How decisive was US support for the Soviet war effort against Germany?

I find this highly dubious.

By 1943, never mind 1944, vaunted German mobility was in tatters. There is a reason they were reduced to these set-peice engagements which anyone with a brain could see they should have (and if they had the quality and material they had for Barbarossa, would have) avoided. It is at this point when people begin pointing fingers at Hitler and praising Manstein, but such is nonsense.

For Kursk (still in the midde of 1943) the Soviets were able to mobilize well over twice the manpower. Such a ratio was, with few exceptions, either maintained or bettered for the subsequent engagements of the war.

Secondly as far as I am aware US support for the Soviet War Effort conforms to a graph of similar shape to the weight of Strategic bombing (or American involved in the war generally). That is to say it was comparatively small to begin with but became a flood towards the end. If someone has the per-year (or month) data, coupled with the amount of time it took for the material to reach the USSR's various ports and then be put to use, either at the front or in the factories beyond the Urals, I may surrender this point. As it stands though just pointing at an absolute sum doesn't impress me. Nazi Germany lost the Eastern Front if not at Stalingrad then certainly by Kursk, and while 1944 may not have been as catastrophic for Nazi Germany if the Soviets had been more limited (It is worth mentioning though that by Bagration only 50%~ of all the trucks that would eventually reach the USSR had arrived), in a race to the bottom it was only ever going to be one way traffic. The Soviet economy severely out-performed the German and the Soviets had greater reserves of manpower. War by numbers is simplistic but when you have more of everything your generals have really underperform if you are going to lose.

Actually the Germans and Soviets were at most points equal in manpower across the whole of the battle front. The Soviets were able to make overwhelming concentrations where it was necessary but for most of the war Axis and Soviet manpower was about equal.

In this scenario German mobility sucks but the Soviets suck even worse.

I would even say that only two allies would face long protraced war bordering on stalemate (well, but then you have nuclear weapons...)

Yup. The Soviets and the British would have to wait for Tube Alloy to work and would be victors in an even more Pyrrhic sense than they were IOTL, the Soviets and the United States would *really* be the war Soviet propaganda claimed WWII was, and the USA and Britain would have been fucked and unable to invade the German Empire until after Japan is defeated.

Other key US aid: Radios, uniforms, explosives, spam (compact, high-calorie food source), synthetic rubber (try building trucks, tanks or planes without rubber and while the Soviets did have a synthetic rubber plant or two they produced crap), high-octane avgas, and summaries of Ultra intercepts (suitably disguised as to source, though the Soviets got some of the raw material through Philby, etc). The Soviets had their own intelligence sources, of course, but they craved the summaries and the Western Allies used that as leverage from time-to-time when the Soviets were being more than usually jerks about something.

I've pointed out that radios mattered to help the USSR co-ordinate their attacks. The lack of co-ordination was a fatal weakness of Imperial Russian forces in WWI, and was nearly fatal for the Soviets in WWII.

I cleave to roughly this view

Sure, without US aid the USSR would not have fallen to the Nazis

But they would not have been able to push back. And that is not simply a delay in dates, but a profound strategic change whose echoes affect North Africa and the whole of the subsequent European theatres

German divisions who are not dead are still in play, German corps who are not forced to engage in defensive campaigns in the East can be deployed elsewhere

Best Regards
Grey Wolf

Right. Given for all his defects Rommel was able to die down a good number of British troops, if the Germans are able to send a fair deal more, the Axis may well win the war in North Africa even with intelligence weaknesses like OTL because they'd have more and better armor the Allies would be able effectively to counter.

It was a joint effort, and without any one of the Allies, a victory in the war would be truly apocalyptic if won at all.
 

Thande

Donor
One thing I always found ironic was that the Soviets found American Lend-Lease tanks (i.e., Shermans) worthless yet they found some use for British Valentine tanks, even though our troops in North Africa considered the Sherman to be superior to the Valentine (when it wasn't cooking them alive that is). The reason being that both tanks couldn't compete in the far more advanced tank atmosphere of the Eastern Front as front-line tanks, but the Soviets found the Valentine to be useful as a scout tank, while the Sherman wasn't.
 
One thing I always found ironic was that the Soviets found American Lend-Lease tanks (i.e., Shermans) worthless yet they found some use for British Valentine tanks, even though our troops in North Africa considered the Sherman to be superior to the Valentine (when it wasn't cooking them alive that is). The reason being that both tanks couldn't compete in the far more advanced tank atmosphere of the Eastern Front as front-line tanks, but the Soviets found the Valentine to be useful as a scout tank, while the Sherman wasn't.

That the Soviets found the Sherman worthless is a myth. They did find the Stuarts and Grants worthless (and lets by honest, they were), but highly valued the Shermans for their reliability, being less prone to exploding, and superior ergonomics. Hence, they tended to equip elite Guards units reserved for breakthrough operations where reliability and crew fitness during extended operations was critical.

That the Eastern Front saw a more advanced tank atmosphere is also a myth. More tanks were being thrown around, but the Germans had an even higher proportion of Pz IVs and older tanks than in the West, and the Soviet T-34 was never notably superior to contemporary Shermans from 42 on.
 
the soviets lose the war without american aid

others have pointed to the trucks, and that along with cloth, radios, half tracks, jeeps, tanks, aircraft and many other things that made the war effort what it was;

but the most important gift was food, the soviet union lost their best agricultural land in 1941 and didn't have it back till 1944... they where able to mobilize many more men than would have otherwise been possible thanks to american beef and pork... without american food, the soviet union would have collapsed by the end of 1942

an army crawls on it's belly - napoleon
 
One thing I always found ironic was that the Soviets found American Lend-Lease tanks (i.e., Shermans) worthless yet they found some use for British Valentine tanks, even though our troops in North Africa considered the Sherman to be superior to the Valentine (when it wasn't cooking them alive that is). The reason being that both tanks couldn't compete in the far more advanced tank atmosphere of the Eastern Front as front-line tanks, but the Soviets found the Valentine to be useful as a scout tank, while the Sherman wasn't.

As XChen08 said that is a myth. The Sherman was something very critical that the Axis never developed in significant numbers: a solid medium tank. The Axis developed really good light tanks and heavy ones but never went too much for medium tanks. Where the USSR and the democracies were much more even with development and didn't order entire grand sweeping revisions every few weeks the way Hitler did.

That the Soviets found the Sherman worthless is a myth. They did find the Stuarts and Grants worthless (and lets by honest, they were), but highly valued the Shermans for their reliability, being less prone to exploding, and superior ergonomics. Hence, they tended to equip elite Guards units reserved for breakthrough operations where reliability and crew fitness during extended operations was critical.

That the Eastern Front saw a more advanced tank atmosphere is also a myth. More tanks were being thrown around, but the Germans had an even higher proportion of Pz IVs and older tanks than in the West, and the Soviet T-34 was never notably superior to contemporary Shermans from 42 on.

And in the event the reason the Soviets won was that they had a mobile, modern army where the Germans were increasingly lacking anything like a 20th Century army the longer the war went on.

the soviets lose the war without american aid

others have pointed to the trucks, and that along with cloth, radios, half tracks, jeeps, tanks, aircraft and many other things that made the war effort what it was;

but the most important gift was food, the soviet union lost their best agricultural land in 1941 and didn't have it back till 1944... they where able to mobilize many more men than would have otherwise been possible thanks to american beef and pork... without american food, the soviet union would have collapsed by the end of 1942

an army crawls on it's belly - napoleon

They would not have lost, as the Germans would still have not faced a situation much different than OTL until 1943. For OTL 1943-5 the USSR will be a lot slower and the result would be a draw, not the complete and utter curbstomp of OTL.
 
Basically a lot worse, the end result would have been the same although the Soviet Union would have suffered a much, much worse war.
 
As XChen08 said that is a myth. The Sherman was something very critical that the Axis never developed in significant numbers: a solid medium tank. The Axis developed really good light tanks and heavy ones but never went too much for medium tanks. Where the USSR and the democracies were much more even with development and didn't order entire grand sweeping revisions every few weeks the way Hitler did.

Heh, the Pz IV was a solid medium tank...in 1941. That it remained the only solid medium tank in the Axis in 1945 was something of a problem, though that it was not wholly outclassed until late 44/early 45 speaks well of the general design.
 

Maur

Banned
Heh, the Pz IV was a solid medium tank...in 1941. That it remained the only solid medium tank in the Axis in 1945 was something of a problem, though that it was not wholly outclassed until late 44/early 45 speaks well of the general design.
PzIVd is something very different from PzIVj.
 
PzIVd is something very different from PzIVj.

And the 1942 M4A1 is a very different machine from the M4A3E8s that dominated T-34/85s in Korea or even more extremely, the Israeli M-51s that slaughtered T-54s in the 6 Day War. What of it? That a machine proves adaptable and upgradeable is a plus.

On the other hand, there are clearly limits to this sort of thing for a machine designed in 1936 which the failure to mount the 75mm L/70 gun and plummeting agility and reliability with each new mark demonstrates.
 
Heh, the Pz IV was a solid medium tank...in 1941. That it remained the only solid medium tank in the Axis in 1945 was something of a problem, though that it was not wholly outclassed until late 44/early 45 speaks well of the general design.

Or alternately that the Soviet failure to correct defects of the T-34 until after Kursk gave it an extended grace period. ;)
 
The Soviets could make up for most of LL lost except high octane gas and explosives but at a cost in man power to the army and arms. They would have to shift a least a million men from the army to arg. and armament production plus shift production of arms to industrial machinery, locomotives , rail stock etc. This would leave 1942 Soviet army smaller and less armed. So no big offensives. this would increase as the war went on. probably a stalemate would in sue.
 
the soviets lose the war without american aid

others have pointed to the trucks, and that along with cloth, radios, half tracks, jeeps, tanks, aircraft and many other things that made the war effort what it was;

but the most important gift was food, the soviet union lost their best agricultural land in 1941 and didn't have it back till 1944... they where able to mobilize many more men than would have otherwise been possible thanks to american beef and pork... without american food, the soviet union would have collapsed by the end of 1942

an army crawls on it's belly - napoleon

They dont the Germans, just last longer. As has been pointed out US lend-Lease only became a major factor long after the Germans had blown any chance of winning in the east.

The food supply during the war wasnt as dire as you just claimed, US aid helped but the re-capture of farmlands land and diversion of labour, to virgin farmlands could take up some of the slack. The Soviet population will be eating old horsemeat & gruel, but they’ll still be eating. Uniforms arnt a great problem the Soviet pre-war and during the war produced millions of cheap and simple uniforms to outfit their rapidly expanding army. The boots are a a problem but that can be worked out too. Even if troops have to *ahem* supply their own footwear. The radio’s are the biggest help, but the Soviets had become fairly adept art working around this weakness.

That the Soviets found the Sherman worthless is a myth. They did find the Stuarts and Grants worthless (and lets by honest, they were), but highly valued the Shermans for their reliability, being less prone to exploding, and superior ergonomics. Hence, they tended to equip elite Guards units reserved for breakthrough operations where reliability and crew fitness during extended operations was critical.

That the Eastern Front saw a more advanced tank atmosphere is also a myth. More tanks were being thrown around, but the Germans had an even higher proportion of Pz IVs and older tanks than in the West, and the Soviet T-34 was never notably superior to contemporary Shermans from 42 on.

Soviet built tanks were better, frankly they were bult with the idea of fighting within Russia in mind. The Shermans were an ok tank but they just couldnt stand up to German tanks. Of course like with everything else the fact thart the Soviet accepted lots of free stuff dosnt they needed it to win.
 
They dont the Germans, just last longer. As has been pointed out US lend-Lease only became a major factor long after the Germans had blown any chance of winning in the east.

The food supply during the war wasnt as dire as you just claimed, US aid helped but the re-capture of farmlands land and diversion of labour, to virgin farmlands could take up some of the slack. The Soviet population will be eating old horsemeat & gruel, but they’ll still be eating. Uniforms arnt a great problem the Soviet pre-war and during the war produced millions of cheap and simple uniforms to outfit their rapidly expanding army. The boots are a a problem but that can be worked out too. Even if troops have to *ahem* supply their own footwear. The radio’s are the biggest help, but the Soviets had become fairly adept art working around this weakness.



Soviet built tanks were better, frankly they were bult with the idea of fighting within Russia in mind. The Shermans were an ok tank but they just couldnt stand up to German tanks. Of course like with everything else the fact thart the Soviet accepted lots of free stuff dosnt they needed it to win.

there was a sustained food crisis in russia going back for a decade, american food put men on the front instead of in the fields, it was absolutely critical... a man with an empty belly isn't capable of resistance

and more than cloth, gas, rubber tanks etc trucks where also a critical bottleneck... the soviets in 1944 where getting thousands of trucks a month to mobilize their armies... the entire run of the studebaker company was devoted to them

a hungry populace is one likely to turn on their masters; ask the czar
 
As has been pointed out many times, each combatant in WW2 had a limit on industrial capacity, and if they decided to produce X instead of Y then they end up with less of Y, given the limits of improved efficiency. Having to produce trucks instead of tanks (and not producing any tractors) is an obvious one. The reason the USSR got boots & uniform items was not because they had factories producing high heels and frocks that they did not convert to war production, because they had neither the capacity nor the raw materials (leather, wool, cotton, etc) to produce these essential military items. Russians may be tough but absent clothing and boots they don't do very well in the cold weather.

If you don't have US food going to Russia, then you have both more people starving to death AND reduced industrial production. There would not be enough food to adequately feed factory workers (and farmers & other essential folks) so that industrial production, farm production, transport efficiency etc drops making the problem even worse. Try putting in a 12 hour day making T-34's on 1500 cal/day & see what happens.

Trains were THE means of moving things any distance in the USSR, because the roads were crap. Remove 84% of the locomotives, a significant number of RR cars, and also the many, many tons of rails the US sent to the USSR and things don't move well, impacting both military operations and industrial production. As you can see all of the lend-lease items work synergistically, and therefore removing them works negatively the same way.

Absent lend-lease the USSR has difficulty concentrating forces, equipping forces, and exploiting any victories. Germany still loses, and the Ostfront still chews up a lot of Germans, but the USSR sees the war end with the Red Army very much to the east of where it was OTL.

BTW to the poster who mentioned the Soviet contribution to the war in the Pacific..it was exactly zero. In the roughly one week they were in it the Soviets beat up on the Kwantung Army, by then a hollow shell and irrelevant in the war, grabbed Manchuria, half of Korea and the Kuriles (which they still have not returned). Had the USSR done nothing it would have made zero difference, except we would not have a divided Korea & japan would still have the Kuriles - S. Sakhalin would have probably gone back to the Russians.
 
Soviet built tanks were better, frankly they were bult with the idea of fighting within Russia in mind. The Shermans were an ok tank but they just couldnt stand up to German tanks. Of course like with everything else the fact thart the Soviet accepted lots of free stuff dosnt they needed it to win.

The Sherman stands up perfectly well against the most common German tank, various marks of the Pz IV, and stands up just as well against the German heavies as the T-34. People forget that the so called "T-34 panic" the Germans experienced was when their only tank with anti-tank ability was the Pz III, as the IV still mounted a low velocity 75mm in its role as an infantry tank. Similarly, the pop cultural memory of the Sherman was tainted by the Tiger panic caused by pitting mediums against heavies on the defensive in bocage country, completely forgetting how the Sherman performed perfectly well against German armor in North Africa as well as later following the breakout. If you are going to claim Soviet tanks to be better, you need to present actual evidence, instead of the same regurgitated nonsense the History Channel puts out.

No, the Russians don't need the Sherman to win. On the other hand, the Sherman was their best exploitation tank, and losing it would slow their counterattack, alongside the lack of trucks, no rubber for roadwheels reducing strategic speed of all Soviet tanks, no radios, half as many aircraft of lower performance, etc.

Trains were THE means of moving things any distance in the USSR, because the roads were crap. Remove 84% of the locomotives, a significant number of RR cars, and also the many, many tons of rails the US sent to the USSR and things don't move well, impacting both military operations and industrial production. As you can see all of the lend-lease items work synergistically, and therefore removing them works negatively the same way.

Oh I agree with you, but this statistic is taken out of context and is misleading, referring as it does to new locomotives, rolling stock, etc, not the actual numbers in service.
 
The Allied support to the USSR in WW2 was mainly a political, rather than a strategical issue, as the USSR could very well have done without it, since the transported goods were only a small factor, given the needs of the USSR. Most resources were domestically produced and refined, while weapons of Western productionlines were indeed not used in the numbers you might have expected. Only some aircraft types saw heavy service in the VVS, since the domestic aircraft were mostly short ranged battlefield support ones, while the West deleivered slightly longer ranging and specialised aircraft for higher altitudes.

Without the supply from both USA and UK to the USSR, the war would have almost certainly be as in the OTL, except for some more troubled relations between the victors afterworths.
 
Don't forget boots. The U.S. sent 14 MILLION pairs of boots to the Soviets.

Here an interesting link for those who REALLY want to see the jaw dropping figures for uniforms and clothing supplied by the U.S. across the board (by country of receipt)

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/LL-Ship/LL-Ship-4.html

The Red Army also received 434,000 truck of various types.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/LL-Ship/LL-Ship-3B.html

I read that the US sent the USSR 1017 thousand tons of Aviation grade fuel in 1945 only. The article I was reading stated that from 1940 to 1945 close to 59% of Soviet aviation fuels come from US/UK lend lease.

It also claimed that during the war years something like 93% of new Soviet rail road rails were supplied through lend lease.

If they had to make just those rails themselves how many tanks wouldn't they been able to build?
 
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