How would you realistically prevent NATO expansion into Eastern Europe after the Cold War

David Flin

Gone Fishin'
Hey we are talking about post-Cold War NATO members, ain't we?

I thought we were talking about NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. Which wasn't so much NATO expanding, as those nations banging on NATO's door asking to be let in so that they had protection against Russian expansion.

Which seems to have been a very real and rational fear on their part.
 
If you are Estonia or hell Poland that's still plenty strong enough to cause an issue.
Russia easily accepted the Estonia's entrance into NATO, because even during the Soviet times the Baltics were considered to be a "Internal abroad" and the majority Balts showed how they wanted independence by means from day-to-day sabotage to the "Forest Brothers" underground. Modern Russia doesn't even share a direct land border with Poland (Kaliningrad region is an exclave).
also given when then happened in terms of Russian expansion between the end of the C17th and then the C18th, I'm not sure it would be a comforting comparison anyway!
The height of Russian-PLC conflict was during the first half of the 17th century, when initially the PLC didn't recognize the first Romanov Tsar (because the Boyars previously pledged to the young Wladyslav during the Smuta). After Russia obtained left-bank Ukraine (which had an Orthodox Cossack revolt) the PLC-Russian relations started to improve, which culminated in the anti-Swedish Russo-Polish alliance between Peter the Great and PLC king Augustus the Strong in the initial years of 18th century.

So, before the PLC partitions (in which not only Russia participated- don't forget about Prussia and Austria), the Russo-Polish relations were pretty complex and not characterized by sole antagonism. Plus, Russia obtained "core" ethnic Polish territories only after the Vienna Congress of 1815.

So therefore it's reasonable for his neighbours to have some insurance, especially given the broader historical context were "we'll be fine so long as Russia behaves" may not be the most reassuring.
Ok, but why NATO (North Americans and West Europeans) should care so much about East European concerns? Could you please give a NATO document that says that prime NATO goal is to keep Russia's 17th century borders intact?
 
Which seems to have been a very real and rational fear on their part.
It may be rational for Baltics (but Russia easily accepted their entrance, because even during the Soviet Era russians considered the Baltic SSRs to be the "internal abroad"), but Russia doesn't even share a direct land border with the majority post-Cold War new NATO members. Ukraine is several times bigger than all Baltic nations altogether, was never considered to be as "dissident" among other SSRs and just to important for Russia in every way to let it be Western-aligned (although, Putin was perfectly fine with formally neutral and independent Ukraine, he is not a pan-Russian nationalist who wants to erase it from map for the sake of it).
 
It may be rational for Baltics (but Russia easily accepted their entrance, because even during the Soviet Era russians considered the Baltic SSRs to be the "internal abroad"), but Russia doesn't even share a direct land border with the majority post-Cold War new NATO members. Ukraine is several times bigger than all Baltic nations altogether, was never considered to be as "dissident" among other SSRs and just to important for Russia in every way to let it be Western-aligned (although, Putin was perfectly fine with formally neutral and independent Ukraine, he is not a pan-Russian nationalist who wants to erase it from map for the sake of it).
It’s not Russia’s choice.
 

David Flin

Gone Fishin'
It may be rational for Baltics (but Russia easily accepted their entrance, because even during the Soviet Era russians considered the Baltic SSRs to be the "internal abroad"), but Russia doesn't even share a direct land border with the majority post-Cold War new NATO members. Ukraine is several times bigger than all Baltic nations altogether, was never considered to be as "dissident" among other SSRs and just to important for Russia in every way to let it be Western-aligned (although, Putin was perfectly fine with formally neutral and independent Ukraine, he is not a pan-Russian nationalist who wants to erase it from map for the sake of it).

So Ukraine, the Baltics, and so on don't get a say, but Russia does?

Don't you think that's rather 19th Century Imperialist thinking there?
 
So Ukraine, the Baltics, and so on don't get a say, but Russia does?
Like, as I've said, Russia has 0 problems with Baltics being pro-West because local population expressed such wish for decades. In case of Ukraine, there was no popular support for it in most parts of UkrSSR until Chernobyl. And the modern Ukranian declaration of independecne LITERALLY states the August coup as the main reason for new Ukranian sovereignty.

And yeah, Russia peacefully gave up it's former republics and expect them to not being openly hostile to Russia as some form of respect for not acting like Serbia under Milosevic. I dunno why.
 
So when Russia has threatened to try to take the Baltics back, that was because...?
Because it's populist rhetoric (even among Russian nationalists there are no further claims than Narva and Daugavpils). In Polish media some may threaten to take Kaliningrad, for example.
 
Ok, but why NATO (North Americans and West Europeans) should care so much about East European concerns? Could you please give a NATO document that says that prime NATO goal is to keep Russia's 17th century borders intact?
NATO countries wanted to limit nuclear proliferation. The best way to do this among Eastern European countries that had the industrial capacity and geopolitical reasons to build their own nuclear deterrent was to take them under their own nuclear umbrella. A scenario where Poland and Romania and Czechoslovakia are left out in the cold is a scenario where they build their own bombs, which both makes proliferation in general more likely and makes a nuclear war more likely.
It may be rational for Baltics (but Russia easily accepted their entrance, because even during the Soviet Era russians considered the Baltic SSRs to be the "internal abroad"), but Russia doesn't even share a direct land border with the majority post-Cold War new NATO members. Ukraine is several times bigger than all Baltic nations altogether, was never considered to be as "dissident" among other SSRs and just to important for Russia in every way to let it be Western-aligned (although, Putin was perfectly fine with formally neutral and independent Ukraine, he is not a pan-Russian nationalist who wants to erase it from map for the sake of it).
Why does Ukraine’s ‘importance’ to Moscow (an importance that does not extend to the people themselves, if the current war is any indication) outweigh the will of the Ukrainian people?
 
Because it's populist rhetoric (even among Russian nationalists there are no further claims than Narva and Daugavpils). In Polish media some may threaten to take Kaliningrad, for example.
It's populist rethoric till is not anymore as Georgia and Ukraine showed (or the propaganda war against the EU) and frankly after a certain amount of this rethoric you start to worry because you are not sure if it's part of the show or the real thing expecially if you have not so stellar previous experice.
In general your argument can be summed in: if we leave the eastern european nations alone (this include EU memberships), i'm sure that Russia will not feel any worry and we will be all friends...btw i don't give a damn about how such non russian nations feel
 
But hey, you could just admit that "cointanment" just mean unchecked bullying of Moscow in reality not allowing it to have any sphere of influence even in Former Soviet republics.
The fears of Russia in some Eastern European countries are based purely on history and has nothing to do with the real Russian intensions and capabilities.
It seems a mite contradictory to simultaneously argue that
  1. Russia is entitled to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and that the West stopping it from doing so is 'bullying', and
  2. That Eastern Europe has nothing to fear from Russia's intentions and capabilities
 
It seems a mite contradictory to simultaneously argue that
  1. Russia is entitled to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and that the West stopping it from doing so is 'bullying', and
  2. That Eastern Europe has nothing to fear from Russia's intentions and capabilities
no contradiction, apparently the people in eastern europe need to be happy and gratefull to be under their russian big brother protection (and i use the term in the mafia sense) that have only their best interest in mind
 

David Flin

Gone Fishin'
It seems a mite contradictory to simultaneously argue that
  1. Russia is entitled to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and that the West stopping it from doing so is 'bullying', and
  2. That Eastern Europe has nothing to fear from Russia's intentions and capabilities

Meh, it's simply Mearsheimerism.
 
Russia easily accepted the Estonia's entrance into NATO, because even during the Soviet times the Baltics were considered to be a "Internal abroad" and the majority Balts showed how they wanted independence by means from day-to-day sabotage to the "Forest Brothers" underground. Modern Russia doesn't even share a direct land border with Poland (Kaliningrad region is an exclave).

Russia didn't easily accept any new NATO members especially not ones with borders close to or shared with Russia (they just weren't in much of a position to complain too much), also Estonia knows it's history with Russia quite well!


The height of Russian-PLC conflict was during the first half of the 17th century, when initially the PLC didn't recognize the first Romanov Tsar (because the Boyars previously pledged to the young Wladyslav during the Smuta). After Russia obtained left-bank Ukraine (which had an Orthodox Cossack revolt) the PLC-Russian relations started to improve, which culminated in the anti-Swedish Russo-Polish alliance between Peter the Great and PLC king Augustus the Strong in the initial years of 18th century.

So, before the PLC partitions (in which not only Russia participated- don't forget about Prussia and Austria), the Russo-Polish relations were pretty complex and not characterized by sole antagonism. Plus, Russia obtained "core" ethnic Polish territories only after the Vienna Congress of 1815.


None of that has any bearing on the point that if you are sitting in Warsaw or Tallinn being told "oh don't worry about Russia they're as weak as they were in the C17th is not going to be much comfort.

Ok, but why NATO (North Americans and West Europeans) should care so much about East European concerns? Could you please give a NATO document that says that prime NATO goal is to keep Russia's 17th century borders intact?
Well that's a bit of a change of tack, so OK NATO is a mutual defence organisation, and so NATO members care about other NATO members but are also OK with having new members join.

In abstract is actually has nothing to do with keeping Russia's C17th borders intact, well until Russia decides it actually wants it's C19th borders or post WW2 borders back in whish case will it become a problem because that involves invading other nations.

Ot put it anther way NATO doesn't inherently have to be in opposition to Russia, but Russia's actions very much make it so
 
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It seems a mite contradictory to simultaneously argue that
  1. Russia is entitled to a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and that the West stopping it from doing so is 'bullying', and
  2. That Eastern Europe has nothing to fear from Russia's intentions and capabilities

no contradiction, apparently the people in eastern europe need to be happy and gratefull to be under their russian big brother protection (and i use the term in the mafia sense) that have only their best interest in mind

Meh, it's simply Mearsheimerism.
With very real consequences.
Acceptance of Russian Hegemony over Eastern Europe as both permanent and legitimate was the de-facto stance of the European Left throughout the Cold War with hardly even any pretenses otherwise. Anyone who disagreed was war monger, needlessly provocative, US stooge, wanted to start WW3, etc etc.
Which is exactly why the Eastern European nations didn't trust the EU security guarantees that come with EU membership and desperately wanted to join NATO as well. An assessment that present day Sweden and Finland also seem to share. That no one in Brussels even bothered making the argument, that as EU members they are already in a defensive alliance and don't need NATO membership should be telling.
 
It may be rational for Baltics (but Russia easily accepted their entrance, because even during the Soviet Era russians considered the Baltic SSRs to be the "internal abroad"), but Russia doesn't even share a direct land border with the majority post-Cold War new NATO members. Ukraine is several times bigger than all Baltic nations altogether, was never considered to be as "dissident" among other SSRs and just to important for Russia in every way to let it be Western-aligned (although, Putin was perfectly fine with formally neutral and independent Ukraine, he is not a pan-Russian nationalist who wants to erase it from map for the sake of it).
Putin's preferences are not holy writ in Eastern Europe that must be adhered to, but not only is it telling that you think they are, it also explains why the area gets a bit concerned.

The really stupid thing is if Putin/Russia had tried a different tactics to keep his neighbours on side we may not even be here, but no it was force, threat of forces and meddling with elections.
 
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David Flin

Gone Fishin'
The really stupid thing is if Putin/Russia had tried a different tactics to keep his neighbours on side we may not even be here, but no it was force, threat of forces and meddling with elections.

Don't forget assassinations of foreign subjects on foreign soil using WMD, shooting down civilian airliners, constant incursions by warships and warplanes into sovereign territory...
 
Don't forget assassinations of foreign subjects on foreign soil using WMD, shooting down civilian airliners, constant incursions by warships and warplanes into sovereign territory...
well if we're going to count every little thing!
 
how you could find some other ways to prevent NATO expansion into Eastern Europe?
"The Slovak way" - Slovakia was not invited to the first round of expansion, because of less than democratic tendencies of the government. Mečiar was not called the Slovak Lukashenko for nothing, though he (fortunately) failed to rule the mass media and to consolidate his power. And he very much wanted the membership, to legitimize his image. His rhetoric turned pro-Russian only when his government was very explilcitely mentioned as the reason for the exclusion of Slovakia.

The issue is, you can easily create a similar problem[*] in almost any CE and EE country, but it is going to be a bleak timeline if happens for the majority of them. And in that case, NATO might expand anyway, to keep the influence, turning a blind eye if necessary (see Turkey).

[*] Poland turns nationalistic and ultra-religious. Yugoslavia war engulfs Slovenia. Transnistria-like separatism in Latvia. Bulgaria and Romania under single-person dictatorship. Politically unstable Czech Republic after several failed elections strangles the economy during the worst possible time. OTOH, if Hungary goes dictatorial and nationalistic, all the neighbouring countries will beg for being admitted to the NATO.
 
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