If the USSR was defeated how would the Pacific War play out?

[CalBear]

I confess I'm curious if Groves had been given some concrete number range by his people when he wrote "increase decidedly in early 1946," and just didn't want to commit to it yet, or if he just was genuinely unsure.

If the production was 7 uranium bombs in December 1945...would an average of a dozen per month for all of 1946 be an unreasonable guess?

If so, it's plausible the Allies could have 150-200 bombs for use in the 1947 campaigning season, if they were of a mind to do a big massed strike - the bombs are too small for a classic Lemay "Sunday Punch," but assuming even just 80% got through, it would certainly bring a lot of the Reich economy (or at least that within the 1939 boundaries that had not beeen relocated farther east) to nearly a halt. This is assuming, of course, that they have not been dumping bombs on Japan like confetti.

The problem is, even if they could pull that off, there's ample reason to think a Nazi Germany in this scenario would not sue for peace, let alone surrender - perhaps not even if you are lucky enough to kill Hitler.

(I'm not advocating doing this, just pondering what the Allies here would likely consider.)



Yeah, Southern France makes no sense as a primary or sole invasion site, since Corsica + every aircraft carrier in the allied inventory still cannot match England as an airbase, let alone invasion ports and infrastructure!

But as for the bombers - I think we must assume everything in the development pipeline still remains fast tracked... the B-47 is butterflied away since Karman does not have access to German swept wing aerodynamics documents, but it is not inconceivable you could supplement an appreciable number of B-36's with with B-45 Tornados by 1947 (service ceiling 46,000ft, payload sufficient for a Little Boy), if the U.S. made it a priority. You'd still lose some bombers (and maybe a few intact bombs!), however.

NACA had already independently discovered the advantages of swept wing designs and had conducted wind tunnel testing of the concept in January 1945 related to critical MACH number performance and shockwave effects.

The WAllies came up with many of the "innovations" that the Reich is credited for and that the Allies are assumed to have been spoon fed by Operation Paperclip. While it is absolutely correct that the German researchers and the reams of test documents greatly aided and sped up any number of programs (especially the U.S. ICBM/Space program) the WAllies were just as innovative. The USN had the most advanced guided missile program in the world (the ASN-N-2 was superior to the German Fritz-X, as was the Gargoyle).

The WAllies didn't rush them into production because, well, they were winning and unlike the Reich (or Imperial Japan for that matter) weren't desperate to plug the dike.

Interestingly, especially in light of the swept wing comments, one of the aircraft that came out of the various research projects was a tailless forward swept wing glider (a la X-29)

Cornelius XFG-1 - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA)

Project Gorgon - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Lemonfish]

I wonder how long can Japan hold out in this scenario, can we see operation downfall happening? Also post war Asia is gonna be interesting, a unified KMT china can rise earlier with US support, and we can see a unified Korea, which will impact geopolitics greatly.

 

[Athelstane]

NACA had already independently discovered the advantages of swept wing designs and had conducted wind tunnel testing of the concept in January 1945 related to critical MACH number performance and shockwave effects.

The WAllies came up with many of the "innovations" that the Reich is credited for and that the Allies are assumed to have been spoon fed by Operation Paperclip. While it is absolutely correct that the German researchers and the reams of test documents greatly aided and sped up any number of programs (especially the U.S. ICBM/Space program) the WAllies were just as innovative. The USN had the most advanced guided missile program in the world (the ASN-N-2 was superior to the German Fritz-X, as was the Gargoyle).

I don't disagree with the larger point, but I think Karman's own testimony has to be given weight: R.T. Jones' NACA research *had* been underway, but it did not have decisive buy-in until Karman transmitted what he'd found at Brauschweig. This is not to say that U.S. aerospace companies wouldn't have developed swept wing aircraft before long (I think they would have), but my concern here is the compressed timeline and context needed to have operational U.S. jet bombers by (say) 1947. I think it's just too big an ask to get the B-47 we all know and love into that position even on a crash program, without the extra push by Karman's digging in Germany (and maybe even WITH it). Whereas a B-45 available and deployable by summer 1947 is entirely plausible in this scenario. And I think the USAAF would want one, precisely for the reason you noted about what they were learning about unescorted prop-driven bombers, a concern that would only be more acute in a timeline like this where the Germans are now able to devote a lot more resources to deploying and refining jet and rocket fighter aircraft for interceptors: even the B-36B/C would not fully answer.

 

[TDM]

I confess I'm curious if Groves had been given some concrete number range by his people when he wrote "increase decidedly in early 1946," and just didn't want to commit to it yet, or if he just was genuinely unsure.

If the production was 7 uranium bombs in December 1945...would an average of a dozen per month for all of 1946 be an unreasonable guess?

If so, it's plausible the Allies could have 150-200 bombs for use in the 1947 campaigning season, if they were of a mind to do a big massed strike - the bombs are too small for a classic Lemay "Sunday Punch," but assuming even just 80% got through, it would certainly bring a lot of the Reich economy (or at least that within the 1939 boundaries that had not beeen relocated farther east) to nearly a halt. This is assuming, of course, that they have not been dumping bombs on Japan like confetti.

The problem is, even if they could pull that off, there's ample reason to think a Nazi Germany in this scenario would not sue for peace, let alone surrender - perhaps not even if you are lucky enough to kill Hitler.

(I'm not advocating doing this, just pondering what the Allies here would likely consider.)



Yeah, Southern France makes no sense as a primary or sole invasion site, since Corsica + every aircraft carrier in the allied inventory still cannot match England as an airbase, let alone invasion ports and infrastructure!

But as for the bombers - I think we must assume everything in the development pipeline still remains fast tracked... the B-47 is butterflied away since Karman does not have access to German swept wing aerodynamics documents, but it is not inconceivable you could supplement an appreciable number of B-36's with with B-45 Tornados by 1947 (service ceiling 46,000ft, payload sufficient for a Little Boy), if the U.S. made it a priority. You'd still lose some bombers (and maybe a few intact bombs!), however.

I agree I think it really unlikely that Hitler and co are going to surrender no matter what. Maybe the allies get very lucky and he and the necessary others get caught in an attack but that would be massively lucky so definitely not something to be counted on. (I think that once the first couple of bombs drop Hitler will disappear precisely to stop this threat). Also even if say Hitler just slips in the bath and dies I don't think Germany would instantly surrender anyway. Leaving aside the bombing campaign they are still in a good position here, and there are going to be plenty of committed Nazis and more importantly just plenty of people who don't fancy the idea of foreign troops marching through their country (you don't need to be an ideologically committed Nazi to not want that).

But that's not really the point of the campaign in my eyes, although I do think it will have negative effect in this area. For me the point is to change that calculus of how hard and bloody it will be for the wallies to try and invade fortress Europe without the red army doing its OTL thing. No matter what you will need to put boots on the ground at some point. Its jut IMO doing so after a couple years of nuclear bombing campaign and wallie advances in other areas is a much different prospect than trying to do it in 1944 after a victorious Germany in Russia in 1942.

Actually not the worst idea. The tactical application of nuclear weapons could be a silver bullet for the Atlantic Wall, German mechanized spearheads, any Heer formation larger than a division...

Basically the type of tactical nuclear weapons usage that the Pentomic Division "pre-empted".

I think that this will be a use they will put to especially once air superiority is established over the western areas and the LW is pushed back.

Also FWIW this will be a worse TL than OTL in lots of ways for lots of people.

 

[TDM]

Soviets out, means US has 12 Billion Dollars to play with that wasn't Lend Leased
Manhattan Project cost a bit over $2B

Quite, but even that figure is small compared to total US expenditure:

A total of $50.1 billion .... worth of supplies was shipped, or 17% of the total war expenditures of the U.S.[2] In all, $31.4 billion went to the United Kingdom, $11.3 billion to the Soviet Union, $3.2 billion to France, $1.6 billion to China, and the remaining $2.6 billion to the other Allies.

You also make the point that the resources spend on the Manhattan project was really quite small in the grand scheme of things (or rather since $2bn in 1942 is a huge sum no matter what way you look at it the grand scheme of things was extremely grand!)

One question though, the $2bn figure gets quoted a lot, but does it include the costs relating to ore extraction and isotope creation?

(on LL the more I think about it the more I like increased support to the Rep of China in this scenario)

 

[Dominic]

I am deeply skeptical as to the Reich's capacity to enforce any serious conditions on the trans-Ural USSR. What exactly are they going to do, march beyond any supplies into a hornets nest? Bomb... Omsk, perhaps, at an absolute stretch? If they could enforce terms, they'd try and occupy more as a result. Everything east of Moscow will in any case be extremely difficult to occupy outside the urban centres, going beyond the Urals seems very unlikely, at least for a good 5 years or more.

 

[TDM]

I am deeply skeptical as to the Reich's capacity to enforce any serious conditions on the trans-Ural USSR. What exactly are they going to do, march beyond any supplies into a hornets nest? Bomb... Omsk, perhaps, at an absolute stretch? If they could enforce terms, they'd try and occupy more as a result. Everything east of Moscow will in any case be extremely difficult to occupy outside the urban centres, going beyond the Urals seems very unlikely, at least for a good 5 years or more.

Yep so I also think the idea of a treaty with a rump soviet state is unlikely.

 

[Dominic]

Yep so I also think the idea of a treaty with a rump soviet state is unlikely.

Some kind of treaty is plausible enough, at least on paper. Just as I doubt the Germans are advancing east, I am very confident the Soviets aren't advancing west. Whoever is at the helm of the USSR is going to need to be able to focus on internal rivals, a treaty that temporarily reduces the active fighting would be useful. I seriously doubt a stable relationship is remotely plausible though.

 

[TDM]

Some kind of treaty is plausible enough, at least on paper. Just as I doubt the Germans are advancing east, I am very confident the Soviets aren't advancing west. Whoever is at the helm of the USSR is going to need to be able to focus on internal rivals, a treaty that temporarily reduces the active fighting would be useful. I seriously doubt a stable relationship is remotely plausible though.

Thing is I can't see a treaty that can't be enforced as one that will followed. I also think the allies will be doing be propping up and supporting them as well (you will be looking at a massive refugee movement and humanitarian crisis once General plan Ost gets going). But yes I agree there not going to be any red army roaring back west anytime soon, at most an insurgency and underground railway for refugees fleeing teh German occupied areas.

However the issue with this is the general question of just how Germany beats the USSR in 1942, but that might take us down a bit of a rabbit hole (that we're all familiar with) as far as this thread is concerned!

 

[Pauh the federalist]

Yep so I also think the idea of a treaty with a rump soviet state is unlikely.

Do you say this because of the fact that the head of the USSR is not going to have enough time due to looking over his shoulder to make sure he does not suffer a coup or a full blown civil war? I am not sure it matters if the soviets' sign or not because internal instability will be the highest its been since at least 1917 if not the early 1920s but in this scenario they are the ones who failed to defend Russia and in the eyes of not a insignificant amount of people and communism has failed and they might start thinking that [insert any first Russian civil war faction or ideology here] was not so bad after all. If they do stick with socialism I feel like many would try to revive the social revolutionary movement (because the soviets' forcefully dissolved it because they viewed it as a threat) as the legitimate successor to the Russian revolution and the Bolsheviks as having highjacked it considering the social revolutionary's actually beat Lenin when it was put to a vote.

1917 Russian Constituent Assembly election - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Socialist Revolutionary Party - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[TDM]

Do you say this because of the fact that the head of the USSR is not going to have enough time due to looking over his shoulder to make sure he does not suffer a coup or a full blown civil war? I am not sure it matters if the soviets' sign or not because internal instability will be the highest its been since at least 1917 if not the early 1920s but in this scenario they are the ones who failed to defend Russia and in the eyes of not a insignificant amount of people and communism has failed and they might start thinking that [insert any first Russian civil war faction or ideology here] was not so bad after all.

I think it's a mix things,

1), I don't think the Germans can enforce it so there no reason for "russia" to abide by it

2). like you say internal stresses and pressures will be great and more immediate

3). you going to have refugees fleeing from the west and they will tell people what general Plan Ost looks like

4). the wallies have no interest in a rump soviet state trapped into supporting the Reich or one that completely falls apart under it's own issues and the humanitarian crisis sweeping in from the west. They will be actively supporting. Especially if as you say it's some non communist faction that can actually muster general support.

5). Just as the German populous/forces won't suddenly collapse at the first atomic bomb, I don't actually think the soviet populous/forces etc are going to just accept defeat and what's going west of the Urals either. (weather or not they are 'Soviet' any more).

6). without getting into the detail of how the USSR loses in 1942 (and there's plenty of threads that do that) the German occupiers west of the Urals might have their hands more than full trying to rebuild Western Russia into something they can use while killing 10's million of Russians, and a lot of Western Russian industry is actually still in Russian hands in the East (although raw resources will be an issue).

 

[Dorknought]

If the LW defenses are better, just keep bombing the Ruhr! Tooze Wages of Destruction. said that during the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command severely disrupted German production. Steel production fell by 200,000 tons and the armaments industry was facing a steel shortfall of 400,000 tons. After doubling production in 1942, production of steel increased only by 20 percent in 1943. Hitler and Speer were forced to cut planned increases in production. This disruption caused the zulieferungskrise (sub-components crisis). The increase of aircraft production for the Luftwaffe also came to an abrupt halt. Monthly production failed to increase between July 1943 and March 1944. The conclusion was that Bomber Command had stopped Speer's armaments miracle in its tracks.

 

[Alstein]

I think Japan might be allowed to conditionally surrender, even if the conditions are such as that's practically the same as unconditional.

Germany gets the bombs done to them first. the Allies probably have to do their invasion through Italy. Germany will get troops, but they'll have to do their extermination campaigns in their occupied lands, and that will take a lot of manpower.

Most likely Soviet Union is kept down by the West as well, with the lands the Germans take being made into new states, or given to Baltics/Ukraine/Poland.

Korea remains united, as a US protectorate. I suspect the Nationalists would be propped up in the Chinese Civil War.

We see an American hyperpower, which might be a good thing for the world in the 40s/50s, but perhaps a bad thing for Civil Rights in the US. I do think decolonization gets sped up. Communism largely dies in the crib as well.

 

[thaddeus]

are we conflating the pinnacle of Allied bombing campaign (and post-Stalingrad situation on the Eastern Front) with the absolute sh!tstorm of a collapse of the USSR one to two years prior?

if the Soviets have collapsed by the end of 1942, then they are collapsing during 1941, and some of the other relevant players, such as Spain and Vichy France are going to adjust their actions to reflect this?

not the least Japan, there would be at least the possibility of oil supply overland , out of the reach of US interdiction? they might adjust their actions to "finish off" both USSR AND China?

 

[TDM]

are we conflating the pinnacle of Allied bombing campaign (and post-Stalingrad situation on the Eastern Front) with the absolute sh!tstorm of a collapse of the USSR one to two years prior?

if the Soviets have collapsed by the end of 1942, then they are collapsing during 1941, and some of the other relevant players, such as Spain and Vichy France are going to adjust their actions to reflect this?

well this is where we get into how have the Germans managed this, and how different this ATL 1941 looks compared to OTL 1941.

OTL 1941 did not look great for the Soviets as is, and still the general response was to wait and see.

not the least Japan, there would be at least the possibility of oil supply overland , out of the reach of US interdiction? they might adjust their actions to "finish off" both USSR AND China?

It going to take a while for Germany to actually access soviet oil, and Germany was already pretty thirsty for it. Plus how are they going to get it Japan overland, in this scenario they stopped at the Urals.

Japan's been trying to finish off China since the mid 30's without much success. I don't think they going to want to add another enormous Asian country to the mix. Besides by 1942 they've already gone south

 

[TDM]

The point has been made that with our 2021 eyes we sometimes conflate the destructive power and impact of later Fusion bombs with the earliest Fission bombs and thus have an inflated idea of their destructive power and general impact on the target nations. And this is a very good point. However I think that point can be made in the other direction as well. That there's a risk of comparing earlier weapons to what we today know will come later and downplaying their effect on people/nations in 1944 who are living in that moment.

 

[Johnrankins]

Do you say this because of the fact that the head of the USSR is not going to have enough time due to looking over his shoulder to make sure he does not suffer a coup or a full blown civil war? I am not sure it matters if the soviets' sign or not because internal instability will be the highest its been since at least 1917 if not the early 1920s but in this scenario they are the ones who failed to defend Russia and in the eyes of not a insignificant amount of people and communism has failed and they might start thinking that [insert any first Russian civil war faction or ideology here] was not so bad after all. If they do stick with socialism I feel like many would try to revive the social revolutionary movement (because the soviets' forcefully dissolved it because they viewed it as a threat) as the legitimate successor to the Russian revolution and the Bolsheviks as having highjacked it considering the social revolutionary's actually beat Lenin when it was put to a vote.

1917 Russian Constituent Assembly election - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Socialist Revolutionary Party - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Agreed , I think there is a decent chance that Stalin would wind up against the wall after some kind of revolution. About the minimum ,most people expect from their government is successfully defending their homeland. If the Russians are pushed back past the Urals the country has been effectively lost and confidence in the Communist Party would drop like a stone, even among the NKVD and Red Army.

 

[Johnrankins]

I am deeply skeptical as to the Reich's capacity to enforce any serious conditions on the trans-Ural USSR. What exactly are they going to do, march beyond any supplies into a hornets nest? Bomb... Omsk, perhaps, at an absolute stretch? If they could enforce terms, they'd try and occupy more as a result. Everything east of Moscow will in any case be extremely difficult to occupy outside the urban centres, going beyond the Urals seems very unlikely, at least for a good 5 years or more.

I also have doubts much of the resources would actually wind up in Germany or at least as a reasonable cost. I can't see the Nazis not implementing Generalplan Ost as quickly as they can. Who the hell is going to work in the fields and mines and oil wells when they are all (or at least very many of the workers) are dead?

 

[TDM]

I also have doubts much of the resources would actually wind up in Germany or at least as a reasonable cost. I can't see the Nazis not implementing Generalplan Ost as quickly as they can. Who the hell is going to work in the fields and mines and oil wells when they are all (or at least very many of them) are dead?

Yep, even if they do keep a slave labour force about (cowed under threat of extermination presumably), it's going to take time to convert what's left of Russian industry and resource extraction infrastructure west of the Urals back to a net producing basis. Let alone all this proposed transferring of German manufacturing from Germany to the east. This last I think some are thinking the Germans will replicate soviets did moving Soviet manufacturing western Russia to beyond the Urals, by moving German manufacturing Germany to west Russia. But these are not similar for for several reasons

1). The soviets wanted to do this, the Germans will be relying on slave labour

2). the soviet factories where already within a top down state run system, Germany factories are not. In fact at this point German industrial mobilisation is mess even within it's own borders (and frankly Speer only looks great compared to what he took over).

3). The soviet had history of mobilising large amounts of it's economy around their territory by command, Germany less so.

4). The soviets didn't just transport factories but also work forces, so unless Germany is also going to take entire German workforces east they are putting a different work force to work.

5). German manufacturing was kind of known for being for want of better terms high craftsmanship almost artisanal, I don't think rounding up a million Russians and driving them into the transplanted factories will be a good fit for that.


I was reading those other thread linked earlier and there were son odd ideas in them. Some one thought the German would be able to get pre invasion Soviet coal production numbers by simply driving 10,000's of slaves into the mines. But unless the Germans inherit a full compliment of soviet mine workers with the seized mines that's not how C20th coal mining works.


Don't get me wrong given enough time yeah the Greater German Reich can pivot the Soviet industrial base to is uses, and I also think some stuff will be easier to get on line than other things, but I think overall we're taking years not months before we start seeing those big Soviet wartime production figure working for the Germans.

 

[thaddeus]

are we conflating the pinnacle of Allied bombing campaign (and post-Stalingrad situation on the Eastern Front) with the absolute sh!tstorm of a collapse of the USSR one to two years prior?

if the Soviets have collapsed by the end of 1942, then they are collapsing during 1941, and some of the other relevant players, such as Spain and Vichy France are going to adjust their actions to reflect this?

OTL 1941 did not look great for the Soviets as is, and still the general response was to wait and see.

for a German victory you would have Leningrad fall in 1941, and likely Moscow as well (or surrounded as Leningrad was historically), that is a much more dire situation, if for no other reason than L-L in the immediate aftermath is impossible.

not the least Japan, there would be at least the possibility of oil supply overland , out of the reach of US interdiction? they might adjust their actions to "finish off" both USSR AND China?

It going to take a while for Germany to actually access soviet oil, and Germany was already pretty thirsty for it. Plus how are they going to get it Japan overland, in this scenario they stopped at the Urals.

Japan's been trying to finish off China since the mid 30's without much success. I don't think they going to want to add another enormous Asian country to the mix. Besides by 1942 they've already gone south

of course they would have to decide to cancel or stall the strike south, there is the example of Finland fighting just the Soviets? I was alluding to the chance some type of Vichy regime established in the USSR, and they could be odd man out, with Germany uninterested in Far East, on the other hand they could go full crazy, blockade the Pacific L-L route and seize Sakhalin? (there is a smidgen of oil and who knows how much stockpiled as it was not shipped west)