Yeah, I'm on holiday, but I've been reading about the Home Rule crisis and jotting things down as I go. So...
When Andrew Bonar Law was buried at Westminster Abbey on November 5th 1923, Herbert Asquith lingered at his grave, which sits next to that of David Livingstone. “How appropriate for the Unknown Prime Minister to be buried next to the Unknown Soldier”, he sneered. Asquith’s comment was cruel, but it has more than a grain of truth; Bonar Law probably is (along with Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who also died in office), the most obscure Prime Minister of the 20th century. Even if his time in office was cut short, Bonar Law was, however, incredibly influential in the politics of the era. While today his is overshadowed by the likes of Lloyd George, His leadership of the Opposition during the Home Rule crisis of 1912-1914 was crucial in establishing the shape in modern Britain.
Bonar Law’s assumption of the Conservative leadership in 1911 came as a shock to everyone, including the man himself. Lady Londonderry was horrified at the idea of “A Glaswegian merchant leading the Party of English Gentlemen” (actually it was even worse, as Bonar Law had been born in a log cabin in New Brunswick and so was Britain's first Canadian PM), while the backbench MP Arthur Lee muttered darkly about the Party behaving like “a man who is conscious it has married beneath him”. When Arthur Balfour announced his resignation in October 1911, everyone had expected either Austen Chamberlain or the former Chief Secretary of Ireland, Walter Long, to be his successor. In the end however, the two frontrunners had proven so equally matched and the Party so terrified of civil war that the Whips Office was able to convince both men to stand aside, and Bonar Law, who had only put his name forward as a way of putting a marker down for the future, was abruptly informed that he was the new leader. The rest, as they say, is history.
Given the tumultuous events of the next decade, the Conservative choice of leader in 1911 had enormous ramifications, not only for Britain’s participation in the First World War, but also in the ongoing crisis over the House of Lords, and the looming struggle over Home Rule. Few Opposition Leaders have faced a bigger set of challenges- and arguably, few could have handled them more successfully than Bonar Law. It would not take too much to remove him from contention; and if this happens, then British politics would be entirely different. My own view is that for a variety of reasons that I’ll elaborate on, by picking Bonar Law, the Unionists- and the country- dodged a pretty big bullet.
So in the grand tradition of Alternative History, let’s have that bullet hit. PoD: the evening of November 10th, 1911. The previous day, Bonar Law had told his friends and close colleagues that he was considering entering the leadership race; this immediately provoked attempts by supporters of Austen Chamberlain, who had hoped to see Bonar Law fall in behind him, to change his mind. A series of Chamberlainite MPs called on Bonar Law warning him off, and late on November 10th his friend Edward Goulding sent him a letter informing him that he had told the Chief Whip of his plans. He also enclosed a copy of a letter sent to him by James Hope, a highly-respected backbencher, saying “I like and respect (Bonar Law) immensely, but I do not think he has a chance of election, and his standing may gravely prejudice Austen’s chances and in any case cannot fail to leave a nasty taste. I am hardly intimate enough with him to beg him to desist, but I hope you may use your influence in this direction”
The letter upset Bonar Law, and almost had its desired effect; he immediately drafted a reply to Hope stating that he would immediately abandon his candidacy if it became clear that Chamberlain’s chances of obtaining the leadership were being damaged because of it, only to have his friend, campaign manager and fellow Canadian Max Aiken (later Lord Beaverbrook) to snatch it from his hand and throw it into the fire. Aiken promptly drafted a second, less generous reply, and Bonar Law’s candidacy avoided a premature conclusion.
But WI Bonar Law had sent his first draft? Having put his willingness to withdraw on the record, Austen Chamberlain could legitimately have expected his friend to row in behind him when Ballcarres, the Chief Whip, met expressing his concerns over a possible deadlock.
There is, of course, another possible PoD, and a rather more dramatic one; in the December 1910 election, Bonar Law challenged Winston Churchill to a direct fight for the seat of Northwest Manchester, with the loser pledging to remain out of politics until the next election. Churchill wisely refused to be drawn and Bonar Law went on to narrowly lose the seat against the popular local textile manufacturer Sir George Kemp. Had Churchill stood, the pro-Free Trade aspect of the seat should have secured his victory, and as an honourable man Bonar Law would have been hors de combat until (assuming the election was held at the same time ITTL) 1918.
Either, way, let’s assume that Bonar Law is out of the picture come Balfour’s resignation. If a contest was inevitable, the first task would have been to draw up some rules; the Conservative Party at that time had no formal mechanism for selecting a leader in opposition, and OTL would manage to avoid creating any until the late 1960s. The Whips would have to choose whether to operate a simple one-round vote of MPs with the candidate with the greatest number of votes winning, or went for a system similar to OTL with a majority of MPs required for a winner.
Whichever the whips plump for, the contest would be very close. It was generally accepted that Walter Long had the majority of backbench support, and could probably win on numbers, but Chamberlain had the majority of the front bench, party establishment, and- crucially- many Whips on his side. I’ll explore both options but in the circumstances I suspect that at the last minute, Central Office will strong-arm just enough backbenchers into place to let Chamberlain win the prize.
Scenario #1: Chamberlain gains the leadership
In a fair and equal world Austen Chamberlain would have been the natural successor to Balfour in 1911; everyone certainly expected him to take over at the time. However, his very strengths- good looks, oratorical ability, a famous name- were his greatest weaknesses. Chamberlain lacked the hunger for the job that his rivals had, and like many people in his position, seemed more concerned about ensuring that it appeared the leadership was thrust upon him then actually acquiring it.
As leader, at least at first Chamberlain would have probably adopted many of Bonar Law’s own positions, and if Law was still in active politics, the two men would have been the governing duo of the Party. There would be some important differences however; Chamberlain would not command the same broad support that his counterpart enjoyed OTL, and if the leadership contest provoked the bitterness that was generally held to be in prospect before Bonar Law intervened, Chamberlain would quickly find himself losing the support of an influential number of backbenchers. Put simply, Bonar Law was seen as ‘one of us’ by the Party in a way that Chamberlain never could; when combined with his strong views on tariff reform, the Tory Free-Trade fringe would feel even more alienated than OTL.
The Chamberlain leadership, too, would have been less well-suited to the coming storm over Home Rule. Chamberlain was far too fastidious and polite for any equivalent of Bonar Law’s uncompromising ‘new style’ of debate; he would risk coming across just as Balfour did and frustrate those in the Unionist Party who were desperate for the fight to be taken to the enemy. OTL, Bonar Law did an excellent job of appeasing the “die hards”, even appropriating their language at times, and yet remaining amenable for compromise and negotiation. ITTL, Chamberlain will be temperamentally incapable of doing this, and will risk seeing the likes of Willoughby de Broke and Edward Carson openly dissent from the official party line. Matters are made worse by his own inclinations towards “Home Rule all Round”. OTL, this idea- essentially a Federal Britain- was canvassed repeatedly, particularly by Churchill and Lord Esher; ITTL, Chamberlain will be very tempted to take this deal and run with it instead of taking Bonar Law’s strategy of brinksmanship.
In an ideal world, this could lead to the Home Rule Crisis over by 1913, Belfast and Dublin Parliaments sitting side-by-side with institutions in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Birmingham (where else?), and a Unionist Party severely split by the resulting tension, but just about holding together. But this seems overly hopeful. Even OTL, Bonar Law feared his uncompromising path risked turning himself into a latter-day Peel; with Chamberlain following a softer line and less obviously in tune with his own MPs, the risk would be far greater. As I discussed in a previous post, Lord Willoughby de Broke briefly considered forming a breakaway Die-Hard grouping in the summer of 1911; if Chamberlain is determined to force through an unpopular Home Rule compromise frustration may boil over and a Tory split results.
The consequences of this are rather scary, as ITTL Britain now has a large segment, perhaps even a narrow majority, of the Lords running entirely rogue and entirely willing to consider desperate measures at the limit of the constitution. One particular, rather horrifying tactic comes to mind. OTL, alongside the gun-running, solemn covenants and the like, the Conservatives briefly considered attempting to vote down, or amend the Army Annual Act as it passed through the Lords. The Act, an artefact of the Bill of Rights, was required to pass every year to legalise the existence of the armed forces. OTL, the threat of such action was used by Bonar Law as a way of steering the Government towards compromise; ITTL, a certain someone might go for De Broke, as it were.
The consequences of the Lords vetoing the Army Annual Act, or amending it to prohibit the use of the army in Ulster, would have been massive; for a start it would have discredited Unionism for a generation, as even Orangemen were appalled at the prospect of the option being implemented. This is probably the surest way of having Home Rule implemented across all of Ireland; the collateral damage however would have been immense. The Unionists would have almost certainly have split irrevocably; we could have seen a Chamberlain-Asquith emergency coalition to implement whatever compromise is decided upon, or the King might throw up his hands in despair and call a General Election to resolve the whole mess. Either way though, would Britain really be in a position to intervene on the Continent in the summer of 1914?
Scenario #2: Long as Unionist Leader
What sort of man was Walter Long? He is certainly rather obscure today, and probably with good reason. RJQ Adams describes him as being “notoriously easily offended himself, but his own brash plain-speaking frequently inflicted pain; quick to anger and to the attack, yet his willingness to pacify former adversaries was sometimes perceived as insincerity; his intellectual gifts were far from admired, he was only six years younger than Balfour and his health was frequently indifferent.” Long did have his good points as well; he was highly popular within the Party, faultlessly loyal and brave, if a little-pig headed, and had impeccable ancestral credentials.
Unfortunately, like Chamberlain, he would have been a very bad choice for a party on the edge of a constitutional crisis. His very popularity with the Party faithful would have given him a lot of leeway for negotiation, but there is no evidence that Long shared any of Bonar Law’s talents for combining harsh rhetoric with practical thinking and pragmatism.
There is also the problem of Exclusion to consider. As a man with close ties to the Southern Unionists and who was recently their leader in the Commons, Long would have found it almost impossible to follow Bonar Law’s path and agree to a Home Rule plan that excluded Ulster from the new arrangements at the expense of abandoning the rest of Ireland. ITTL, instead of playing a complex semi-detached role to the Unionists, it seems very likely that Edward Carson would gradually move away from the Unionist mainstream and consider his own options; it seems very possible that sometime in 1913 or early 1914 the entire negotiation process collapses over the issue of Ulster exclusion (as it almost did OTL), and the Ulstermen take matters into their own hands. How the Government would react in 1914 to the declaration of an independent Ulster State under Carson’s leadership, professing undying loyalty to the King and Empire and daring the Army to intervene is a fascinating question; my guess is that the Government collapses and a General Election is called to resolve the matter once and for all.
Finally, there was Long’s health. It was never good at the best of times; the pressure of two years of constant brinksmanship might take its toll, and Long may be forced to resign or even die suddenly in office. This brings me to the third and final scenario; Chamberlain or Long gets the leadership, quickly becomes highly unpopular due to their handling of the crisis and is forced to stand down much as Balfour was. If this happens, then there is only one plausible candidate; Bonar Law. At first glance, this might seem like a timeline identical to OTL. But the new leader would be taking over in very different circumstances, and may be able to salvage less from the situation. Too much depends on the exact situation to speculate what a delayed Bonar Law leadership may have looked like, but it seems that either way, he would have an awful lot of damage to repair.
Thoughts/Comments?
When Andrew Bonar Law was buried at Westminster Abbey on November 5th 1923, Herbert Asquith lingered at his grave, which sits next to that of David Livingstone. “How appropriate for the Unknown Prime Minister to be buried next to the Unknown Soldier”, he sneered. Asquith’s comment was cruel, but it has more than a grain of truth; Bonar Law probably is (along with Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who also died in office), the most obscure Prime Minister of the 20th century. Even if his time in office was cut short, Bonar Law was, however, incredibly influential in the politics of the era. While today his is overshadowed by the likes of Lloyd George, His leadership of the Opposition during the Home Rule crisis of 1912-1914 was crucial in establishing the shape in modern Britain.
Bonar Law’s assumption of the Conservative leadership in 1911 came as a shock to everyone, including the man himself. Lady Londonderry was horrified at the idea of “A Glaswegian merchant leading the Party of English Gentlemen” (actually it was even worse, as Bonar Law had been born in a log cabin in New Brunswick and so was Britain's first Canadian PM), while the backbench MP Arthur Lee muttered darkly about the Party behaving like “a man who is conscious it has married beneath him”. When Arthur Balfour announced his resignation in October 1911, everyone had expected either Austen Chamberlain or the former Chief Secretary of Ireland, Walter Long, to be his successor. In the end however, the two frontrunners had proven so equally matched and the Party so terrified of civil war that the Whips Office was able to convince both men to stand aside, and Bonar Law, who had only put his name forward as a way of putting a marker down for the future, was abruptly informed that he was the new leader. The rest, as they say, is history.
Given the tumultuous events of the next decade, the Conservative choice of leader in 1911 had enormous ramifications, not only for Britain’s participation in the First World War, but also in the ongoing crisis over the House of Lords, and the looming struggle over Home Rule. Few Opposition Leaders have faced a bigger set of challenges- and arguably, few could have handled them more successfully than Bonar Law. It would not take too much to remove him from contention; and if this happens, then British politics would be entirely different. My own view is that for a variety of reasons that I’ll elaborate on, by picking Bonar Law, the Unionists- and the country- dodged a pretty big bullet.
So in the grand tradition of Alternative History, let’s have that bullet hit. PoD: the evening of November 10th, 1911. The previous day, Bonar Law had told his friends and close colleagues that he was considering entering the leadership race; this immediately provoked attempts by supporters of Austen Chamberlain, who had hoped to see Bonar Law fall in behind him, to change his mind. A series of Chamberlainite MPs called on Bonar Law warning him off, and late on November 10th his friend Edward Goulding sent him a letter informing him that he had told the Chief Whip of his plans. He also enclosed a copy of a letter sent to him by James Hope, a highly-respected backbencher, saying “I like and respect (Bonar Law) immensely, but I do not think he has a chance of election, and his standing may gravely prejudice Austen’s chances and in any case cannot fail to leave a nasty taste. I am hardly intimate enough with him to beg him to desist, but I hope you may use your influence in this direction”
The letter upset Bonar Law, and almost had its desired effect; he immediately drafted a reply to Hope stating that he would immediately abandon his candidacy if it became clear that Chamberlain’s chances of obtaining the leadership were being damaged because of it, only to have his friend, campaign manager and fellow Canadian Max Aiken (later Lord Beaverbrook) to snatch it from his hand and throw it into the fire. Aiken promptly drafted a second, less generous reply, and Bonar Law’s candidacy avoided a premature conclusion.
But WI Bonar Law had sent his first draft? Having put his willingness to withdraw on the record, Austen Chamberlain could legitimately have expected his friend to row in behind him when Ballcarres, the Chief Whip, met expressing his concerns over a possible deadlock.
There is, of course, another possible PoD, and a rather more dramatic one; in the December 1910 election, Bonar Law challenged Winston Churchill to a direct fight for the seat of Northwest Manchester, with the loser pledging to remain out of politics until the next election. Churchill wisely refused to be drawn and Bonar Law went on to narrowly lose the seat against the popular local textile manufacturer Sir George Kemp. Had Churchill stood, the pro-Free Trade aspect of the seat should have secured his victory, and as an honourable man Bonar Law would have been hors de combat until (assuming the election was held at the same time ITTL) 1918.
Either, way, let’s assume that Bonar Law is out of the picture come Balfour’s resignation. If a contest was inevitable, the first task would have been to draw up some rules; the Conservative Party at that time had no formal mechanism for selecting a leader in opposition, and OTL would manage to avoid creating any until the late 1960s. The Whips would have to choose whether to operate a simple one-round vote of MPs with the candidate with the greatest number of votes winning, or went for a system similar to OTL with a majority of MPs required for a winner.
Whichever the whips plump for, the contest would be very close. It was generally accepted that Walter Long had the majority of backbench support, and could probably win on numbers, but Chamberlain had the majority of the front bench, party establishment, and- crucially- many Whips on his side. I’ll explore both options but in the circumstances I suspect that at the last minute, Central Office will strong-arm just enough backbenchers into place to let Chamberlain win the prize.
Scenario #1: Chamberlain gains the leadership
In a fair and equal world Austen Chamberlain would have been the natural successor to Balfour in 1911; everyone certainly expected him to take over at the time. However, his very strengths- good looks, oratorical ability, a famous name- were his greatest weaknesses. Chamberlain lacked the hunger for the job that his rivals had, and like many people in his position, seemed more concerned about ensuring that it appeared the leadership was thrust upon him then actually acquiring it.
As leader, at least at first Chamberlain would have probably adopted many of Bonar Law’s own positions, and if Law was still in active politics, the two men would have been the governing duo of the Party. There would be some important differences however; Chamberlain would not command the same broad support that his counterpart enjoyed OTL, and if the leadership contest provoked the bitterness that was generally held to be in prospect before Bonar Law intervened, Chamberlain would quickly find himself losing the support of an influential number of backbenchers. Put simply, Bonar Law was seen as ‘one of us’ by the Party in a way that Chamberlain never could; when combined with his strong views on tariff reform, the Tory Free-Trade fringe would feel even more alienated than OTL.
The Chamberlain leadership, too, would have been less well-suited to the coming storm over Home Rule. Chamberlain was far too fastidious and polite for any equivalent of Bonar Law’s uncompromising ‘new style’ of debate; he would risk coming across just as Balfour did and frustrate those in the Unionist Party who were desperate for the fight to be taken to the enemy. OTL, Bonar Law did an excellent job of appeasing the “die hards”, even appropriating their language at times, and yet remaining amenable for compromise and negotiation. ITTL, Chamberlain will be temperamentally incapable of doing this, and will risk seeing the likes of Willoughby de Broke and Edward Carson openly dissent from the official party line. Matters are made worse by his own inclinations towards “Home Rule all Round”. OTL, this idea- essentially a Federal Britain- was canvassed repeatedly, particularly by Churchill and Lord Esher; ITTL, Chamberlain will be very tempted to take this deal and run with it instead of taking Bonar Law’s strategy of brinksmanship.
In an ideal world, this could lead to the Home Rule Crisis over by 1913, Belfast and Dublin Parliaments sitting side-by-side with institutions in Edinburgh, Cardiff and Birmingham (where else?), and a Unionist Party severely split by the resulting tension, but just about holding together. But this seems overly hopeful. Even OTL, Bonar Law feared his uncompromising path risked turning himself into a latter-day Peel; with Chamberlain following a softer line and less obviously in tune with his own MPs, the risk would be far greater. As I discussed in a previous post, Lord Willoughby de Broke briefly considered forming a breakaway Die-Hard grouping in the summer of 1911; if Chamberlain is determined to force through an unpopular Home Rule compromise frustration may boil over and a Tory split results.
The consequences of this are rather scary, as ITTL Britain now has a large segment, perhaps even a narrow majority, of the Lords running entirely rogue and entirely willing to consider desperate measures at the limit of the constitution. One particular, rather horrifying tactic comes to mind. OTL, alongside the gun-running, solemn covenants and the like, the Conservatives briefly considered attempting to vote down, or amend the Army Annual Act as it passed through the Lords. The Act, an artefact of the Bill of Rights, was required to pass every year to legalise the existence of the armed forces. OTL, the threat of such action was used by Bonar Law as a way of steering the Government towards compromise; ITTL, a certain someone might go for De Broke, as it were.
The consequences of the Lords vetoing the Army Annual Act, or amending it to prohibit the use of the army in Ulster, would have been massive; for a start it would have discredited Unionism for a generation, as even Orangemen were appalled at the prospect of the option being implemented. This is probably the surest way of having Home Rule implemented across all of Ireland; the collateral damage however would have been immense. The Unionists would have almost certainly have split irrevocably; we could have seen a Chamberlain-Asquith emergency coalition to implement whatever compromise is decided upon, or the King might throw up his hands in despair and call a General Election to resolve the whole mess. Either way though, would Britain really be in a position to intervene on the Continent in the summer of 1914?
Scenario #2: Long as Unionist Leader
What sort of man was Walter Long? He is certainly rather obscure today, and probably with good reason. RJQ Adams describes him as being “notoriously easily offended himself, but his own brash plain-speaking frequently inflicted pain; quick to anger and to the attack, yet his willingness to pacify former adversaries was sometimes perceived as insincerity; his intellectual gifts were far from admired, he was only six years younger than Balfour and his health was frequently indifferent.” Long did have his good points as well; he was highly popular within the Party, faultlessly loyal and brave, if a little-pig headed, and had impeccable ancestral credentials.
Unfortunately, like Chamberlain, he would have been a very bad choice for a party on the edge of a constitutional crisis. His very popularity with the Party faithful would have given him a lot of leeway for negotiation, but there is no evidence that Long shared any of Bonar Law’s talents for combining harsh rhetoric with practical thinking and pragmatism.
There is also the problem of Exclusion to consider. As a man with close ties to the Southern Unionists and who was recently their leader in the Commons, Long would have found it almost impossible to follow Bonar Law’s path and agree to a Home Rule plan that excluded Ulster from the new arrangements at the expense of abandoning the rest of Ireland. ITTL, instead of playing a complex semi-detached role to the Unionists, it seems very likely that Edward Carson would gradually move away from the Unionist mainstream and consider his own options; it seems very possible that sometime in 1913 or early 1914 the entire negotiation process collapses over the issue of Ulster exclusion (as it almost did OTL), and the Ulstermen take matters into their own hands. How the Government would react in 1914 to the declaration of an independent Ulster State under Carson’s leadership, professing undying loyalty to the King and Empire and daring the Army to intervene is a fascinating question; my guess is that the Government collapses and a General Election is called to resolve the matter once and for all.
Finally, there was Long’s health. It was never good at the best of times; the pressure of two years of constant brinksmanship might take its toll, and Long may be forced to resign or even die suddenly in office. This brings me to the third and final scenario; Chamberlain or Long gets the leadership, quickly becomes highly unpopular due to their handling of the crisis and is forced to stand down much as Balfour was. If this happens, then there is only one plausible candidate; Bonar Law. At first glance, this might seem like a timeline identical to OTL. But the new leader would be taking over in very different circumstances, and may be able to salvage less from the situation. Too much depends on the exact situation to speculate what a delayed Bonar Law leadership may have looked like, but it seems that either way, he would have an awful lot of damage to repair.
Thoughts/Comments?