January 1943. The German View

Rumania
There had been some suprises for the Luftwaffe air crew who had become used to the Red Air Force, or who thought the Rodeo & Circus operations of 1942 were typical of the RAF defense ability.
I imagine the biggest surprise was not 1 but 2 Air forces defending the UK - 10% losses sounds low given how out numbered they would be - Malta Raids frequently exceeded 16% in 1942

And the PLAN had kicked in 1942 providing 1000s of well trained pilots and aircrew
 
I imagine the biggest surprise was not 1 but 2 Air forces defending the UK -

That might be a surprise to the air crew headed across the water. The Abwehr and Luftwaffe intelligence certainly had a idea OTL of what the RAF & AAF had operational on the British isles. Looking at the production, training, and shipping statistics for the US AAF for 1942 its difficult to see how they could have substantially boosted the numbers in the UK/Mediteranean. A quick glance at Ellis tables in 'Brute Force' indicates the Germans 3,440 operational aircraft on all fronts December 1942 OTL. Assuming 90% of that number are in the West & Mediterranean in this ATL thats slightly over 3,000 operational German and perhaps another 800 Italian combat aircraft. I strongly suspect the operational Allied total in the UK this ATL would be perhaps ,1,600 to 1,800 as of January 1943. That is assuming the same numbers to the Mediterranean theatre as OTL. By January 1st Dolittle counted 490 operational aircraft in his five week old 12th Air Force in Algeria. The RAF seems to have had a minimum of 1,200 in Africa.

Of course it would be more complicated, the defenders have an advantage in these air battles, there's differences in falls per sortie between them and the Red Air Force. The Luftwaffe would still have a high proportion of 2 - 3 year veterans, vs the very low portion of veterans in the AAF this date. We could fill many pages of a thread on the nuances of each sides advantages and weaknesses.

10% losses sounds low given how out numbered they would be...

That just one segment of the overall sorties, the rookies on their first combat mission over Britain. & Hahn was thinking of fighter pilots in my text. The losses over Malta, included the more vulnerable bombers. & it had a very dense AA artillery battery in 1942.
 
There were Allied troops all along the rail line from Abadan to the Soviet border, including Tehran.

Mostly construction and railway operating units.

It was quickly enlarged into the route that carried 45% of all Lend-Lease.

Quickly is relative here. The Brits initiated a program to increase the capacity of the railway to Terhan in 1941. that included contracting US railway services to assist. In 1942 the US Army stepped in. The results are reflected in the chart below showing deliveries via the Gulf to Terhan route. Totals including automotive transport, air, and railway are shown in total. The 1942 totals average out to 967 tons daily for all transport and 454 tons daily for the railway alone. Thats enough daily supply to sustain a British or US corps by 1942 standards, or by rail a single reinforced division with Brit or US levels of motorization. (Note that for the first 90 days of Op OVERLORD the Allied logistics plan allowed 900 tons daily per division slice of the total forces ashore.

Note that it is not until the spring of 1943 the monthly average reaches 100,000 tons monthly, or 3,300n tons daily. Perhaps six divisions and some ground support units for a small tactical Air Force. If a substantial logistics tail and a larger tactical air force based forward is added in and supplies for sustained combat are required six division slices would run up towards 5,000 tons daily.

You are correct that the Germans face daunting logistics challenges if they advance into Persia, of simply defending the old fields/refineries in the Baku region. But the Allied advantage in industrial power is difficult to realize in this part of the war. In the summer & autumn of 1942 there are a lot of disincentives for both against rushing off half cocked in yet another direction. I would not predict a 'Persian Front' would never develop but one or both sides needs to develop the necessary infrastructure.

Lend Lease Persian Rte Delivery copy.jpg


A Note on the automotive side of the supply transport. The US Army contracted the construction of a final assembly plant for the trucks sent from the US. It was more efficient to ship them partially assembled & do final assembly in a factory built at the port. The vehicles intended for he Red Army were loaded for a one way trip north. Heavier lift trucks were used for the round trip. The automotive transport required extensive reconstruction and a mantinace program for the roads. As with the railway that did not see substantial results until into 1943.
 
That might be a surprise to the air crew headed across the water. The Abwehr and Luftwaffe intelligence certainly had a idea OTL of what the RAF & AAF had operational on the British isles. Looking at the production, training, and shipping statistics for the US AAF for 1942 its difficult to see how they could have substantially boosted the numbers in the UK/Mediteranean. A quick glance at Ellis tables in 'Brute Force' indicates the Germans 3,440 operational aircraft on all fronts December 1942 OTL. Assuming 90% of that number are in the West & Mediterranean in this ATL thats slightly over 3,000 operational German and perhaps another 800 Italian combat aircraft. I strongly suspect the operational Allied total in the UK this ATL would be perhaps ,1,600 to 1,800 as of January 1943. That is assuming the same numbers to the Mediterranean theatre as OTL. By January 1st Dolittle counted 490 operational aircraft in his five week old 12th Air Force in Algeria. The RAF seems to have had a minimum of 1,200 in Africa.

Of course it would be more complicated, the defenders have an advantage in these air battles, there's differences in falls per sortie between them and the Red Air Force. The Luftwaffe would still have a high proportion of 2 - 3 year veterans, vs the very low portion of veterans in the AAF this date. We could fill many pages of a thread on the nuances of each sides advantages and weaknesses.



That just one segment of the overall sorties, the rookies on their first combat mission over Britain. & Hahn was thinking of fighter pilots in my text. The losses over Malta, included the more vulnerable bombers. & it had a very dense AA artillery battery in 1942.
Operational Strengths of Fighter Command can be found here

And a link to Air 22 which shows returns etc for all of the RAF during WW2 can be found here - not had a chance to look at it yet

RAF Fighter command Established strength on Jan 1 1943 was 1,530 aircraft of which 828 were Spitfires
 
Thanks. This is very valuable. I'd turned up several useful sources on the Luftwaffe, and have been analyzing the US AAF, but not really started on the RAF. One of the problems in interpretation are differences in what each Air Force reported as operational. Another I have turned up is the ongoing trend in the Luftwaffe towards chronic understrength in 1942 - 43 while the RAF & AAF are able to keep a small reserve of replacement aircraft in the operating forces, and have a growing stream of replacements and reinforcements. Sorting all that out is time consuming.

Operational Strengths of Fighter Command can be found here

And a link to Air 22 which shows returns etc for all of the RAF during WW2 can be found here - not had a chance to look at it yet

RAF Fighter command Established strength on Jan 1 1943 was 1,530 aircraft of which 828 were Spitfires

Even subtracting the German Air Force losses in the east OTL from mid 1942 the overall situation is not one of overwhelming superiority by January in this story. The GAF has some clear advantages, a robust airfield and transport infrastructure in France and Low Countries, a higher portion of combat veterans, and can concentrate some superiority in number and combat power on a specific front. On the down side the OTL loss ratio in the west, including the Mediterranean was not as favorable as against the Red Air Forces. The air crew or pilot training programs and the aircraft engine production were already long term behind the combined RAF/AAF. Id certainly predict that as in OTL the German AF would from July 1942 through December 42 win a lot of tactical victories in the West/Med.
 
Thanks. This is very valuable. I'd turned up several useful sources on the Luftwaffe, and have been analyzing the US AAF, but not really started on the RAF. One of the problems in interpretation are differences in what each Air Force reported as operational. Another I have turned up is the ongoing trend in the Luftwaffe towards chronic understrength in 1942 - 43 while the RAF & AAF are able to keep a small reserve of replacement aircraft in the operating forces, and have a growing stream of replacements and reinforcements. Sorting all that out is time consuming.



Even subtracting the German Air Force losses in the east OTL from mid 1942 the overall situation is not one of overwhelming superiority by January in this story. The GAF has some clear advantages, a robust airfield and transport infrastructure in France and Low Countries, a higher portion of combat veterans, and can concentrate some superiority in number and combat power on a specific front. On the down side the OTL loss ratio in the west, including the Mediterranean was not as favorable as against the Red Air Forces. The air crew or pilot training programs and the aircraft engine production were already long term behind the combined RAF/AAF. Id certainly predict that as in OTL the German AF would from July 1942 through December 42 win a lot of tactical victories in the West/Med.
My reading of the RAF established vs operational is the aircraft assigned to squadrons

Very likely that the Spitfires and Hurricane Squadrons is 16 assigned plus 8 reserves per squadron (pooled and not actually assigned) - this was true in 1940 and I know squadrons deployed overseas had 24 aircraft assigned where a replacement pool did not exist.

Aircraft such as the Spitfire in WW2 could expect to spend as much as 1/4 of its service life 'being serviced' and having life expired components changed etc - this means that of the 16 aircraft in the field with a squadron up to 4 will be U/S on average undergoing planned maintenance etc - which is why there is 16 to allow 12 aircraft to be in service.

So I read the established vs operational as being the assigned aircraft and of those aircraft - the number operational is the established number of aircraft minus the aircraft undergoing planned servicing on that day.

God I'm a nerd!
 
Ive seen but never much followed these debates on how many aircraft could dance on the head of a availability report. My main insight comes from a few strategic war games and some long looks at Allied aircraft deployments. In gross numbers the western Allies outnumber the Luftwaffe by many measurements in 1942. But their ability to bring that superiority to bear was crippled by logistics and exterior lines. its not until the winter or Spring of 1943 they started bringing sufficient force to defeat the Luftwaffe at a few specific points, & then more so as the year advanced. Improvements in tactics had something to do with that too I suppose.

But that is in the future. I don't see either side gaining or losing anything strategically decisive in the air war as the USSR collapses. The results there would not become apparent until later in 1943.

God I'm a nerd!

But are you a good Nerd or a evil Nerd?
 
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Italy

General Paul Deichman, Kesselrings Chief of Staff, the 2d Air Fleet & German Forces South, sipped a small cup of the Italian Coffee. The Italians could be depended on to provide good coffee. So was the lunch, a excellent pasta & a soup. His Aide was clearly impatient to get back to the room where their brief cases, reference papers, and the other staffers he had brought along were. To meet and talk before the conference resumed at two o’clock. The aide, a Captain, thought it important they study some information on the delivery of transport aircraft to the groups. It would, the young Captain thought, make some sort of difference in the calculation of cargo deliveries to Africa over the next three months. The assistant transportation officer, anther Captain was a good friend of Deichmans Aide and that young Capitan wanted his friend to shine for a moment. Deichman had no particular problem with this. What he knew & the young Captain did not understand is the information on deliveries of the Ju52 transports was useless. It was clearly something Goering & Milch had fabricated to please the Grofaz. Anything with that history was worth little attention and of no value in planning. Perhaps the Reichs factories would delivery that many aircraft, but Deichman wanted to see the evidence from some other source than a report to OKW from the likes of Goerings office.

The afternoons meeting was already guaranteed to be a long one, and everyone present would be fortunate if it resolved more than one or two of the items on the agenda. So far the participants had managed to arrive at a figure for how many tons of fuel the Italian oil tankers might deliver to Tunis in the next ninety days. Then find a firm estimate for the bulk cargo capacity that could be depended on for the same 90 days. He suspected they really needed to be working on determining the deliveries to Africa and Tunis for 180 days, but OKW had demanded a plan for defeating the English in Tunisia, and driving them back to Algiers in just three months. Perhaps ‘Army Tunisia’ could. Things were looking better since Arnim had replaced the defeatist Nerhring. Still to many questions remained. The enemy had surprised everyone repeatedly in the past six months. There were likely to be more suprises & a more methodical & robust series of operations would be better. The long series of hasty and risky operations of the previous three and a half years had been successful. But more costly than many of his peers cared to admit. General Deichman also thought the results smaller each time. But they continued. Since the collapse of the Bolshiviks the entire Wehrmacht had been in chaos with hasty redeployments from the east to every other possible front. The results were not what most might have hoped for. Train loads of worn and mismatched equipment mostly. Vehicles for a entire Panzer corps lay scattered about Italy as the maintinance units worked endlessly to get enough for the next ship load in working order & off to Africa. It was only in the past month enough repair companies had arrived in Italy to handle the task properly.

So Deichman sat a few minutes longer at the lunch table and savored the demitasse of Coffee, while his Aide suppressed his fidgiting. When he arose his Aide set straight off for where the other staff were assembling, but Deichman turned to opposite direction and slipped into the latrine nearby. Then finally on to join the others. The young Captain as expected had the transport aircraft delivery schedule at the ready. Deichman politely looked it over, then was rescued by his Aide attempting to stall a communications officer with a message copy. Obviously the message was important or it would not have been sent to him here this afternoon, rather than to his office. But, the man was new and trying to prove himself by being officious with a Lieutenant. Deichman brusquely stepped away from the earnest Captain, and addressed the Lt directly, then quickly taking the message from his hand. It is a section from the newest intelligence summary on the enemy air effort in the Mediterranean. Reading thru its clear why the Intel chief sent it direct by messenger. He’d made it known to the intel chief the information would be germane to the planning conference underway. In its essence there were two points; first the enemy air strength across Africa is placed at some 2,400 aircraft. While not suprising the number is still higher than previous estimates predicted. The Americans newly formed 12th Air Force was already 490 operational aircraft. Hardly eight weeks after the first America soldier set foot in Algeria. The English were there as well in large numbers. In Egypt twice that many were divided between the English tactical air force and the heavy bomber force of the combined English and Americans. The raw numbers did not disturb him nearly as much as the second critical point. That is the intelligence estimate predicted the enemy air forces in Africa would double in 90 days. This he saw reading between the lines, was a conservative estimate. The actual numbers thought to be arriving by April were offset by a prediction of large losses. If the losses were less he saw the enemy would have more than parity across the Mediteranean, but a marked superiority. A thought about the mass of Luftwaffe aircraft arrayed in France & attacking England came & was dismissed. The English needed to be struck directly at home if they were to be forced to accept the inevitable. So the Luftwaffe returning from the east has been split. The bulk deployed across the north western French airfields, and the remainder to Italy, bringing the strength across the Mediterranean to some 2,600. That and the Italians had eight months earlier been thought to be enough to properly support The Africa war. Now what had seemed a easy victory half a year earlier was becoming a bloody contest in the air.

TheGeneral hands the paper to his Aide, he never keeps anything in his hands, & prefers not to file it himself, in his brief cases or cabinets. Ignoring the still waiting Capitan with the transport delivery schedule he confers briefly with the Luftwaffe Liasion Officer. The reports on combat aircraft strengths and projected deliveries for the coming year are to be sorted out of the briefcases and brought to the Chief of Staff imeadiately. Then he indicates the staff officers will move to the main conference room to continue the afternoons planning session. As they pass thru the corridor he considers both Kesselring and the Luftwaffe chief for the Mediterranean have or will receive the same intelligence report he has just read. Either way it will be urgent topic between himself and Smiling Al today. The latter will be joining the conference late in the afternoon to review their work.

Instead of the group imeadiately picking up the mornings unfinished subject Kesselrings transportation chief interjects with a review of the jammed Italian railways, and docks. Tediously he covers ground they all understand. Deichman understands the junior staff have to be aggressive, but he’d rather have returned imeadiately to the questions of sea transport to Tunisa rather than this longwinded recap. The Transport Chief gets to his point, he asks if the mechanics repairing the backlog of vehicles on the Italian docks and rail yards can be increased yet again. This point had been made before, the difficulty in bringing more vehicles to Italy when many thousands of worn automobiles & panzer are already there. Clearing the storage sites faster would ease the demand on the railways and coastal traffic. General Deichman cuts off the transportation chief before he runs on to repeat his argument. With the necessary Italians now present the discussion returns to the problem of getting those vehicles and much else across the sea. That might be more straight forward. But, as usual nothing is certain. The African dockworkers are not as efficient; the enemy bombs the docks and ships at sea enough a increasing wastage of material and time must be allowed for. The Italians also complain how there are not enough cargo ships. The CoS rather understands that. Despite the inclusion of Greek, Yugoslavic, and French cargo ships the Italian cargo fleet has shrunk and new construction is thin. There is the remaining cargo to the Tripoli “Festung” and the transport of the thin stream of cargo from nuetral Turkey and Spain. Now its suddenly necessary to set up a new army in Africa, so ships must be scheduled for the run to Bizerte. Deichman is certain there will not be a problem for the near term, tho the Italians are less certain. Near a tedious two hours later and they have determined all they can about the quantity of cargo that can be sent in the next few weeks.

Its been over a hour since the conference resumed and the participants scatter for a piss break. The logistics & transport officers will slip into another conference room to fuss with details for getting this new army to Tunisia. With only the intelligence and operations staff present the plan for how they will get to Algiers will be worked out. Kesselring did not provide a exact time he would join but the CoS is certain it will be after16:00. Another 90 minutes probablly. That will cut the operations planning short as Kesselring will want to review everything before picking up the Algiers plan.

Technically the army commander on the spot should be making this plan. But Arnim hardly has a Army, let alone a complete staff. His ground force defending the small enclave around Bizerte & Tunis is little more than a glorified corps, which had through December been short of everything including a complete corps HQ. In any case Arnim was fully preoccupied in managing the current battle and had no time for thoughts on the next one.

The next session starts with the respective German and Italian intelligence chiefs giving a joint review of the enemy forces across the entire Africa littoral. In Egypt sits the rear & logistics base of the English 8th Army & a sort of rear defense force. The latter includes ground and support formations extending to Palestine & Syria. There is no evidence those forces are being drawn down. They & the English forces in Lybia are both reinforced with fresh Common Wealth formations and others from England. The CoS interrupts to ask how much the English home army has been drawn down? The German intelligence officer has no answer. The CoS anticipated that, but asking makes the point that a answer might be important to understanding the reinforcements actually sent to Africa. Also in Egypt the English have built a powerful air force. It has been separated into two, with a tactical support division moving its bases west, far into Lybia. One of the identified such bases of this tactical air force is marked on a map as hardly 120 kilometers from Tripoli. The other a heavy bomber division remains in Egypt, its long range aircraft roving across the Eastern and Central Mediterranean. The English had their habit of making such raids at night. In the past few months the Americans had added hundreds of their own Fortress and Liberator four engined monsters. This new American Army Air Force, titled 9th Air Force was still increasing its sorties, despite substantial confirmed losses. Curious how the Americans had retained their air force under the control of the Army. Compared to the far to independent Luftwaffe the American arraingment seemed better than the chaotic management of Goering & Milch. They were flying a impressive number of the heavy long range bombers after just six months presence in the Mediterranean. More than the RAF perhaps. Next came a overview of the enemies Lybian army that had among other things just enveloped Tripoli. The Intel officers, neither Italian and German were able to guess if the enemy intended to assuallt Tripoli, or simply screen it and pursue the panzer Army Africa into Tunisia.

The Intel briefers insisted on including too much information about Malta. Perhaps the respective Italian and German intel officers thought to excise last summers fiasco by providing masses of information now? The CoS was already painfully familiar with the current state of the islands defense, having read a detailed report the previous week. OKW had wanted a new appreciation of a attack on the island during the winter. He’d made a few minor up dates to the intel report on Maltas defenses that had already been in OKW hands two weeks, then noted no viable airborne or amphibious force existed Now to execute such a operation. The formations not lost on Malta were now deeply committed in Tunisia. He recalled the happy optimism in which the attack on Malta had been ordered and planned in late spring 1942. The Bolshiviks collapse in Europe had freed a enormous quantity of ground forces and as the summer passed virtually the entire strength of the Luftwaffe in the east. Much of the army had returned home for demobilization and returned to industry. Impressive projections were made on the new equipment, weapons, and other necessities. But the Grofaz had wanted the English defeated sooner, rather than after a couple years of production reequipped the armies. Thus a attack on Malta was launched with a lot of heady optimism. The plan looked like a good one, there was enough air transport for the Paras, there were more than enough battalions of paras, Italian Marines, artillery, pioneers. & the size of the Luftwaffe available for the operation more than doubled. Deichman still thought the plan a good one, if the Lufwaffe had been able to hold up its part of the operation. Or perhaps the intelligence on the English defense positions was bad. He had reviewed much of it himself, before and after the battle, and was still not certain. Others blamed the cowardice of the Italian seaborne soldiers. The claim went they had mutinied and refused to assualt Maltas shore. Perhaps some had, those of the last waves to try. If so he did not blame them. He’d seen the air reconissance photos of the coves and beaches jammed with wrecked or drifting hulks of the landing craft. Few had returned to the ships to take on the next waves of the landing force. The evidence of the photos showed the boats crews had driven on to the shore despite a murderous fire and soldiers aboard had not forced the crews to turn away. Others blamed the Paras for not securing the airfield, tho they had overrun one runway early in the assuallt. Another story was the English had marched thousands of Italian prisoners, taken on the beaches into the Paras lodgment, making the Paras situation untenable. Deichman thought the Luftwaffe had simply failed to destroy enough of the defenders guns. Those overlooking the beach, and the anti aircraft & heavy cannon. At the end of the day the attack had failed, the Paras with no relief had surrendered with severe numbers of wounded and dead. Enraged orders had come down from OKW for disbanding the Para formations, for punishing the Luftwaffe, and with restrictions of all sorts on future cooperation with the Italians. Yet now a few months later he was in a important planning meeting with the Italians, the punishment of the Luftwaffe aircrew waived away or mitigated, the shattered para formations still existant, and enquiries about new attack on Malta being made.

The briefing officers had gone on to the enemy in the north western African French colonies. Aside from the 700+ aircraft in the two new enemy air forces covering the area there was now nearly a full corps of ground forces facing Arnim outside Tunis & Bizerte. There were also advanced reconissance forces probing as far south as someplace called Gafsa in central Tunisia. Arnims rapidly growing strength was sufficient to deal with that.. But, three enemy corps had been landed and there was little reason to believe the other corps in Algeria would not soon arrive in the Dorsale mountains just west of Tunis. That complicated the offensive planning underway. The enemy dispositions were not clear. They actually seemed confused about them as well. Neither did the intel officers have any clarity to offer on the best roads west to Algiers. The enemy had brought much of the force in Tunisia east by boat to Phillipeville & Bone. Arnims force would not have that luxury. They’d be advancing entirely by road. Perhaps the French railway would useful for logistics support. Perhaps not. Again the intel dept could not come up with a useful evaluation. What they were more certain of was the ability of the enemy soldiers facing Arnim. Deficiencies in the enemy were described. All were new to combat, they failed to hold infantry positions, Their tanks were badly handled, their AT guns inferior, their air support badly coordinated, their tactics bad… General Deichman considers that this same enemy has pushed within fifty km of Bizerte, raided airfields outside Tunis holds the stratigic cross roads of Medjeb al Bab after weeks of battle over it & is still throwing its air force violently agains the Luftwaffe, inflicting losses at a far higher ratio than in the east.
 
Interesting time line, nice to read.
So the Whermacht is largely demobisied, and the men returning back to the farms and factories or in the reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure in Germany and the ocupied lands.
This increase in German production workers should improve production or not?
The defeat of Communist Russia, should have reporcussions in occupied Western Europe. Beside the propaganda it should appear to the average citizen in the ocupied West European countries that a liberation is possible not happening soon, and that it might be beneficial to accpet the current reality. I wonder how Vichy France is reacting to this geo-political reality.
Since the strategic targets of the Germans are now realy far away, and the need for long distance bomber are significant increased, I wonder how the developments of long range bombers is. And due to the demob of the Whermacht there should be more men available for development and production.
 
Interesting time line, nice to read.
So the Whermacht is largely demobisied, and the men returning back to the farms and factories or in the reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure in Germany and the ocupied lands.

Certainly not completely. A large occupation force would be required to sit on the eastern territories until some sort of adequate police force is stood up, there is the remaining Red Army in the east to watch, there is still a war on with the Anglo/Americans in Africa, which might expand to the Middle East.

This increase in German production workers should improve production or not?

Eventually. nazi industrial policy was a not the best managed OTL & we can't magically expect everything would reverse overnight.

The defeat of Communist Russia, should have reporcussions in occupied Western Europe. Beside the propaganda it should appear to the average citizen in the ocupied West European countries that a liberation is possible not happening soon, and that it might be beneficial to accpet the current reality.

It certainly discourages the left everywhere, and likely leads to more independence among those who remain active.

I wonder how Vichy France is reacting to this geo-political reality.

Petains government was rapidly becoming irrelevant in 1942. The nazi regime probably gave it more respect than was necessary for them. The colonial governors and locals saw how the Japanese occupation of Indo China showed Petains government could not defend them. OTL a number of them had either deserted Petain for the Allies, or reached secret agreements, while some remained loyal to Petain.

Since the strategic targets of the Germans are now realy far away, and the need for long distance bomber are significant increased, I wonder how the developments of long range bombers is. And due to the demob of the Whermacht there should be more men available for development and production.

OTL there were some fundamental obstacles to large scale production, and continued development. The US and Britain had a head start, and despite a better organized industry. They still had major problems getting off the dime, and a effective VLR bomber strategic force was not effective until early 1944, or very late 1943 at best. Like many other things its not going to happen over night, or even by next Christmas.
 
Certainly not completely. A large occupation force would be required to sit on the eastern territories until some sort of adequate police force is stood up, there is the remaining Red Army in the east to watch, there is still a war on with the Anglo/Americans in Africa, which might expand to the Middle East.
Were the infamous ''Einsatz truppen'' not the occupation force in the East, or were this deathsquads rooming around?
Eventually. nazi industrial policy was a not the best managed OTL & we can't magically expect everything would reverse overnight.
I understood the National Socialist industry politics were not efficient, but a ( partly) demobed Whermacht and German laborers would mean less dependency on foreign workers.
It certainly discourages the left everywhere, and likely leads to more independence among those who remain active.
I was more thinking about the commitment of West European entrepeneurs and factories owners, not so much the (over rated resistance, by 1942 only an extreme minor % of population was comitted to active resistance). Since the Bolshevist are defeated and a victory of UK/USA is uncertain I was thinking West European factory owners would start to activly pursue orders from Nationalist Socialist Germany, wheter this would be civilian orders or military orders. Since they thought their chimneys need to smoke. And despite shortages this could contribute to the production of the National Socialist Europe.
 
Were the infamous ''Einsatz truppen'' not the occupation force in the East, or were this deathsquads rooming around?

Its a matter of scale. At this point OTL a considerable portion of the Wehrmacht was involved in security operations in the occupied territories of the USSR. ie: Guderian notes how it was necessary for the numerous service units to post guards everywhere, and conduct combat patrols to protect their operations. Even in the areas overrun in 1941 the transition to a security force reliving the army from such duties was slow. We can assume that without active Communist government support there would be less activity, but we also must remember much of the resistance in 1942 was spontaneous, invited by the German occupation policies. To many Russians, Ukrainians and others were faced with a choice of obediently going into oblivion or fleeing to the woods and some sort of survival.

Then there is the portion of the Wehrmacht employed in rebuilding the infrastructure. Several organizations were involved in that, including assorted Army and Luftwaffe railway, and automotive transportation units. Others were involved in salvaging equipment, or what was useful from the captured Soviet material & factories. Exactly how much that might decrease or increase absent a war in the east I can't say.

Last there is the need to continue logistics support all the way across European Russia & the Trans Volga & Caspian/Caucassian region. The former Red Army has not entirely vaporized & keeping a guard on the frontier is prudence.

I understood the National Socialist industry politics were not efficient, but a ( partly) demobed Whermacht and German laborers would mean less dependency on foreign workers.

Yes they would. nazi domestic doctrine demands the two or three million demobilized army personnel be swiftly employed. No one would want to think of repeating the volatile employment of the 1920s.
I was more thinking about the commitment of West European entrepeneurs and factories owners, not so much the (over rated resistance, by 1942 only an extreme minor % of population was comitted to active resistance). Since the Bolshevist are defeated and a victory of UK/USA is uncertain I was thinking West European factory owners would start to activly pursue orders from Nationalist Socialist Germany, wheter this would be civilian orders or military orders

Most remaining in Europe, the factory owners and management of the non German regions, were already pursuing orders from German industry. Those were the only game in town as it were OTL. They were hindered by a number of things: nazi policy of priority to 'German' businesses; the haphazard looting of French, Belgian, Dutch, and others factories; The lack of key raw materials, including fuel; and the nazi failure to organize a viable economic system for occupied Europe.

This last crippled nazi exploitation of Europes industries 1941-1944. Early on the short term goal was to benefit the German middle class with cheap consumer goods from the rest of Europe, and benefit the Wehrmacht with cheap or free material from the occupied regions. Todt, Speer, and others were unable to overcome this kleptocracy economic doctrine 1941-1943. Some rationalization was accomplished, but as with everything else it was not happening overnight.

. Since they thought their chimneys need to smoke. And despite shortages this could contribute to the production of the National Socialist Europe.

Looking over the numbers John Ellis summarizes in 'Brute Force' its clear that in several categories of critical raw materials German industry was falling behind. One item was Aluminum. While raw ore and salvage metal were sufficient for the air craft production of 1942 or 1943 the problem becomes apparent when you realize Germany needed triple the Aluminum to match the combined US and British aircraft production. The Aluminum problem was aggravated by the lack of any source of Cryolite. That mineral or lack of it about doubles the energy requirement for smelting raw ore into usable Aluminum stock. Sources for Wolfram were inadequate in occupied Europe was another example. These problems can be overcome in the longer run, but again its not happening in a few months or even a year.

You are correct in the longer term, of several years, & assuming rationalization of the new German order economy wins out over the rather chaotic kleptocracy of Goering, Krupp, the management of IG Farben, and others. It took the US from mid 1940 to mid 1943 to arrive at some sort of rational industrial mobilization for a war economy. Germany did not start the same until latter 1941 & was hindered by internal problems the Roosevelt administration did not have to face. The Brits starting in 1939 also required the better part of three years to get to best case war economy. OTL Germany was only half way there at the end of 1942, and had both internal politics and a damaged infrastructure across Europe to deal with.
 
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Tripoli

Lt Niebergall looked with some satisfaction on the days improvements his AT gun crews had put on their positions. The initial positions were well along. Revetted, ammunition pits connected by slit trenches, a bunker for each with thick overhead cover for the crews to shelter from mortar or artillery fires, slit trenches connecting the positions and CP, buried telephone wire, such camoflage as was possible on this dry grass and immature date date trees of a replanted orchard. Now they were digging a set of alternate positions. The commander of the detachment intended to keep the guns moving about between the duplicate gun pits at night and confound the enemy observation during daylight. The new positions were a bit better sighted and were a bit more elaborate with alternate embrasures for more flexible fields of fire.

On the down side his battery only had three of the four cannon it rated. The entire detachment only had five total. The also had a pair of MG. Those were deployed a bit forward. Supporting a infantry position more than they protected the AT guns. But, there were alternative positions dug n for those as well, much closer to the battery. Ammunition was a question. They had what amounted to their standard load at hand. A bit more if you counted the ‘Special’ rounds held in reserve. The ammo bunker had been built for a much larger quantity, in anticipation of a large delivery. They had all the barbed wire delivered to them set out, and the few mines.

A few hundred meters to the rear there was a light FLAK battery. Of the 2cm guns. Those were positioned to both protect the battery and infantry positions from air attack, and to support the infantry position as well. The AT detachments telephone loop had been extended and connected to the FLAK batteries wire as well. Off in the distance a Italian position was present. He’d visited it once with the other battery officers and senior NCO. It bristled with MG and some light AT guns, and the Italian soldiers seemed as well disciplined as any he’d had contact with.

Aside from some very distant vehicles on the horizon, and a small bit of artillery fire they’d seen nothing of the Tommies, or at least their ground forces. The Tommies air was another matter. They were bombing the harbor to the north near every night, and had been making small daily attacks around the defenses facing inland. He could not see any of the German or Italian airfields beyond the low rises surrounding his position, but had the general location of three air fields identified. The main one had pleanty of both Italian and German aircraft coming and going. Less traffic concentrated around what were probably auxiliary landing sites. A couple months earlier in Egypt the enemy air had been a lot more active and deadly. In the last weeks of fighting in Egypt the battery had been heavily bombed twice and the adjacent positions hammered even more often. Uncomfortably he wondered when the enemy would become again more aggressive. He had also seen a few of the big American bombers. They’d come in at very high altitude one afternoon and made a half circle over the city, then departed the way they’ed come. He’d been able to identify them as the American type, the Festung model with his binoculars. The falling bombs were invisible, but a few minutes later they could hear the long running rumble of explosions in the direction of the city. Barely visible were some German or italian fighters that counter attacked the big aircraft. One trailed smoke and seemed to drop away from the others, but disappeared into the distant haze before its fate was clear.

Rumors abounded. One claimed they would soon be withdrawn by ship to Italy, or Tunisia. Of course others claimed the opposite, of reinforcements and Rommel leading them back to Egypt Given the number sunken ships in the harbor he’d seen when they passed over some overlooking hills, neither seemed very likely. It had just been two weeks since they had rolled into Tripoli out of the country side of orchards and wheat fields. He’d wondered where else they might retreat to, and the answer was, for his division at least nowhere. They had been positioned here the next day and been digging since. He seriously doubted the several rumors that they had not been surrounded, or been relieved. That last came after a few hours of very distant artillery fire to the northwest, two days ago.

The food was not bad. A bit of fresh meat even, and more fresh and dried fruit than he’d seen in months. He recalled during the long retreat from Egypt seeing a huge pile of fruit, some loose and some in crates that had been soaked in fuel and partially burned. Presumablly to deny it to the English. He’d wondered why they’d not been allowed to take up from the piles themselves.
 
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Separate from this forum the question about the reference to a failed attack on Malta was raised. That is why would the Germans or Axis push ahead on that operation. I have to say I don't regard that as a given, & the overall narrative stands quite well without it. I included it mostly for color. The German motivation for such operations would have come from a desire for actions that might encourage Britan to start peace negotiations. The Reds are vanquished, panzers at at the gate to Egypt, the U boats running amuck in the Atlantic, ect... with aircraft freed up from the eastern front a seizure of Malta might be seen as the blow that brings Britain to a armistice and peace negotiations. The other question is of course how could such assault fail. I've seen it happen on the game boards enough times to understand a Axis victory there is not inevitable, even with another 200 or 300 bombers. In any case the Axis forces owning Malta does not decisively alter the military side of it. It does change some aspects in latter 1942, but not the global military situation. Political consequences are different matter & I'll leave those for folks who enjoy that variety of mud wrestling.
 
Certainly not completely. A large occupation force would be required to sit on the eastern territories until some sort of adequate police force is stood up, there is the remaining Red Army in the east to watch, there is still a war on with the Anglo/Americans in Africa, which might expand to the Middle East.



Eventually. nazi industrial policy was a not the best managed OTL & we can't magically expect everything would reverse overnight.



It certainly discourages the left everywhere, and likely leads to more independence among those who remain active.



Petains government was rapidly becoming irrelevant in 1942. The nazi regime probably gave it more respect than was necessary for them. The colonial governors and locals saw how the Japanese occupation of Indo China showed Petains government could not defend them. OTL a number of them had either deserted Petain for the Allies, or reached secret agreements, while some remained loyal to Petain.



OTL there were some fundamental obstacles to large scale production, and continued development. The US and Britain had a head start, and despite a better organized industry. They still had major problems getting off the dime, and a effective VLR bomber strategic force was not effective until early 1944, or very late 1943 at best. Like many other things its not going to happen over night, or even by next Christmas.
Do the Eastern Ministry have the sense to embrace Anti Communist Russians or defectors like Vlasov?
 
Do the Eastern Ministry have the sense to embrace Anti Communist Russians or defectors like Vlasov?

OTL Germany was bit bipolar on that one. On one hand the overarch policy was to enslave the population. But, there were numerous programs that sought assistance from the Slavic population and treated the individuals or groups cooperating better than the rest. If the surviving industry, the agriculture, and raw materials of the former USSR are to be exploited to any useful level the Slavic labor is essential. & that includes skilled and educated labor. A few million Aryan settlers are not going to fill in for 150 million or 100 million native workers. Thats no guarantee they would be offered good incentives and be efficiently integrated. If the German exploitation of French, Belgian, or Dutch industry, agriculture, and finances 1940-1944 is any indication treatment of the Slavic population would be uneven and fairly inefficient. I think you can see some hints in my previous posts.
 
I wanted to ask, is it possible that Germany is using some Russian/Soviet technology in this story?
I wondered, for example, with the Luftwaffe Ilyushin Il-2, if the Germans had seized some of the factories where the aircraft were manufactured after the victory in the East. And they have access to material, labor, why not try to produce something that will benefit them. Would the Luftwaffe even be interested in such an aircraft?

Are there any Soviet weapons systems that the Wehrmacht would really like badly enough to begin mass production of?

Another question, what is the relationship between Germany and Finland now that both countries have a land connection. The Finns had big problems with the lack of material, for example, they lacked locomotives and many other equipment. In OTL Keitel said that shipping by sea must be limited, now such an excuse is no longer credible. Will Germany continue to support Finland economically and militarily, or will it end this support because Finland no longer needs it so much?

I also wonder what state Leningrad is in now, can the port be used, or is it completely destroyed and the Kriegsmarine can no longer use it? If the fighting in the Baltic Sea is over, it will facilitate the training program of the submarine fleet, and the Germans will no longer have to create a convoy system for their cargo ships that import raw materials from Sweden and Finland. Such a decision would increase shipping turnover and secure more raw materials for German industry.

Are the Germans in control of Tikhvin? If so, then they have access to large reserves of bauxite, which could or should alleviate their lack of aluminum...
 
Just the fact that this came from the eighties is enough to make me subscribe to it.

Edit: Also the nazi Darth Vader (Schorner) isn't horrific enough in his chapter, please make him more horrifying in the future.
 
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