James G. Randall's defense of George McClellan--any thoughts?

[David T]

(How is this a what-if? Well, it rasises the question "What if Lincoln had stood by McClellan?" I am posting this on the 195th anniversaey of McClellan's birth. Well, actually that was on December 3, but being a little slow seems to be appropriate here... )

We tend to forget that there was a time when historians were much more sympathetic to George McClellan than they are today. This was esepcially true of some of the "revisionist" historians of the 1920s and 1930s, who dsiliked the "fanaticism" of Radicals who they thought had unjustrly demanded McClellan's scalp (though as David Donald has pointed out, plenty of conservative Republicans were dissatisfied with McClellan's slowness as well. [1])

One of the most prominent revisisonists, noted for his blaming the ACW on a "blundering generation" was James G. Randall. Here I would like to quote his defense of McClellan and ask people here--some of whom are a lot more familiar than I am with the details of the military history of the ACW-- what they think of it:

"McClellan created an efficient army out of an unmilitary aggregation. The army that fought at Gettysburg was largely of his building. He operated against the Confederacy at its military peak; only an amateur would suppose that he was unwise in demanding full preparation when taking the offensive against Richmond. His requests for troops and supplies, so sarcastically denounced, were a matter of appraising what was needed to overwhelm Confederate defense under able Southern commanders. (This problem is not so much a matter of judging McClellan’s information service, which is not to be taken very seriously, but of considering realistically what was required, not merely to face the Confederates in battle, but to put an end to their military power at the strongest point of their competent defense.) Never did the Union army under McClellan suffer a major defeat. The worst that Lee accomplished against him was to administer a temporary setback at Gaines’s Mill. The campaign against Richmond was in mid-progress when the incredible order came from Washington to drop it all and leave the Peninsula.

"That withdrawal allowed Lee to move north, overwhelm Pope, and create panic at the Union capital. At this hour of peril McClellan saved Washington and the Union cause at Antietam. In 1862 he had planned to operate against Richmond from the south as Grant did in 1864; there is reason to believe that he would have succeeded as well as Grant did, and far sooner. One could make out a case to show that Grant was as slow as McClellan. It is simply that history is not usually written in those terms. Among surviving veterans no tradition was stronger than admiration for “Little Mac” and confidence in his leadership. No one can measure the effect of the attack behind the lines which destroyed him, and nearly destroyed the Union cause. There were times when it seemed that radicals actually dreaded Union victory if it should come too soon and under McClellan." Lincoln the Liberal Statesman, pp. 84-85.
https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.188288/page/n113/

(Randall giving McClellan credit for Gettysburg remiinds me a little of what Al Franken is supposed to have said to Paul Wolfowitz in 2003: "Clinton’s military did pretty well in Iraq, huh?" https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2003/05/should-clinton-share-the-credit-for-victory-in-iraq.html)

[1] "By 1862 nearly all Radicals opposed the retention of George B. McClellan in high command, but it is a serious error to equate suspicion of that slow-moving general with Radicalism. McClellan’s long winter of inactivity, his unsuccessful campaign on the Peninsula, and his slowness to reinforce Pope at Second Bull Run left him with few congressional friends besides die-hard Democrats. At the same time that Radical George Perkins Marsh denied McClellan’s "military capacity to command a platoon” and found "in his movement [not] so much evidence of stolidity, as of treachery,” Conservative Edward Bates was complaining of the general’s "criminal tardiness,” "fatuous apathy,” and "grotesque egotism.” The famous Cabinet "round robin” of August 1862, protesting against McClellan’s restoration to command, is incorrectly considered a "Radical plot” against the general. Secretary Chase’s diary reveals that the document represented the opinion of all the Cabinet members except Seward and Blair. Conservative Attorney-General Bates willingly signed the "round robin,” and Conservative Gideon Welles declined to do so only "on the grounds that it might seem unfriendly to the President,” though he "agreed in opinion and was willing to express it, personally.”" Lincoln Reconsidered, p. 110.

 

[wcv215]

Frankly it basically reads as, “McClellan built a nice shiny army. And he definitely would have won if he ever fought with it.” But he didn’t. The point is made that McClellan never lost to Lee, apart from that time he did, but that’s also because he avoided fighting like the plague.

So overall, I just kind of find such defenses to be based far too much on supposition rather than concrete events.

 

[River of Death]

Well, I don't pretend to be one of our super-experts in the Civil War, but I'll give my knowledge a shot as far as it goes:

"McClellan created an efficient army out of an unmilitary aggregation.

True. Of course, so did Halleck in Cairo, Buell in Cincinnati, Burnside in Annapolis, Butler wherever-his-camp-was-prior-to-NOLA, and many others.

The army that fought at Gettysburg was largely of his building.

Eh, partially at best. I, XI, and XII corps came from the Shenandoah Valley via Pope. Pennsylvania Reserves entered V corps basically after McClellan; so that's maybe 1/2 the infantry. McClellan created no cavalry corps or unified artillery corps either.

He operated against the Confederacy at its military peak;

By the numbers true enough on the Peninsula but against a largely equally amateur force. By the training and expertise, arguably true at Antietam (but debatably waited until 1863) but there their forces were majorly depleted. Numerically Lee and the Eastern Confederates remained near their 1862 strength until midway through 1863, especially considering that after McClellan and until June 1864 their forces were split between the AoNV and the Richmond garrison.

only an amateur would suppose that he was unwise in demanding full preparation when taking the offensive against Richmond. His requests for troops and supplies, so sarcastically denounced, were a matter of appraising what was needed to overwhelm Confederate defense under able Southern commanders. (This problem is not so much a matter of judging McClellan’s information service, which is not to be taken very seriously,

Leaving aside "sarcastically denounced"...(I know many of us on the forum today do this. At the time some of his delays eventually were talked about sarcastically but not at first and not universally - and, in fact, most of the early-to-mid requests for both men and supplies were fulfilled). The real question then becomes what counts as "full preparation", and different commanders may legitimately disagree about this (see: Thomas and Grant in Kentucky in January and February 1862). Also, overwhelming your opponent depends on how many men they have and how well-prepared their defenses are. It follows that the quicker you move against them, the less time they have to plan their own defenses and gather reinforcements.
Full agreement about Pinkerton though, fair point.

but of considering realistically what was required, not merely to face the Confederates in battle, but to put an end to their military power at the strongest point of their competent defense.)

Same point. Moving forward earlier than Spring 1862, and moving up the Peninsula faster and/or using overland flanking moves properly, will mean that the Confederates are not yet as strongly placed. As for the physical defenses themselves, nothing around Richmond in 1862 compared to the trenches of 1864.

Never did the Union army under McClellan suffer a major defeat. The worst that Lee accomplished against him was to administer a temporary setback at Gaines’s Mill.

True enough. Some quibbles maybe - if you consider Harper's Ferry's survival as being under McClellan's purview (and its relief certainly was), then surrendering 12,000 men there was a pretty massive defeat. Ball's Bluff was also not exactly a flattering experience for McClellan.

The campaign against Richmond was in mid-progress when the incredible order came from Washington to drop it all and leave the Peninsula.

Um, what? McClellan had retreated to the James and was sitting there for over a month before "orders came from Washington" for him to evacuate the Peninsula, and only after them deeply inspecting the position to become satisfied that there were no future prospects there. You can argue with their interpretation, sure. But McClellan wasn't doing anything either.

"That withdrawal allowed Lee to move north, overwhelm Pope, and create panic at the Union capital.

True. Not that Pope doesn't take at least half the blame for being beaten so badly, but that's another matter.

At this hour of peril McClellan saved Washington and the Union cause at Antietam.

Half true. Washington proper was never in danger. McClellan did revitalize the army and did win the Maryland campaign (12,000 POWs at Harper's Ferry notwithstanding...). In the former role he may have been uniquely situated. In the latter, just about any other commander in his spot could do as well in the lead up to and in Antietam proper once they got S.O.191.
As for the larger point about the "Union cause", what exactly does that mean? The Emancipation Proclamation? Fair. Although, absent a win at Antietam (tactical draw to be sure), likely the combination of Perryville and Corinth would work as well. As to this leading to the die-down of possible European Interference, this possibility did not really die down until Rosecrans' win at Stones' River a few months later.

In 1862 he had planned to operate against Richmond from the south as Grant did in 1864; there is reason to believe that he would have succeeded as well as Grant did, and far sooner. One could make out a case to show that Grant was as slow as McClellan. It is simply that history is not usually written in those terms.

This needs sources and O.R. quotes. Considering that OTL McClellan never operated south of the James, none of his moves in OTL prepared for such operations, his OTL moves *did* move towards Richmond directly, and he made no actual moves during the month after the 7 Days' in that direction......I would say the onus is on Mr. Randall to give evidence for this claim.
Only then can we even start comparing relative hypothetical speeds of McClellan and Grant - and Grant's speed is based on an opening campaign day of May 4 to a first assault on Petersburg of June 15, so that's (...counts...) 42 days. Being kind and giving McClellan a starting point of Fortress Monroe (and not the Washington defenses), that is an impressive speed to match.

Among surviving veterans no tradition was stronger than admiration for “Little Mac” and confidence in his leadership. No one can measure the effect of the attack behind the lines which destroyed him,

True, essentially. Unless you count the Army of the Tennessee's love and admiration for Grant and Sherman, or the Army of the Cumberland's love and admiration for Thomas. Post-war reunions, speeches, etc., make this quite clear.
As for Little Mac personally, I'll believe that the "attack behind the lines" hurt him, sure, but for our analysis what matters is if said "attack" was justified. A good case can be made for it.

and nearly destroyed the Union cause. There were times when it seemed that radicals actually dreaded Union victory if it should come too soon and under McClellan."

I will not speak to the political situation, except that @David T seems to have already debunked this particular point.

==========

So, on balance, I would describe this defense of McClellan as "Contains elements of truth, but more often exaggerated and erroneous, and in part based on a debunked political analysis."

 

[TRH]

I remember reading that Gaine's Mill could have easily ended in disaster if Stonewall Jackson hadn't been uncharactaristically ineffective, so not sure I'm ready to hand McClellan too much credit on that front. Also find it ironic that such a defensive-minded general idolized Napoleon. Archduke Charles seems more his speed. But, like, Charles from his books, the real man would be way too aggressive for Mac to stomach.

 

[Arnold d.c]

Alright I guess I'll have a go at it:

McClellan created an efficient army out of an unmilitary aggregation. The army that fought at Gettysburg was largely of his building.

Counterpoint: Who is to say that no one else could train up the Army of the Potomac? The Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland, the Western Theater's premier armies, were not trained by McClellan yet managed to make good progress unlike the Army of the Potomac. Furthermore, the army that fought at Gettysburg was not the original army McClellan had built. Furthermore, Hooker's reforms drastically changed the Army of the Potomac's cavalry corps, which, under McClellan, had been completely useless thanks to McClellan's distrust of volunteer cavalry.

His requests for troops and supplies, so sarcastically denounced, were a matter of appraising what was needed to overwhelm Confederate defense under able Southern commanders. (This problem is not so much a matter of judging McClellan’s information service, which is not to be taken very seriously, but of considering realistically what was required, not merely to face the Confederates in battle, but to put an end to their military power at the strongest point of their competent defense.)

Now I've seen some defense of this. Usually, some of McClellan's defenders argue that Pinkerton's estimates were estimates of all Confederate forces in Virginia, which is realistic when one intends to seize Richmond, the heart of Virginia. But there's a problem with this. Even before Pinkerton gave his first estimates, McClellan assumed that Beauregard had a force "three to four times my force" - 150,000. McClellan also deliberately inflated Pinkerton's estimates, which overestimated rebel numbers but to a lesser degree, in his reports to Washington - I do find that inexcusable.

Never did the Union army under McClellan suffer a major defeat. The worst that Lee accomplished against him was to administer a temporary setback at Gaines’s Mill. The campaign against Richmond was in mid-progress when the incredible order came from Washington to drop it all and leave the Peninsula.

Now I will say this: the Lincoln administration made mistakes that negatively affected the Army of the Potomac. They oscillated on where to deploy certain forces, were paranoid about Washington’s safety due to Jackson’s Valley Campaign, and indecisive about what to do with other commands near that theater. But this was also partially McClellan's fault. He failed to disclose to Lincoln how protected Washington was. By playing fast and loose with the number of troops Washington had to defend itself, Lincoln was left with the impression that McClellan was lying and that Washington was in danger. If a financial advisor refuses to disclose the risks and logic behind their advice, then nobody should accept it.

Furthermore, Lee was able to concentrate the forces in Virginia and North Carolina to at least achieve numerical parity with McClellan, possibly even superiority. I should note here that numerical superiority is not out of the question. In recent years it has come to light that the Confederacy's troop numbers were higher than historically reported. For example, Lee's army during the Overland Campaign was much stronger by about 20,000 men. At Shiloh, Confederate casualties was found to be understated by at least a third.

On the retreat to the James River, McClellan's logic was sound, but even Ethan Rafuse, who wrote a balanced but sympathetic account to McClellan, acknowledges that McClellan's absence from the battlefield was inexplicable and inexcusable, leaving the Army of the Potomac leaderless during pitched battle. McClellan's corps commanders deserve the credit for ensuring that a major defeat never occurred, not McClellan.

On the evacuation order, it clearly conceded the initiative to Lee, who took full advantage of the opportunity to attack John Pope's Army of Virginia during its brief period of isolation. On paper, this can be regarded as one of the worst decisions of the war, but that must be balanced against the complete absence of trust and confidence that existed by that time between the Lincoln administration and the commander of its top army. Besides, McClellan was doing close to nothing and I doubt that John Pope could win even if Jackson was on his own.

That withdrawal allowed Lee to move north, overwhelm Pope, and create panic at the Union capital. At this hour of peril McClellan saved Washington and the Union cause at Antietam.

Ahem. McClellan deliberately lobbied Halleck and the Administration to delay sending elements from the Army of the Potomac to Pope’s aid due to the risks it would incur his own men, conveniently hurting Pope.

In 1862 he had planned to operate against Richmond from the south as Grant did in 1864; there is reason to believe that he would have succeeded as well as Grant did, and far sooner. One could make out a case to show that Grant was as slow as McClellan. It is simply that history is not usually written in those terms.

LMAO I find it hilarious that things really haven't changed. Even today's McClellan apologists have to indulge in Grant bashing to make their hero shine more.

 

[Elfwine]

I think this is fair:

Frankly it basically reads as, “McClellan built a nice shiny army. And he definitely would have won if he ever fought with it.”

I could, if the situation merited it, go point by point on what McClellan did - some things reflect well on him, some do not, and some there's no good way to answer because they were never tested.


But the lingering impression of his campaigns is that McClellan was never hesitant to offer explanations for erring on the side of caution. Take the Antietam campaign, because I think it displays what this meant better than the Peninsular campaign and Seven Days.

I have not read Rafuse, so this is does not draw on anything he wrote directly.

Arguably, neither the Army of Virginia nor the Army of the Potomac were in great shape in September 1862. Indisputably the new regiments were very - painfully, even - new. They were barely even trained, and definitely unblooded. At least a good portion of his cavalry was arguably unfit for active campaigning.

McClellan and his defenders can write, at length, on how their circumstances were very far from ideal at achieving a decisive victory. And certain points are entirely true. But what of the condition of the Army of Northern Virginia? What of its ability to withstand McClellan landing assaults on multiple points at once? One could say something about his subordinates not making this any either, but its his job to make his army follow his orders at some point there.

No one has won a war on the basis that "I would have succeeded if only.".