I think you're forgetting the fact that in OTL the formations of post-war borders of Eastern Europe (except for the territorial losses of Germany of course), had been happening completely separately from the conversations in Versailles, the conversations which were exclusively about Germany and Germany alone. So setting up the uncomfortable conditions for Germany does not contradict trying to be at good terms with Russia.
The main problem here would be Poland, toward which the French had bilateral feelings in OTL. On one hand, France enjoyed the reemergence of Poland as a new way to keep Germany in check, as a replacement for Russia. But on the other hand France still hoped that the Soviets might lose the Russian Civil War, and the French pressured the Poles to militarily support the whites, something Poland was not willing to do because of whites refusing to recognize independent Poland. If Russia doesn't turn communist, then France will be definitely favoring the Russians over the Poles in the role of anti-german ally in the east... But then again, Poland would be necessary to weaken Germany by cutting East Prussia out of the rest of Germany. I suppose that the French could try to pressure the Poles to give away some lands in the east to Russia, in exchange for more gains at the cost of Germany in a more radical Treaty of Versailles. Remember, Poland is only beginning to form her borders, so the Poles would see the concessions in the east not as any shameful giving up the lands, but merely as not trying to get them in the first place. The main polish politician representing the Poles in Versailles, Roman Dmowski, largely supported the concept of "Piast Poland" and saw the east as something secondary for the polish interests, so he could mediate in such deal. He always saw Germany as a far bigger threat and opted for cooperation with Tsarist Russia.