H. G. Wells Urged The Dutch To Launch A Surprise Attack Against Imperial Germany--Could It Have Ended World War I ?

[Rattenfänger von Memphis]

Six months after World War One started, the New York Times published in February 1915 two very contrasting articles.

The first article on February 7, 1915, was by H.G. Wells (author of “The Time Machine”, “The Island of Doctor Moreau”, “The Invisible Man”, “The Food of the Gods”, “The War of the Worlds”, etc. ) which urged the Netherlands to launch a surprise attack against Germany and thereby hopefully bring the war to a speedy end with an Allied victory.

The second article, actually a “Letter To The Editor” response to H. G. Wells, was published February 27, 1915 and was an explanatory refusal of such a stab in the back by a Dutchman, Hendrik Willem van Loon.

I am posting the pertinent part of H.G. Wells’ article and all of H.W. van Loon’s response to show the reasoning of both why and why not such an action by the Dutch might happen if not at this time (Spring 1915), perhaps later in the war.

As a background at the time these two articles were printed, Germany had just declared that, effective February 18, 1915, the waters around the British Isles were to be considered a War Zone in which all enemy ships were subject to being sunk by U-Boats (this was a response to the British blockade of Germany declaring the North Sea a War Zone in November 1914).

Most of the bad, onerous burdens that neutrals like the Netherlands would face, had not yet occurred at this early stage of the war. Britain would soon intensify the blockade against Germany and limit imports by the neutrals bordering Germany. In the very near future, the Germans would first use poison gas and the Western Allies would land at Gallipoli (April 1915). And the Germans would sink the Lusitania and Italy would enter the war against Austria-Hungary (May 1915) .

I personally do not think the Dutch would have gone to war against Germany in 1915. But it seems there were 3 other times during World War One that they might have done so as the conditions they faced, from both sides, worsened. (More about those 3 possibilities below, after the two February 1915 articles to establish a basis for making a decision.)

** H.G. Wells mentions a 400,000-man Dutch army at this time. However Wikipedia says the total was 200,000 men.)

First, H.G. Wells’ article of February 7, 1915 in the New York Times:

HOLLAND’S FUTURE by H. G. WELLS

(This article was suppressed by the censor and its publication in England forbidden. It is printed here [The New York Times] for the first time)


“Were she [Holland] now subjected to any German outrage she could strike with her excellent army of 400,000 men at Aix-la-Chapelle [Aachen], and turn repulse into rapid disaster. That is the interesting thing about the Dutch position now. The Dutch hold a sword at the back of Germany…. But were they to come in on the side of the Allies they would at once deliver a conclusive blow. They could cut the main communication of the German army in Flanders, they could round up and assist to capture every large portion of the German western forces, and they could open up the road not only to attack but to turn the Rhine defenses. In fact, they could finish Germany.

This situation is already fairly obvious; I betray no strategic secret; it must become manifest to every Dutchman before many more weeks. One has but to look at the map. Every day now diminishes the possibility of Germany being able to make any effective counterattack, any [of the same type of] Belgian destruction in Holland, and every day increases the weight of the blow that Holland may deliver. What are the chances that Holland may not ultimately realize to the full the possibilities of that blow and join the Allies ?

….. Unless she [Holland] intervenes this war will probably last for another full year. She wants it to end. It is a terrible oppression. Her army must remain mobilized, even if it does not fight. Her trade stagnates. She is encumbered by refugees. What if she struck to end the war and get the tension over ? Not now, perhaps, but presently. Simultaneously with the Franco-British counter-stroke that now draws near.

….And by coming in, there is something more than the mere termination of a strain and the vindication of international righteousness to consider. There is the possibility, and not only the possibility but the possible need, that Holland should come out of this world war aggrandized.

…..is it very likely that the British will be able to tolerate the continued German possession of the Frisian Islands ? …. The British intend soberly and sanely to do their utmost to make a repetition of the present war impossible. To secure this they may find it necessary to have Germany out of the North Sea. But they have no desire whatever to take either the Frisian Islands or East Friesland, if Holland will save them that trouble.

….. And, in addition, there are those Frisian Islands, and East Friesland, and that dangerous wedge that Germany drives into Holland along the Rhine. It is not difficult to map a very much improved Dutch frontier along the Ems, and thence striking down to the Rhine and meeting the iron country on the left bank of the Rhine, whose annexation and exploitation is Belgium’s legitimate compensation for her devastation and sufferings. Here are the makings of a safer Greater Holland ! “

….. But I have a sort of feeling, for the reasons that I have stated, that even without any serious breach of Dutch neutrality by the Germans, Holland may decide presently to put her troops beside the Belgians. And if, as is always possible, the Germans do make some lumpish onslaught upon Dutch neutrality, then I am convinced that at once that sturdy little country will up and fight like the very devil. And do remarkably well by it.

Now a Dutch response by H.W. van Loon in the New York Times on February 27, 1915.

WHY HOLLAND IS NEUTRAL

Mr. van Loon replies to H.G. Wells that his country has no cause of quarrel with Germany and owes no duty to sacrifice herself for the benefit of England

My attention has been drawn to an article which appeared in your paper [the New York Times] a few days ago, which was written by Mr. H. G. Wells, and which proposed that Holland give Germany the coup de grace, suddenly attack Aix [Aachen] and Cologne [not mentioned in Wells’ article], cut off Germany’s line of supplies, and thereby help win the war for the cause of justice. I am not writing this answer in any official capacity, but I have reason to believe that I write what most of my fellow countrymen feel upon the subject.

Holland is neutral. The country is just as neutral as Belgium would have been had she not been invaded; as neutral as Denmark and Switzerland and the other small countries which are suffering so severely through this war. If any power should attack Holland, Holland would no longer be neutral, but should inundate the central part of the provinces of North and South Holland, would occupy the very strong position around Amsterdam, and would fight to the end. But unless attacked directly Holland will take no part in this war.

Mr. Wells hints at the idea of the righteousness of the cause of the Allies. All races and all colors have been brought together to beat Germany. Now Holland ought to do the same. She is in a position to exercise great power with her fresh troops. In the name of humanity, which has been so grievously maltreated in Belgium, let her join. I think that the answer of the greater part of our people would be somewhat as follows:

No quarrel was ever made by a single person. It takes two to start a fight. England and Germany are fighting for the supremacy of commerce. In the course of this quarrel Belgium has been sacrificed. We are extremely sorry. We have opened our frontiers to all of our southern neighbors. They were welcome to flee to us with all their belongings. We shall take care of them as long as they wish to stay. Our position is not always easy. The Dutch and the Belgian characters are very different. We do not always understand each other. But in the main the Belgians know that we will share our food with them until the last, that in every way we shall make them as comfortable as we can. We are not a very graceful people. We often lack a certain charm of manner. The little potentates who are the Mayors of our small frontier towns are not always very tactful. But these things are minor matters. Holland is the natural place of refuge for her southern neighbors and as long as they suffer from the German domination they know that with us they are safe. But should we have gone with the Allies when the Belgians suffered through no fault of their own ?

For France there is in Holland the greatest personal sympathy. But she is far away from Holland. The direct issue is between England and Germany. The Hollander likes England, fashions his life as much as possible after the English pattern, prefers to do business with English people. Yet is there any reason that Holland should make the possible sacrifice of her own existence for the benefit of England ?

Will Mr. Wells kindly glance through his history and see what we as a nation have suffered at the hands of England ?

During three centuries we fought with England for a principle laid down by Grotius of Delft. We claimed that the sea was an open highway, free to all navigators. England used her best legal talent to prove the contrary. In this struggle we exhausted ourselves and we finally lost. Incidentally we saw our richest colonies go into the possession of England. The very colony in which I am writing this letter [New York] was taken from us in time of peace. Of course all this is past history and no Hollander is going to accuse an Englishman of acts committed by his great-grandfather. But the people will remember all those things, however vaguely, and they will distrust the nation that has constantly done them harm. We gave England her best King (if one is to believe Mr. Macaulay) William III in order to destroy the power of Louis XIV, and greatly for the benefit of England incidentally, did the greatest harm to the country of his origin. After 1715, totally exhausted, we were obliged to see how England got ahead of us.

Then there are some other small items. I take one at random. While the Duke of Wellington danced the polka in Brussels, the Prince of Orange with a small Dutch army stopped Napoleon’s progress at Quatre Bras, and by disobeying the orders of the British commander saved the armies of the allies and made the victory of Waterloo possible. Our thanks for this self-sacrifice was the mild abuse of Mr. Thackeray and other gentlemen who have ever since laughed at the clumsy Dutch troops who in truth so valiantly assisted the British and Prussians. In this matter a little more generosity on the part of British historians would have made us feel more cordial toward our English neighbors. It was ever thus. To read the story of the Armada one would believe that the English destroyed this dangerous Spanish fleet. As a matter of fact, competent historians know that certainly one-half of the glory for that feat goes to the Dutch sailors, who prevented the Spaniards from getting their supplies, their pilots, and their auxiliary army. These are merely examples. They are all small things. But there are so many of them, they return with such persistent regularity that we would feel very little inclination to risk our national existence for a nation which according to our feeling (rightly or wrongly, I am not debating that question) has never treated us with fairness, and which we had to fight for over three centuries before it would accept those general principles of international law which were first of all laid down by Grotius in the beginning of the seventeenth century.

Remember, however, this does not mean any hostility to England. Mr. Wells undoubtedly knows that our ships have invariably done noble work in rescuing the victims of submarine attacks. He will know that our government ( to the great anger of Germany) has construed the articles of several international treaties in the most liberal way and has immediately released all such British subjects as were thrown upon our coasts through the accidents of war. He will also know, if he has read the papers, that our entire country has turned out to do homage to the bravery of those men. The danger to the sailor of a British man-of-war who lands in Holland is that he will be killed by a severe attack of nicotine poisoning caused by the cigars which the people, in their desire to show their feeling and unable to break the strict law of neutrality, shower upon the Englishman who is fished out of the North Sea by our trawlers or our steamers.

But away deep under this very strong personal sympathy for England, and with very sincere admiration for the British form of government, the people of Holland cannot easily overcome a feeling of vague mistrust that the nation which in the past has so often abused them cannot entirely be counted upon to treat them justly this time. Incidentally I may say that the bungling of Mr. Churchill in Antwerp, which we know much better than do the people of England, is another reason why we are a bit afraid of the island across the North Sea.

We are indeed in the position of a dog that has often been beaten innocently and that is now smiled upon and asked to be good and attack another person who has never done him any harm. The comparison may not be very flattering to us, but Mr. Wells will understand what I mean. We have had the Germans with us always. Personally, taking them by and large, we like them not. Their ways are not our ways. Our undisciplined race abhors their system. We have seen the misery which they caused in Belgium more closely than anyone else. The endless letters and pamphlets with which the Germans have inundated our land to prove the justice of their cause have made no impression whatsoever. We have with our own eyes seen the victims of their very strict explanation of Section 58, Article 1, of the German military penal code. We have seen the Belgians hanging by their own red handkerchiefs, and we have with our own hands fed the multitude that had been deprived of everything. On the other hand, Germany has up to date been most scrupulous in her behavior toward us. In the past she has never done us any harm. We may not like her, but she has in a very careful way avoided all friction and has treated us with great consideration.

In view of all this, in view of the very sober attitude of our people upon all matters of our daily life, in view of these historical reflections, which have a very decided influence, would it be quite fair without any provocation on the side of Germany to go forth and attack her in the back, now that she is in such very dangerous straits ? I repeat that this may not be the exact sentiment of all of my countrymen, but I believe that very many of us feel things that way. Perhaps we disagree in minor details, but we agree about the main issue.

We love our country. For centuries we have fought to maintain our individual civilization against the large neighbors which surround us. We try to live up to our good reputation as a home for all those who suffer. The people who are made homeless by Germany come to us and we try to feed them on such grain as the British Government allows to pass through the Channel. We try to continue in our duty toward all our neighbors, even when they declare the entire North Sea (in which we also have a certain interest) as a place of battle and blow up our ships with their mines. We patiently destroy the mines which swim away from our neighbors’ territorial waters and land upon our shores. In short, we perform a very difficult act of balancing as well as we can. But it seems to us that under difficult circumstances we are following the only correct road which can lead to the ultimate goal which we wish to reach, the lasting respect of all those who will judge us without prejudice and malice.

It is very kind of Mr. Wells to offer us territorial compensation, but we respectfully decline such a reward for the sort of attack which was popular in the days of the old Machiavelli.

That was the situation in February 1915 but what about later ? Would the Dutch have possibly done what H.G. Wells suggested and attack Germany ? I offer 3 possible times when this might have happened.

(1) In March 1916, a German U-Boat sank the Dutch ship SS Tubantia causing great anger in the Netherlands. The Germans denied it (although, as it turned out, they were responsible) and they and the British blamed each other for the sinking. To divert the Dutch anger toward them, the Germans successfully spread rumors of an imminent British invasion of Holland which so unnerved the Dutch that they declared a 4-day emergency from March 30 to April 2, 1916.
The Dutch were unnerved because if they were viewed by the Germans as unable to stop a British invasion, Germany might invade and occupy Holland to definitely safeguard the German Rhineland industrial areas.
Bearing this Dutch situation in mind, a little later in June 1916, the Brusilov offensive threatened, on its own, to knock Austria-Hungary out of the war. Another neutral power, Romania, entered (too late as the Brusilov offensive had petered out) in August 1916 against the Central Powers, which had to scramble and hastily gather together forces to contain and conquer Romania by December 1916. No doubt had the Romanians joined the Russians when the Brusilov offensive was at high tide, Germany would be in deep danger, aside from probably losing Austria-Hungary.
At this time, could the Dutch possibly have coordinated with the Allies on the Western Front (Verdun and the Somme were going on at this time), and simultaneously attacked Germany per H. G. Wells’ suggestion in conjunction with Russia and Romania ?

(2) Before deciding to launch unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917, the Germans had been discussing it for many months and if such an action would bring neutrals against them into the war, including Holland at the very time of situation (1) above.

(A) In “Ring of Steel: Germany and Austria-Hungary in World War I”, author Alexander Watson, on page 422, writes: “Hindenburg and Ludendorff had refused to support the Admiralty [over unrestricted submarine warfare] at the end of August 1916. With heavy fighting on the Somme and at Verdun, a frail ally in the east and the new need to defend against Romania, the army’s manpower was totally committed. The Field Marshal and his First Quartermaster General [Hindenburg and Ludendorff] feared no soldiers would be left to defend the borders if the submarines provoked Denmark or Holland into war against the Reich.”

(B) In “The German High Command At War: Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct World War I”, author Robert B. Asprey, on pages 266-267, writes: “Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg had not changed his views from the last conference on the subject [unrestricted submarine warfare]. He again argued against the proposal, citing the danger of bringing not only America into the war but also Denmark and Holland. The Duo [Hindenburg and Ludendorff], along with most army and navy officers, denigrated any threat from America. The enmity of other neutrals, including their immediate neighbors, was something else, because these borders were undefended. Hindenburg and Ludendorff agreed that the subject should be deferred, at least until the end of the Romanian campaign, when troops would be available for border defense vis-à-vis Holland and Denmark.”

(C) In “A History Of The Great War 1914 – 1918”, author C.R.M.F. Cruttwell, on page 380, writes: “The question of Holland and Denmark also entering the war was considered. That they would do so was considered possible rather than probable. Ludendorff engaged that he could transfer sufficient troops from Rumania to deal with them.”

The Germans certainly considered it possible that Holland could attack them during 1916, if not after unrestricted submarine warfare began in February 1917.

(3) In March 1918, Great Britain and the United States commandeered Dutch ships in their territorial waters, citing the principle of Angary. They had tried to lease Dutch shipping for months but Holland would not agree due to pressure from Germany.
Could this action finally have tipped Holland into the war against Germany to help end this seemingly unending collateral damage she had suffered for nearly 4 years ?

Was such a Dutch attack do-able at any time after February 1915 ? Feasible ? Conceivable ? Viable ?

And finally , if H. W. van Loon's reply to H. G. Wells, rules out a Dutch attack in any case, then based on just pure mechanics and facts on the ground as if this were a move in a wargame, what damage could a Dutch attack against Imperial Germany have done?

 

[Riain]

Sad as it is to say, in WW1 only the greatest of powers really mattered. Romania is a good example, her army of something like 650,000 defeated quickly by Germany IIRC, even bigger powers like Italy and the Ottomans were handled very roughly by greater powers. If the Dutch went to war against Germany it is likely they'd suffer a similar fate to Belgium or Romania.

 

[Snowstalker]

The Netherlands was far too tied to Germany economically and culturally, and more importantly, the bulk of its military is in the Dutch East Indies. It would be suicidal for them while only slightly alleviating the Allied situation.

 

[Reggieperrin]

I’ve no idea if Welles facts were correct, but let’s say that the Netherlands did have an army of 400k. Even if by some implausible chance 50% of them were front-line soldiers its now 200k available to fight. Shave off a decent number for reserves, holding defences etc and you are quickly down to a relatively small force able to go on the attack.
So then you have a few divisions with no combat experience whatsoever that have to sneak-attack a large, experienced, well-established army at a point in history when defensive method was at the height of its advantage vs the offense and exploiting success was hugely difficult.

It doesn’t sound like an attractive proposition at all, even before you weigh up the possibility of it going really wrong (like the Germans spot the attack being set up and get ready for it) or what happens to the Netherlands economy if it is only a partial success and they wind up stuck in the war for a while.

 

[naraic]

Sad as it is to say, in WW1 only the greatest of powers really mattered. Romania is a good example, her army of something like 650,000 defeated quickly by Germany IIRC, even bigger powers like Italy and the Ottomans were handled very roughly by greater powers. If the Dutch went to war against Germany it is likely they'd suffer a similar fate to Belgium or Romania.

At the end of the day there was a large technological gap between the major powers and the minor powers.

We have spoken on other threads about the state of French and Germany artillery recently in the 1900s and how German advances meant they were ahead of the French in 1914 but France would have had significant advantages in a 'Morrocco Crisis' war as they would have an advantage at that time.

The majority of Artillery owned by secondary powers date from the 1880s or 1890s.

Romania's survival in ww1 was essential as the southern flank of Russia. If Russia was succeeding Romania would have done a lot better. If Russia was struggling Romania was doomed.

Had the Netherlands joined the war I'm sure that the Entente would be delighted but the Dutch army (be it 200,000 or 400,000) would have been quickly overwhelmed. That was at many times in the Western front the Dailly losses. Perhaps the Dutch could hold defensively behind the waterline but I do not feel they could hold long term without aid.

 

[HJ Tulp]

The Netherlands was far too tied to Germany economically and culturally, and more importantly, the bulk of its military is in the Dutch East Indies. It would be suicidal for them while only slightly alleviating the Allied situation.

Incorrect I'm afraid. The Dutch East Indies were not defended by the Dutch military but by the KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army). Conscripts were in fact prohibited from overseas service.

Regarding the OP: While I'm pretty confident in the Dutch capability to defend behind the Waterlinie, and the Dutch Army was pretty well equipped and trained at that point in history, it's offensive capabilities were practically non-excistant.