How decisive was US support for the Soviet war effort against Germany?

Ahem: http://www.ccnr.org/chronology.html

Sure....the British would have been so squeamish about using a weapon they gave most of the material and work already done to the USA to build in the first place. :rolleyes:


The UK had cooperated with the USA in this Nuclear Weapons prgramm, when seriously under threath from German presure in times when Allied citory was far from certain. After 1944, the Allied Victory was only a matter of time, so there would be no more reason to use beyond logical terror to subdue Germany anymore, besides making a point to the then still allied USSR. In this case, the point had to be made in a more constructive way, particularry by showing of force at will, which was better suited in the more remote secondary Pacific Theater, than in the primary theater of Europe, which was badly needed after the war as well.

So nuclear bombs on Germany were still out of the question after the start of 1944, simply since political demands indicated this. Asia was a different matter, since the USA could play here on its own terms, without much intereference of other allied powers, which were very present in Europe.

Besides that, the US Politicians were not stupid to throw away their biggest advantage, namely the Allied Alliance, by doing their own thing, without consulting its allies. Europe was already a won race, so the Bomb was only to be used either as on a testingground, or in Asia, where the conclussion of the war was a little less later to be expected compared to Europpe, given the Germany First Rule.
 
The UK had cooperated with the USA in this Nuclear Weapons prgramm, when seriously under threath from German presure in times when Allied citory was far from certain. After 1944, the Allied Victory was only a matter of time, so there would be no more reason to use beyond logical terror to subdue Germany anymore, besides making a point to the then still allied USSR. In this case, the point had to be made in a more constructive way, particularry by showing of force at will, which was better suited in the more remote secondary Pacific Theater, than in the primary theater of Europe, which was badly needed after the war as well.

So nuclear bombs on Germany were still out of the question after the start of 1944, simply since political demands indicated this. Asia was a different matter, since the USA could play here on its own terms, without much intereference of other allied powers, which were very present in Europe.

Besides that, the US Politicians were not stupid to throw away their biggest advantage, namely the Allied Alliance, by doing their own thing, without consulting its allies. Europe was already a won race, so the Bomb was only to be used either as on a testingground, or in Asia, where the conclussion of the war was a little less later to be expected compared to Europpe, given the Germany First Rule.

Spelling, you're doing it wrong. You're claiming that in the event that the Allies are in a much more difficult and desperate situation than the OTL, that the same Allies who approved the firebombing of Dresden are somehow going to be squeamish about Nukes. Uh. Huh. :rolleyes:
 
Spelling, you're doing it wrong. You're claiming that in the event that the Allies are in a much more difficult and desperate situation than the OTL, that the same Allies who approved the firebombing of Dresden are somehow going to be squeamish about Nukes. Uh. Huh. :rolleyes:

Still highly unlikely, since the (western) Allies also had knowledge of the political consequenses of of out of proportional violence, such as using the Bomb in Europe. Europe was too delicate to be lost to the Allied cause, as that was seriously a possibility, if the USA (and for the matter UK) would decide to nuke Germany. It would trigger almost certainly a response from Moscow, most likley a withdrawal from earlier treaties and agrements and a continuation of the war, even after Germany had surrendered, although this time against the inferior US and British, who had no means to stop an all out Russian groundoffensive against them.

Even with their strategical airpower, the Russians rulled the batltefield itself, by sheer numbers in the air locally, against which the Allied Airforces were not well equipped to do much about it. (Too few fighters and too many heavy bombers made up the ranks of the Allied Airforces, while the tactical VVS was almost exclusively equipped with short ranged battleflieldsupport and fighter aircraft.)

The principle question therefore remained; Were the governments in Washington DC and London prepared to continue a major war against the USSR, after Germany had surrendered? The UK certainly would not and the USA most likely felt the same.
 
It's odd really. Sometimes, you are a halfway decent poster, whose posts are generally obvious, but at least true. Then there are the times when you start posting complete nonsense that would set Bard to shame, and curiously, both grammar and spelling goes down the tubes at the same time. It's like you are 2 separate people. Either that, or this is what happens when you start posting without thinking. Please, start thinking.

Still highly unlikely, since the (western) Allies also had knowledge of the political consequenses of of out of proportional violence, such as using the Bomb in Europe. Europe was too delicate to be lost to the Allied cause, as that was seriously a possibility, if the USA (and for the matter UK) would decide to nuke Germany. It would trigger almost certainly a response from Moscow, most likley a withdrawal from earlier treaties and agrements and a continuation of the war, even after Germany had surrendered, although this time against the inferior US and British, who had no means to stop an all out Russian groundoffensive against them.

Even with their strategical airpower, the Russians rulled the batltefield itself, by sheer numbers in the air locally, against which the Allied Airforces were not well equipped to do much about it. (Too few fighters and too many heavy bombers made up the ranks of the Allied Airforces, while the tactical VVS was almost exclusively equipped with short ranged battleflieldsupport and fighter aircraft.)

The principle question therefore remained; Were the governments in Washington DC and London prepared to continue a major war against the USSR, after Germany had surrendered? The UK certainly would not and the USA most likely felt the same.

So, the Western Allies, the ones that massively firebombed cities throughout the war are going to be concerned about proportional violence. Indeed, the UK, you know, those people that switched to terror bombing in 1940 and never looked back, even when improving technology had made targetted destruction of industrial targets more effective by 1944, are going to be so squeamish about it that they would abandon their alliance with the U.S. And the Soviets, you know, those paragons of violence in proportion and no more, are going to be willing to go to war with the West to avenge German civilian deaths. Curious how they weren't willing to do so to avenge Dresden, but hey, Nukes are Magic.

I'll just ignore the nonsense about how this war would go since it's really too much.
 
[QUOTE=xchen08;3772418


So, the Western Allies, the ones that massively firebombed cities throughout the war are going to be concerned about proportional violence. Indeed, the UK, you know, those people that switched to terror bombing in 1940 and never looked back, even when improving technology had made targetted destruction of industrial targets more effective by 1944, are going to be so squeamish about it that they would abandon their alliance with the U.S. And the Soviets, you know, those paragons of violence in proportion and no more, are going to be willing to go to war with the West to avenge German civilian deaths. Curious how they weren't willing to do so to avenge Dresden, but hey, Nukes are Magic.


You seem to miss the crucial point in this: The USSR already was not all too happy about having Western Allied Forces close to its borders, considered the needed buffer against the treachereous Western Capitalist Powers, since that was what the Communists realy feared and were willing to fight against, once the National Socialist Enemy was crushed. The nuclear attack therfore would only provoce a Soviet counterreaction, most likely a hostile one, resulting in war between the former Allies. The strategical objectives of the Russians would be to keep the West and their nuclear power as far away as possible, from its spere of Influence and borderregions. Therefre, the West would have been expelled from the Eurasian Continent, meaning driving them back across the Englih Chanel.

So unlike the West, which was tired of almost six years of war (USA only 3,5 years), the USSR was prepared to defend its strategical interests, as its leadership was very concerned about the strategical situation in Europe, considering the savety of the USSR as a whole. Stalin had not forgotten how the West had allowed Germany to grow strong again, as well as aggressive, resulting in the WW2. He demanded this would not be repeated, by using force if necessary against the former Allies, when there were signs of a new threat against the USSR.
 
You seem to miss the crucial point in this: The USSR already was not all too happy about having Western Allied Forces close to its borders, considered the needed buffer against the treachereous Western Capitalist Powers, since that was what the Communists realy feared and were willing to fight against, once the National Socialist Enemy was crushed. The nuclear attack therfore would only provoce a Soviet counterreaction, most likely a hostile one, resulting in war between the former Allies. The strategical objectives of the Russians would be to keep the West and their nuclear power as far away as possible, from its spere of Influence and borderregions. Therefre, the West would have been expelled from the Eurasian Continent, meaning driving them back across the Englih Chanel.

So unlike the West, which was tired of almost six years of war (USA only 3,5 years), the USSR was prepared to defend its strategical interests, as its leadership was very concerned about the strategical situation in Europe, considering the savety of the USSR as a whole. Stalin had not forgotten how the West had allowed Germany to grow strong again, as well as aggressive, resulting in the WW2. He demanded this would not be repeated, by using force if necessary against the former Allies, when there were signs of a new threat against the USSR.

I assume you've forgotten about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, eh? Thanks to that the British blockade of Germany was a joke. In fact just as the USA was an Ally for a full year before its formal declaration of war, the Soviets were a member of the Axis for the first two years of the war. That does not negate that Marshals Zhukov, Konev, and the like proved to be among the best Allied generals of the war but it's a fact Soviet apologists tend to avoid.

Stalin did forget his own role to contributing to German victories over the democracies, evidently.

Still highly unlikely, since the (western) Allies also had knowledge of the political consequenses of of out of proportional violence, such as using the Bomb in Europe. Europe was too delicate to be lost to the Allied cause, as that was seriously a possibility, if the USA (and for the matter UK) would decide to nuke Germany. It would trigger almost certainly a response from Moscow, most likley a withdrawal from earlier treaties and agrements and a continuation of the war, even after Germany had surrendered, although this time against the inferior US and British, who had no means to stop an all out Russian groundoffensive against them.

Even with their strategical airpower, the Russians rulled the batltefield itself, by sheer numbers in the air locally, against which the Allied Airforces were not well equipped to do much about it. (Too few fighters and too many heavy bombers made up the ranks of the Allied Airforces, while the tactical VVS was almost exclusively equipped with short ranged battleflieldsupport and fighter aircraft.)

The principle question therefore remained; Were the governments in Washington DC and London prepared to continue a major war against the USSR, after Germany had surrendered? The UK certainly would not and the USA most likely felt the same.

You do realize that these were the Western Allies who leveled major cities in both Germany and Japan to rubble by the end of 1944 IOTL, right?
 
You seem to miss the crucial point in this: The USSR already was not all too happy about having Western Allied Forces close to its borders, considered the needed buffer against the treachereous Western Capitalist Powers, since that was what the Communists realy feared and were willing to fight against, once the National Socialist Enemy was crushed. The nuclear attack therfore would only provoce a Soviet counterreaction, most likely a hostile one, resulting in war between the former Allies. The strategical objectives of the Russians would be to keep the West and their nuclear power as far away as possible, from its spere of Influence and borderregions. Therefre, the West would have been expelled from the Eurasian Continent, meaning driving them back across the Englih Chanel.

I have no clue how your thought processes function. If the nuke is necessary because the Russians have failed to push the Germans back, why exactly would this weaker Soviet Union be able to do a damn think if the Allied nuclear attack pushes the final division line further East? If the nuke is necessary because the Allies have failed in the West, then it would do no more than make up for that and the division line would be no further East.

So unlike the West, which was tired of almost six years of war (USA only 3,5 years), the USSR was prepared to defend its strategical interests, as its leadership was very concerned about the strategical situation in Europe, considering the savety of the USSR as a whole. Stalin had not forgotten how the West had allowed Germany to grow strong again, as well as aggressive, resulting in the WW2. He demanded this would not be repeated, by using force if necessary against the former Allies, when there were signs of a new threat against the USSR.

Is there a single concept here that was not entirely made up by you without historical underpinning? Can you source any of that?

And hell, the idea that the utterly spent Red Army could sweep the Allies out if Stalin really is as insane as you think as been repeatedly debunked on this very site.
 
I mentioned this earlier, but I want to emphasize it: The Soviets had no sources of natural rubber and could not or at least did not produce synthetic rubber good enough to be usable in most applications. If you think the Soviets could have pushed to Berlin on their own eventually, you might want to figure out how they could do that once you subtract out everything they built that required rubber in the manufacture. Let's see: tank engines, truck engines, aircraft engines, tires for all of those things. Replacement tires. Replacement belts of various kinds for industrial machinery.

The reality is that defeating Germany was a team effort. None of the Allies could have done it alone, with the possible exception of the US, and the human cost of the US doing it alone would have probably wrecked the US, and probably wouldn't have been supportable politically, even if it had been possible.

The Soviet lost a lot of key inputs to their industrial machine in the first part of the war--food, some natural resources, and some manufacturing. The Western Allies filled in the key gaps because they needed the Soviets in the war and frankly would have had a horrible time defeating the Germans without Soviets manpower.

Key phrase: Team effort.
 
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