germans had moved several divisions away from the front towards Moscow, and the Soviets are able to break these weaker concentrations easier.

But december of '45, Soviet soldiers march into Berlin unopposed. Soon all of Europe flies the Hammer and Sickle.

 

[englander1]

Yes, of that I am aware of, I did mention the Kwantung Army. However, this force was not geared for strategic offensive against Soviet Union - there were attempts at improving it for the job, but the Japanese began to show lack of enthusiasm after it became more apparent that Soviet Union was not rotten structure waiting to be pushed down. Actually, some of the war-planning read like material of a fantasist - pushing as far as Soviet Central Asia (!), andn even the most prudent and consevative plans call for eventually capturing Chita... their perception of requirement in logistical structure and armoured strength also seems sadly lacking.

Regardless, I do agree that they could have maintained occupation in areas surrounding Manchuria and on the coast, especially with naval supremacy (but it would be unbelievably ugly, Red Army and Pacific Fleet was fortifying everything. Vladivostok would have been like Sevastopol), and in general probably an even worse idea than invading South (short of invading America).

Part of motivation of attacking South, was due to embargo and lack of oil and other raw material, tin, rubber, etc. Attacking Soviet Union would have gained them very little of that while being very expensive in blood and treasure (and oil!)... I don't see there as being sufficient incentive.

But, given Japanese strategic planning in that period, I don't believe it is impossible. I do believe that, however, PoD has to be before 1938-9 - as by that time it seems Japan was pretty set on going South - requirements of war and achievement against Soviet Union being motivators.

Seems quite accurate.
Much to what I was thinking.

The best Jap option I thought would be to attack the British and Dutch Empires but not any US territory.
The risk is that If the Americans join in the war because of this then Japan will be in a very bad possition.
Hence in real life they attacked the USA.
I think America may well have stayed out however.

 

[Michele]

The Japanese, perhaps after a few minor successes, get beaten like a red-headed stepchild by superior Soviet arms, armour, and aircraft, probably suing for peace with only the minimal loss of a chunk of Manchuria (possibly going towards a Greater Mongolia). The Kwantung Army is humiliated.

Meanwhile, in the West, the Germans reach Moscow, and promptly get annihilated at the end of a long logistics nightmare rushing into a meatgrinder wherein the Soviet can bring in fresh troops and supplies every day without a problem. Ironically, this ends up being an advantage for the Soviets, as Hitler concentrates vast numbers of men on the hopeless cityfight of Moscow, and, having kept up an unmoving offensive for the entire spring and summer in Moscow, the German Army breaks down far earlier than OTL. The Soviets make some gains in '42 as the Germans had moved several divisions away from the front towards Moscow, and the Soviets are able to break these weaker concentrations easier.

But december of '45, Soviet soldiers march into Berlin unopposed. Soon all of Europe flies the Hammer and Sickle.

Rather realistic. Talk about unintended consequences.
One would really wonder, by the way, how on earth the Kwantung Army would be able to remain in supply, assuming it had any kind of success that required it to move away from its bases. Japanese logistics in China were already a nightmare without such an effort.

 

[Urban fox]

The IJA simply isnt mechanized enough to beat the red army. Tankettes are no match for T-34s. and from a tactical standpoint the INJ relyed to much elan & suicidal-bravery. This may work ok in the jungles of SE-Asia, but in the steppes it would be a recipe for disaster.


Also, a Siberian campiain would be a logisticical nightmare (Russia has cornered the world market on vast empty spaces). The IJA's logisics system could hardly cope with the rigors of its chinese campaigns.

 

[englander1]

The IJA simply isnt mechanized enough to beat the red army. Tankettes are no match for T-34s. and from a tactical standpoint the INJ relyed to much elan & suicidal-bravery. This may work ok in the jungles of SE-Asia, but in the steppes it would be a recipe for disaster.


Also, a Siberian campiain would be a logisticical nightmare (Russia has cornered the world market on vast empty spaces). The IJA's logisics system could hardly cope with the rigors of its chinese campaigns.

The Japanese didnt plan to push into Siberia their plans where limited to the Maritime regions of Asia and Lake Baika.

The idea of launching an eastern offensive was first conceived at the time of the new plan of 1934. Three years later Japanese operational planning was again revised:

1. At the outbreak of a war, the forces stationed in Manchuria will mount an offensive against the Soviet Union; reinforcements thereafter dispatched from homeland will join in the attack. This plan differed from its predecessor, which had called for an offensive only after the reinforcements had arrived in Manchuria.
2. After successfully concluding the eastern offensive, Japanese forces should not immediately drive toward the Lake Baikal region, but should instead consolidate along the Hsingan Mountains Range and prepare for subsequent operations.
3. Operational planning against must attach prime importance to actions against both China and the Soviet Union.

 

[englander1]

After this secret conference, Imperial Headquarters ordered the implementation of the revised policy toward the Soviet Union by commencing large scale reinforcements of the Kantogun. To keep the true reasons secret, the build-up was called the "Special Manoeuvers of Kantogun" or KANTOKUEN for short. The 400,600 troops of the Kantogun suddenly rose to over 700,000 and some billion Yen in military funds were allocated. These manoeuvres prepared the use of force against Soviet Union, based upon the prospect that the Russo-German war might rapidly take a favorable turn for Germany. In the event that force was used against the USSR, the new operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted north and east from Manchuria. Additionally the new plan included landings in Soviet Far East islands and coastal areas, and land operations in Outer Mongolia. Japan also had in Manchuria 150,000 to 200,000 troops.

 

[englander1]

As defensive measures against any Soviet counteroffensive, Japan had the primary goal of knocking out the Soviet Far Eastern Air Forces, as necessary to protect Manchuria and Japan. The Kantogun laid plans for a border defense system in 1934, but construction work did not begin until 1935. To begin with, to 1938 only four zones were fortified in East Manchuria, plus three in the north and one in the west.

 

[englander1]

Rather realistic. Talk about unintended consequences.
One would really wonder, by the way, how on earth the Kwantung Army would be able to remain in supply, assuming it had any kind of success that required it to move away from its bases. Japanese logistics in China were already a nightmare without such an effort.

In this scenario as the Japanese never invaded Indo-China economic sanctions against them are much less and they will have the Navy to help with logistics as they will not be occupied with other things in the Pacific.