Greater chaos under heaven 天下大混亂: Alternate Post-Yuan China

[yboxman]

Will be responding to only a few salient points, mostly out of genuine interest in learning more.

That's not what you had said earlier, though. You had specified 700-800 years of Chinese control through the Han-Wei-Jin, not Yan-Qin. Your duration would require political control starting from 500-400 BC, which is not supported at all by historical/archaeological evidence. Six centuries would be the absolute max (although extremely unlikely).

True, I had previously assumed fairly continuous Wei-Jin control which, together with the earlier Yan-Qin would stretch Chinese domination to eight centuries. Do you have any sources showing specifically that the Jin lost control of Liaodong in the aftermath of the Wu-Hu wars? Not doubting you, but can't find any specific citation showing this.

For records about Gojoseon pre-108 BC, all of the Chinese primary sources detail rivers and settlements for Liaoxi, but curiously do not for Liaodong. For example, the Records of the Grand Historian state that the Yan "conquered" Gojoseon (without specifying territory), while the Qin "controlled" Liaodong, and that the border was eventually withdrawn to the vicinity of the Pei River (浿水) during the Han (implying the situation before the Qin had invaded). Because the river is detailed elsewhere as flowing eastward into the ocean, that rules out the Yalu and Liao, while the Taedong doesn't make sense because Wanggeomseong (Pyongyang) was located along the river. The alternatives are the Daling or the Luan, both west of the Liao, implying that because China's possessions within the region were centered around the two rivers, the Han controlled Liaoxi, but not Liaodong.

I can see a number of alternative rivers between the Yalu and the tip of the peninsulam whose upper channels, at least, flow West to East before veering Northwest to Southeast when they pour into the sea. http://www.chinamaps.org/china/provincemaps/liaoning-province-map.html The Davang, for example, or the Yungne. For that matter, the Dadong (The westernmost tributary of the Yalu) would seem to fit the bill if the estuary of the Yalu, which is pretty much where the Dadong flows into it, was viewed as "the ocean".

Archeological evidence also indicates that Gojoseon's influence extended both west and east of the Liao River (corresponding to Chinese sources stating that the original capital was located on a nearby river before it was relocated to Wanggeomseong) after the Yan invasion. Additionally, artifacts within Liaodong closely resembling ones unearthed within the Korean peninsula are dated from at least the 8th to the 2nd century BC, corresponding to Chinese sources stating that Weiman (Wiman), who had followed "barbarian" customs, fled from the Yan to Gojoseon before eventually taking the throne after a coup, indicating that Liaodong remained firmly under Gojoseon cultural and political influence.

This indicates some Influence, yes. Not necessarily dominance.

The records at the time also state that the first invasion in 109 BC failed altogether, while reference to at least two Gojoseon army divisions suggest a highly organized military. It was not until officials defected to the Han after conflicts between political factions and the ruler was assassinated (by a disgruntled official) that China was able to take advantage of the chaos to conquer the state, although Wanggeomseong held out for a month, suggesting that infighting (not logistics) was the biggest reason for Gojoseon's demise.

That's not an uncommon cause for military collapse at that time period. Given the limited logistics of the period the dfender generally held the advantage if he could maintain socio-political adhesion. Larger empires had the advantage of having more military and financial resources to pour into a war and suborning factions amongst their opponents but generally had less political cohesiveness.

While Goguryeo was semi-nomadic until the early-mid 5th century or so, this was certainly not the case afterwards, as its population (the vast majority of whom were culturally Korean) grew from three to five million within two centuries, and began to rely heavily on an extensive string of fortifications. Neither resemble conditions for a nomadic dynasty, as the Khitan, Jurchen, and Mongols each did not number much more than one million, and heavily favored cavalry warfare out in the open field due to maintaining similar living conditions for centuries.

The question is not whether Goguryeo RULED over four or five million sedentary people but whether the rulers shared the same cultural identity and lifestyle as the ruled. That relates to the question of whether they had an incentive to encourage the cultural adoption by minor Sedentary groups they ruled (presumed Han in the Liadong Peninsula) of the Major Sedentary groups they ruled (Koreans in the northern Korean peninsula).

The Yuan ruled over 60 million sedentary Chinese, adopted in their later phase Confusican ideology for the purposes of ruling China, and heavily used artillery which horse nomads could not produce on their own. But that did not make them "Chinese", and, did not lead them to "Sinicize" the portions of North Korea they seized (or, Liaodong if we accept a major Korean population there). Right?

On the other hand, Balhae's core base and a significant proportion of its population was located deep within Eastern Manchuria, with four out of its five capitals located deep within forests and mountains. Neither terrain was conducive to nomadic warfare, and records indicate that it had an extensive administrative system, with virtually all of the uncovered archaeological settlements within Eastern Manchuria. In contrast, Wanyan Aguda established the Jin after establishing a firm Jurchen base in what is now Harbin (Central Manchuria), which was more suited to nomadic warfare, and faced difficulties when invading the Korean peninsula due to an abundance of mountains in the northeast.

Allow me to clarify- "nomadic" or "semi nomadic" in the sense I used it, was a sloppy shorthand for societies which had a low population density, possibly shifting, slash and burn agriculture, and a diet heavily dependent on hunting. Whether or nor not they were transhumanist or cavalry based, that effect is having a lesser ability and incentive to impose their culture on a more densely populated intensively agricultual society. To use a Western analogy, I might naively compare the Balhae to their contemporary Germanic tribal confederations of the 5th-7th centuries. Not nomadic, and deriving a large proportion of their Diet from farming rather than hunting or herding but not densely populated, and not able or interested to impose their culture and identity on densely populated subject people.

But this only suggests that "Koreans" were essentially a majority in the region, as I can't think of a case where a unified dynasty would voluntarily leave a majority Han Chinese region politically independent for over a century without any major military conflicts. There must have been a strong Korean presence for the Tang to justify non-intervention.

Well, the Northern Song did with the sixteen prefectures of the Liao for a relatively long time (120 years). No Reason the Tang couldn’t do the same if they had a relatively unsuccessful series of military campaigns preceding the withdrawal from Liaodong.

It did (5:50-59). Limitations in agriculture didn't prevent Koreans from expanding into other areas within Manchuria, while military force wasn't an option.

Sure, it didn’t keep them (or Han settlers further West for that matter) from expanding when the Nomads were disunited, and they had the backing of a relatively strong state )or good relations with local tribal chieftains). But when relations went sour the relatively thinly scattered sedentary communities did not have a sufficient numerical advantage over the superior military capabilities of the tribal confederations and tended to withdraw. It's only once Agricultural techniques became sufficiently advanced, and military techniques (Gunpowder, fotifications) began favoring the sedentary groups that the northward spread of the sedentary people became less subject to reverses.

Because the Korean population itself had almost been wiped out in the Mongol invasions? I had stated earlier that the population had plummeted from 10-12 to 4-5 million.

The Chinese population plummeted as well during the Yuan conquest 9and the earlier Jurchen conquest), especially in Northern China. The question is not what the overall population was, but what the population was in the proximate regions to Manchuria and whether it had better farmland readily available for reclamation closer to them. I am not at all sure Shandong was better positioned to flood Manchuria with colonists at that point than Korea absent a pre-existing Korean population "firebreaker" in Liaodong.

You may choose to ignore conditions pre-14th century, but many of the conditions that you're describing in the 1300s are cumulations of events centuries before then. .

I realize that, and I do thank you for clarifying my blind spots. I am not trying to ignore pre-14th century events but I do admit to overlooking one underlying rationale for Korea's interest in the Liaodong Peninsula prior to the Joeson coup.

I don't see why the rebels would need to go through Inner Mongolia to the north, as Liaodong was in the east. Anyway, it seems as if the rebels had taken a route from Shandong to Liaodong either along the coastline or through maritime routes, but don't quote me on that. .

At the time, "Mongolia", in the sense of land under direct Nomadic rule and thinly settled if at all by sedentary communities, seems to have reached the Yellow sea. This was the case during early Ming and early Qing, anyway (sedentary populations re-establshed a corridor to Liandong during both dynasties). This is not to say that no agricultural communities at all existed in that corridor, but gleaning enough supplies form them to feed an infantry based army of 200,000 seems near impossible.
Naval invasion would also have been difficult since the Qing and their loyalists (and Goreyo) had a semi-functional navy and the Northern Red turbans did not.

Because Liaodong had continued to remain demilitarized for all intents and purposes. None of the conflicts between Shenyang and Goryeo involved more than a few thousand troops, while the soldiers who participated were directly supplied by the Yuan court. It would have been very obvious had a rebel movement suddenly popped up in Liaodong.

Ah, well that explains that issue. With the Red Turban offensive taking Kaifeng and nearly taking Dadu, the Yuan would have had no troops to shore up their vassal.

As you've acknowledged, there are no sources indicating a significant Han Chinese presence centuries before the Ming, and I haven't seen indications after the 5th century either. It's also difficult for me to follow your train of thought when you're making very strange assumptions about Korea as well (granted due to limited sources).

Well, the thing is, that none of the sources I've read dealing with the early Ming or later Han settlement in Manchuria seem to explicitly acknowledge any Major Korean presence in Southern Manchuria (as opposed to the Yalu borderlands), or even refer to a controversy regarding it's demographic composition. The general formulation seems to be " Liaodong, unlike the rest of Manchuria was an area with long established Chinese presence" and leave it at that. There is no hint that the entire peninsula was utterly depopulated following the evacuation of most of it's (Korean) population preceding the Ming conquest.
Now it may very well be that this is a case of Sinocentric publication Bias and that I have fallen prey to it due to insufficient familiarity with early Korean History and the Pre-Liao political situation in Manchuria. Based on what you told me this makes sense. For this I humbly eat humble pie. But it would help if you could show me a serious publication which makes an explicit assertion to Korean demographic (not political) domination of Liaodong during the Yuan

I (as well as you) brought up details concerning Manchurian demographics because I had reasoned that it would be an extreme hassle for you to retcon everything chapters down the line. You seem to assume that the Han Chinese continued to number over a million within Manchuria even before 1370 or so, but I think I've thoroughly demonstrated that there is no evidence for this, in addition to the fact that the vast majority of the population residing within Liaodong continued to be non-Han Chinese for almost a millennia. .

My assumption was that prior to the 1359 Red Turban inruption the peninsula had a 600-700 thousand population range and that the majority of them were Han, yes. Humble pie eaten. For the sake of TTL, there are a number of potential scenarios explaining what happened (Northern Red Turbans marching on Liaondong , succeeding in doing so, and then invading Korea).
1. Han made up a plurality of the Peninsula's population and rose up against their Korean-Mongol overlords, inviting a Red Turban faction from Shangdong or elsewhere to invade. When the Red Turbans arrived they found less support than they expected and logistical difficulties accompanies by Yuan recapture of Dadu and the seaways left them trapped and with no choice but to invade Goreyo.
2. Han made up a smaller minority in the peninsula but one that was relatively well integrated and intermarried with the Koreans and others. They transmitted the class warfare ideology and religion of the Red Turbans to the Korean underclass and the result was a locally based rebellion, with some support from the main (Han) Northern Red turban factions which viewed it's primary priority as seizing the throne in Korea rather than China. It's invasion of Goreyo was partially due to desperation (because they had wrecked the local economy), but partially because their success had sparked copy cat revolts in Korea proper on which they sought to capitalize.
Right now I'm leaning towards option #2 and Han making up 200-250 thousand in the Peninsula, Koreans around 350,000 and Balhae, Jurchens and Mongols another 100,000.
How things play out when the Northern Red Turbans march on Dadu ITTL (and they will)… well, I'm still working that out. Major Butterlies from the POD on the Yangtze delta will start hitting North China around 1360-1361.

I have to work on my TL as well (for reference, my last chapter took up over 12 pages on Word), so I will be commenting less frequently from now on.

Well, I now at least have some grounding in your original POD and the trends and themes you are based on. Will love reading it and offering my own comments as time and knowledge permits.

Now, onwards to the next post, the south China coast, pirate warlords and Yuan intrigues!

 

[democracy101]

Will be responding to only a few salient points, mostly out of genuine interest in learning more.

Sure.

True, I had previously assumed fairly continuous Wei-Jin control which, together with the earlier Yan-Qin would stretch Chinese domination to eight centuries. Do you have any sources showing specifically that the Jin lost control of Liaodong in the aftermath of the Wu-Hu wars? Not doubting you, but can't find any specific citation showing this.

Will these do? All of the maps show the Former Yan (337-70), a Xianbei state, in full control of Liaodong (and other regions), and are fully backed by primary Chinese sources.

Additionally, Murong Hui (the founder's father), had directly governed Liaodong since 289 as a Jin vassal (indicating that the Jin didn't even control it directly at least since then). He also only paid lip service to the Jin after the Wu Hu uprising in order to retain a veneer of authority, as he had retained full military and control of the peninsula after 304. While significant Han Chinese immigrations did occur, they would not have numbered more than 100,000, as the vast majority had fled south to escape the nomadic invasions.

Honestly, what sources are you relying on?

I can see a number of alternative rivers between the Yalu and the tip of the peninsulam whose upper channels, at least, flow West to East before veering Northwest to Southeast when they pour into the sea. http://www.chinamaps.org/china/provincemaps/liaoning-province-map.html The Davang, for example, or the Yungne. For that matter, the Dadong (The westernmost tributary of the Yalu) would seem to fit the bill if the estuary of the Yalu, which is pretty much where the Dadong flows into it, was viewed as "the ocean".

"Davang" and "Yungne" are impossible to pronounce in Mandarin. Did you mean Dayang and Yinghe instead?

Anyway, the rivers that you're suggesting don't fit the criteria because the "浿水" was specifically described as a major river, and certainly not a tributary.

This indicates some Influence, yes. Not necessarily dominance.

That's not an uncommon cause for military collapse at that time period. Given the limited logistics of the period the dfender generally held the advantage if he could maintain socio-political adhesion. Larger empires had the advantage of having more military and financial resources to pour into a war and suborning factions amongst their opponents but generally had less political cohesiveness.

Even if China had managed to directly control Liaodong before the Han dynasty, the fact that a strong cultural influence remained for a century or so indicates that the locals had actually assimilated the defenders, which doesn't make sense had the Han Chinese been in the majority. For comparison, Giao Chỉ (Vietnam) had continued to remain culturally "Vietnamese" for centuries (on the basis of various archeological artifacts) despite direct political control by the Han, as the locals had continued to outnumber the Han Chinese.

The question is not whether Goguryeo RULED over four or five million sedentary people but whether the rulers shared the same cultural identity and lifestyle as the ruled. That relates to the question of whether they had an incentive to encourage the cultural adoption by minor Sedentary groups they ruled (presumed Han in the Liadong Peninsula) of the Major Sedentary groups they ruled (Koreans in the northern Korean peninsula).

The Yuan ruled over 60 million sedentary Chinese, adopted in their later phase Confusican ideology for the purposes of ruling China, and heavily used artillery which horse nomads could not produce on their own. But that did not make them "Chinese", and, did not lead them to "Sinicize" the portions of North Korea they seized (or, Liaodong if we accept a major Korean population there). Right?

I honestly have absolutely no idea what you're trying to say here. Where are you getting your assumptions from?

Goguryeo was a multiethnic state, but the vast majority (80%+) of the population remained culturally Korean. Chinese and Korean primary sources all concur that the Ye, Maek, Buyeo, Gojoseon, Okjeo, and Han (韓) across the northern Korean Peninsula and Southern Manchuria shared the same culture and language. The Malgal (Mohe) are vague, but the ones living in the Korean Peninsula and Southern Manchuria either seem to have been Yemaek or those that assimilated into Korean culture. This I think we agree on.

The Gwanggaeto stele (constructed in 414 to honor Gwanggaeto's exploits (r. 391/2-412/3) clearly indicates that the Ye and Han (韓) were considered as part of the greater Goguryeo "identity," indicating no major distinctions among the different ethnic groups sharing the same culture. (The stele is also the first extant mention of Korean “god-rulers,” as Chumo, the founder, is mentioned as the Son of Heaven.) While Liaodong may have been extensively settled by the Chinese during the Han, no Chinese source from the 5th to 7th centuries mentions any significant Han Chinese presence within Liaodong despite visits by numerous Chinese officials and traders, indicating that major emigrations occurred during relocation by the Cao Wei and extensive chaos under nomadic dynasties throughout the 4th century, as well as gradual Goguryeo expansion pre-400. Also, mainstream historians (Korean, Chinese, Western) all acknowledge that the Koreans had remained demographically dominant within Liaodong since at least the 5th century or so. Sui and Tang records also state that while the dynasties viewed Liaodong as politically part of China long in the past, the region was not considered to be culturally Han Chinese.

I also haven't seen any examples where hundreds of thousands of nomads managed to govern millions of their own sedentary kin (not foreigners), all the while continuing to retain nomadic customs for well over five centuries. The Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols, and Manchu all specifically delineated major differences among them, although various ethnic groups within Goguryeo (excluding foreign nomadic groups) seem to have had no issues continuously emphasizing their “shared” identities, especially during times of war.

Unless you're telling me that the Chinese numbered 2-4 million within Goguryeo, which is not supported in any way, shape, or form, Goguryeo was not nomadic after ~400.

Allow me to clarify- "nomadic" or "semi nomadic" in the sense I used it, was a sloppy shorthand for societies which had a low population density, possibly shifting, slash and burn agriculture, and a diet heavily dependent on hunting. Whether or nor not they were transhumanist or cavalry based, that effect is having a lesser ability and incentive to impose their culture on a more densely populated intensively agricultual society. To use a Western analogy, I might naively compare the Balhae to their contemporary Germanic tribal confederations of the 5th-7th centuries. Not nomadic, and deriving a large proportion of their Diet from farming rather than hunting or herding but not densely populated, and not able or interested to impose their culture and identity on densely populated subject people.

Buyeo was established by the 4th-3rd century BC, gradually encompassing all of Manchuria south of the Songhua River. Jolbon Buyeo broke off in the 1st century BC, after which it was renamed to Goguryeo. Both Buyeo and Jolbon were comprised of large agricultural bases farmed by sufficiently dense populations, and Chinese sources record that Buyeo and Goguryeo were virtually identical in every cultural aspect. However, due to significant foreign pressures, Goguryeo's capital was relocated to rugged terrain in AD 3 in order to defend itself from China, while cavalry was used to launch repeated small-scale raids out of necessity. After Goguryeo conquered most of Buyeo by the late 4th century, the capital was relocated to Pyongyang in 427, and the aristocratic elite adopted to sedentary life. Warfare then became centered around assaults on fortresses, not facing each other out in the open. Balhae adopted even more sedentary policies, and excavations indicate that settlements closest to where it was founded (Eastern Manchuria) were the most densely populated (much less so for Central and Western Manchuria), with its largest palace comparable to Chang'an in size. I don't see the Khitan, Jurchen, or Mongols largely shifting away from cavalry warfare, nor building their largest palaces deep within their core territories where they were founded, instead of focusing on what is now Beijing.

The Germanic analogy is also incorrect because there were no major settlements comparable to that of Rome at its peak. The Franks also gradually shifted their power base to France instead of continuously retaining it within Germany, which coincided with cultural divergences between the two. On the other hand, there is no indication that there was a major cultural split within Goguryeo and Balhae for almost a millennia. In fact, the opposite was actually true as ethnic distinctions became blurred long before the Sui invaded, while the Mohe/Malgal in Central Manchuria (if they had not originally been culturally Korean under Buyeo) continued to remain very keen on retaining Goguryeo customs.

Well, the Northern Song did with the sixteen prefectures of the Liao for a relatively long time (120 years). No Reason the Tang couldn’t do the same if they had a relatively unsuccessful series of military campaigns preceding the withdrawal from Liaodong.

That wasn't my point. The sixteen prefectures were not politically independent of the Liao and Song, as they were directly governed by the former.

Meanwhile, Balhae was founded deep within Eastern Manchuria in 698, and did not even directly contact the Tang until 705, while China begrudgingly acknowledged the entity later in 713. The state did not rapidly expand into the west until Mu's reign (719-37), so it would not have been able to influence Liaodong at all before then. On the other hand, despite occasional rebellions, Liaodong continued to firmly remain under Tang control until 699, when Later Goguryeo was established, before which no local militia had existed.

Sure, it didn’t keep them (or Han settlers further West for that matter) from expanding when the Nomads were disunited, and they had the backing of a relatively strong state )or good relations with local tribal chieftains). But when relations went sour the relatively thinly scattered sedentary communities did not have a sufficient numerical advantage over the superior military capabilities of the tribal confederations and tended to withdraw. It's only once Agricultural techniques became sufficiently advanced, and military techniques (Gunpowder, fotifications) began favoring the sedentary groups that the northward spread of the sedentary people became less subject to reverses.

It's not like the Jurchen were particularly united before the 12th century, nor were they before the 17th, while Eastern Manchuria continued to be sparsely populated.

The Chinese population plummeted as well during the Yuan conquest 9and the earlier Jurchen conquest), especially in Northern China. The question is not what the overall population was, but what the population was in the proximate regions to Manchuria and whether it had better farmland readily available for reclamation closer to them. I am not at all sure Shandong was better positioned to flood Manchuria with colonists at that point than Korea absent a pre-existing Korean population "firebreaker" in Liaodong.

I'm fully aware of the chaos within North China, but 4-5 million was for the entire peninsula. The northern regions in Korea would have had less than 1 million.

I realize that, and I do thank you for clarifying my blind spots. I am not trying to ignore pre-14th century events but I do admit to overlooking one underlying rationale for Korea's interest in the Liaodong Peninsula prior to the Joeson coup.

Sure, but there are a lot of other issues that you seem to be overlooking as well.

At the time, "Mongolia", in the sense of land under direct Nomadic rule and thinly settled if at all by sedentary communities, seems to have reached the Yellow sea. This was the case during early Ming and early Qing, anyway (sedentary populations re-establshed a corridor to Liandong during both dynasties). This is not to say that no agricultural communities at all existed in that corridor, but gleaning enough supplies form them to feed an infantry based army of 200,000 seems near impossible.
Naval invasion would also have been difficult since the Qing and their loyalists (and Goreyo) had a semi-functional navy and the Northern Red turbans did not.

See below.

Ah, well that explains that issue. With the Red Turban offensive taking Kaifeng and nearly taking Dadu, the Yuan would have had no troops to shore up their vassal.

Basically this. The Red Turbans would have faced virtually no resistance when heading into Liaodong, as the Mongols would have focused their troops around Dadu.

The local population would have largely opposed the rebels, though.

Well, the thing is, that none of the sources I've read dealing with the early Ming or later Han settlement in Manchuria seem to explicitly acknowledge any Major Korean presence in Southern Manchuria (as opposed to the Yalu borderlands), or even refer to a controversy regarding it's demographic composition. The general formulation seems to be " Liaodong, unlike the rest of Manchuria was an area with long established Chinese presence" and leave it at that. There is no hint that the entire peninsula was utterly depopulated following the evacuation of most of it's (Korean) population preceding the Ming conquest.
Now it may very well be that this is a case of Sinocentric publication Bias and that I have fallen prey to it due to insufficient familiarity with early Korean History and the Pre-Liao political situation in Manchuria. Based on what you told me this makes sense. For this I humbly eat humble pie. But it would help if you could show me a serious publication which makes an explicit assertion to Korean demographic (not political) domination of Liaodong during the Yuan

But why would they? The Ming had no way of knowing who lived there before settlement began in 1370. It's not like the Yuan extensively kept track of population figures for every single minor region, while Liaodong was not politically controlled by Goryeo, and many records would have been destroyed. However, Yuan sources continuously speak of a major Korean presence, which overlaps with details for Goryeo PoWs, defectors, and farmers emigrating to Manchuria en masse, as well as the Red Turbans encountering a major Korean presence in Liaodong. The peninsula would't have been entirely depopulated either because I would assume that at least 200,000 nomadic and Han Chinese locals would have remained, while the fact that Balhae individuals also suddenly disappear from sources post-Yuan suggest that many may have followed those heading back to Goryeo.

Specifically, Hong Bok-won defected to the Mongols with 1,500 civilian households in 1231, after which he was assigned a ducal title theoretically governing 10,000 military households, and defectors continued to flood in for over two decades. While the exact number of households is uncertain, 10,000 isn't unlikely given that he did control 40 fortresses, while an estimated 10,000-20,000 soldiers (assuming 1-2 soldiers per family) is also reasonable given that Goryeo raised over 200,000 troops, with a significant amount stationed (with their families) along the northern border. Another defector, Wang Jun (a Goryeo prince sent as a hostage), was separately assigned control of 2,000 military households after 1255. Assuming an average of five members for each family, the total population directly governed under Goryeo elites would have been 50,000-60,000. Adding this to the 200,000+ that were taken prisoner adds up to 250,000+, and at least an additional 100,000 fleeing to escape chaos, famines, and emigrations after depopulations by the Korean court of cities such as Seogyeong, hence the 350,000+ extrapolation. Although some of the troops in Liaodong were later used for the invasion of Japan, the military would have been purged after the Hong clan lost influence by around 1300 or so, after which the peninsula would have remained largely demilitarized.

I also haven't come across any sources indicating that the Han Chinese numbered more than 300,000 in Liaodong from the 10th to mid-14th centuries at any point, although I have certainly seen numerous indications (including the source that you cited) illustrating how the Ming newly colonized "relatively" unsettled territory since around 1370 or so.

A "long-established presence" could also mean around 100,000 Chinese settlers continuously residing for centuries, which I'm not disputing.

My assumption was that prior to the 1359 Red Turban inruption the peninsula had a 600-700 thousand population range and that the majority of them were Han, yes. Humble pie eaten. For the sake of TTL, there are a number of potential scenarios explaining what happened (Northern Red Turbans marching on Liaondong , succeeding in doing so, and then invading Korea).
1. Han made up a plurality of the Peninsula's population and rose up against their Korean-Mongol overlords, inviting a Red Turban faction from Shangdong or elsewhere to invade. When the Red Turbans arrived they found less support than they expected and logistical difficulties accompanies by Yuan recapture of Dadu and the seaways left them trapped and with no choice but to invade Goreyo.
2. Han made up a smaller minority in the peninsula but one that was relatively well integrated and intermarried with the Koreans and others. They transmitted the class warfare ideology and religion of the Red Turbans to the Korean underclass and the result was a locally based rebellion, with some support from the main (Han) Northern Red turban factions which viewed it's primary priority as seizing the throne in Korea rather than China. It's invasion of Goreyo was partially due to desperation (because they had wrecked the local economy), but partially because their success had sparked copy cat revolts in Korea proper on which they sought to capitalize.
Right now I'm leaning towards option #2 and Han making up 200-250 thousand in the Peninsula, Koreans around 350,000 and Balhae, Jurchens and Mongols another 100,000.
How things play out when the Northern Red Turbans march on Dadu ITTL (and they will)… well, I'm still working that out. Major Butterlies from the POD on the Yangtze delta will start hitting North China around 1360-1361.

That should be fine for now.

Well, I now at least have some grounding in your original POD and the trends and themes you are based on. Will love reading it and offering my own comments as time and knowledge permits.

Sounds good, but my TL is currently almost 100 pages on Word, with 22 chapters. You probably won't have time to read the whole thing while working on your TL.

 

[yboxman]

#3: Eastern currents


The nominal submission of the kingdom of Dazhou to the even more nominal Empire of Tianwan came not a moment too soon. In Dadu, the strife torn Yuan court had entered into a brief period of clarity and had turned its attention back towards the break-away Southern provinces.

Seeking to diminish the power of the southern warlords, and to restore the flow of southern Grain to the capital, they plied Feng Guozan with both titles and silver to induce him to attack Dazhou rather than Yuan shipping, promising him both military support and recognition of his own rule as their vassal over the Yangtze delta. In fact, the Yuan (1) hoped for the mutual destruction of the two warlords or, at worst, forcing Dazhou to come to terms with the Yuan and supply them with tribute Grain and military assistance against the Northern Red Turbans (2)

Fully expecting the bulk of Dazhou forces to be held down by Zhu Yuanzhang, Feng was unpleasantly surprised to find Zhang Shide marshal nearly the entirety of his forces for a vigorous land campaign which swiftly penetrated the self proclaimed Kingdom of Min, while relying on a series of fortifications at the mouth of the Yangtze to hold back Feng's amphibious thrust at the vitals of Dazhou (3). Within four months Ningpo was captured and more southerly southern coastal cities of Min were under siege. Feng's forces, while successful in capturing Chusan and a number of other coastal islands and imposing a fairly tight interdiction of overseas trade in Dazhou, failed to make any headway in penetrating the Yangtze.

Had the Yuan made good of their promises and moved to support Feng, he might have been willing to maintain this conflict, trusting to his naval forces to retain his coastal strongholds while raiding Dazhou's coasts. Instead, with his territorial base threatned, and the Yuan showing every sign of satisfaction at his misfortune, he chose to once again switch sides.

Though the heirs of Zhang Shi would have cause to regret it, there is no doubt that the treaty of Chusan marked a critical point in the rise to greatness of the later Wu dynasty. It granted Feng continued control over the offshore islands of Zheijiang and Jiangsu, as well as the coastal cities of his former domain (4) and the right to collect taxes on all overseas trade. Such taxes were used to maintain and expand the navy of Dazhou- over which Feng was proclaimed hereditary admiral as well as minister of the newly formed ministry of naval affairs (5).

This arrangement was anything but stable. It succeeded, however, in expanding the manpower and revenue base of Dazhou, as well of giving it a naval strike force, albeit under unreliable command. For Feng, the arrangement released him from the need to expend his resources on land, and gave him a stable base from which he could raid the Northern Yuan coasts as Dazhou invaded the Yuan by land.

Within a few months, however, Zhang Shide reached an unofficial armistice with Koke Temur, who sought to concentrate his forces against Han Lnier's Song regime. With his domain expanded and his Northern, Western and Coastal frontiers temporarily secure, Zhang Shide turned his attention southwards.


Situation in 1358. The breach between Chen, Zhu and Ming is simmering but not yet open, The Yuan factions and Northern Red Turbans are still at loggerheads and Dazhou just went from mid range power to the first rank of contenders for the mandate of heaven.

(1) The intricacies of Yuan faction fights and the myriad ways different factions differed at different times in the aims and means of their favored "foreign policy" are overwhelming, disputed and hard to follow. Accordingly, except when dealing with those faction fights directly, or when the particular features of the faction in ascendance are germane to policy shifts, I will refer to the identity of the decision makers in Dadu as, simply, "The Yuan" rather than going into details.
(2) Which is what happened OTL.
(3) OTL, the ongoing conflict with Zhu Yuanzhang meant Feng was free to raid Dazhou by both land and sea, with his own home base largely free of retaliation. He ended up winning by points and forcing Zhang Shicheng to make a deal with the Yuan.
(4) But not most of the interior-or the Northern cities around Hangzhou bay. Those are occupied, and taxed, by regular Dazhou forces. Not that Feng bothered administering the interior much before 1357.
(5) OTL, Feng settled for much less when he submitted to Zhu Yuanzhnag. But TTL he submits a decade earlier and with many, many other players, some of which are stronger than Dazhou, still around and able to bid for his services. If the Yuan hadn't double crossed and screwed him over him over so badly he probably would take his navy north and become their admiral.

 

[Koxinga]

good work, i like where this is going