Hitler attacking in the West in November 1939

All,

We have been alluding to this one before, but maybe we could further ‘ponder’ this.

Hitler had wanted to turn on the West immediately after the fall of Poland.

Hitler was drafting his memo to the generals, while Brooke was was fearing how it would go if Germany attacked (Arthur Bryant)

Brooke was alerted to a German attack on 15 October – this coming from the French HQ. Commander had decided that if so, the Franco-British forces should advance into Belgium to meet the attack.

Again From Bryant: “To Booke and Dill this seemed madness. Their unarmored troops could not yet hope to meet a German attack except behind the defences they were so busy strengthening”

Hitler fixed the date for the attack as 12 November.

The weather messed it up: Wet and extremely cold, heavy snow and other calamities.

Here is the thing: The British were not even at half the projected strength at spring. The French were not prepared at all and no coordination was done with Belgium.

It opens a few scenarios:

Shlieffen V2.0
October/November would mean dusting off the old plan as Britain and France expected Germany to do.

If the weather had ‘behaved’ would it have been a success? After all, the attack would have gone in with a lot more battle-proven German troops vs. not a lot of British troops and even less in tanks etc.

With the weather as OTL, could it have been forced anyway? LW could not fly, but neither could anybody else.

Manstein plan
Driving through the Ardennes in spring was hard, try that in heavy snow and the whole thing could stall – badly.

But again: If the weather ‘behaved’?

Brooke was busy building a defensive line. Anything would be better than Plan D, but could it be held for any longer time?

Another ‘twist’ could be that Churchill would see where it was going and sacked Gort and put Brooke in instead (or Dill?)

Could that have tilted the balance with a defensive line and a more professional approach?

On a side note: Amazing to see how the weather determined this – and other battles
 
Another ‘twist’ could be that Churchill would see where it was going and sacked Gort and put Brooke in instead (or Dill?)
Churchill was 1st Sea Lord at the time.

IIRC what stopped early attacks by the Germans was lack of ammunition as it was anticipated that the campaign would take 6 months.
 
The Mechelen incident was January 1940, which probably rules out the Sicklecut so it's Schlieffen 2 or a variant.
Germany will suffer from not having reorganised the Panzer divisions and taken on board the experience from Poland, and will not have replaced damaged tanks.
Wikipedia (yeah I know) says total 1939 production was 15 Panzer2, 310 Panzer3 and 38t, and 45 panzer IV, and 99, 1,400 ish and 368 in 1940. ,

OTL the war started May, so they'll be missing roughly 1/6 of 1939 and 4/12 of 1940 production compared with OTL.
So that's 35 Panzer 2, 510 3s and 38s and 130 less panzer 4s. That's a big shortfall - at least 2, and maybe 3 or 4 panzer divisions worth - especially as they are the most useful tanks.

That alone is a worry, but add in poor weather and their air advantage is reduced, so the shortage of artillery will become noticeable. Plus German logistics and winter clothing don't slways mix well.

In Germany's favour, Gamelin is still in charge, but against is that the Dyle plan wasn't developed until 1940 so he might stay defensive which is better for France.

So if France sits on the Eschaut line, there's a fair chance that Schlieffen 2 stalls, whence it is unlikely to ever recover. A smarter move would be for Germany take Belgium and Netherlands, then halt in place until Spring. Good luck convincing Adolf on that one.
 
Churchill was 1st Sea Lord at the time.

IIRC what stopped early attacks by the Germans was lack of ammunition as it was anticipated that the campaign would take 6 months.
Criticism by AH over munitions shortages drove the head of the Army Ordnance Office, General der Artillerie Karl Becker, to suicide just before the invasion of Denmark on 8 April 1940.
 
Sorry - yes - Churchill was only PM from 10 May

The German deficiencies would have to be seen in context of the British deficiencies. That is what worried Brooke.
Even with a 'good season' the weather in Northern France and Belgium is not conducive to outdoor activities in November.

That said, it would count against both.

I agree that the urgency of changing plans were not there in October - HOWEVER - it could as easily have been Hitler who vetoed Schlieffen V2.0 and sent them back to draw up something 'new'. The Manstein plan might have been presented in October/November.

But then again, driving through the Ardennes in November?

There are many permutations i think
 
Sorry - yes - Churchill was only PM from 10 May

The German deficiencies would have to be seen in context of the British deficiencies. That is what worried Brooke.
Even with a 'good season' the weather in Northern France and Belgium is not conducive to outdoor activities in November.

That said, it would count against both.

I agree that the urgency of changing plans were not there in October - HOWEVER - it could as easily have been Hitler who vetoed Schlieffen V2.0 and sent them back to draw up something 'new'. The Manstein plan might have been presented in October/November.

But then again, driving through the Ardennes in November?

There are many permutations i think
I think the longer Germany is prevented from advancing into France is going to build French morale both in the field and politically. The British and French are going to feel justified that Poland got steamrolled by Germany due to Polish incompetence, not German superiority. I am not sure if this pushes France into the mode of "So what if Paris falls we will keep fighting!" or not. If it does maybe Mussolini goes I'm not taking on France now and just stays out of things. Not sure.
 

thaddeus

Donor
The Mechelen incident was January 1940, which probably rules out the Sicklecut so it's Schlieffen 2 or a variant.
Germany will suffer from not having reorganised the Panzer divisions and taken on board the experience from Poland, and will not have replaced damaged tanks. ...

So if France sits on the Eschaut line, there's a fair chance that Schlieffen 2 stalls, whence it is unlikely to ever recover. A smarter move would be for Germany take Belgium and Netherlands, then halt in place until Spring. Good luck convincing Adolf on that one.

I've wondered about that latter point, taking the Netherlands and Belgium, under the assumption France will not or will not be able to broadly counterattack(?) until spring.

I had started an alt.history timeline where Germany had managed to recruit Lithuania into the Polish invasion, which had saved them (the Germans) some of the OTL losses.
 
I've wondered about that latter point, taking the Netherlands and Belgium, under the assumption France will not or will not be able to broadly counterattack(?) until spring.

I had started an alt.history timeline where Germany had managed to recruit Lithuania into the Polish invasion, which had saved them (the Germans) some of the OTL losses.
Link?
 

Garrison

Donor
In 1939 there is no Manstein plan, so it would be Schlieffen Mk2. In November 1939 an offensive in the west would be a disaster for the Germans. They are low on munition, the Polish campaign revealed some serious issues that needed to be addressed and of course the Panzer divisions were fewer in number and less well equipped than 1940. Add in the winter weather and I suspect the Wehrmacht might well stall at the Dyle line.
 
The thing is: Hitler could very well have vetoed the 'old' plan and asked for something new. That could easily have been Manstein plan.

Yes, the Polish campaign had a lot of lessons to learn, but Germany may have learned faster as they were on the receiving end of it.

Yes, the Panzers were not as many in November, but the British and French were not better off either.

If Plan D was not there either (or at least not being executed), then Germany would have hit the defensive line Brooke was busy building. Wonder how that would have gone.

My big WHAT IF is the weather - if it had been a nice late autumn weather in Northern France and Belgium? not as it was OTL
I don't think it is a given that it would have been a disaster. But could it have achieved the objective - either Schlieffen V2.0 Or Manstein?
 
The thing is: Hitler could very well have vetoed the 'old' plan and asked for something new. That could easily have been Manstein plan.

Yes, the Polish campaign had a lot of lessons to learn, but Germany may have learned faster as they were on the receiving end of it.

Yes, the Panzers were not as many in November, but the British and French were not better off either.

If Plan D was not there either (or at least not being executed), then Germany would have hit the defensive line Brooke was busy building. Wonder how that would have gone.

My big WHAT IF is the weather - if it had been a nice late autumn weather in Northern France and Belgium? not as it was OTL
I don't think it is a given that it would have been a disaster. But could it have achieved the objective - either Schlieffen V2.0 Or Manstein?
The Norwegian campaign drew off some elite units from the Wallies, those units may make a difference in this scenario. OTOH the Germans have their airborne division and its planes still intact. Not sure how many units the Wallies had at this point in time vs May.

German Division Distribution September 1939 to June 1940
MonthGermanyEasternWesternNorwayTotal
Sep-39360490112
Oct-39418670116
Nov-394410680122
Dec-393110980139
Jan-4031101010142
Feb-404610980154
Mar-404617990162
Apr-4040181006164
May-4029151147165
Jun-401171427167

German Mobilization details*

* German Divisions formed between November 1939 and 1940 included 54 infantry divisions, 1 Panzer Division and 1 Motorized Division.

Divisions formed outside of the Welle system between November 1939 and May 1940​

During World War II the German infantry divisions were, mostly, mobilized in "Wellen" (Waves)
Wkr. = Wehrkreise" (Military Districts)

Div.Nr.153 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. III
Div.Nr.154 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. IV
Div.Nr.155 * Formed: Nov. 1939 - Wkr. V
Div.Nr.156 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VI/XX
Div.Nr.157 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VII
Div.Nr.160 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. X
Div.Nr.166 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VI/XX
Div.Nr.180 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. X
Div.Nr.182 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. XII/XXI
205. Infanterie-Div. * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. V
Div.Nr.148 * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. VIII
Div.Nr.158 * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. VIII
Div.Nr.159 * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. IX

9. Panzer Div. * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. XVII

SS-Div. (mot.) "Verfügungstruppe" * Formed: Apr. 1940 - Wkr. n/a

6.Welle (Wave) Mobilized – November 1939. [Reservists – Disbanded in 1940]

81.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VIII
82.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. IX
83.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. X
88.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. XIII

7.Welle (Wave) Mobilized – January 1940. [Reserve Training Units]​

161.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. I
162.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. II/VIII
163.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 18 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. III
164.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 27 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. IV
167.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 26 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. VII
168.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VIII
169.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 28 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. IX
170.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. X
181.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. XI
183.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 28 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. XIII
196.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 27 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. VI
197.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. XII
198.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. V
199.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Nov. 1940 - Wkr. I

8.Welle (Wave) Mobilized – February 1940. [Active and Training Units]​

290.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 05 Oct. 1940 - Wkr. X
291.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. I
292.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 06 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. II
293.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 08 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. III
294.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 06 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. IV
295.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. XI
296.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 05 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. VII
297.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 31 Jan. 1940 - Wkr. XVII
298.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 06 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. VIII
299.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 09 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. IX

9.Welle (Wave) Mobilized – February/March 1940. [For Static Duties – Disbanded: July 1940]​

351.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. XVII
[Formed from a Landesschützen-Division in “Tschenstochau”]
358.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. VIII
[Formed from the Stab Oberfeldkommandantur 540 in “Kielce”]
365.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. V
[Formed from the Stab Oberfeldkommandantur in “Tarnow”]
372.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 20 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. IV
[Formed from the Stab Oberfeldkommandantur 581]
379.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 15 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. IX
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.424 in “Lublin”]
386.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Apr. 1940 - Wkr. III
[Formed from the Stab Oberfeldkommandantur 530 in “Warsaw”]
393.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. VI
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V. 423]
395.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 16 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. I
[Formed from the 521.Infanterie-Div. in “Tilsit”]
[521.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. I]
399.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 15 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. XXI
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.421 in southeast Prussia]

“Upper Rhine Divisions” (Static Units – Disbanded June 1940)

554.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 15 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. V
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.441]
555.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. VI
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.443]
556.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 11 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. XII
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.426]
557.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 15 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. IV
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.427]
 
Last edited:
In 1939 there is no Manstein plan, ...
Sry but ... wrong.
Manstein offered his plan in October 1939 on behalf/support/instigation of his then commanding General v.Runstedt rejecting Halders (rather uninspired and somewhat helpless IMHO) Schlieffen V2.0. IIRC there were other tob brass' as well not really happy with it.
But Halder rejected it and IOTL thsi decision was taken by him alone (yet no involvement of ... someone ... else).

... let ... someone ... else ... get wind of it and you might have the dicision for it early enough for being inplemented in or rather for November. It might take some other changes as well - like better preparation for winter warfare - but ... I would assume doable.
 

Garrison

Donor
The Norwegian campaign drew off some elite units from the Wallies, those units may make a difference in this scenario. OTOH the Germans have their airborne division and its planes still intact. Not sure how many units the Wallies had at this point in time vs May.

German Division Distribution September 1939 to June 1940
MonthGermanyEasternWesternNorwayTotal
Sep-39360490112
Oct-39418670116
Nov-394410680122
Dec-393110980139
Jan-4031101010142
Feb-404610980154
Mar-404617990162
Apr-4040181006164
May-4029151147165
Jun-401171427167

German Mobilization details*

* German Divisions formed between November 1939 and 1940 included 54 infantry divisions, 1 Panzer Division and 1 Motorized Division.

Divisions formed outside of the Welle system between November 1939 and May 1940​

During World War II the German infantry divisions were, mostly, mobilized in "Wellen" (Waves)
Wkr. = Wehrkreise" (Military Districts)

Div.Nr.153 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. III
Div.Nr.154 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. IV
Div.Nr.155 * Formed: Nov. 1939 - Wkr. V
Div.Nr.156 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VI/XX
Div.Nr.157 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VII
Div.Nr.160 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. X
Div.Nr.166 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VI/XX
Div.Nr.180 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. X
Div.Nr.182 * Formed: Dec. 1939 - Wkr. XII/XXI
205. Infanterie-Div. * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. V
Div.Nr.148 * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. VIII
Div.Nr.158 * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. VIII
Div.Nr.159 * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. IX

9. Panzer Div. * Formed: Jan. 1940 - Wkr. XVII

SS-Div. (mot.) "Verfügungstruppe" * Formed: Apr. 1940 - Wkr. n/a

6.Welle (Wave) Mobilized – November 1939. [Reservists – Disbanded in 1940]

81.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VIII
82.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. IX
83.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. X
88.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. XIII

7.Welle (Wave) Mobilized – January 1940. [Reserve Training Units]​

161.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. I
162.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. II/VIII
163.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 18 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. III
164.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 27 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. IV
167.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 26 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. VII
168.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. VIII
169.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 28 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. IX
170.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. X
181.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. XI
183.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 28 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. XIII
196.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 27 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. VI
197.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. XII
198.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Dec. 1939 - Wkr. V
199.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Nov. 1940 - Wkr. I

8.Welle (Wave) Mobilized – February 1940. [Active and Training Units]​

290.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 05 Oct. 1940 - Wkr. X
291.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. I
292.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 06 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. II
293.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 08 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. III
294.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 06 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. IV
295.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. XI
296.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 05 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. VII
297.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 31 Jan. 1940 - Wkr. XVII
298.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 06 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. VIII
299.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 09 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. IX

9.Welle (Wave) Mobilized – February/March 1940. [For Static Duties – Disbanded: July 1940]​

351.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. XVII
[Formed from a Landesschützen-Division in “Tschenstochau”]
358.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. VIII
[Formed from the Stab Oberfeldkommandantur 540 in “Kielce”]
365.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. V
[Formed from the Stab Oberfeldkommandantur in “Tarnow”]
372.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 20 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. IV
[Formed from the Stab Oberfeldkommandantur 581]
379.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 15 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. IX
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.424 in “Lublin”]
386.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Apr. 1940 - Wkr. III
[Formed from the Stab Oberfeldkommandantur 530 in “Warsaw”]
393.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. VI
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V. 423]
395.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 16 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. I
[Formed from the 521.Infanterie-Div. in “Tilsit”]
[521.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 01 Nov. 1939 - Wkr. I]
399.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 15 Mar. 1940 - Wkr. XXI
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.421 in southeast Prussia]

“Upper Rhine Divisions” (Static Units – Disbanded June 1940)

554.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 15 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. V
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.441]
555.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 10 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. VI
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.443]
556.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 11 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. XII
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.426]
557.Infanterie-Div. * Formed: 15 Feb. 1940 - Wkr. IV
[Formed from the Divisionstab z.b.V.427]
If the Germans try to use their airborne troops in the way they did at the Hague that is going to be costly, perhaps ending up resembling Operation Market Garden when the ground offensive grinds to a halt.
 
Sry but ... wrong.
Manstein offered his plan in October 1939 on behalf/support/instigation of his then commanding General v.Runstedt rejecting Halders (rather uninspired and somewhat helpless IMHO) Schlieffen V2.0. IIRC there were other tob brass' as well not really happy with it.
But Halder rejected it and IOTL thsi decision was taken by him alone (yet no involvement of ... someone ... else).

... let ... someone ... else ... get wind of it and you might have the dicision for it early enough for being inplemented in or rather for November. It might take some other changes as well - like better preparation for winter warfare - but ... I would assume doable.
Agreed, it looks like many bridges too far. The Germans have 38 less divisions available to deploy to the West in November 1939 vs June1940. This includes one less panzer division and one less motorized division.
 
Last edited:
Agreed, it looks like many bridges too far. The Germans have 38 less divisions available to deploy to the West in November 1939 vs June1940. This includes one less panzer division and one less motorized division.
Which is a big overall difference even before allowing for the shortfall in overall tank numbers. Also instead of fighting Hotchkiss and Renaults in Panzer 3,4 and 38t with supporting Panzer 2s (as OTL), they will be more often facing them in Panzer 2s with support from Panzer 1s and a few mediums.
Because the key to German victory was better organisation, good radios, more mobile and better laid out tanks rather than just armour vs guns (which tends to favour the French), the outcome of any given battle might not change a lot. What is likely to change is the cost of victory in the mechanised and motorised German spearhead. This will be much higher in 1939 with these disadvantages. Add that rate of progress should be slowed due to fewer German tanks (fewer locations where overwhelming numbers can be concentrated) in combination with fewer air support sorties in winter, and the chances of running out of steam are much increased.
 
Good luck convincing Adolf on that one.
That's not crazy unlikely if it is getting too laate in the season to continue. Hitler didn't think the 1940 consecutive Low Countries and France campaigns would go nearly as fast as they actually did in OTL.

If it does maybe Mussolini goes I'm not taking on France now and just stays out of things. Not sure.
If Paris goes, even if the French are still resisting, if the Germans are still advancing the Italians will have a hard time *not* wishfully thinking the French wll go down sooner or later and deciding they don't want to miss the war.

if it was in alt-history.what-if the google group, those groups are all broken
 
It is a big difference going to war in Pz 1 and 2's. However, UK (Brooke) complained about the near-total lack of effective anti-tank guns - that would also have made a difference.

If we tinker a little bit with 'facts' we could see:
- the weather stays nice and warm and no heavy rains
- Plan D does not get implemented
- Manstein plan gets chosen
- German attach goes in 12 November

How many UK divisions were present in November '39? 2 or 4?
Was French 'morale' still better in November or did it readily collapse as in May?
RAF Strength in November? even with flying weather?

just wondering
 
The outcome is a disastrous stalemate for the Wehrmacht. The months of retraining and reorganization were absolutely critical in making the Heer the sharp instrument it was when it began the offensive in May. The German General Staff was adamant that a fall/winter offensive would fail, in no small part because it recognized the potentially disastrous deficiencies of the Wehrmacht needed to be addressed before diving into battle against what it regarded as the best army in the world.
 
There was a period of the Heer absorbing the lessons learned from the Poland campaign with all Rgt colonels and above having specific training etc and then returning to their commands and training them on the revised doctrine and this retaining took place over the Winter of 1939/40.

A lot of their pre war doctrine was found wanting during the Polish campaign - for example things like the make up of the machine gun teams within a squad (4 guys armed with P38 pistols and an MG34) - this was changed by the French campaign to give the assistant's rifles as well as things like junior officers leading their platoons directly at machine guns.

The other change was that in 1939 largely due to teh massive expansion of the German armed forces the Heer did not have enough MG34 machine guns to equip more than 50% of its infantry requirement - the rest being met by captured Czech MGs such as the ZB 26 and the belt fed ZB 53 as well as older machine guns still in use.

There was a ramp up in production allowing for far more of the Heer to be correctly equipped with the MG 34

So without this and taking into account the other factors mentioned by other posters (ie lack of tanks and more of what they had being light tanks) the Heer as a whole would not enjoy as much of an advantage over the Allies as it did in April - June 1940.
 
Top