How "should" WWII in 1940 have gone?

[Cryhavoc101]

Later in the war, British can opt not to make/buy hundreds of Bothas and Defiants, last hundreds of Battles and Blenheims, Hundreds of tanks deemed not suitable for combat service (Centaur, Cavalier, Covenanter) can also not be made/bought.



Oh, it was not the case of either bigger thanks or fewer guns.
Spitfire's fuselage - that had no guns installed ever - was of generous size, that enabled eg. Spitfire III prototypes (that started the life as parts for Spitfire I) to be with 99 imp gal fuel tanks. Or that Spitfire V was ferrying in 1942 with an additional 29 imp gal tank behind the pilot, or that Spitfire IXs were eventually (if too late) available with 66-70 imp gal tanks behind the pilot.
The drop tank installation also had nothing to do with number of guns. If we want to put fuel tanks in the wings, the Spitfire VII and VIII were with total of 25 imp gals there, again the number of guns took no hit.

The thing that precluded the LR Spitfire happen was then-current doctrine at RAF.

Yes the Spitfire was designed to quickly take off, rapidly climb to intercept altitude, prove the maxim "The bomber will always gets through" a great big fekkin lie, land, refuel and rearm - rinse and repeat.

Adding fuel, makes it heavier, reduces its rate of climb, makes it a poorer interceptor and being able to escort Bombers over Germany in 1943 was not a requirement for its primary role when designed.

But it could have been if they had wanted it to!

And no guns would have been harmed in the making of it

My POD for such an aircraft by 1942 is designing a 'Malta Special' Spitfire V that can self deploy to Malta from Gibraltar or from Egypt/Cyrenaica that is then used as the basis for a LR Escort fighter.

 

[Derwent Water]

- What are the actual amounts that you claim could have been saved in total and how much would the extra ground forces have cost?

Of course, this is not a simple cash transaction. With an early war divisional slice of 24,000 men, an extra four divisions is probably taking roughly 100,000 prime working age men out of the workforce where they can pay tax and earn export dollars (still a major issue throughout the war). So there's significant further costs to be added to the "simple" one of finding 100000 men, training them, housing them, feeding them, giving them weapons and taking them to the right place.

4- What are these men going to be armed with? The British army was short of guns, tanks, artillery, etc etc etc. Where do the extra weapons come from and when do they arrived, get tested, and receive trained crews?

5- What happens if there is no Lend Lease and you have been throwing so much extra money around so early? Even if the hindsight wand gets rid projects deemed worthless then the UK's money will run out quickly. If the UK has put more money into ground forces early on, what happens in say late '43?

I largely agree with this excellent post although I wasn't too sure about the section above. The British system was to have a small regular army for policing the Empire, with the forces at hone to provide trained replacements for those serving abroad. The home forces were also organised to (in theory) provide an expeditionary force for emergencies. IOTL they could barely scape together the equipment for 2 Divisons to send to France with more regular Divisions arivng over the winter of 1939/1940. These regular Divisons were backed up by the Teritorial Army of 14 or so, Infantry Divisons. Part time volunteer soldiers. These Divisons were even more poorly equipped than the regular formations.

With the outbreak of war the Teritorial Force was called up and started training (as much as the unusually cold winter of 39/40 would allow). Several of these divisons were later to be sent out to France to help with lines of communications work buy despite being woefully equipped got chucked into the carnage of May 1940 (it didn't end well).

My point being that Britain had the trained(ish) manpower available to send around10 more dividons to France over OTL. Enough to potentially change the outcome of the BoF. However, it couldn't do this due to the chronic lack of suitable and modern equipment.

This stems fro.m a number of issues. Lack of funds being one of them in the early to kid 1930's but more important IMHO is the lack of a clear plan for the coming war. The belief that the next war would be fought in the sky's over Europe and would be over quickly led the British to spend big on the RAF at the expense of the Army. IOTL they only formally realised that an BEF would be needed in the Spring of 1939! There was nothing wrong with the modern British equipment which even in tanks where at least competitive with the Panzers. There just wasn't enough of it. Making the decision to prepare a BEF earlier would increase the amount of equipment Britian could produce in peace time.

Finally the economic argument that is often stated is that this would have to be done at.the expense.of something else is in this case rather weak. Although financially diminished by WW1 by the mid 1930's Britian was still a wealthy country able to raise revenue through both trade concessions and via increased debt levels. Investing in British industry would mean a lot of the money would return to the Tresury through increased tax returns and (fingers crossed) if there wasn't a war the increased modern industrial capacity could be turned to other things like consumer goods for the export market. Also an enhanced British Defence industry in the late 1930's could also export arms to friendly nations for a profit.

 

[tomo pauk]

Perhaps the most important thing (and I think I've asked for it before with no response). If it was so easy to make all the right decisions then you should be able to provide us with a consistent, detailed and accurate set of guidelines that all new projects could be held to in order to ensure that no turkeys were made. So please, what are these guidelines?

At any suggestion regarding the alternatives to the British rearmament from the early 1930s, you don't have a problem accusing the ones making the changes of painting the British civil servicemen as stupid, and do it often. So I see no point in making yet another long post (or couple of them) so you can sprinkle around the accusations. I've stated my case, take it as you please.

That is, BTW, a reason why I've stopped posting in the 'sanity options' thread about the British army.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I largely agree with this excellent post although I wasn't too sure about the section above. The British system was to have a small regular army for policing the Empire, with the forces at hone to provide trained replacements for those serving abroad. The home forces were also organised to (in theory) provide an expeditionary force for emergencies. IOTL they could barely scape together the equipment for 2 Divisons to send to France with more regular Divisions arivng over the winter of 1939/1940. These regular Divisons were backed up by the Teritorial Army of 14 or so, Infantry Divisons. Part time volunteer soldiers. These Divisons were even more poorly equipped than the regular formations.

With the outbreak of war the Teritorial Force was called up and started training (as much as the unusually cold winter of 39/40 would allow). Several of these divisons were later to be sent out to France to help with lines of communications work buy despite being woefully equipped got chucked into the carnage of May 1940 (it didn't end well).

My point being that Britain had the trained(ish) manpower available to send around10 more dividons to France over OTL. Enough to potentially change the outcome of the BoF. However, it couldn't do this due to the chronic lack of suitable and modern equipment.

This stems fro.m a number of issues. Lack of funds being one of them in the early to kid 1930's but more important IMHO is the lack of a clear plan for the coming war. The belief that the next war would be fought in the sky's over Europe and would be over quickly led the British to spend big on the RAF at the expense of the Army. IOTL they only formally realised that an BEF would be needed in the Spring of 1939! There was nothing wrong with the modern British equipment which even in tanks where at least competitive with the Panzers. There just wasn't enough of it. Making the decision to prepare a BEF earlier would increase the amount of equipment Britian could produce in peace time.

Finally the economic argument that is often stated is that this would have to be done at.the expense.of something else is in this case rather weak. Although financially diminished by WW1 by the mid 1930's Britian was still a wealthy country able to raise revenue through both trade concessions and via increased debt levels. Investing in British industry would mean a lot of the money would return to the Tresury through increased tax returns and (fingers crossed) if there wasn't a war the increased modern industrial capacity could be turned to other things like consumer goods for the export market. Also an enhanced British Defence industry in the late 1930's could also export arms to friendly nations for a profit.

I've always maintained that the biggest change the HMG could have done is an earlier limited conscription earlier along with an appreciation that the Army was going to have return to the continent - something not done OTL until May 1939

If the decision could have been made say at the time of Munich to introduce limited conscription 8 months or so earlier that would have seen nearly 1/4 million troops already completed their training and a second 1/4 or so million nearing the end of theirs come Sept 1939 and an extra 8 months to plan, tender and expand the industries to supply everything from the extra boot laces to the 25 pounders required to equip them and that has got to be a boost to the economy and industry.

And this would put the Dominions and India on standby to expand their armies - India was tasked with supplying Brigades to replace regular army formations around he world to allow them to return to the UK etc and this could be done earlier as well.

That's not going to give the army its desired 32 Division British army in Sept 1939 or even May 1940 but it will be a lot further towards that goal than OTL

But introducing conscription is hard, a tough decision for a government in Britain to make and in Sept 1938 an unpopular one.

(This and improving pay and conditions to increase the number of volunteers etc)

But I maintain that despite that it was their duty to have done so earlier than they did and not have the burden of the war fall on relatively few regular's for the first few years of the war - or even worse have it fall on green under equipped units.

 

[Capt Thunderbolt]

I've always maintained that the biggest change the HMG could have done is an earlier limited conscription earlier along with an appreciation that the Army was going to have return to the continent - something not done OTL until May 1939

After reading the first chapter of this, you can understand why it didn't happen.

 

[JasTysoe]

At any suggestion regarding the alternatives to the British rearmament from the early 1930s, you don't have a problem accusing the ones making the changes of painting the British civil servicemen as stupid, and do it often. So I see no point in making yet another long post (or couple of them) so you can sprinkle around the accusations. I've stated my case, take it as you please.

That is, BTW, a reason why I've stopped posting in the 'sanity options' thread about the British army.

But your case ignores reality, such as the restrictions on available resources.

Perhaps the issue is not with my posts (and they have defended the Germans and others as well as the Brits) but with those who sit back with the advantage of hindsight and throw sweeping implied and explicit criticism of those who were there at the time and generally know vastly more about what actually happened.

If the criticism was not merely based on hindsight and a lack of understanding of the difficulties involved in real life, then it would easy to actually show how a proper set of policies could have prevented dud aircraft and engines and other bad choices. The fact that the critics can't do that shows that they are merely using hindsight and showing a lack of appreciation of the restrictions real life brings.

 

[JasTysoe]

I largely agree with this excellent post although I wasn't too sure about the section above. The British system was to have a small regular army for policing the Empire, with the forces at hone to provide trained replacements for those serving abroad. The home forces were also organised to (in theory) provide an expeditionary force for emergencies. IOTL they could barely scape together the equipment for 2 Divisons to send to France with more regular Divisions arivng over the winter of 1939/1940. These regular Divisons were backed up by the Teritorial Army of 14 or so, Infantry Divisons. Part time volunteer soldiers. These Divisons were even more poorly equipped than the regular formations.

With the outbreak of war the Teritorial Force was called up and started training (as much as the unusually cold winter of 39/40 would allow). Several of these divisons were later to be sent out to France to help with lines of communications work buy despite being woefully equipped got chucked into the carnage of May 1940 (it didn't end well).

My point being that Britain had the trained(ish) manpower available to send around10 more dividons to France over OTL. Enough to potentially change the outcome of the BoF. However, it couldn't do this due to the chronic lack of suitable and modern equipment.

This stems fro.m a number of issues. Lack of funds being one of them in the early to kid 1930's but more important IMHO is the lack of a clear plan for the coming war. The belief that the next war would be fought in the sky's over Europe and would be over quickly led the British to spend big on the RAF at the expense of the Army. IOTL they only formally realised that an BEF would be needed in the Spring of 1939! There was nothing wrong with the modern British equipment which even in tanks where at least competitive with the Panzers. There just wasn't enough of it. Making the decision to prepare a BEF earlier would increase the amount of equipment Britian could produce in peace time.

Finally the economic argument that is often stated is that this would have to be done at.the expense.of something else is in this case rather weak. Although financially diminished by WW1 by the mid 1930's Britian was still a wealthy country able to raise revenue through both trade concessions and via increased debt levels. Investing in British industry would mean a lot of the money would return to the Tresury through increased tax returns and (fingers crossed) if there wasn't a war the increased modern industrial capacity could be turned to other things like consumer goods for the export market. Also an enhanced British Defence industry in the late 1930's could also export arms to friendly nations for a profit.

Interesting and thanks. I was thinking of the issues if the TA had been called up earlier, giving it time to get fully trained. I completely agree about the issues with the conception of the coming war and the comparatively lavish spending on the RAF and I'm trying to find out more about where the idea that the bomber would always get through came from. So far the big issue (apart from politics) is the lack of proper exercises that would have shown their lack of effectiveness, but on the other hand the actual record of WW1 did show that they could cause civilian panic and heavy casualties.

My remarks on the economic side come from info like the Treasury's arguments in (IIRC) the Inskip report and others where it was decided that the economy was "the fourth arm of defence", and on the problems caused by running out of foriegn exchange later in the war. I'm runnng around for the next few days but will look for more detail later.

On the purely emotional side I can sympathise for the British taxpayer in the '30s, who had a standard of living vastly lower than ours and who had in many cases already paid a terrible price in WW1. The typical factory worker didn't have a lot of spare cash as it was, and higher taxation would have hit them hard and been hard to sell.

One thing is that if the Brits had spent up big on defence in the mid '30s and (fingers crossed) war had been averted by some freak event, the hindsight experts of the ATL would no doubt be writing about the enormous waste and incompetence of governments when anyone would have seen that Hitler was going to be ousted/strike east/be struck by lightning/have a stroke and become a pacifist.

 

[Giant Man Eating Rabbits]

But it could have been if they had wanted it to!

Love the article, good read.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

View attachment 900184

After reading the first chapter of this, you can understand why it didn't happen.

Oh totally as I said - it would have been un popular - and I guess the first job of a political party is to ensure that they get re-elected - but by not instigating it when they should they failed the British people.

 

[ECavalier]

Guilty Men.

One of histories greatest pieces of blame shifting propaganda whos anonymous authors included an ex-Mosleyite Tory and a far left unilateralist who had openly criticised Baldwin for pursuing rearmament.

 

[Two fingers awry]

But your case ignores reality, such as the restrictions on available resources.

Perhaps the issue is not with my posts (and they have defended the Germans and others as well as the Brits) but with those who sit back with the advantage of hindsight and throw sweeping implied and explicit criticism of those who were there at the time and generally know vastly more about what actually happened.

If the criticism was not merely based on hindsight and a lack of understanding of the difficulties involved in real life, then it would easy to actually show how a proper set of policies could have prevented dud aircraft and engines and other bad choices. The fact that the critics can't do that shows that they are merely using hindsight and showing a lack of appreciation of the restrictions real life brings.

I agree with this in its entirety Britain at the time was chronically short of the essentials for preparing for war . As I said on another thread the Vulcan foundry on designing the castings for the Matilda 2 , had 1 draughtsman it's now wonder it took so long to get to the troops. If you start war production 18 months earlier you might not get the Matilda
You might get more of the already designed tanks in service or something even worse . Nothing is done in isolation Germany and Russia learned lessons through combat experience in Spain, Britain and France did not , the lessons learned from an observer Britain and France, and the people using the weapons Germany and russia, are not neccessarily the same , Just as 2 people involved in an incident dont give identical statements. The point is British industry was chronically under funded at this time and the training of the people to design these systems are in extremely short supply . Even with or should I say especially with a POD of 2 years you may sow the seeds of your own downfall . Imagine ww2 without the spitfire but using the defiant the UK would suffer bombing that the defiant could not stop . If the UK then decided it needed the spit
You are talking 42 , 43 before a aircraft to compete with German models can get into production. Also not taken into account is the views of the higher echelons of the war ministry etc ie none or few high explosive shells for tanks no dp guns for destroyers 8 .303s for fighters instead of 4 20mm or 6 .5 all decisions made by "experts " because they know better than the men that had to fight in these things.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

I agree with this in its entirety Britain at the time was chronically short of the essentials for preparing for war . As I said on another thread the Vulcan foundry on designing the castings for the Matilda 2 , had 1 draughtsman it's now wonder it took so long to get to the troops. If you start war production 18 months earlier you might not get the Matilda
You might get more of the already designed tanks in service or something even worse . Nothing is done in isolation Germany and Russia learned lessons through combat experience in Spain, Britain and France did not , the lessons learned from an observer Britain and France, and the people using the weapons Germany and russia, are not neccessarily the same , Just as 2 people involved in an incident dont give identical statements. The point is British industry was chronically under funded at this time and the training of the people to design these systems are in extremely short supply . Even with or should I say especially with a POD of 2 years you may sow the seeds of your own downfall . Imagine ww2 without the spitfire but using the defiant the UK would suffer bombing that the defiant could not stop . If the UK then decided it needed the spit
You are talking 42 , 43 before a aircraft to compete with German models can get into production. Also not taken into account is the views of the higher echelons of the war ministry etc ie none or few high explosive shells for tanks no dp guns for destroyers 8 .303s for fighters instead of 4 20mm or 6 .5 all decisions made by "experts " because they know better than the men that had to fight in these things.

Italy suffered from eariy rearmament. At least Britain in 1937 had light tanks in place of tankettes, and the prospect of a 2pounder gun that actually worked against enemy tanks.

 

[WeissRaben]

Italy suffered from eariy rearmament. At least Britain in 1937 had light tanks in place of tankettes, and the prospect of a 2pounder gun that actually worked against enemy tanks.

Yeah, people overlook that part often enough. Early rearmament means you are building your stock over plans, exercises, wishes, and dreams. Rearming later does get you caught with your pants down, probably, but you will rearm across the needs of the current war.

 

[tomo pauk]

But your case ignores reality, such as the restrictions on available resources.

My case does not ignore reality.
I've accounted for the restrictions due to the resources more times than I can remember, and not just for the British.

Perhaps the issue is not with my posts (and they have defended the Germans and others as well as the Brits) but with those who sit back with the advantage of hindsight and throw sweeping implied and explicit criticism of those who were there at the time and generally know vastly more about what actually happened.

It is the issue with your posts, when you use the preventive painting of people ( that dare to suggest that British should've done something differently) of accusing the civil servicemen of being stupid. Not the 1st time and not the 1st forum where it is indirectly stipulated that these people are above any criticism, even if it is mild.
We can trash Axis or Soviets as much as we like, but, boy, if someone dares as much as suggest that HE shell is made available for the 2pdr, or, god forbid, that Spitfire is plumbed for drop tanks...

Expecting that forumites here do not use even a slightly amount of hindsight is missing the point of the site.

If the criticism was not merely based on hindsight and a lack of understanding of the difficulties involved in real life, then it would easy to actually show how a proper set of policies could have prevented dud aircraft and engines and other bad choices. The fact that the critics can't do that shows that they are merely using hindsight and showing a lack of appreciation of the restrictions real life brings.

The fact is that it is very easy to discard even the smallest suggestion on the account that 'British people in the charge were not stupid, you know'. That killed any enthusiasm in discussing the alternative possibilities with you on this forum.

 

[merlin]

I'm pretty sure all the dead aircrew from the Battles, Blenheim's and Wellingtons would care to differ!

Moreover, the RAF sortie rate was higher than the French.

 

[merlin]

They should have committed most of the RAF to defending France, that is where the decisive battle was to be fought, as it was, the LW suffered 30% losses, imagine if they were opposed by a larger force.

But in France there was little Command & control setup. No RDF (radar) coverage, no (French version) Observer Corp. Little or no, AAA to defend these 'new' airfields that the RAF were to use. No, such a move would just have wasted the RAF and lost the Battle of Britain before it began.

 

[Derwent Water]

But in France there was little Command & control setup. No RDF (radar) coverage, no (French version) Observer Corp. Little or no, AAA to defend these 'new' airfields that the RAF were to use. No, such a move would just have wasted the RAF and lost the Battle of Britain before it began.

It really makes you wonder what the British and French where doing pre war as supposed Allies! Surly the French must have been aware (even if just an inkling) of the C&C set up of Fighter Command, the use of Radar, onservers and secure communications.

In so many avenues just by talking to each in the years between 1936 and 1939 great strides could have been made. Whether it sharing the design of weapons, planes and tanks or in the aearas of doctrine and lessons learned from maneuvers and colonial campaigns, lots could have been improved at relatively little cost.

 

[merlin]

By bombing the horrific traffic jam that was the German supply line in the Ardennes, the outnumbered wally air forces were swept off by the LW, what do you think would happen once those narrow, twisting mountain roads start to get blocked by hundreds of vehicles on fire?

I would agree, Bomber Command from UK bases, could have sent Wellingtons & Whitley's over, loaded with a mix 250lb HE & small 12lb fragmentation bombs plus some incendiaries. An attack outside the effectiveness of German 20mm, perhaps preceded by Lysanders 'marking' the bomb line, to arrive before dawn, before the LW would be active.
Better something like this, than the attacks by the Battles that were delayed until the afternoon, to become a suicide attack!

 

[Bougnas]

It really makes you wonder what the British and French where doing pre war as supposed Allies! Surly the French must have been aware (even if just an inkling) of the C&C set up of Fighter Command, the use of Radar, onservers and secure communications.

In so many avenues just by talking to each in the years between 1936 and 1939 great strides could have been made. Whether it sharing the design of weapons, planes and tanks or in the aearas of doctrine and lessons learned from maneuvers and colonial campaigns, lots could have been improved at relatively little cost.

They were aware enough to have an ongoing program since 1939 to set up British radars in the country. But it was too little too late.

Attempts were made to build Merlins and Bristol radials, but failed in the face of French industrials' opposition and limited British ressources to actually help set up production.

Real cooperation dates back to 1939-40, with weapon exchange schemes to cover gaps in each countries' arsenals: French got Boys ATR for squad AT and were to get British-built light tank hulls to sustain their production plans, Brits got 25mm AT guns and were to get B1s as supplemental infantry tanks and AT guns to help build up the BEF. Obviously let's not talk about the joint Anglo-French team to buy aircrafts in the US together.

French archive indexes also refer to industrial cooperation undergoing in the energy sector (likely other industries too). But the bulk of the coop started during the war.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

One of histories greatest pieces of blame shifting propaganda whos anonymous authors included an ex-Mosleyite Tory and a far left unilateralist who had openly criticised Baldwin for pursuing rearmament.

At worst that makes the 3 Authors hypocrites (and hypocrites who were not in a position of authority) - it does not however make them wrong - Britain was ill prepared for WW2 (particularly the army) and the men it blamed were for the most part those in charge pre war whose jobs it had been to have made Britain ready for war.

It might not even have been fair and largely relying on hindsight in that for example the appeasement of Hitler did not work but again those 'guilty men' had been in charge during the period in question and it is on their shoulders that the blame must fall.

Ill go back to my original point - however distasteful and unpopular conscription might have been, the benefit to the nation of it being introduced earlier and having more trained soldiers would have been massive.