Grande Nation

Afaik in Bavaria and other southern german states had the same inheritance laws as in the code Napoleon. And thats the reason why farms in this area were smaller then farms in northern or eastern Germany. With no effect on the demographics.

Good point, yet there actually was an effect on demographics: those lands were the source of many of the German emmigrants.

So either there are two ways of coping with these inheritance laws: the French way of smaller families (rather difficult IMHO in a catholic country with the general problems of keeping families small in pre-industrial societies) or the Southern-German way of keeping large families of which parts emmigrate.

The other possibility, which I deem more valid, is that inheritance laws are not the cause for the slower French population growth.


In the other discussion mentioned above, I think one major idea was that a higher standard of living in France led to smaller families - a similar effect can still be observed today in emerging countries.


Considering the long-term effects of a higher French population: If there are as many Frenchmen as Germans, WWI as we know it is butterflied away. As mentioned above, neither side will have a sizeable fleet. Both sides will be strong economic competitors for Britain. Therefore Britain will likely keep its splendid isolation a lot longer.

On the other side no side will be able to become european hegemon over the other side - as long as the Austrians are separated from the Germans, which ITTL should make France and AH close Allies?
 
German-Austrian rapprochement could still happen in such a scenario; if history occurs as OTL with only the French demographics being a major change Franz Josef has a bone with both Prussian Germany and France, having fought both of them and losing.

It depends on which of Bismarck or the Third Republic would seem more appealing to Vienna.
 
I think a higher-population France (if possible: I'm interested to see data or a plausible reason to show that an increase in population is plausible) may indeed "win" the Franco-Prussian War (massive butterflies aside), if only because all of those armies called up by Gambetta et al are going to be X times larger, with corresponding ability to hamper lines of communication, etc.

Getting ahead of the POD, of course, but a thought that needs to be taken under consideration in a long-term scenario.
 
Well a more populous France would probably be more a more secure France, and so would see less need to make recourse to the Entente Cordiale. Paradoxically relations with Germany, if it exists ITTL might well be better as a France with a larger population would perhaps be more amenable to balance of power diplomacy rather than contending alliance blocs. So possibly a longer-lasting, more influential Concert of Nations?

BUT- such a France might afford a second run against Germany far earlier and if necessary without allies. This might mean a 2nd Franco-Prussian war, maybe in the 1880s already.
OTOH, developments of this kind might lead to better Anglo-German relations over time and once Britain enters an European alliance, it might rather be an Axis with Berlin in order to keep France (which might also be more ambitious in colonial theatres than OTL) checked. It wouldn't be the first time.
From then on, things really differ.

A different demographic and therefore economic and military evolution of France might indeed greatly upset the OTL balance of powers.

In OTL the system of alliances leading up to the two opposing blocs on the eve of WW1 developed rather naturally, geopolitics sort of forcing the hands of all continental powers: France was 'by definition' against Germany, Austria-Hungary had no real choice but to be Germany's ally, and Russia was the only available continental ally of France. The tip of the balance, as usual, was Britain.

Yet in the 19th century it was not at all obvious on who's side Britain was going to fight in a potential European war, or whether it was going to fight at all. As Lord Palmerston had said: ''We have no permanent allies just permanent interests.'' Britain always fought against whoever was most likely to upset the balance of powers. Up until Napoleon it used to be France; after 1871 it increasingly became Germany.

But had France been stronger and less of an obvious pushover for Germany in a one-on-one war Britain might have taken a different political line. Increased colonial rivalries might also have strained its relations with France. I don't know how much chance there would have been for Britain to stay out of a major European war; but the political and economic strength of a 60 million large France might have seriously influenced the perceptions of power.

So, just for the sake of argument imagine the following chain of events:

- a larger & stronger ~55-60 million France
- less political agreement between France and Britain- no Entente
- a major European war analogous to WW1, with Germany+Austria-Hungary vs. France+Russia
- neutral Britain -> no unrestricted submarine warfare -> no American entry
- and a German victory, as it surely would have happened in OTL without Britain and as it almost happened regardless, had there been no America

I assume this is a too conventional scenario not to have been discussed in depth already, but I haven't come across any such timelines yet... so what do you think?

The idea that a stronger France might actually result in a victorious Germany is just too sweet.
 
The idea that a stronger France might actually result in a victorious Germany is just too sweet.

And very plausible, with a Neutral BE ( or worse, pro-German ) France can be well f*cked in a WWI analogue ... but this can butterfly the German - Austrian, as already said ... I doubt Germany and Russia could be "friends" for too long ...
 
So, just for the sake of argument imagine the following chain of events:

- a larger & stronger ~55-60 million France
- less political agreement between France and Britain- no Entente
- a major European war analogous to WW1, with Germany+Austria-Hungary vs. France+Russia
- neutral Britain -> no unrestricted submarine warfare -> no American entry
- and a German victory, as it surely would have happened in OTL without Britain and as it almost happened regardless, had there been no America

I assume this is a too conventional scenario not to have been discussed in depth already, but I haven't come across any such timelines yet... so what do you think?

The idea that a stronger France might actually result in a victorious Germany is just too sweet.

Without any other player than (more populous) France, Russia, Germany and A-H, if germany don't attack Belgium (to avoid angering the british, France can hold on for a long, long time, as the frontier is very small (just the Alsace-Moselle region) with poor infrastructure and small mountains, while Russia will be crushed by the Germans and A-H. On a small frontier and with defensive warfare of the early 20th century, there will be little change during a lot of time.

But anyway this is ASB as a more populous France require the absence of the Napoleonic wars (1.5 million French casualities) and maybe no revolutionary wars (500k French casualities), and this will butterfly the wwi as we know it. As without Napoleonic wars, France could have a Rhine frontier, without revolutionary wars, the same frontier as otday and so on. And a river like the Rhine is very easy to defend.
 
In a more populous France there is more of a chance that their will be a victory in the France-prussian war. Or it will be a lot closer of a war. In a sense the french (deciding that the germans are to big of a threat or if they lose) would just continue to fight the germans in their economies and politically. Also when WW1 comes along I think Russia will be stronger due to the fact that French subsidaries will help bring Russia as a potentially stronger ally.

If there is a WW1 in this scenario I expect that it would be more of a standstill west while in the east Germany and Austria might steam roll Russia.

Colonially due to this bitter rivalry I don't think that they would be investing to much in wordly matters such as this.
 
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