Iron Curtain on the Curzon Line? Early End to WWII

[Not James Stockdale]

The basic background for this is question is that the Western Allies have an additional 40 or so divisions in the ETO, combined with the increases in industrial output necessary to support such a force beginning in 1940 or so. The result is an invasion of the continent beginning in 1943 and ending in late summer of 1944 with the Western Allies meeting the Soviets on the Vistula in Poland.

In this scenario, what kind of borders are likely for post-war Poland? Is the OTL trade of trans-Curzon territory for trans-Oder territory likely to happen? Would Stalin want a split occupation of Poland as IOTL in Germany, or would Poland's status as a liberated country lead to a different outcome? If there is going to be an independent Poland, the Curzon line is probably the westernmost reasonable border, but the Soviets would be a hundred miles west of that at the end of Bagration, controlling about a quarter of OTL post-war Poland. The Soviets would obviously want to occupy German territory - would East Prussia be enough for them? The Soviets are likely to reach Romania and Bulgaria before the end of hostilities, but I think the Western Allies would be able to get to most of Hungary and Slovakia before the Soviets. Would there be any significant change in Yugoslavia with the war ending a year early? AIUI, Tito's influence was large throughout the war but grew significantly after the summer of 1944.

 

[raharris1973]

In this scenario, what kind of borders are likely for post-war Poland?

Curzon line in the east, southern East Prussia in the north, Upper Silesia and eastern and central Pomerania in the west. Those would be the external borders. Internally, Poland would be divided between a London Polish-heritage "Poznan Poland" and a Soviet-backed "Lublin Poland" divided by the Vistula or whatever set of river lines things settle on.

Is the OTL trade of trans-Curzon territory for trans-Oder territory likely to happen?

Some, but not as much. See above.

Would Stalin want a split occupation of Poland as IOTL in Germany

Yes.

or would Poland's status as a liberated country lead to a different outcome

No

If there is going to be an independent Poland, the Curzon line is probably the westernmost reasonable [eastern] border, but the Soviets would be a hundred miles west of that at the end of Bagration, controlling about a quarter of OTL post-war Poland

The Soviets would obviously want to occupy German territory - would East Prussia be enough for them?

It's all they will get under their own power. They will insist on more. The Allies wouldn't quibble with a Soviet military mission and observers in Berlin, but the Soviets will want a zone in Mecklenberg extending down to Brandenburg that touches Berlin. The WAllies will probably be too angry about the territorial amputation, and regime partition of Poland, and too suspicious in general, to concede anything like that.

The Soviets are likely to reach Romania and Bulgaria before the end of hostilities, but I think the Western Allies would be able to get to most of Hungary and Slovakia before the Soviets.

Sure. Although Czechoslovakian politics postwar will be anti-German postwar, even if the west does the liberating, and philo-Soviet. The Soviets will be considered an important ally for Prague. The western postwar drawdown, combined with the prewar Munich experience, will encourage this view, which will be good for the Communist Party's electoral chances. So the Czechoslovakian Communist Party might get elected and have the right Cabinet and military appointments to be able to execute a successful coup in this ATL.

The Western Allies could possibly reach most of Hungary. If they reach all of it, it could end up a small western aligned state. If the Russians have up to the Tisza river, they have the leverage to bargain for it to be a perpetual neutral state. If the Westerners and Russians meet at the Danube line Hungary may become a designated neutral, or may be split into Communist and non-Communist republics.

Would there be any significant change in Yugoslavia with the war ending a year early?

Not in the final outcome in terms of Tito and company ending up in control.

AIUI, Tito's influence was large throughout the war but grew significantly after the summer of 1944.

Correct. Tito will probably need to work harder and draw more blood in the immediate postwar crushing Chetnik and Ustashe dissent establishing his authority.

I actually think the greatest potential change is for *better* Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

Reasons why:

1) Less likely that Soviet troops will pass through the northeast corner of Yugoslavia, commit rapes and murders that the Partisans complain about, and receive "how dare you" counter-complaints from Stalin.
2) Tito is less cocky and secure about his own position as he squeezes himself into final consolidated power, keeping him more inclined to stay on Stalin's good side.
3) Stalin is weaker in Central Europe, Yugoslavia is not so thoroughly in his military grip, but is offering to be an ally. In a Europe where half of Poland is hostile, hardly any of Germany is controlled, and Hungary is either neutral or half hostile, taking Tito as an ally and not throwing it away make more sense than risking the relationship by trying to hard to "homogenize" the regime.

 

[TimTurner]

I actually think the greatest potential change is for *better* Yugoslav-Soviet relations.

Reasons why:

1) Less likely that Soviet troops will pass through the northeast corner of Yugoslavia, commit rapes and murders that the Partisans complain about, and receive "how dare you" counter-complaints from Stalin.
2) Tito is less cocky and secure about his own position as he squeezes himself into final consolidated power, keeping him more inclined to stay on Stalin's good side.
3) Stalin is weaker in Central Europe, Yugoslavia is not so thoroughly in his military grip, but is offering to be an ally. In a Europe where half of Poland is hostile, hardly any of Germany is controlled, and Hungary is either neutral or half hostile, taking Tito as an ally and not throwing it away make more sense than risking the relationship by trying to hard to "homogenize" the regime.

Not the first thing I would have thought of, but makes sense in context.

 

[raharris1973]

Maybe the map would look like this - per the text, rather than the title of the OP, the iron curtain is actually west of the Curzon Line, maybe its at the Vistula, maybe the Soviets are a little more generous with Bialystok and Lviv for Lublin Poland. White (orange) west Poland gets Upper Silesia, Danzig and all pre-1772 Poland at a minimum.

You know offered thoughts on Yugoslavia before. I don't know if the subtle changes this scenario makes in Yugoslavia are enough to prevent Albania from going red. I don't know enough about Albania and the alternatives to Hoxha and when they disappeared.

 

[raharris1973]

Any other thoughts, maybe on PoDs we can set further back to get either the scenario the OP described, or to contrive things so we get the iron curtain map to look like map pictured in post #4?

 

[TimTurner]

how will the situation in Hungary be like, with a Trainon trauma going on all while the country is split in 2?