Grosser Ostaufmarsch: (Great Eastern Deployment)
Part 1: Now the Sword Must Decide
When Kaiser Wilhelm sat down for a meeting with Helmuth von Moltke, his Chief of the General Staff, at midday on August 1st, 1914 the situation was grim. A few hours ago he had finished signing the papers for the mobilization of the German army and preparations for war were underway. His nation was looking at the prospect of a war on two fronts, with France attacking on the one side and the Russians on the other. This doomsday scenario of course did not take the Kaiser by surprise; the signing of the French-Russian Entente in 1892 had after all made it fairly obvious that Germany would be faced with a war in both the west and the east. He had even order his military high command to prepare a plan for such a situation in years prior. What they had presented to him in 1905 was what was called the Schlieffen Plan. Named after its creator, the elderly Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, the Schlieffen Plan was supposed to be the “perfect war winning plan.” It called for a majority of the German army to be deployed in the west, while only a token force would be left in the east to hold the Russians at bay. The “Plan” began with a dash through the Low Countries, northern France, and ended with the capture of Paris itself, after only forty days. In Schlieffen’s mind with Paris captured and France defeated a significant portion of the forces in the west could then be sent east to halt the Russians.
This plan as the Kaiser saw it had one major flaw; it called for the invasion of the Low Countries. To the Kaiser an invasion of the Low Countries, especially Belgium, was frightening. He knew that by attacking Belgium, Germany, would provoke England to war and that would then put his own “beloved” navy at risk. This he could not allow. So it was to Moltke’s surprise when the Kaiser informed him of his decision to launch an offensive against Russia, instead of France. Moltke was of course stunned that the Kaiser would just simply dismiss the Schlieffen Plan and the last decade of German military preparations. At first he vigorously protested, but after sensing the Kaiser’s irritation he remembered what happened to old Bismarck and simply gave in saying “as you wish sire, we will conduct a Grosser Ostaufmarsch and Russia will be bleed white!”
Molke after the meetings conclusion withdrew to the quiet seclusion of his office. He now contemplated how many armies to send to the east and how many to keep in the west. Since the Kaiser suspended all thought of offensive operations in the west, Moltke felt that no more than five armies needed to remain there. He decided upon keeping Albrecht’s 4th Army, the Crown Prince’s 5th Army, Rupprecht’s 6th Army, and Heeringen’s 7th Army for the defence against any French offensive action. Putting these forces aside, Moltke was now left with the choose of what to deploy for the Grosser Ostaufmarsch, Kluck’s 1st Army, Bulow’s 2nd Army and Hausen’s 3rd Army were all still available. These forces would normally have made up the right wing of theSchlieffen plan, but now were without a task. This thus promoted Moltke to send the 1st and 2nd armies with all possible speed to East Prussia to join Prittwitz’s 8th Army which was already deploying there. Hausen’s 3rd Army would have to remain behind for a short while, due to the limits of the rail network in the east, but it was Molke’s hope that this force would also be deployed east in due time. After this period of contemplation, Moltke discussed the entire situation with his logistics expert Wilhelm Groener, before he finalized and issued his orders. He then, in the closing hours of August 1st 1914, made preparations for the conscription for two new German armies, the 9th and 10th, which would hopefully be deployed to the east by the end of the year.
The Kaiser meanwhile had broken off all contact with cousin “Nicky” and took up the task of rallying the populace. From the balcony of his palace, in Berlin, on the 4th of August he made another one of his famous fiery speeches. Declaring that “in the midst of peace we are now attacked by the enemy” and that “now the sword must decide.” He warned the crowd of 100,000 or so people that “any indecision, any hesitation, would betray the fatherland.” By the speeches conclusion the German people had no doubt in their minds that they would emerge victorious in this war to end all wars.
Russia and France at this point were busy making their own preparations. The 1.2 million man Russian Army was on the march, four Russian Armies deployed along the border with Austria and a further two along its border with Germany. The two forces that deployed opposite Germany in early August were the Russian Niemen and Narew armies. The Niemen Army was under the command of Paul von Rennenkampf and was assigned with the task of attacking north of the Masurian Lakes region into East Prussia. The Russian Narew Army, under Alexander Samsonov, was instructed to advance south of the Masurain Lakes. The goal of the offensive was to advance on East Prussia from two different directions and destroy the German forces. Both the Niemen and Narew armies was under the overall command of Yakov Zhilinsky, the commander of the Northwest Front, who in turn was under orders from, the Czar’s cousin and Commander in Chief of the Russian military, Grand Duke Nicholas.
France at the other end was in the process of deploying five armies along its border with Germany. They were getting ready to conduct French General Joseph Joffre’s Plan XVII, which called for a multi army offensive into German held Alsace-Lorraine. Alsace-Lorraine had been lost to the Germans after France’s great defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and it was a matter of national pride that it had to be regained. On the diplomatic end French Ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paleologue, was prodding Czar Nicholes II to conduct his offensive against Germany as soon as possible. France had made the error in 1870 of going to war without a major ally in the east and did not want to make the same mistake again. The Czar gave a satisfactory response that as early as the 14th of August the Russian Army would begin its drive into East Prussia.
Sources
Wikipedia
Wikimedia Commons:
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Germany_Before_the_First_World_War_1890_-_1914_HU68377.jpg
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Keisari_vihelm_II.jpg
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Germany_Before_the_First_World_War_1890_-_1914_HU68368.jpg
http://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?search=helmuth+von+moltke+the+younger&title=Special%3ASearch&fulltext=1
“Massacre in the Marshes” by Eric Niderost
Archive.org
Part 1: Now the Sword Must Decide
When Kaiser Wilhelm sat down for a meeting with Helmuth von Moltke, his Chief of the General Staff, at midday on August 1st, 1914 the situation was grim. A few hours ago he had finished signing the papers for the mobilization of the German army and preparations for war were underway. His nation was looking at the prospect of a war on two fronts, with France attacking on the one side and the Russians on the other. This doomsday scenario of course did not take the Kaiser by surprise; the signing of the French-Russian Entente in 1892 had after all made it fairly obvious that Germany would be faced with a war in both the west and the east. He had even order his military high command to prepare a plan for such a situation in years prior. What they had presented to him in 1905 was what was called the Schlieffen Plan. Named after its creator, the elderly Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, the Schlieffen Plan was supposed to be the “perfect war winning plan.” It called for a majority of the German army to be deployed in the west, while only a token force would be left in the east to hold the Russians at bay. The “Plan” began with a dash through the Low Countries, northern France, and ended with the capture of Paris itself, after only forty days. In Schlieffen’s mind with Paris captured and France defeated a significant portion of the forces in the west could then be sent east to halt the Russians.
This plan as the Kaiser saw it had one major flaw; it called for the invasion of the Low Countries. To the Kaiser an invasion of the Low Countries, especially Belgium, was frightening. He knew that by attacking Belgium, Germany, would provoke England to war and that would then put his own “beloved” navy at risk. This he could not allow. So it was to Moltke’s surprise when the Kaiser informed him of his decision to launch an offensive against Russia, instead of France. Moltke was of course stunned that the Kaiser would just simply dismiss the Schlieffen Plan and the last decade of German military preparations. At first he vigorously protested, but after sensing the Kaiser’s irritation he remembered what happened to old Bismarck and simply gave in saying “as you wish sire, we will conduct a Grosser Ostaufmarsch and Russia will be bleed white!”
Molke after the meetings conclusion withdrew to the quiet seclusion of his office. He now contemplated how many armies to send to the east and how many to keep in the west. Since the Kaiser suspended all thought of offensive operations in the west, Moltke felt that no more than five armies needed to remain there. He decided upon keeping Albrecht’s 4th Army, the Crown Prince’s 5th Army, Rupprecht’s 6th Army, and Heeringen’s 7th Army for the defence against any French offensive action. Putting these forces aside, Moltke was now left with the choose of what to deploy for the Grosser Ostaufmarsch, Kluck’s 1st Army, Bulow’s 2nd Army and Hausen’s 3rd Army were all still available. These forces would normally have made up the right wing of theSchlieffen plan, but now were without a task. This thus promoted Moltke to send the 1st and 2nd armies with all possible speed to East Prussia to join Prittwitz’s 8th Army which was already deploying there. Hausen’s 3rd Army would have to remain behind for a short while, due to the limits of the rail network in the east, but it was Molke’s hope that this force would also be deployed east in due time. After this period of contemplation, Moltke discussed the entire situation with his logistics expert Wilhelm Groener, before he finalized and issued his orders. He then, in the closing hours of August 1st 1914, made preparations for the conscription for two new German armies, the 9th and 10th, which would hopefully be deployed to the east by the end of the year.
The Kaiser meanwhile had broken off all contact with cousin “Nicky” and took up the task of rallying the populace. From the balcony of his palace, in Berlin, on the 4th of August he made another one of his famous fiery speeches. Declaring that “in the midst of peace we are now attacked by the enemy” and that “now the sword must decide.” He warned the crowd of 100,000 or so people that “any indecision, any hesitation, would betray the fatherland.” By the speeches conclusion the German people had no doubt in their minds that they would emerge victorious in this war to end all wars.
Russia and France at this point were busy making their own preparations. The 1.2 million man Russian Army was on the march, four Russian Armies deployed along the border with Austria and a further two along its border with Germany. The two forces that deployed opposite Germany in early August were the Russian Niemen and Narew armies. The Niemen Army was under the command of Paul von Rennenkampf and was assigned with the task of attacking north of the Masurian Lakes region into East Prussia. The Russian Narew Army, under Alexander Samsonov, was instructed to advance south of the Masurain Lakes. The goal of the offensive was to advance on East Prussia from two different directions and destroy the German forces. Both the Niemen and Narew armies was under the overall command of Yakov Zhilinsky, the commander of the Northwest Front, who in turn was under orders from, the Czar’s cousin and Commander in Chief of the Russian military, Grand Duke Nicholas.
France at the other end was in the process of deploying five armies along its border with Germany. They were getting ready to conduct French General Joseph Joffre’s Plan XVII, which called for a multi army offensive into German held Alsace-Lorraine. Alsace-Lorraine had been lost to the Germans after France’s great defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and it was a matter of national pride that it had to be regained. On the diplomatic end French Ambassador to Russia, Maurice Paleologue, was prodding Czar Nicholes II to conduct his offensive against Germany as soon as possible. France had made the error in 1870 of going to war without a major ally in the east and did not want to make the same mistake again. The Czar gave a satisfactory response that as early as the 14th of August the Russian Army would begin its drive into East Prussia.
Sources
Wikipedia
Wikimedia Commons:
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Germany_Before_the_First_World_War_1890_-_1914_HU68377.jpg
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Keisari_vihelm_II.jpg
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Germany_Before_the_First_World_War_1890_-_1914_HU68368.jpg
http://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?search=helmuth+von+moltke+the+younger&title=Special%3ASearch&fulltext=1
“Massacre in the Marshes” by Eric Niderost
Archive.org
