How could the Oregon dispute have gone differently?

They wouldn't be? There would just have been a different treaty in the first place.
Why would the U.S. agree to a treaty where the border ran along the 49 Parallel from the western tip of Lake Superior but a few hundred miles from the Pacific it drops down below the Columbia River? Why would the U.S. have no interest in the rich lands of the vast inland water ways of the region? At the time both sides had almost no settlements west of the Great Lakes, and as it turned out American settlers got there first. Why would the British be so worthy of such largess? What would the British offer in return?
 
They wouldn't be? There would just have been a different treaty in the first place.

Or the whole thing would break down and the two sides would get the war that neither of them really seemed to want, despite all the chest thumping. The US had plenty going for it in the dispute, it's just that the wagon train settlers weren't the factor some people imagine they were.
 
Or the whole thing would break down and the two sides would get the war that neither of them really seemed to want, despite all the chest thumping.

Or it's one more element of the friction between the UK and US in the late 30s, and something else (such as the Hermosa and/or Creole incidents getting bloody) is the straw that breaks the camel's back.
 
The Oregon dispute occurred in a period when British investment and trade with the US was high, the value of the HBC and fur were declining, and both the US and UK had pressing concerns elsewhere. If you want to derail that to some extent, you probably need to resolve the dispute over Texas earlier, presumably in the 1830s and probably keep a more populist, Anglophobe government alive in the US. Andrew Jackson attempted to cultivate such a foreign policy, but his state department was filled with Northern Democrats and former Federalists, who were generally more Anglophilic and resisted those impulses. Southern Democrats were also skeptical of war with Britain due to its potential effect on exports. It was primarily the Western Democrats that pushed for more bellicose stance against Britain in Oregon. A good divergence point might be Lewis Cass winning the 1844 Democratic Convention, something that nearly happened, and then the general election after that. Some butterflies are probably also necessary on the British side as well, but I lack the expertise on British politics to speculate on that too much.
 
The Oregon dispute occurred in a period when British investment and trade with the US was high, the value of the HBC and fur were declining, and both the US and UK had pressing concerns elsewhere. If you want to derail that to some extent, you probably need to resolve the dispute over Texas earlier, presumably in the 1830s and probably keep a more populist, Anglophobe government alive in the US. Andrew Jackson attempted to cultivate such a foreign policy, but his state department was filled with Northern Democrats and former Federalists, who were generally more Anglophilic and resisted those impulses. Southern Democrats were also skeptical of war with Britain due to its potential effect on exports. It was primarily the Western Democrats that pushed for more bellicose stance against Britain in Oregon. A good divergence point might be Lewis Cass winning the 1844 Democratic Convention, something that nearly happened, and then the general election after that. Some butterflies are probably also necessary on the British side as well, but I lack the expertise on British politics to speculate on that too much.
Pretty much the same state of affairs that the British had in 1861 and the Trent Affair. Financially speaking Britain made more from investments than a diplomatic concession would have cost the country.

I am not saying that Britian would always back down though.
 
There are a couple of things that need to be made clear. President Polk had a strategic vision for the future of the US. He believed that the key to America's future was Asia trade. Europe was the past. The key to this future was the deepwater ports of what is now Seattle, San Francisco, and San Diego. The Mexican War was instigated (among other reasons) so we could acquire the California ports. A popular sentiment about the Oregon Territory was "54°40' or fight!" 54°40' is the southern border of Alaska. There was real sentiment that the US should fight for all of Oregon. President Polk decided that one war at a time was enough and settled with Britain on the boundary that we have today. Note that Puget Sound is the border.
 
Pretty much the same state of affairs that the British had in 1861 and the Trent Affair. Financially speaking Britain made more from investments than a diplomatic concession would have cost the country.

I am not saying that Britian would always back down though.
Selling to both sides made a fortune for the UK in the ACW.
 
Why would the U.S. agree to a treaty where the border ran along the 49 Parallel from the western tip of Lake Superior but a few hundred miles from the Pacific it drops down below the Columbia River?

This is a very good question. One possible answer is that in 1818 the US was still under the impression that the Columbia river offered a good spot for a seaport and perhaps even a highway into the continent, making the Puget Sound ports less important. However I think it's more likely that the answer is that the US wouldn't agree to such a treaty at that time at least. Let's consider what that might mean in the case where Britain took a harder line in 1818.

The US was not going to got to war again with Britain in 1818, it just wouldn't be feasible. So the immediate effect is either no 1818 treaty at all, or a treaty that excludes the Oregon question and perhaps the entire question of borders. There was enough mutual interest in extending the commercial treaty and settling fishing rights that I expect a treaty would be signed at least addressing these issues. But Oregon would not be shared or neutralized and the on the ground reality would be British occupation.

The HBC would turn away rival fur traders and settlers to the best of its ability. The US will probably encourage its traders to cross the Rockies and work the territory. Preventing settlement will be much easier than driving off organized fur trading bands and driving off individual "mountain men" will be close to impossible. The HBC might succeed in extending its OTL policy of creating "fur deserts" by deliberate overhunting though. The US will of course continue to maintain its claims based on exploration by land (Lewis & Clark) and sea (Robert Gray), as well as through its purchased Spanish claims (assuming Adams - Onis goes through as OTL). This wouldn't seem very strong compared to continued effective British occupation of the territories.

Things will eventually come to some sort of head, perhaps by the 1830's, after the more urgent questions of Spanish America settle down. The crisis could take the form of conflict directly over Oregon or as as exacerbating factor to other potential conflicts like the Hermosa and Creole incidents, the Maine border issue, or the Canadian rebellions of the 1830's. If the Red River border isn't settled in 1818 that could also be another problem. There will nonetheless be strong forces opposed to war, in particular from the commercial interests others have mentioned here.

There look like there are lots of possibilities here.
 
But I don't see how to stop the massive inflow of U.S. settlers. Oregon is going to be American. Only question is does an agreement then divide Oregon territory that let's the British hold on to Washington.
Maybe give the British some reinforcements....

- Coastal tribes in what is now Washington State are all staunchly pro British from early contacts with charismatic British missionaries. The missionaries distribute copious quantities of weapons. Then, they paint a picture of a relentless and approaching civilizational threat to native culture. Though the threat resembles the British in language, appearance, and culture- it is not the British. The good guys always wear red .

- The British expand the definition of "British". Russians in the Russian Far East / Alaska are promised land (of the fertile sort) in Oregon, starter funds, and.... weapons if they agree to swear loyalty to the UK and settle in Oregon. The British are careful, however. There are no Russian majority settlements as the British want them to acculturate instead of forming a distinct community that could, well, switch sides.
 
I'd also mention that Seattle and the Puget Sound as a whole was basically a backwater until the Klondike Gold Rush of the 1890s. I don't know I've ever heard that Polk was interested in Puget sound specifically, though I'll admit my expertise extends only as far as one single paper I wrote in college about the parallel development of Seattle and Vancouver through the broader lens of urbanism and historical geography, so I may just be unaware of Polk's "grand strategy". But my understanding is that Portland was the "prize" of the PNW and it was only the railroad, logging industry, gold rush, and growing importance of deep water ports that turned Puget Sound into the de facto capital and economic driver of the PNW – none of which happened until 40 years after Polk.

- The British expand the definition of "British". Russians in the Russian Far East / Alaska are promised land (of the fertile sort) in Oregon, starter funds, and.... weapons if they agree to swear loyalty to the UK and settle in Oregon. The British are careful, however. There are no Russian majority settlements as the British want them to acculturate instead of forming a distinct community that could, well, switch sides.
Were there many Far East/Alaskan Russians to be enticed at that time?
 
This is a very good question. One possible answer is that in 1818 the US was still under the impression that the Columbia river offered a good spot for a seaport and perhaps even a highway into the continent, making the Puget Sound ports less important. However I think it's more likely that the answer is that the US wouldn't agree to such a treaty at that time at least. Let's consider what that might mean in the case where Britain took a harder line in 1818.

The US was not going to got to war again with Britain in 1818, it just wouldn't be feasible. So the immediate effect is either no 1818 treaty at all, or a treaty that excludes the Oregon question and perhaps the entire question of borders. There was enough mutual interest in extending the commercial treaty and settling fishing rights that I expect a treaty would be signed at least addressing these issues. But Oregon would not be shared or neutralized and the on the ground reality would be British occupation.

The HBC would turn away rival fur traders and settlers to the best of its ability. The US will probably encourage its traders to cross the Rockies and work the territory. Preventing settlement will be much easier than driving off organized fur trading bands and driving off individual "mountain men" will be close to impossible. The HBC might succeed in extending its OTL policy of creating "fur deserts" by deliberate overhunting though. The US will of course continue to maintain its claims based on exploration by land (Lewis & Clark) and sea (Robert Gray), as well as through its purchased Spanish claims (assuming Adams - Onis goes through as OTL). This wouldn't seem very strong compared to continued effective British occupation of the territories.

Things will eventually come to some sort of head, perhaps by the 1830's, after the more urgent questions of Spanish America settle down. The crisis could take the form of conflict directly over Oregon or as as exacerbating factor to other potential conflicts like the Hermosa and Creole incidents, the Maine border issue, or the Canadian rebellions of the 1830's. If the Red River border isn't settled in 1818 that could also be another problem. There will nonetheless be strong forces opposed to war, in particular from the commercial interests others have mentioned here.

There look like there are lots of possibilities here.
Your comments are well thought out but there's one problem with settling for Portland as a seaport. If you don't control the land north of the Columbia the British would control access to it. Americans could already see the value of the vast inland waterways of what's now Washington State. By 1818 American investors and strategic leaders were already deeply interested in expanding Asian trade and wanted major ports on the Pacific Coast. San Francisco, Monterey, Portland, and what would become Seattle were prime real-estate for American planners.
 
Your comments are well thought out but there's one problem with settling for Portland as a seaport. If you don't control the land north of the Columbia the British would control access to it. Americans could already see the value of the vast inland waterways of what's now Washington State. By 1818 American investors and strategic leaders were already deeply interested in expanding Asian trade and wanted major ports on the Pacific Coast. San Francisco, Monterey, Portland, and what would become Seattle were prime real-estate for American planners.

They very much wanted a deep water Pacific port for the Asian trade and they knew that the Puget Sound area could provide such, so there was indeed interest in that. It was not considered so essential though because of the mistaken impression that the mouth of the Columbia could provide such a deep water port. Supposedly official Washington only learned the true situation with the visit of the US Exploring Expedition in 1841, though the information on the bar of the Columbia was surely out there if someone had taken a closer interest earlier. Very little was really known about the region at the start of the period.
 
I'd also mention that Seattle and the Puget Sound as a whole was basically a backwater until the Klondike Gold Rush of the 1890s.

It might be that the importance of the Puget Sound ports faded with the takeover of San Francisco. A deep water port in the Oregon territory was considered essential during the earlier Anglo-American condominium and was insisted on in negotiations.
 
Given that states were admitted into the United States of America either as free states or slavery states to help calm down the constant tension between people who were pro slavery and people who were anti slavery, it could be possible that America takes a greater interest in gaining British Columbia with the states of Washington and Oregon to make sure that free states are added alongside other states into America to balance free states and slave states.
 
It might be that the importance of the Puget Sound ports faded with the takeover of San Francisco. A deep water port in the Oregon territory was considered essential during the earlier Anglo-American condominium and was insisted on in negotiations.
Well, the problem is that by the time California was in American hands they already had Puget Sound. Before 1846 California belonged to Mexico but the Oregon territory was open for negotiation.
 
Prior to the War of 1812 the Americans had a stronger position in Columbia/Oregon Country than the British Empire did. The lead was taken by the Astor Company out of Manhattan, trying to get a colony going so they could send supplies up to Russian Alaska, pick up a load of furs, and then take that over to China for trade. There was a promising but narrow window of opportunity for starting up a Russian+American trading relationship with Japan, but it fell through. There was some set back to the Astor Company's efforts in the region because of its remoteness, the difficulty of navigating the Columbia River, and the ecology. If John Astor had sent some better lumberjacks they probably would have had a better go of it. The Royal Navy could put more ships out there than the US Navy could so when the War broke out John Astor sold his stakes there to the HBC to get something out of it rather than having it taken away completely. With no War of 1812 the American might be able to get Vancouver Island and most of the Fraser River watershed.

As it was, I think Polk could have flexed his position a bit more, especially if he had less internal opposition and if he hadn't boxed himself in with a one term pledge. A stronger Harrison/Tyler presidency could have helped.

For the British and Canadian perspective the same is true as with Astor, if the HBC could have got more there and sooner they probably could have got Washington, northern Idaho, and western Montana. I don't think they had the means to settle all of Cascadia, so if you want them to push down into northern California towards the San Francisco Bay it will need another war after 1812. Another thing they could do is manipulate and insist that Oregon Country and the Central Valley of California become independent states, but I don't know if the British had the geographic understanding of California at that time to prompt that policy before the Gold Rush started.

I don't think the Spanish could have set up a colony there.

If Japan could have started an earlier Pacific Empire, they could have used Hawaii as a spring board to get to the PNW, but I don't know what there would be to draw them there that they couldn't also have gotten closer to home.

If a potato farming culture had started up in the PNW before the 1700s, that would be intriguing. And if Europeans had saw an intense potato cultivation in another locality the practice might have spread to other places around the world quicker, such as going to the Dutch and Huguenots in South Africa.
 
Prior to the War of 1812 the Americans had a stronger position in Columbia/Oregon Country than the British Empire did. The lead was taken by the Astor Company out of Manhattan, trying to get a colony going so they could send supplies up to Russian Alaska, pick up a load of furs, and then take that over to China for trade. There was a promising but narrow window of opportunity for starting up a Russian+American trading relationship with Japan, but it fell through. There was some set back to the Astor Company's efforts in the region because of its remoteness, the difficulty of navigating the Columbia River, and the ecology. If John Astor had sent some better lumberjacks they probably would have had a better go of it. The Royal Navy could put more ships out there than the US Navy could so when the War broke out John Astor sold his stakes there to the HBC to get something out of it rather than having it taken away completely. With no War of 1812 the American might be able to get Vancouver Island and most of the Fraser River watershed.

As it was, I think Polk could have flexed his position a bit more, especially if he had less internal opposition and if he hadn't boxed himself in with a one term pledge. A stronger Harrison/Tyler presidency could have helped.

For the British and Canadian perspective the same is true as with Astor, if the HBC could have got more there and sooner they probably could have got Washington, northern Idaho, and western Montana. I don't think they had the means to settle all of Cascadia, so if you want them to push down into northern California towards the San Francisco Bay it will need another war after 1812. Another thing they could do is manipulate and insist that Oregon Country and the Central Valley of California become independent states, but I don't know if the British had the geographic understanding of California at that time to prompt that policy before the Gold Rush started.

I don't think the Spanish could have set up a colony there.

If Japan could have started an earlier Pacific Empire, they could have used Hawaii as a spring board to get to the PNW, but I don't know what there would be to draw them there that they couldn't also have gotten closer to home.
The biggest problem any power had in gaining control of Oregon at the time of the dispute is putting people whether colonists, troops or whatever on the ground. For the Americans and British there are just too many equally profitable options closer to home/eastern Canada to expend great effort.

For the Spanish it is even less tempting in that any expedition has to be launched from Mexico and there are no rumours of gold. Ditto for the Russians except they are having coming from Alaska.

Japanese Oregon is even more less likely because the Shogunate was isolationist.
 
A potential way for the United States of America to gain more territory in the Pacific Northwest is form companies and recruit traders and explorers to operate in what is now British Columbia. The Mississippi River could bring these explorers and traders to the area of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, and British Columbia, thus providing transport for Americans who want America to claim more of the Pacific Northwest.
 
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