Indonesia's parliamentary democracy survives?

[Vinization]

Liberal democracy period in Indonesia - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

From 1950 until the imposition of "guided democracy" in 1959, Indonesia was a parliamentary democracy marred by uprisings, coups and prime ministers with extremely short tenures, the longest of which lasted just two years. Was there any way this system could be less dysfunctional, preventing both Sukarno's self-coup and, years after that, Suharto's takeover and the tide of bloodshed and corruption that came with it?

Assuming Indonesia stays a democracy, how would the conflicts in Malaysia and East Timor develop? Can they be avoided? What about West Papua?

 

[Vinization]

Could not having Sidik Djojosukarto not die on the campaign trail in 1955 give PNI a better result in that year's legislative election, creating a less fractured parliament as a result?

Also, calling in @SkylineDreamer since he's writing a TL on Indonesia.

 

[GSD310]

Was there any way this system could be less dysfunctional, preventing both Sukarno's self-coup and, years after that, Suharto's takeover and the tide of bloodshed and corruption that came with it?

Perhaps not switching to parliamentary democracy in the first place would have been the way to go. The 1945 Constitution envisaged a presidential system but in order to accommodate Sjahrir, who was more acceptable than Sukarno to the Allies and the Dutch as a negotiating partner because he had not collaborated with the Japanese, and to fulfill demands from the provisional parliament that ministers be accountable to the provisional parliament rather than the president, a switch was made in November 1945 to a parliamentary democracy.

I daresay if this switch was avoided, things remained a presidential system, and a election was held, it would be hard-pressed to imagine someone defeating Sukarno in a presidential election. Sukarno would win and the PNI could ride on Sukarno's coattails to a majority in parliament. But then the dilemma would be, would the Allies and the Dutch negotiate with Sukarno despite Sukarno's collaboration with the Japanese?

 

[Vinization]

Perhaps not switching to parliamentary democracy in the first place would have been the way to go. The 1945 Constitution envisaged a presidential system but in order to accommodate Sjahrir, who was more acceptable than Sukarno to the Allies and the Dutch as a negotiating partner because he had not collaborated with the Japanese, and to fulfill demands from the provisional parliament that ministers be accountable to the provisional parliament rather than the president, a switch was made in November 1945 to a parliamentary democracy.

I daresay if this switch was avoided, things remained a presidential system, and a election was held, it would be hard-pressed to imagine someone defeating Sukarno in a presidential election. Sukarno would win and the PNI could ride on Sukarno's coattails to a majority in parliament. But then the dilemma would be, would the Allies and the Dutch negotiate with Sukarno despite Sukarno's collaboration with the Japanese?

From what little I read on the internet on this subject, the 1950 constitution was supposed to be a temporary one anyway, and a constitutional assembly was elected along with the legislature in 1955. Could a better result by PNI (caused either by Djojosukarto or something else) in both races help straighten things out and convince Sukarno not to pull off his self-coup?

Also, I'm looking for a POD after 1951 because, well, I have my reasons .

 

[Arnold d.c]

From 1950 until the imposition of "guided democracy" in 1959, Indonesia was a parliamentary democracy marred by uprisings, coups and prime ministers with extremely short tenures, the longest of which lasted just two years. Was there any way this system could be less dysfunctional, preventing both Sukarno's self-coup and, years after that, Suharto's takeover and the tide of bloodshed and corruption that came with it?

In the aftermath of the Japanese occupation and the war for independence, it would have taken some real political wizardry to save Indonesia's parliamentary democracy even in the most ideal circumstances.

Though revolutionary elan existed in 1949, religious, ethnic and ideological divisions existed in Indonesian society and sometimes reinforced each other. The new leaders of Indonesia rejected feudalism but could not agree on an interpretation of democracy: Sukarno wanted a one-party state while most politicians supported a multi-party state. A striking feature of Indonesia's democratic experiment was that in some respects its parliament resembled that of the Dutch - which quickly proved to be a mistake. With the results of an election being based upon proportional representation, there were too many parties, resulting in complex political bargaining among party leaders for a majority and weakening the position of cabinets. This weakness was readily acknowledged by the Indonesian elite but I suspect that this system was kept to prevent Masjumi, the moderate Islam political party, from dominating the political system. This political paralysis and obvious government weakness, combined with the indecisive results of the 1955 general election, disillusioned many Indonesians who genuinely hoped that democracy would be panacea for their nation's woes and bring about a better future.

Economically, the situation was grim: Indonesia in '49 was a country with broken infrastructure, crippling debt and a diminished ability to export. According to "An Economic History of Indonesia: 1800-2012", the Japanese occupation from '42-45 had not only killed millions of Indonesians but also dismantled existing infrastructure for use in Malaya and Thailand as well as for scrap iron. The total loss and damage amounted to 2.3 billion guilders, roughly 50% of Indonesia's total GDP in 1941. Immediately after Japanese occupation came the 4-year war of independence, which involved continuous printing of money to finance the war as well as persistent attack on infrastructure. The book is very blunt in saying that the economic challenges were too immense. Having to build a new state apparatus, rebuilding infrastructure and providing social services to realize ambitious social goals, all the while maintaining a balanced budget to curb inflation, is as difficult as it gets. It took only 3 years after the Dutch Army left for Indonesia to face a 'first-rate financial crisis'.

Due to changing cabinets, Indonesian economic policy was absolutely schizophrenic or plain ineffective. Worse yet, the import-substitution policy that had been intended to achieve a balanced budget and external account had resulted in greater tensions between Java and the outer islands. Java was political dominant thanks to its population, but economically weaker compared to the outer islands. The import-substitution policy had the impact of redistributing income from the Outer Islands' commodities to Java, which undermined the central government's influence and led to the Permesta rebellion which in turn caused the downfall of Parliamentary Democracy and the beginning of the Guided Democracy era. Indonesia's markets across the country were arguably less integrated than during the colonial era!

To conclude, Indonesia's Parliamentary Democracy was unlikely to work because the political instability resulting from the presence of so many parties to negotiate and placate will not be conductive to resolving Indonesia's economic woes and achieving its ambitious social objectives. In theory, a long-lasting cabinet could implement a consistent economic policy such as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo's Economic Urgency Plan (Rencana Urgensi Perekonomian), but there are severe issues such as Indonesia's work force lacking in education and organizational skills, lack of a class of domestic entrepreneurs and resentment towards Dutch and Chinese-run business, which could hamper economic development and result in unrest in the population.

 

[Vinization]

snip

Was there any way the 1955 election could've been more decisive?

 

[Workable Goblin]

To conclude, Indonesia's Parliamentary Democracy was unlikely to work because the political instability resulting from the presence of so many parties to negotiate and placate will not be conductive to resolving Indonesia's economic woes and achieving its ambitious social objectives.

This seems like it could be solved with a different electoral system that promotes consolidation into fewer political parties. Then only one or two parties would be necessary to form a government, instead of many. The Dutch example is actually significant in the reverse way, the "pillarization" trend was strong at the time and this should have been a warning to such a diverse society that copying them would probably not work well. A system more like that of the United States or other British colonies that promoted a two or three-party system might have been more effective, for example, even if in the short-run this might have empowered Masjumi.

In theory, a long-lasting cabinet could implement a consistent economic policy such as Sumitro Djojohadikusumo's Economic Urgency Plan (Rencana Urgensi Perekonomian), but there are severe issues such as Indonesia's work force lacking in education and organizational skills, lack of a class of domestic entrepreneurs and resentment towards Dutch and Chinese-run business, which could hamper economic development and result in unrest in the population.

This is true, but on the other hand other countries have faced similar challenges and still maintained democracy (India is an example, albeit better-off after independence in some areas). Perhaps a reevaluation of some goals could help as well, for example if they focused on the basics over "ambitious social goals" this might help stave off severe economic crises.

This is all rather airy-fairy speculation, though, I suspect all of this would have been entirely unacceptable at the time without the benefit of hindsight. As GSD310 said, perhaps not switching to parliamentary democracy in the first place would have been better.

 

[Arnold d.c]

This is all rather airy-fairy speculation, though, I suspect all of this would have been entirely unacceptable at the time without the benefit of hindsight. As GSD310 said, perhaps not switching to parliamentary democracy in the first place would have been better.

This is pretty much the issue. The creators of the Indonesian Republic never envisioned a system of few parties. The nationalist leaders had, after all, studied in the Netherlands and were influenced by the multiplicity of small parties. Furthermore, it was felt that a system of many parties would better reflect the different ethnic and communal segments of Indonesia. Hence, the Indonesian nationalist movement never developed the organizational cohesion and mechanisms for settling internal political conflict as seen in the contemporary Indian Congress Party and the Philippine Nacionalista Party.

Another noted issue was that most of the big parties had internal divisions, except for the Communist Party. "The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia" blames these divisions on "bapakism" (literally father-ism). The leader (bapak or father) receives the loyalty and support of his subordinates (anak buah or children) but the leader must make sure that his subordinates are rewarded generously or the followers would desert the leader. This led to active competitions within parties to maintain the loyalty of personal followers and screw over the other political leaders. Hence, all major parties save for the communists and socialists were lacking in cohesion. I can't imagine this being better if all the small parties were consolidated into the big ones.

Perhaps a reevaluation of some goals could help as well, for example if they focused on the basics over "ambitious social goals" this might help stave off severe economic crises.

It really has to be said that there was no good economic solution at all. Any government is virtually damned to have an economic crisis unless the war of independence was avoided and even then fixing the damage from the Japanese occupation would have taken years. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that these ambitious social goals were demanded by the public itself (ok, maybe the monuments weren't but...). People needed employment and cutting expenditure would have been political suicide. Investment in education was a key for the legitimization of the state - only 10% of Indonesians were literate and only 15-18% had primary education in 1930. Maintenance and construction of new infrastructure was also badly needed.

The only thing that could've had its budget slashed was the military. But that would increase the tensions between the military and the political leadership, especially due to events during the Indonesian war of independence. During the second Dutch 'police action', many in the army felt betrayed by the political leadership who the civilians chose to let themselves get captured instead of following the army into the hinterlands of Java to begin the insurgency campaign.
Furthermore, many soldiers didn't want to be demobilized. They didn't want to leave a good-paying and honorable job to return to a non-white collar job. If the war of independence had been averted, then this might've been avoidable.

Was there any way the 1955 election could've been more decisive?

Probably not. I don't think it's possible for any party to achieve a majority in the election. So another compromise cabinet would have to be made.

Assuming Indonesia stays a democracy, how would the conflicts in Malaysia and East Timor develop? Can they be avoided? What about West Papua?

Can't really speak on Malaysia and East Timor. But West Papua will almost certainly be a point of conflict for Indonesia. Even in 1949, there was enthusiasm in the public to press the Dutch on the ownership of West Papua. The Indonesian government tried to ignore it in the early '50s but when the economy is dominated by Dutch businesses and the rhetoric of 'anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism' is popular, I think that the Indonesian public would eventually demand the government to confront the Dutch ownership of West Papua eventually.

 

[GSD310]

From what little I read on the internet on this subject, the 1950 constitution was supposed to be a temporary one anyway, and a constitutional assembly was elected along with the legislature in 1955. Could a better result by PNI (caused either by Djojosukarto or something else) in both races help straighten things out and convince Sukarno not to pull off his self-coup?

Also, I'm looking for a POD after 1951 because, well, I have my reasons .

For a TL, I presume?

I supposed the question is what would be the definition of a better result. If you look at the OTL numbers, it was pretty much a 4-way tie between the 4 largest political parties with a lot of minor parties scattered in there. Unless a better result leads to a landslide, a better result probably won’t result in a majority anytime soon.

What makes this WI tricky is that there was nobody with enough power in their hands to impose their will.

The old pre-1955 elections parliament was fractured, ditto the post-1955 elections parliament, Sukarno was very much the ceremonial head of state here rather than someone with power concentrated in his hands, and the Army had only just figured out enough to put aside factionalism when dealing with the civilians.

I would propose economic policies that are friendly towards the non-Java islands (ie. Sumatra and Sulawesi) rather than improved election results as a POD for a surviving Parliamentary Democracy. These policies could perhaps make it less likely or even butterfly away the rebellions that emerged OTL in Sumatra and Sulawesi. In OTL, the rebellions were the catalyst for Sukarno and the Army to combine into a coalition, impose martial law on Indonesia, and have the necessart levers of power to set up Guided Democracy when the time comes.

No rebellions mean no martial law. No martial law means Sukarno not being in a position to set up Guided Democracy.

The dilemma is this:
-It would require all the pre-1955 election Prime Ministers to consistently advocate the same policies for the outer islands so that there are no rebellions. Would this be possible?

-Even without Martial Law and Sukarno not being in a position to establish Guided Democracy, the question is will Parliamentary Democracy survive or are we just kicking the can down the road? The OTL Constituent Assembly, which was elected along with the parliament in this election, would get deadlocked about what to put in the new permanent constitution.

An election was scheduled for 1959 but will it produce a definite winner? In OTL, after the 1955 Elections, there won’t be another election until 1971.

Very tricky WI. The Parliamentary Democracy Era is seen as the most politically free time in Indonesia with the freest elections (only time independent candidates have been able to participate in national elections, only time soldiers have been able to select) but also seen as an unstable time with parties withdrawing from coalitions and causing governments to fall.

 

[Vinization]

For a TL, I presume?

A butterfly, actually, which is why I'm thinking of having something subtle like Djojosuharto not dying during the campaign and PNI getting a slightly bigger share of the vote in the elections as a consequence - things would still be shaky, but hopefully a bit less so.

 

[Vinization]

To restart this discussion, did any of the short-lived cabinets that reigned during the 1950-1959 period have the potential to implement good policies for Indonesia, had they not collapsed almost as soon as they took power? What about Wilopo's government, for example?

 

[Arnold d.c]

To restart this discussion, did any of the short-lived cabinets that reigned during the 1950-1959 period have the potential to implement good policies for Indonesia, had they not collapsed almost as soon as they took power? What about Wilopo's government, for example?

I thought that Mohammed Natsir (of the Masjumi Party) had a decent idea in the Economic Urgency Plan - in which high priority would be placed on industrialization during the first years of independence. They also did enact policy changes to benefit from the Korea boom - the sudden surge in commodity prices arising for materials during the Korean War. Unfortunately, the cabinet collapsed in just 6 months, making very little progress.

Wilopo's government followed the theme of austerity because by the time he came to power, the Korea boom was over (in mid 1951) and by mid 1952, it was impossible to deny that Indonesia was facing a financial crisis. Wilopo's efforts at austerity were then killed off when Ali Sastroamidjojo came into power; the resulting nine months of that cabinet were a fiscal disaster - government debt trebled and foreign exchange reserves were depleted.

One of the key problems in this era was that cutting expenditures would be extremely difficult. Education was a massive part of legitimacy for the state, going from 10% literacy in 1930 to 39% in 1961 (and later 61% in 1971) was a major accomplishment. Moreover, infrastructure, after 3 years of Japanese occupation and 4 years of war with the Dutch, needed to be replaced and built upon. The only real source for expenditure cut was the military, but this could generate a lot of political discontent among the army. See, in 1949, there were about 200,000 men in the armed forces and it was a mishmash of forces from different political backgrounds. Efforts to "rationalize" the army and cut it down to a leaner size were quite unpopular. Japanese-trained officers felt that they were getting shafted by the increased professionalism demanded, there were cries that socialists would effectively take over the army, and there was anxiety among the rank and file that finding alternative employment would be hard, especially since the army was a prestigious job. There was even an incident in 1952 where the army brought tanks in front of the presidential palace and demanded Sukarno to dissolve the parliament, which Sukarno told them to stand down. But, realistically, if there's any place to cut the budget, it's here.

 

[Vinization]

Wilopo's government followed the theme of austerity because by the time he came to power, the Korea boom was over (in mid 1951) and by mid 1952, it was impossible to deny that Indonesia was facing a financial crisis. Wilopo's efforts at austerity were then killed off when Ali Sastroamidjojo came into power; the resulting nine months of that cabinet were a fiscal disaster - government debt trebled and foreign exchange reserves were depleted.

How plausible could it be to avert the incident that brought Wilopo down IOTL?

 

[Arnold d.c]

How plausible could it be to avert the incident that brought Wilopo down IOTL?

So some context: The Wilopo cabinet was a cabinet that included the two largest parties together: the PNI and Masjumi. This was a recipe for disaster, especially when you consider that the two parties could not even agree on the same topics such as the Japanese peace treaty, the abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesia union and the general election. Yet, the new cabinet was well received by the press as it was made of young politicians rather than the generally older cabinets of Natsir and Sukiman.

Several factors led to the collapse of the cabinet:
1. Sukarno was antagonistic to the Wilopo cabinet, as it included several policymakers in the Natsir cabinet, who placed limitations on Sukarno's presidential power.
2. Some elements of the army reacted to demobilization with efforts at a coup. Wilopo's slow and cautious approach in handling of the October 17 movement resulted in very harsh criticism in parliament, with his own party practically disavowing him.

Anti-Dutch feelings were riled up by the result of the Westerling case (where Westerling was sentenced to 1 year of imprisonment for an attempted assassination of an Indonesian military attaché at The Hague) while 43 Indonesian infiltrators captured at Irian Jaya were sentenced to 13 years of jail. This, on top of the war and the foreign domination of capital in Indonesia, led to particularly strong anti-foreign feelings during Wilopo's cabinet. The incident was going to boil over one day - it was inevitable I'd argue. During the Japanese occupation, the Japanese had encouraged villagers and former estate workers to begin growing foodstuffs in former Dutch plantations. After 1949, foreign owners still had legal claim to the land and the Indonesian government accepted that it was a test of their ability to enforce legal rights and protect foreign investments. The previous cabinet, the Sukiman cabinet, had agreed to a compromise: some of the land would be returned and the remaining half of the land would be resettled by squatters.

However, it's the Wilopo cabinet that had to carry out. The policemen attempted to carry out their duties and the squatters apparently attempted to attack the policemen, resulting in the policemen opening fire. Weak in party and army support, this incident proved fatal. The PNI, which had been unenthusiastic about the Wilopo cabinet, finally gathered enough small party support to exclude the Masjumi party from cabinet and thus Wilopo was no longer needed.