You are more likely to get Montanas and Alaskas. The Alaskas were to threaten Japanese trade and draw off forces to defend that trade. Iowas were to operate as a squadron in the battle line. Alaska's were expendable, Iowas not. If the Yamatos were known and more importantly, believed, then the Iowa's would simply be replaced with bigger ships but the need for Alaskas would still be there.
Perhaps just end Captain A. J. Chantry's career (head of Preliminary Design in the Bureau of Construction and Repair in 1938) to make the Montana's appear.
From Friedman, Norman; Naval History and Heritage Command. Winning a Future War: War Gaming and Victory in the Pacific War (p. 159):
Another cruiser development almost certainly did not involve the college or gaming. In March 1938, the Secretary of the Navy (presumably meaning the CNO) proposed a new type of large cruiser armed with 10- or 12-inch guns, hence capable of overcoming all existing cruisers. Initial design studies showed that it would displace about 18,000 tons or more (26,000 tons with three triple-gun 12-inch turrets), hence would be well outside the cruiser category as defined by the London Naval Treaty. It would be defined, then, as a capital ship. One question was whether the U.S. Navy would willingly sacrifice battleship tonnage (as provided under the Vinson Acts) to build such ships.
There is no indication that the idea came out of gaming. The General Board cruiser file (420-8) includes a 4 April 1938 paper strongly advocating the new type of cruiser, written by Captain A. J. Chantry, who was then head of Preliminary Design in the Bureau of Construction and Repair. Chantry had been a member of the Naval War College Senior Class of 1936. His 1938 paper is in the form of the college-advocated “Estimate of the Situation,” but it is far less analytical than the paper the college produced in 1931 to guide future cruiser policy. Given its timing, it may have been mainly an attempt to back the Secretary’s request rather than an independent proposal that the United States should build a super-cruiser. Chantry based his estimate of what the Japanese were likely to build on the national character of her people; the aspirations and aims encompassed in her national policy; geographic factors; and in particular, her present and future economic position…. In considering Japanese character it is perhaps sufficient for present purposes to note that her people are zealots, almost fanatical in type, and only removed in moderate degree from the influences of feudalism. Nationalism is highly developed backed by determination of the strongest character. The Japanese believe that they are the children of Heaven and nothing can divert them from their national idealisms. Life is held cheaply in support of their country. They are the most resolute of peoples, the most fearless and determined adversaries of those who seek to oppose them. They are secretive…. It is safe to assume that [Japan] now seeks the hegemony of all China and areas to the north and desires to extend her influence to the East Indies and South Seas as opportunity presents…there is almost no limit to Japanese conceptions of Empire. Coupled with the fanatical determination of her people it makes Japan a “problem child” in the family of nations; one whose every move deserves the most serious attention and consideration of major powers.
Some of Chantry’s tone may be traceable to the recent shock of the Japanese attack on China in 1937, in the course of which the U.S. Yangtze River gunboat Panay had been attacked and sunk, apparently deliberately. The invasion and such incidents were then leading to the beginning of U.S. mobilization, in the form of the second Vinson Act and less public debate on whether to increase production of naval weapons and equipment. Japan was also in the process of rejecting attempts to convince her to abide by the limits stated in the new London Naval Treaty. However, Chantry was going far beyond the usual cool Naval War College analysis. War College papers did not dwell on national characteristics the way Chantry did.
Chantry went on to point to Japanese dependence on imported raw materials; Japan had amassed sufficient supplies to last for the early stages of a war, but would have to rely on imports anyway. None of this can have been unfamiliar. Earlier analyses of likely Japanese naval construction would not even have mentioned it. A list of courses of action open to Japan repeated that Japanese secretiveness would be a major factor in her grand strategy. Japan would counter opponents’ greater strength with “cunning,” meaning that Japan would develop “weapons of attack for which her opponents have no counterpart readily available.” This last was an accurate prediction of Japanese policy, which emphasized the development of individually superior weapons such as the huge Yamato-class battleship, the Zero fighter, and the Type 93 “Long Lance” oxygen-propelled torpedo.
Chantry correctly predicted that the Japanese would build warships individually superior to their foreign counterparts. He parted company with the Naval War College in not considering overall Japanese requirements, hence looking at likely Japanese priorities. Instead, he focused on one part of a possible Pacific War, a war against trade that the United States would prosecute. The question was how the Japanese would defend their own trade. This was very different from the issues typically raised in gaming. The Naval War College certainly agreed that Japan would live or die based on its ability to import what it needed, but that led to a U.S. strategy of blockade. Games explored raiding, not as a means of crippling Japan, but rather as a way to draw off Japanese forces to allow the U.S. fleet greater freedom of action.
Chantry pointed out that a Japanese convoy strategy would fail if the convoy escorts could not deal with individually powerful raiders (presumably cruisers). However, the raiders would be drawn into focal areas (where shipping routes crossed) as they ran down their victims. By placing individually powerful ships in the focal areas, the Japanese would gradually annihilate the raiders. It would not matter if the United States built large numbers of cruisers, as long as they were individually inferior to those the Japanese had. It happened that the focal-area defense had been planned by the Royal Navy during the latter part of the 19th century. It was the alternative to convoys that the British adopted at the time as a means of protecting their trade. It is not clear that Chantry or anyone outside the Admiralty knew this in 1938; the focal-area approach may merely have been the obvious one.
Chantry cited persistent rumors that Japan was already building cruisers somewhat larger than the 10,000-ton limit embodied in the treaties. Other countries might do the larger than the 10,000-ton limit embodied in the treaties. Other countries might do the inch guns) as well as very fast light Italian cruisers. He suggested that the Japanese would use their extra tonnage to mount heavier guns—9-, 10-, or 11-inch calibers. In fact, the Japanese cruisers displaced considerably more than 10,000 tons. No one knew that until the end of the Pacific War. The Japanese used the extra tonnage to gain conventional advantages like greater speed, but the ships did not mount heavier guns.
Chantry pointed out that having freed themselves of treaty restrictions, the Japanese might choose to build somewhat larger and better-protected ships armed with more 8-inch guns . Alternately, they might jump to a super-cruiser type armed with much more powerful guns. Japanese secrecy made it impossible to know whether super-cruisers were planned. Chantry argued that the possibility could not be dismissed. Any of these ships might indeed be extremely expensive, but the Japanese might well build them anyway. Moreover, the Japanese had a national tendency to spring surprises on their opponents. Chantry argued that the United States should anticipate the possible construction of Japanese or other super-cruisers by building competing ships, the type the General Board was considering. The U.S. Navy needed something superior to either the super 8-inch gun cruiser or the semi-capital ship, since it could not be sure what the Japanese were building.
All of this was a very non–Naval War College argument dressed in Naval War College clothing. Chantry never asked the usual Naval War College questions. What were overall Japanese requirements? What were their priorities likely to be, given likely U.S. action in wartime? There is no evidence that the college was ever asked for its views, or for that matter whether it ever volunteered any. For the moment, enthusiasm for big overarmed cruisers waned, because it seemed more important to use available tonnage for real battleships (the Iowas were being designed). However, the super-cruiser idea returned in 1940, when the Two-Ocean Navy Act of July 1940 dramatically increased available tonnage and all restrictions associated with the London Naval Treaty had died. The big new cruiser program included the six Alaskas, which certainly filled Chantry’s requirements. As for the Japanese, they seem to have decided to build their own super-cruisers only in 1941, and then as part of their main fleet (they were to replace the Kongo-class battlecruisers). These ships were never laid down.
