Bit hard to sustain a successful presidential run if you've lost the people at home. Blanchard inching it would still mean problems for him, bit like how people don't take into account the slide Cuomo had suffered at home by 1992.
I think Carroll Campbell is massively overstated on this site btw, and has been about as long as I've been on here. I think he was too much of a pre-New South, only-on-the-cusp-of-the-Republican-breakthrough-in-the-region, purebread Atwaterite creature to do well at a national level. When people got a sniff that Bob Dole was looking at him in 1996, Republican Jewish groups went ape over what went on in his race against Max Heller. And as the Dole campaign came to believe, he had no substantive compensations. A lot of baggage, a sectionally Deep South candidate, with not much else to counterbalance for him.
I feel like there's a myth floating about on here of Campbell as some Bubba-on-the-Republican-side dream moderate which doesn't hold up to much scrutiny.
ULTRA LATE EDIT: I forgot that CC gave a speech to the friggin' Liberty Lobby while in Congress. And of course, was a gubnor strongly supportive of the Palmetto State flying the Dixie flag in the statehouse grounds.
Yeah, the more I think about it the more I realise he's going absolutely nowhere in terms of national fundraising for a presidential contest. People aren't going to pour money into such a baggage-loaded vehicle. Remember, people always talk about him peaking in the era of David Duke. Anything that is even half-reminiscent of that sort of shit is going nowhere with the GOP establishment in an alt'92.
My apologies for taking so long coming back around to this -- backlog from work and then that defining crisis of modern life, wifi outage for a while yesterday. It's remarkable how that ranks right up there with whether the food in the fridge is going to hold up when the power goes out.
I don't know that "losing the people back home" is a full assessment of Blanchard's situation in 1990. It was really down to three factors, none of which were a popular mandate about Blanchard no longer being viable. The first was turnout: the longer a successful politician is in office especially here in the States, or their machine is (e.g. someone who's "keeping their seat warm" because of term limits or the like), the more there's typically a fall-off in marginal voters for them, by which I don't mean late deciders but people who like them yet reason that "well he/she keeps getting elected, there are enough people who'll vote for them that I can skip this time." Which is not "rational" in the economic sense but like a lot of voter behavior basically self-justifying and based on limited information. That sluggish turnout alone was more than enough to make the difference. The second was a hard cycle, the timing was bad in terms of the Poppy Bush Recession which started to hit Michigan hard in the late stages of the 1990 campaign, and the old law about blaming sitting executives for hard times, that vestigial instinct from monarchy, kicked in. Butterfly either of those things and you're already home.
The third was that it was, overall, a tough cycle for the Democrats despite their being in opposition to a sitting Republican president. In the Senate they gained a whopping one seat and that was just Minnesota regressing to its Democratic mean, and on both sides of the aisle a lot of incumbents either had narrow escapes or, like Blanchard in the gubernatorial statistics, were very narrowly beaten. Bill Bradley, hugely popular in New Jersey, barely survived a challenge based on many of the same dynamics that affected Blanchard, anemic turnout and anti-incumbent feeling in a recession (add to that the fact Michigan was a
deeply purple state at the time and the last Democratic governor had left office twenty years before Blanchard was inaugurated; 1986 was a demonstration he'd done something truly remarkable, not that he would
always command overwhelming majorities like that.) Also both of them in particular, Bradley and Blanchard, faced high-quality opposition. John Engler wasn't elected to three terms of his own on a lark; he was the absolute best, most experienced, and most relentless candidate the Michigan GOP could put up against Blanchard, much like the John Kerry-Bill Weld battle in Massachusetts in '96. Blanchard hadn't "lost the people" any more than the difference between, say, Roosevelt's results in '36 and '44 indicate that he had. It was simple erosion over time, incumbency, touches of voter fatigue (not with him, necessarily, but with voting), and a badly timed economic downturn. And even then a more effective pitch to late deciders would've been more than enough. There are butterflies flapping all over the place in that race.
If it goes the other way -- if the
right butterflies flap and Blanchard's returned to office however narrowly -- I don't think it hurts him. Indeed the spin is going to be "he beat the best Michigan Republicans could throw at him in a tough year -- he's a survivor." For two other examples, that Kerry-Weld senate race where Kerry won by the flimsiest skin of his teeth, or Mike Dukakis' career in which he was straight-up primaried after his first term because he'd incurred the wrath of the state party establishment, then clawed his way back to two more terms after that. In both cases, each man suffered what could be pitched as a career-crippling setback. But in practice that set them up to prove they were survivors; that, to use a sports metaphor, they could win in the clutch. Blanchard's national profile, given the substantive things he did as governor as well, could actually be
enhanced by these contrasting wins: the big one when he was fresh off being "the man who saved Michigan" rather like Hugh Carey in New York, and the one where times were tougher and he outlasted the mighty John Engler. Americans like cyclical narratives that come back around to redemption, it's one reason the country's founders revived the old term "revolution," which of course at the time meant returning things to an earlier pristine state. It is as the great Johnny Mercer put it, the "come rain or come shine" dynamic. Shows consistency whatever the weather.
As for Campbell, however you cast him I certainly wouldn't make it as a Bubba-analogue. (Now, he may very well have been cast in that fashion in TLs back in the day, my working knowledge other than a handful of classics before about 2013-14 is poor so I grant you that's a bad analogy if it was made.) Cast as an
antidote to Clinton in the South, maybe, from a Southern Republican's point of view, but certainly not an equivalent. Campbell was as clean-cut as Clinton was loosey-goosey, as focused as Clinton was perambulating and scattershot, and "presented" (almost in the medical sense...) to the bulk of moderate-to-conservative Southern suburbanites and rednecks alike (although there's certainly overlap in the "exurbs") as the old "polite Christian gentleman" type beloved of Southern politicking as the kryptonite to the impassioned (often below the beltline as well as above -- Clinton and John Edwards were proof only that there's nothing new under the sun), rabble-rousing, poor-boy-made-good type. (Jimmy Carter was a curious animal in that he squared the circle of the two types, drawing on the passion and the hardscrabble backstory but portraying himself as the ramrod-straight paragon of morals.)
Campbell (and let me make clear, I'd have crawled across broken glass to vote against the guy, I come from a stubborn strain of Appalachian leftists going way back) was also to a much greater and more meticulous degree than Clinton a
builder. Before his rise the GOP in South Carolina was Strom Thurmond's machine, ably run by Harry Dent for as long as he lasted (Strom of course was probably getting injections from the harvested pancreases of sinless children to keep at it until over 100), and beyond that the state was full of tory Democrats, who were ideologically more or less moderate Republicans of the old school except when Fritz Hollings was in the right mood (there were slender exceptions like Tom Turnipseed and Jim Clyburn, but they were
very much individuated exceptions.) By the time Campbell was done the GOP had lasting majorities in both houses of the state lege, and the Congressional delegation, and a permanent advantage against even the Bluest Dogs for the governorship. He methodically cultivated candidates and donors and media managers and door-knockers and bagmen until South Carolina displaced Mississippi as a center of gravity for the Southern GOP. And he understood, long before Poppy Bush decided the Oval Office was worth employing the guy, how to make "best" use of Lee Atwater. Campbell's central difficulty wasn't whether he had spoken to one batch or another of fringe right-wingers, no matter what flavor of odiousness their politics involved (in any case that was the primary "open secret" category of the Nineties and Aughts, displacing the old-line journalists' attitude towards senatorial tomcatting; if you were part of the modern generation of Republican politicians all paid speeches in front of anyone short of the Illinois Nazis was a non-story unless someone created a reason
why it would be one. That's part of what got that old preener Trent Lott in the end, not that he palled around with the most vicious sorts of Neoconfederates but that he'd made the wrong enemies in the party in his rise to power and they decided that his actions "counted," rather than being subject to standard IOKIYAR [It's OK If You're A Republican] rules.) It's that, while Campbell was a skilled Doctor Faustus -- miles smarter than Dubya, far cleaner-cut and more upright (and more easily airbrushed in the short attention span of the media) than vanity projects like Trent Lott or bantam roosters like Jeff Sessions -- his Mephistopheles up and died on him before he could make a play for center stage.
I'm not surprised Dole's people didn't like Campbell: the GOP often outdoes even the Democrats (who tbf are practically idiots-savant on this score) when it comes to infighting over factional bigotries and personal grudges. Hell the 115th Congress is practically performance art on that score. As such the politicos and staffers involved are
great primary sources for what those conflicts are, but far from rational arbitrators of how things are likely to play out in practice. It's still more than a little amusing that bitter old Nixonian hatchet man Dole enjoyed this odd period in the Nineties where he benefited from the collective delusion of the pack media that he was some kind of stalwart of old-school Republican decorum (Republican decorum? In a party that had nothing but an endless series of civil wars within itself from Lincoln's rise until the New Right leveraged the Dixiecrats to claim ownership? I'm not sure there
is such a thing although it was absolutely essential to several generations of establishment journalists that such an illusion be maintained. The Democrats, to both their credit and their blame, were much too flagrant in their disorder to get away with any dissembling.) Dole was hardly alone in looking down his nose at the Republican Dixiecrats; the '96 campaign in particular was a long exercise in what was left of any kind of Republican "establishment," in the traditional meaning of that term in American party systems, looking down its nose at all of the factions and factors that were actually the moving parts of the modern party. Hence that wonderful anecdote about Goldwater showing up to a Dole rally (that in itself was something, the OG New Righter and a paleocon with strong Nixonian tendencies making peace in the common experience of old age) where both party elders listened to a Gingrich-generation freshman congressman open up for them with fire and brimstone. After that Goldwater turned to Dole and supposedly said, "my God, Bob --
we're the liberals now." Truer words. And at the end of the day rather than taking the fight to Clinton throughout the South, Mississippi and Ohio River valley states, and more of the inter-mountain west, Dole pulled 40.72% of the vote at a time when Democratic numbers were in a state of collapse across most of those regions, the South in particular. (Attempts by the DLC to say the Clinton/Gore era "won back the South" or at least significant parts of it for the Democrats are literally like saying the grass is blue and the sky green. Their Southern vote totals did nothing but tumble from 1992 to the point in 2000 where Gore couldn't win his home state where even Walter Mondale had topped 40% of the vote and a better candidate than Dukakis easily could have won, and the great engine of the Gingrich Congress in '94 besides an odd massacre of Democrats in Washington state was almost entirely the secular collapse of Democratic candidates across the old Confederacy. And that's before we get to the Eighteenth
Brumaire of Mike Huckabee in Clinton's home state.)
Dole himself won the nomination (1) because rather like the John McCain of '08, in the Late Soviet GOP it was His Turn Dammit; (2) because of his gymnastically heartrending speech at Nixon's funeral (talk about Late Soviet, getting the top job because you cried at the right time when the old General Secretary popped his clogs); and (3) because Pete Wilson showed the
nous at presidential campaigning of a medium sized cabbage and no one like Campbell got in the game who could own a region, showcase Dole's structural weaknesses as a presidential candidate, and force the establishment to recognize that this particular year was their death rattle, not their chance to get back on top of all the recent developments. Change those last two factors and at the least you have something like a Wilson/Campbell ticket uniting the nativist-Bircher West Coast right with the Dixiecrats, and fully prepared to mobilize full metal Clinton Derangement Syndrome in order to get ahead. And right around the corner of the cycle lay the Southrons' other poster boy Dubya, with Karl Rove horns and all on his left shoulder, and a feudalized, feral pack of billionaire donors set to displace any properly functioning party apparatus. In that sense any unfortunate timing on Campbell's part was being ahead of it, not behind like some kind of Ross Barnett-like relic. Campbell was where the party was already
going, the butterflies just lay in when and how it was going to get there.