These being fragile Sherman tanks and the much larger Russian front... there probably wernt a lot left huh?I believe all the surviving Sherman tanks were returned.
These being fragile Sherman tanks and the much larger Russian front... there probably wernt a lot left huh?I believe all the surviving Sherman tanks were returned.
Ahem: http://www.ccnr.org/chronology.html
Sure....the British would have been so squeamish about using a weapon they gave most of the material and work already done to the USA to build in the first place.
These being fragile Sherman tanks and the much larger Russian front... there probably wernt a lot left huh?
The UK had cooperated with the USA in this Nuclear Weapons prgramm, when seriously under threath from German presure in times when Allied citory was far from certain. After 1944, the Allied Victory was only a matter of time, so there would be no more reason to use beyond logical terror to subdue Germany anymore, besides making a point to the then still allied USSR. In this case, the point had to be made in a more constructive way, particularry by showing of force at will, which was better suited in the more remote secondary Pacific Theater, than in the primary theater of Europe, which was badly needed after the war as well.
So nuclear bombs on Germany were still out of the question after the start of 1944, simply since political demands indicated this. Asia was a different matter, since the USA could play here on its own terms, without much intereference of other allied powers, which were very present in Europe.
Besides that, the US Politicians were not stupid to throw away their biggest advantage, namely the Allied Alliance, by doing their own thing, without consulting its allies. Europe was already a won race, so the Bomb was only to be used either as on a testingground, or in Asia, where the conclussion of the war was a little less later to be expected compared to Europpe, given the Germany First Rule.
Spelling, you're doing it wrong. You're claiming that in the event that the Allies are in a much more difficult and desperate situation than the OTL, that the same Allies who approved the firebombing of Dresden are somehow going to be squeamish about Nukes. Uh. Huh.
Still highly unlikely, since the (western) Allies also had knowledge of the political consequenses of of out of proportional violence, such as using the Bomb in Europe. Europe was too delicate to be lost to the Allied cause, as that was seriously a possibility, if the USA (and for the matter UK) would decide to nuke Germany. It would trigger almost certainly a response from Moscow, most likley a withdrawal from earlier treaties and agrements and a continuation of the war, even after Germany had surrendered, although this time against the inferior US and British, who had no means to stop an all out Russian groundoffensive against them.
Even with their strategical airpower, the Russians rulled the batltefield itself, by sheer numbers in the air locally, against which the Allied Airforces were not well equipped to do much about it. (Too few fighters and too many heavy bombers made up the ranks of the Allied Airforces, while the tactical VVS was almost exclusively equipped with short ranged battleflieldsupport and fighter aircraft.)
The principle question therefore remained; Were the governments in Washington DC and London prepared to continue a major war against the USSR, after Germany had surrendered? The UK certainly would not and the USA most likely felt the same.
You seem to miss the crucial point in this: The USSR already was not all too happy about having Western Allied Forces close to its borders, considered the needed buffer against the treachereous Western Capitalist Powers, since that was what the Communists realy feared and were willing to fight against, once the National Socialist Enemy was crushed. The nuclear attack therfore would only provoce a Soviet counterreaction, most likely a hostile one, resulting in war between the former Allies. The strategical objectives of the Russians would be to keep the West and their nuclear power as far away as possible, from its spere of Influence and borderregions. Therefre, the West would have been expelled from the Eurasian Continent, meaning driving them back across the Englih Chanel.
So unlike the West, which was tired of almost six years of war (USA only 3,5 years), the USSR was prepared to defend its strategical interests, as its leadership was very concerned about the strategical situation in Europe, considering the savety of the USSR as a whole. Stalin had not forgotten how the West had allowed Germany to grow strong again, as well as aggressive, resulting in the WW2. He demanded this would not be repeated, by using force if necessary against the former Allies, when there were signs of a new threat against the USSR.
Still highly unlikely, since the (western) Allies also had knowledge of the political consequenses of of out of proportional violence, such as using the Bomb in Europe. Europe was too delicate to be lost to the Allied cause, as that was seriously a possibility, if the USA (and for the matter UK) would decide to nuke Germany. It would trigger almost certainly a response from Moscow, most likley a withdrawal from earlier treaties and agrements and a continuation of the war, even after Germany had surrendered, although this time against the inferior US and British, who had no means to stop an all out Russian groundoffensive against them.
Even with their strategical airpower, the Russians rulled the batltefield itself, by sheer numbers in the air locally, against which the Allied Airforces were not well equipped to do much about it. (Too few fighters and too many heavy bombers made up the ranks of the Allied Airforces, while the tactical VVS was almost exclusively equipped with short ranged battleflieldsupport and fighter aircraft.)
The principle question therefore remained; Were the governments in Washington DC and London prepared to continue a major war against the USSR, after Germany had surrendered? The UK certainly would not and the USA most likely felt the same.
You seem to miss the crucial point in this: The USSR already was not all too happy about having Western Allied Forces close to its borders, considered the needed buffer against the treachereous Western Capitalist Powers, since that was what the Communists realy feared and were willing to fight against, once the National Socialist Enemy was crushed. The nuclear attack therfore would only provoce a Soviet counterreaction, most likely a hostile one, resulting in war between the former Allies. The strategical objectives of the Russians would be to keep the West and their nuclear power as far away as possible, from its spere of Influence and borderregions. Therefre, the West would have been expelled from the Eurasian Continent, meaning driving them back across the Englih Chanel.
So unlike the West, which was tired of almost six years of war (USA only 3,5 years), the USSR was prepared to defend its strategical interests, as its leadership was very concerned about the strategical situation in Europe, considering the savety of the USSR as a whole. Stalin had not forgotten how the West had allowed Germany to grow strong again, as well as aggressive, resulting in the WW2. He demanded this would not be repeated, by using force if necessary against the former Allies, when there were signs of a new threat against the USSR.